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The last several years have been exciting for those who study protest, with a 
wave of activity ranging from revolutions in the Arab-speaking world to tent 
cities in Israel, Europe, and the United States, followed by Turkey, Brazil, and 
elsewhere. There have been right-wingers like the Tea Party sympathizers 
who shouted down their elected representatives in town hall meetings in the 
United States, and left-leaning projects in favor of the “99 percent.” But even as 
we congratulate ourselves for living through an important moment in history, 
we should not forget that protest occurs every day, all around the world, and 
probably always has – whether or not it is dramatic and sustained enough to 
attract media coverage. Protest is a fundamental part of human existence.
Despite a plethora of exciting cases to study, theories of protest move-
ments have reached an impasse. On the one hand, theories of great structural 
shifts – modernization, markets, nation-building, urbanization – no longer 
have much to say about the practice of protest, commenting instead on the 
conditions of possibility for collective action in the grand sweep of history. 
On the other hand, cultural theories which focus on the perspectives of 
protestors, including their emotions and grievances and choices, have had 
diff iculty building beyond them and connecting with the arenas from 
which outcomes eventually emerge.
A strategic perspective may be able to bridge this gap by giving equal 
and symmetric weight to protestors and to the other players whom they 
engage, and by focusing equally on players and the arenas in which they 
interact (Jasper, 2004).1 Although beginning from the goals and means that 
each player controls, we can watch what happens when players interact 
creatively over short or long periods of time. The main constraints on what 
protestors can accomplish are not determined directly by economic and 
political structures so much as they are imposed by other players with 
different goals and interests. Although the strategic complexity of politics 
and protest is enormous, in this book we hope to make a beginning through 
a careful examination of players and arenas, accompanied by theorizing 
on the strategic interactions among them.
The big paradigms that linked social movements to History or to Society 
have fallen out of favor. If there has been a trend in recent theories of protest, 
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it has been toward the micro rather than the macro, and toward interpretive 
and cultural rather than materialist approaches (Jasper, 2010a; 2012a). Thus 
we see political-opportunity theorists renouncing their own structuralism 
in favor of local causal mechanisms (Kurzman, 2004; McAdam, Tarrow, and 
Tilly, 2001); Alain Touraine (1997) discussing individuals as subjects instead 
of the collective Subjects struggling to control the direction of History; 
rational choice theorists who are adding collective identities, frames, and 
even emotions to formal models formerly centered on material interests 
(Opp, 2009). How can we acknowledge the felt experience of participants 
without losing the insights of the structural school? How can we trace the 
effects of global capitalism or neoimperialist states at the level of individuals 
and their interactions?
Players
Players are those who engage in strategic action with some goal in mind. 
Simple players consist of individuals, compound players are teams of 
individuals. Compound players range from loose, informal groups to 
formal organizations all the way up to nations tentatively or seemingly 
united behind some purpose. Simple and compound players face many of 
the same challenges and dilemmas, but they differ in an important way: 
the individuals who comprise teams may depart, defect, partly defect, or 
pursue their own goals at the same time that they pursue the group goals. 
Compound players, even when they have names and bylaws and payrolls, 
are never completely unif ied. They are “necessary f ictions” that attract and 
inspire supporters through their promise of unity (Gamson, 1995; McGarry 
and Jasper, 2015).
Every player has multiple goals, which range from its off icial mission 
to other stated objectives to secret aspirations to murky motivations that 
may be obscure even to the players themselves. These goals take them 
into different arenas: a police department engages protestors in public 
battles for control of the streets, but also lobbies legislatures for more 
funding, is a member of a propolicing interest group, and engages in moral 
entrepreneurship in the media during a moral panic. It is diff icult for a 
player to compare or rank-order its goals, in part because their salience 
shifts according to external circumstances and in part because there is 
always contention within a player over its priorities. The goals of compound 
players are especially unstable, because factions and individuals are forever 
competing to make their own goals into the off icial goals of the team. Goals 
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can be entirely altruistic as well as self ish, ideal interests as well as material 
interests. In addition, goals change: new ones surface, old ones disappear, 
new twists and interpretations emerge.
Players have a variety of capacities at their disposal in pursuing their 
goals. Adopting a general strategic language, we observe three basic families 
of strategic means: paying others to do what you want, persuading them 
to, and coercing them to. A fourth, derivative capacity is to hold positions 
(physical locations on a battlef ield, bureaucratic posts in an organization) 
that help you pay, persuade, or coerce others. Money, reputation, technolo-
gies, even emotions of confidence are all helpful. Some capacities adhere 
to an organization, others are held primarily by individuals. By identifying 
capabilities like these, we hope to push beyond the vague and often circular 
language of “power” in order to specify more precisely how players try to 
attain their goals. Pierre Bourdieu similarly used various forms of capital 
to specify the mechanisms of power: cultural knowledge, social network 
ties, money, and reputation. I f ind the metaphor of capital – one makes an 
investment in order to reap a return – provocative, but it seems clearer and 
more concrete to speak about payments made, technologies of coercion, the 
media and messages of persuasion, and off icial positions governed by rules.
Players vary in how tight or porous their boundaries are. Some compound 
players are composed of paid staff positions; some have security guards 
at the door to keep outsiders away. Most organizations have rules about 
who can speak at meetings. At the other extreme, a group may be open to 
anyone who shows up at a meeting or a rally – raising problems of inf iltra-
tors whose intent is to discredit or disrupt the player’s projects, but also of 
well-intentioned participants with widely different goals or tastes in tactics.
Players overlap with each other. A protest group is part of a movement 
coalition. An MP is also a member of her party, occasionally pursuing its 
goals (fundraising, for instance) alongside legislative ones, and she may also 
be a member of a protest group seeking social change or justice. Individuals 
are especially clear cases of one player moving among and being a part of 
various other players. Thanks to the individuals who compose them, protest 
movements can permeate a number of other players, even on occasion their 
targets and opponents.
Compound players are always shifting: appearing, merging, splitting, 
going through dormant periods, disappearing altogether, growing, shrink-
ing, changing names and purposes. Although our analytic approach begins 
with players, we do not want to reify them as necessarily preexisting and 
permanent. After all, players redefine each other through their interactions 
and conflicts, as Fetner (2008) describes in the case of pro- and anti-gay 
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rights activists. Players are not set in stone, but change constantly, especially 
expanding and contracting. Charles Tilly famously linked the emergence 
of new players to the opening of political opportunities: create or empower 
a parliament, and political factions and parties will appear to pursue the 
stakes available within it. This structural insight was very fruitful, but 
such an emphasis on access to arenas meant that players were often taken 
for granted (Jasper, 2012b; Krinsky and Mische, 2013). From the structural 
perspective, it is sometimes diff icult to see how players move among are-
nas, trying to enter those where their capabilities will yield the greatest 
advantages, or to see how new goals emerge and inspire players to form 
around them (Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008).
Groups and organizations that operate as players in various external 
arenas can, from a different point of view, be seen as arenas themselves 
when we look at their internal procedures. The individuals who compose 
them never agree entirely on either goals or means, so that considerable time 
is devoted to arriving at decisions through formal and informal processes 
(Maeckelbergh, 2009). In fact a compound player almost always devotes 
more time to internal interactions – making decisions, performing rituals 
of solidarity, eating or occupying together – than to external engagements. 
These internal activities are strategic and influential, and they prepare 
players to confront others. A player that looks unif ied from the outside is 
still going to be an arena for contestation within. Even players that have 
strict hierarchies, intended to reduce internal conflicts, have many ways 
that individuals maneuver. Players are also arenas. Ann Mische (Chapter 
2 of this volume) calls this a fractal process, in which each player can be 
broken into subplayers, each of those can in turn be further subdivided, all 
the way down to individuals (or beyond, according to postmodern theorists, 
who insist that individuals are not unif ied actors either, but rather sites for 
internal conversation and conflict) (Archer, 2003; Wiley, 1995).2 We need to do 
this kind of work if we wish to acknowledge the lived experience of human 
beings. For example, bureaucrats do not feel their way toward action as “the 
state,” but rather as accountants, department heads, litigators, and so on.
Its ability to incorporate individuals as players (and as symbols) seems an 
enormous advantage for a strategic perspective. Some decisions are made 
by a single individual, who either persuades others, disposes of f inancial 
or coercive resources, or has some positional authority provided by a set 
of rules. We can only understand these decisions if we come to grips with 
the biography and psychology of that single person; such factors must f ind 
a place in social-science models (Jasper, 1997: ch. 9). Even the most macro-
level phenomena often reflect the influence of one or a few individuals. In 
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the chapters that follow, the reader will encounter a number of idiosyncratic, 
influential individuals. (I prefer to speak of individuals rather than of “lead-
ers,” given the mystique that business and military observers have bestowed 
on “leadership,” and given that there can be influential individuals at any 
level of an organization, in any part of a network.)
Players are not always fully conscious of all their goals and projects, 
and they certainly do not always articulate them to others (whether to 
articulate them publicly is a dilemma [Jasper, 2006: 78]). Many of them 
are preconscious, part of what Anthony Giddens (1984) calls practical 
consciousness: we have not consciously thought about them but would 
probably recognize them if we were challenged or interrogated about them. 
In contrast I hesitate to include goals that are entirely unconscious to the 
player, on the Freudian model of repression, largely for methodological 
reasons.3 Evidence is necessarily weaker for unconscious motives, and the 
observer is given enormous freedom to speculate. Structural approaches 
allow similar license to the researcher to assume that she already knows 
the goals of players, because she can read their “objective interests” directly 
from their structural positions. Strategic theories have the advantage of 
encouraging (or forcing) the researcher to acknowledge a range of goals 
through empirical investigation rather than deductive theory.
Appreciation of the meanings and emotions of players is crucial to 
explaining their actions. Emotions in particular permeate both goals and 
means, as well as the very definition of the players. We hope to take account 
of both the affective solidarities that def ine players, the reflex emotions 
they have when engaging others, and the moods and moral emotions that 
energize participants. Like other components of culture, emotions are 
now being studied from many angles, but they have yet to be integrated 
completely into a strategic approach (Archer, 2001; Collins, 2004; Gould, 
2009; Jasper, 2011).
To understand how protest arises, unfolds, and affects (or does not 
affect) the world around it, research needs to begin with catalogs of the 
players involved on all sides. These lists often need to be quite extensive, 
and include the multiple goals and many capabilities a player has at its 
disposal. The goals and the means, furthermore, change over time, as do the 
players themselves. Because today we tend to see culture as contested, con-
structed, and ever-shifting, rather than unitary and static, we must admit 
that players and arenas are always emerging, changing, and recombining. 
But by developing better theories about who these players are, what they 
want, and how they operate, we hope to aid future political researchers in 
creating their own catalogs.
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Talking about players allows us to avoid the term “social movements,” 
which many scholars think is simply too vague (although it is perhaps 
another necessary f iction, useful as a popular label or collective identity). 
Researchers have also given too much attention to explaining the rise and 
fall of movements, as opposed to the many other dynamics inside and 
outside of them (McAdam et al., 2001; McAdam and Tarrow, 2010). Once we 
break both the movement and its environment down into their component 
players and arenas, we can judge when there is enough coherence to these 
players to warrant the term “social movement.”4
We originally asked our contributors to keep in mind the following 
questions about the players in their cases. How do these players typically 
operate: what do they want, what means do they have at their disposal, 
what constraints do they face? What were the origins of this player? How 
well def ined or permanent are its boundaries? How stable is it? What goals 
do its components widely share? What goals receive less consensus? What 
means does it have: what f inancial resources, legal standing, rhetoric for 
persuading others, coercive capacities? What is its internal structure, when 
viewed as an arena rather than as a player? How does it make formal and 
informal decisions? How vertically is it structured? What role do its leaders 
play?
Arenas
An arena is a bundle of rules and resources that allow or encourage certain 
kinds of interactions to proceed, with something at stake. Players within 
an arena monitor each others’ actions, although that capacity is not always 
equally distributed. Players can play different roles in the same arena (such 
as active players, reserve players, referees, assistants and managers, audi-
ences, backstage managers), governed by different rules and norms. Some 
strategic moves are made clearly within the rules of the game, others are 
meant to change, ignore, or twist those rules. Bend the rules far enough, and 
the player has moved into a different arena, as when a sports team bribes 
referees (although it is the same conflict between teams). Some rules are 
formally written down, providing procedural ammunition for any player 
who has a stake in seeing that they are enforced. Other rules are moral 
norms, and the cost of breaking these is usually a tarnished reputation 
among those who hold to the norms, but here again opponents must work to 
tarnish that reputation. There are many combinations in-between. Arenas 
are where politics occur, at least in Sheldon Wolin’s (1960: 16) expansive 
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definition of politics as the place “where the plans, ambitions, and actions 
of individuals and groups incessantly jar against each other – colliding, 
blocking, coalescing, separating.”
Arenas vary along several dimensions. Like players, they vary in the degree 
to which they are institutionalized with bureaucratic rules and legal recogni-
tion as opposed to informal traditions and expectations; public opinion is an 
amorphous arena, whereas law courts have elaborate rules, including rules 
about who has standing in them. Second, they vary in the ratio of players to 
audience: some arenas are composed only of the players themselves, while 
at the other end of the spectrum a vast audience watches a tiny number of 
players. Third, different capacities are useful to different degrees and in 
different combinations in different arenas: in markets we expect money 
to matter most, but in politics and courts we expect persuasion to matter 
more than money – although corruption occurs all the time (Walzer, 1983).5
Arenas have a variety of formal and informal relationships with each 
other. In more formal cases there may be hierarchies of arenas, as with 
appeals courts. Most arenas can be further broken down into subarenas. 
Thus policy-making can be seen as one arena, or as a number of distinct 
arenas, ranging from informal persuasion to registered lobbying to legisla-
tive chambers and votes (and even votes can be formal tallies of names 
or less formal voice votes). An outcome in one arena can be the opening 
move in another, like a new law that is challenged in court. Players can 
force each other into some arenas, but must entice them in other cases. 
(They face the Bystander dilemma: you may wish to get outsiders involved 
in your strategic engagement, but you cannot always control what they do 
once they are involved [Jasper, 2006: 123].) One arena may affect another 
merely by changing morale, as players carry a good or bad mood with them 
from one setting to another.
Arenas are similar to that favorite concept of sociologists, the institution. 
Taylor and Zald (2010: 305) def ine this as “a complex of roles, norms, and 
practices that form around some object, some realm of behavior in a society.” 
In line with this structural-functional concept, they claim that within the 
“common cultural understandings” that def ine the institution, there can 
be conflict over how to “enact” the values and roles (Taylor and Zald, 2010: 
307), which is more or less the argument of Smelser (1962). Taylor and Zald go 
further down this strategic path, fortunately, saying that “institutions may 
actually be seen as made up of several institutional arenas.” The potential 
circularity of seeing institutions as institutional suggests that we might be 
better off simply observing the arenas rather than some mysterious entity 
behind them.
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Because of these variations in both players and arenas, players can have a 
variety of relationships to arenas, and they usually have several kinds at the 
same time. They can play in an arena through formal standing, or through 
the standing of individual members. They can try to influence other players 
in an arena through personal networks, by persuading third parties such as 
the media, or by creating their own versions of other players (establishing 
their own media or f ielding their own candidates for off ice, say). Some 
arenas are def ined by the players in them, as in games or in legislatures 
(which could not exist without legislators). Some prove to be “false arenas”: 
as soon as a new player is admitted, the arena loses its influence (whether 
to enter such arenas, which are often intentional traps, is another dilemma 
[Jasper, 2006: 169]).
One kind of strategic project is to change arenas themselves. Some play-
ers may try to stabilize an arena to their advantage, or to change an existing 
one so that it favors them. Some arenas are changing constantly, without 
much stabilization; others are established for long periods, punctuated by 
sudden changes that can be dramatic and which are often unexpected. 
But all arenas can be changed or abandoned. When they are stable for 
long periods, it is not mere inertia, but the result of active support from 
interested players.
The positions they hold in arenas can help or hinder players, just as 
their resources and skills can. Like positions on a f ield of battle, positions 
in an arena such as a bureaucracy allow players to do certain things by 
providing them with a distinct bundle of rules and resources. They may still 
have to f ight to enforce or bend those rules and to deploy those resources, 
despite the formalities of their positions. As Maarten Hajer (2009: 21) notes, 
highlighting the performance involved in politics, “In addition to this de 
jure authority, they have to create de facto authority by acting out their 
role in a sequence of concrete situations.” Some positions, like the high 
ground on a battlef ield, are more advantageous than others, and a great 
deal of contestation centers around getting into good position. In some cases 
attaining standing in an arena is a key position, but then in addition there 
are different positions within that arena. Being elected to the US Congress 
is one thing, chairing an influential committee is another.
Arenas capture most of what has gone under the banner of structure. 
There are several levels of structures buried in the idea of an arena: literal 
structures are physical places that offer spaces to stand or sit, doors through 
which to enter and exit, recording devices for the media, possibly artif icial 
lighting for nighttime uses, and of course constraints on how many people 
can f it comfortably or uncomfortably in the arena. Beyond these physical 
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characteristics, structure becomes more metaphorical: there are formal 
rules that some subplayer may be charged with enforcing; informal norms 
and traditions that can be broken but only at some cost in reputation; and 
other expectations that have to do with how the meeting was called and 
organized. It is easier to break an informal expectation than to walk through 
a wall.
Arenas embody past decisions, invested resources, and cultural mean-
ings. A society’s history as well as its patterns of inequality shape arenas, as 
well as shaping what happens in those arenas by affecting what players can 
bring to those arenas. These are indirect effects, compared to the direct ef-
fects of the interaction that unfolds in the arena itself. Randall Collins (2008: 
20) contrasts background and situational factors in his micro-sociological 
account of violence. There are “factors outside the situation that lead up 
to and cause the observed violence. Some background conditions may 
be necessary or at least strongly predisposing, but they certainly are not 
suff icient; situational conditions are always necessary, and sometimes they 
are suff icient.” He f inds it useful to push as far as possible with the situ-
ational approach, in contrast to most explanations that rely on background 
conditions. Although I am sympathetic to this approach, there is far more 
work that goes into preparing players and arenas in advance than there is 
for most interpersonal violence.
There are arenas that a researcher must infer, but inferred arenas come 
in two forms. In one, we simply lack access: political leaders, corporate 
executives, and military commanders – the power elites – prefer to meet 
behind closed doors (cf. Allison and Zelikow, 1999). But we also infer arenas 
by aggregating large numbers of separate arenas. The paradigm here is the 
market, which sets a price out of many small transactions. Economists 
have made a discipline from such aggregations, as well as from pointing 
out the unintended (and often irrational) aggregate consequences of many 
uncoordinated (and in the eyes of economists, rational) choices. But these 
arenas are more metaphorical, living in summations of data rather than 
the lived experience of human beings. And as E.P. Thompson points out, 
“the market” in the abstract derives from real, physical marketplaces, where 
buyers and sellers used to meet every week or every month.6
The concept of an arena is similar in some ways to Pierre Bourdieu’s 
popular idea of a f ield of conflict over clearly identif iable stakes. This was 
an advance over images of institutions as tightly integrated by norms and 
values, offering instead a strategic vision of them as sites for competition 
and conflict. Yet the idea of a f ield was never meant to do much institutional 
work; it is a “f ield of struggle” defined by the relations between players, some 
18 JAmes m. JAsPer 
dominant and others subordinate but all trying to improve their positions. 
It represents social structure, not institutional structure. Any formal rules 
are imposed by the “f ield of power,” namely the political system or the state, 
which structures the relations among arenas.7
A f ield’s form of competition is usually taken for granted, as though there 
were no choice of arenas or of major strategies within a f ield. Agreement is 
assumed to govern some parts of the f ield (cognitive understandings, goals, 
norms of behavior), while conflict governs others (competition for the stakes 
of the f ield), with a clear (perhaps unrealistically clear) boundary between 
them. The boundaries of f ields are restricted, with little ability for players to 
open up new arenas or to innovate in their struggles. Fields also tend to be 
zero-sum, consisting of competition more than cooperation, even though 
most strategic action includes both. Fields are also extremely metaphorical. 
Fields are constructed by social scientists; arenas are built by the strategic 
players themselves. You can’t see a f ield, only imagine or draw it from data 
you collect. But you can sit in most arenas and watch the interactions. Even 
aggregate arenas such as the media consist of the summing up of lots of 
concrete arenas such as TV shows or websites.8 Finally, f ields homogenize 
players’ motives by building the stakes into the def inition of the f ield: 
players cannot have multiple goals, only the goal offered by the f ield.
By distinguishing players, arenas, and players’ goals and capabilities 
(especially their resources and skills), we hope to better observe the in-
teractions among them. Why do players choose the arenas they do, often 
switching from one to another? How do they adapt their capabilities to 
arenas, and choose arenas that best suit their capabilities? What positions 
do they hold in an arena, and what do these positions allow them to do? 
We can also observe when there are good matches and when there are 
mismatches between a player’s capacities and an arena. Players sometimes 
fail badly, or unexpectedly. By distinguishing arenas from players, we can 
also observe more dimensions of the arenas: formal rules versus informal 
traditions, status within the arena versus status outside it, soft and hard 
boundaries that def ine which players can participate. Players and arenas 
constantly adjust to each other, but they do not entirely def ine each other.
Conflicts among players often spill across arenas. They switch back and 
forth between battles over form and battles over content. They can even 
distort or change an arena. In what I call the Players or Prizes dilemma, 
for example, a player can pursue the standard stakes of an arena or instead 
devote its energy to defeating or harming its opponent (Jasper, 2006: 149). 
In bitter rivalries, there often end up being fewer rewards for everyone, 
as in nasty divorce proceedings from which only lawyers benefit (Jasper, 
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2010b). In civil wars, often, hatreds and vengeance threaten to crowd out 
all other goals.
The media are crucial players and arenas in politics. As players, reporters, 
editors, and others have their own perspectives on the issues, their own 
goals (usually audience size and prof its), professional norms, and usual 
interventions. In arenas such as meetings, these insiders debate and decide 
what is news, what is the right tone for a f ictional series, how to portray 
different characters. In doing their work they are influenced by the actions 
of external players. Political players f ight hard to gain media coverage, even 
though they never entirely control that coverage, a dilemma that players 
always face when deciding whether to enter a new arena or not (Gitlin, 1980; 
Soberiaj, 2011). How they are portrayed in the media affects what they can 
do in other arenas. Because cultural understandings matter, Hajer (2009: 
9) speaks of “the struggle to conduct politics at multiple sites, relating to a 
multiplicity of publics, and communicated through a multiplicity of media.”
We asked our contributors to consider the following questions about their 
players’ relationships to other players and to arenas. How does this player 
interact with protest groups: what conflicts, cooperations, tensions, dilem-
mas? Does it tend to follow one strategy or many? Does it have one arena 
to which it is restricted, or in which its capacities are especially useful? 
How and when does it choose to enter an arena or exit from one? What is at 
stake? How well are the player’s goals and means understood by outsiders, 
especially by protestors? What are protestors’ images and expectations 
about the other player? What expectations does it have about the protestors 
with which it interacts? What schemas, stories, and stereotypes does it 
deploy? What capacities does it have for bringing other players into the 
engagement? When does it try to do this? When does it succeed? What 
are its primary allies? What types of outcomes are there? Do they lead to 
new arenas or end here? How are new arenas created? Are there examples 
of “false arenas” that a player joins, only to f ind that the arena has been 
rendered ineffectual?
Dynamic Interactions
Although the term “strategy” is often used – in business and the military – to 
refer to a plan drawn up in advance of interaction or battle, we use the 
adjective “strategic” to refer to efforts to get others to do what you want 
them to. I have suggested (Jasper, 2006: 5) that strategic approaches include 
not only the goals and means of players, but some possibility of resistance, 
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a focus on interaction, and projects oriented toward the future (Emirbayer 
and Mische, 1998). A strategic theory need not assume resistance: some 
of the best strategies involve persuasion and the avoidance of conflict. 
Cooperation is a more common form of strategic interaction than conflict. 
And considerable strategic activity is internal to a group or organization, 
such as grappling with radical f lanks. Only in the strategic back-and-forth 
of engagement can we ever achieve a fully dynamic picture of politics, in 
the plans, initiatives, reactions, countermeasures, mobilizations, rhetorical 
efforts, arena switches, and other moves that players make.
Our strategic approach highlights the trade-offs, choice points, and 
dilemmas that players face as they negotiate arenas. I have already men-
tioned Players or Prizes, the Articulation, the Bystander, and the False 
Arena dilemmas, but there are many more. Several appear in the pages that 
follow. For instance the Powerful Allies dilemma, when protest groups make 
some kind of connection with another player but often f ind that the other 
player twists them to its own ends rather than helping the protestors attain 
their own, arises with the news media and with intellectuals (Nicholls and 
Uitermark label this version of it the “Power of Representation dilemma”).
A great deal of sociology has been devoted to showing why people have 
fewer choices than they think. Social facts, structures, networks, institu-
tional norms or logics all emphasize constraints. Various kinds of habits 
and routines are introduced to explain the stability of interactions, most 
recently in the guise of the habitus, an internalized set of dispositions for 
reacting in predictable ways even while improvising slightly within the 
set. Kathleen Blee (2012) has recently shown how protest groups establish 
decision-making routines in their f irst few months which they do not need 
to revisit. But all routines were originally choices, implicit or explicit. All 
changes to routines are also choices. And within certain routines, there 
are still choices to be made, especially in reaction to the actions of other 
players. The purpose of routines is to allow a group to focus its attention on 
new decisions. Decisions are still made, even when scholars avoid looking 
at them.
Some choices are tough ones, in which each option carries risks. For 
this reason, players often try hard to back their opponents into a position 
in which their options are limited and treacherous. Majken Sørenson and 
Brian Martin (2014) dub this “the dilemma action.” In many cases, they say, 
these actions force state agents to repress nonviolent protestors, leading to 
moral indignation in response. More generally, the point of these moves is to 
push an opponent to do something that conflicts with widely held or stated 
beliefs and values. In a way, protest itself is an effort to force authorities (or 
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other players) into actions they would prefer to avoid, whether concessions 
or repression or uncomfortable silence.
Scholars of protest and politics always think they are talking about strat-
egy, but only game theorists are entirely explicit about what they mean.9 
Social-movement scholars have begun to pay more explicit attention to 
strategy lately. Holly McCammon (2012), for instance, emphasizes activists’ 
agency in changing their strategies in response to emerging opportunities 
and contexts, although she still works with a linear model in which context 
and movement characteristics lead to strategic choices, which in turn lead 
to outcomes. The complex interactions between players are reduced to 
context: movements interact with contexts, rather than with other players. 
Two recent books examine the interplay between pairs of movements bat-
tling each other over time (Fetner, 2008; Bob, 2012), and an edited volume, 
based on a large 2007 conference, presents a dozen essays on various aspects 
of strategies of protest (Maney et al., 2012).
Sociology as a whole may be rediscovering strategy. In a powerful critique 
of neoinstitutionalists’ tendency to focus on the constraints imposed by 
institutions, Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam (2012: 10-12) have extended 
Bourdieu’s concept of f ields, in which “[a]ctors make moves and other actors 
have to interpret them, consider their options, and act in response.” Even 
in apparently stable f ields, there is always “a good deal of jockeying for 
advantage.” Strategic action f ields are “socially constructed arenas within 
which actors with varying resource endowments vie for advantage.” They 
retain some of the problems of the f ield, especially the conflation of play-
ers and arenas and its zero-sum competition. They give the example of 
the 2,500 colleges and universities in the United States, which normally 
compete with each other, but would “probably unite and oppose” proposed 
legislation against their collective interests. But instead of recognizing 
this unity as forming a new player (as I would), perhaps intended to lobby 
collectively in policy arenas, they see it as a new f ield. Finally, Fligstein and 
McAdam observe that a modern society contains millions of f ields, making 
the concept less useful as a way of grappling with institutional constraints.
The great theories of arenas, namely political-opportunity-structure 
approaches to protest, have also gestured toward a more strategic vision. In 
his last formulation of political-opportunity structures, Charles Tilly (2008) 
insisted that each protest campaign reshapes the political landscape, which 
in turn offers different opportunities to the next campaign, and so on. To 
make this approach more fully dynamic, we only need to add the many 
expectations, choices, and reactions made by players within each round of 
contestation, or to drop the image of rounds altogether and recognize that 
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some sort of strategic maneuvering is always present. Arenas do not simply 
sit there statically waiting for the next round of challenge. Players work 
constantly to strengthen their positions, as Gramsci famously suggested.
Hanspeter Kriesi and his collaborators traced the complexities of the 
interaction between social movements and the state in greater detail than 
Tilly. But their language remained that of structural availability rather 
than strategic choices: “Overt facilitation of action campaigns of new social 
movements by a Social Democratic government is unlikely, because of the 
risk that such campaigns might get out of hand” (1995: 59). The risk seems 
objectively given, rather than something that government decision-makers 
might have to think about, might disagree about, and might try to manage in 
creative ways. The risks (known and unknown), the costs, and the benefits 
all add up to recurrent dilemmas. What is more, different segments of the 
state may face different dilemmas, or make different choices in the face 
of the same one. Kriesi and Donatella della Porta (1999) have described 
global protest as multilevel, international games. But all protest operates 
at different levels and across many arenas, whether those arenas are local, 
regional, national, global, or a combination of all of these. Arenas offer a 
kind of “mediation” between different players (Amenta, 2006).
When scholars reify arenas into static structures, they implicitly embrace 
a “lock and key” model of strategic engagement: protestors search for a weak 
spot that will allow them access to the polity. Their agency consists in trying 
a succession of keys. Cultural approaches sometimes fall into their own 
version of lock and key: activists try one frame after another until they hit 
upon one that resonates with audiences. Beneath such visions, it seems as 
though costs, benefits, and risks are already given rather than emerging 
and shifting constantly during engagements, due to all the players’ actions. 
In contrast, an interactive approach would see various players adapting 
to each other, anticipating moves, and trying actively to block opponents. 
Both sides are constantly moving targets.10
By looking at players in arenas, we highlight time, interaction, and 
process, all of which are obscured in more structural models. Pam Oliver 
(1989: 4) similarly talks about “these chains of action and reaction [that are] 
outside the control or direction of any person or organization.” According 
to two symbolic interactionists,
Process is not just a word. It’s shorthand for an insistence that social 
events don’t happen all at once, but rather happen in steps: f irst one thing, 
then another, with each succeeding step creating new conditions under 
which all the people and organizations involved must now negotiate the 
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next step. This is more than a theoretical nicety. It makes theoretical 
room for contingency. … The interactionist emphasis on process stands 
… as a corrective to any view that insists that culture or social structure 
determines what people do. (McCall and Becker, 1990: 6)
Tracing interactions over time will address the goals of the players, the rules 
of the arenas, the meanings players attach to those arenas, as well as the 
resources and skills that players bring with them or acquire in the arenas. 
We can also observe processes such as arena switching, alliance-building, 
and decision-making. We should also be able to see changes: the processes 
by which players emerge, change, and dissolve; the shifting boundaries 
and stakes of arenas. By analyzing interactions, and the choices various 
players make during them, we aim for a fully dynamic vision of how protest 
unfolds. Both structural and cultural approaches have rarely been able to 
move beyond static models, despite heroic efforts. Strategic models should 
do better.
What Follows
We have brought together experts on the interactions between political 
protestors and the many other players with whom they interact, including 
components of the state, such as courts, police, legislators, armies, and 
unelected rulers (these contributions appear in Duyvendak and Jasper 
[2015]); related players such as unions and professions; cultural institutions 
such as universities, artists, mass media, and religious organizations; as 
well as other players in the social movement sector such as potential allies 
or competitors, recruits, or funders.
Each of the following chapters combines illustrative materials from case 
studies with theoretical formulations and hypotheses. More theoretical 
generalizations are possible for those players that have already been well 
studied, such as the media (just as protestors are obsessed with media 
coverage, so scholars sometimes seem obsessed with studying it). In other 
cases, authors stick closer to their case materials to tease out observations 
about interactions. In all cases, our aim is to advance explanations of how 
protest unfolds through complex interactions with other players.
Part 1 begins by taking the players usually known as social movements or 
movement organizations, and looking at them as arenas for internal conflict; 
it also looks at external players that are expected to be sympathetic and sup-
portive to protestors. In Chapter 1, Francesca Polletta and Kelsy Kretschmer 
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address the scholarship that has tended to treat the causes of factionalism as 
internal to the organization, showing instead that groups’ interactions with 
other players – government actors, funders, groups within this movement 
and others, and so on – have had divisive effects. Yet factional battles do not 
necessarily sound the death knell for the organization or even foreclose the 
possibility of future collaboration between breakaway organizations and 
their parents. Polletta and Kretschmer show how a strategic perspective can 
illuminate causes and consequences of factionalism, while also showing 
the compatibility of that perspective with a more cultural-structuralist one.
Ann Mische’s Chapter 2 also looks inside movements, examining the 
communicative dilemmas generated by the fractal structuring of social 
movement arenas, in which major divisions among camps are mirrored in 
internal subdivisions at multiple levels, generating complex configurations 
of alliance and opposition. Mische shows how these internal subdivisons 
generate stylistic and strategic challenges for players, as they engage in 
symbolic and material battles over control of movement organizations and 
agendas. By analyzing the breakdown of a Brazilian student congress, she 
shows how commitments to styles of communication among movement 
leaders constrained them in dealing with moments of crisis, despite their 
own skilled efforts at mediation and alliance-building.
We then turn to external funders. Most research on the role of founda-
tions in contentious claims-making has emphasized how patrons channel 
collective action in the direction of moderation and professionalization; this 
movement-centric view of foundations is illuminating in many ways but 
limiting in others. Ed Walker in Chapter 3 examines the factors that shape 
foundation giving in the health sector as well as how those funders provide 
resources to health advocacy organizations and social movement organiza-
tions (SMOs). Foundation giving is shaped more heavily by organizational 
and institutional pressures on foundations than by the mobilization of 
advocacy groups. In addition, foundations try to strategically align the 
interests of their donors with those of the advocacy groups they fund. The 
funding of SMOs serves as a covert marketing practice by the corporate 
parents of these foundations.
In Chapter 4 Christian Scholl looks at allies, in analyzing anti-summit 
protests as a chain of tactical interactions. Focusing on how different players 
create, shape, redefine, and reproduce political arenas, he examines f ive 
players, constituting, at the same time, arenas for dynamic interactions: 
counterglobalization movements, intergovernmental organizations, gov-
ernments, police, and the media. Strategic interactions, especially through 
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tactical innovation and adaptation, neutralized the impact of anti-summit 
protests.
Part 2 turns to several types of formal organization that have strong 
identities and interests of their own, operating in markets: corporations, 
professions, and trade unions. These are sometimes allies of protestors, 
and sometimes – especially corporations – targets and opponents. Philip 
Balsiger’s Chapter 5 looks at the interactions between movements and 
corporations using the case of the anti-sweatshop movement. He discusses 
the “influence chains” that movement players create outside of and within 
corporations to make f irms change, and how f irms comply with, confront, 
or sidestep movement demands. The interaction between movements and 
corporations may lead to the creation of new markets (arenas) by taking 
up some of the demands made by movement players.
In Chapter 6, Frank Dobbin and Jiwook Jung examine the growing power 
of corporations, through their control of resources, influence over the life 
chances of individuals, and role in protecting everything from the envi-
ronment to the safety of individuals. Protest movements are increasingly 
addressed not to nation-states, but to corporations. Moreover, professional 
groups have increasingly taken on the role of social movements, both inside 
and outside the corporation. Thus the civil rights movement was taken up 
by personnel professionals, who promoted equal opportunity from their 
professional perches within the f irm; the shareholder value movement was 
led by professional institutional investors who directed their activism at 
publicly held corporations.
Ruth Milkman looks at labor unions in Chapter 7. Beginning with the 
disconnect between the sociological literature on the labor movement 
and the larger literature on social movements, she explores the potential 
of the players-and-arenas perspective for analysis of unions and the labor 
movement. Milkman argues that unions and labor movements are different 
from the other players considered in this volume, in that they are both part 
of the “establishment” and at the same time agents of social protest. The US 
labor movement in particular plays both an “inside” and an “outside” game, 
although as its power and legitimacy have declined in recent decades, the 
balance has increasingly tipped toward the latter.
Part 3 examines players that generate or frame ideas and facts for broader 
audiences, as well as the general public that is often the target of these 
claims. In Chapter 8 Walter Nicholls and Justus Uitermark investigate the 
role of intellectuals within social movements, particularly the contradic-
tion that intellectuals can be a force for movements but may also exercise 
power over others within movements. The chapter explores the resulting 
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Power of Representation dilemma – intellectuals have superior skills of 
representation but if they use them for the movement, they marginalize 
others within the movement – through a historical overview of how some 
activist intellectuals in the past have addressed and sought to resolve the 
dilemma. The chapter also examines the roles of intellectuals in the im-
migrant and LGBT rights movements in the United States.
In Chapter 9, Alissa Cordner, Phil Brown, and Margaret Mulcahy look 
at the strategic role of scientists and public health off icials. Through a 
case study of state-level regulation of f lame-retardant chemicals, situated 
in the larger context of anti-toxic legislation and environmental health 
controversies, they examine how various players interact in regulatory 
arenas and justify their positions through the language of science. Players 
identifying as scientists or activists often operate in overlapping arenas, 
make similar claims to scientif ic knowledge, and challenge conventional 
ideas about the separation of science from policy arenas.
In Chapter 10 Edwin Amenta, Neal Caren, and Amber Celina Tierney 
play out the image of arena as sports venue, in showing that although news 
coverage is crucial to the goals of social movements, the news media do 
not treat protestors as players analogous to institutional political actors. 
The media serve as a kind of referee for institutional political contenders, 
who are treated like star players, but act like stadium security guards or 
owners for protestors, who are treated like unruly fans or wannabe players 
and are usually barred from the discursive contests of the news. That said, 
protestors do often gain coverage, and sometimes favorable coverage, as 
the authors show through a review of the literature and recent research 
from the Political Organizations in the News project, which encompasses 
all articles published mentioning SMOs in several major US newspapers 
in the 20th century.
Chapter 11, by Silke Heumann and Jan Willem Duyvendak, is about the 
interactions between religious organizations and protest movements. They 
ask when and why religious groups become political players, analyzing 
the involvement of Catholic and Evangelical churches in the Nicaraguan 
“pro-life” movement. These churches would seem to be a natural ally for 
the anti-abortion movement, but Heumann and Duyvendak demonstrate 
that alliances always require strategic work.
Hahrie Han and Dara Strolovitch, in Chapter 12, explore the relationships 
between bystander publics and social movements using the Tea Party and 
Occupy Wall Street as case studies. Bystander publics that allied with the 
movement shaped each movement’s relationship to what scholars have 
come to call “intersectionally marginalized populations.” They also af-
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fected how each movement chose its targets and characterized economic 
problems and their victims. Rather than standing passively on the sidelines, 
many members of “bystander publics” are actively engaged in processes 
and institutions that build their democratic capacities (such as civic skills, 
motivations, and networks).
Finally, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Olivier Fillieule join forces in the 
conclusion to draw broader theoretical implications of the players-and-
arenas approach for the study of social movements, linking the theory more 
to interactionist traditions. They also raise a number of useful questions 
about the differences between arenas and f ields.
In addition to the chapters in this volume, a second volume is in produc-
tion, called Breaking Down the State, which contains chapters on the players 
formerly known as the state: bureaucrats, legislators and parties, police and 
armies, inf iltrators, and more. They apply the same players-and-arenas 
framework as the contributors to this volume, examining how these state 
agents interact with protestors.
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Notes
1. I think that the players-and-arenas framework fits other relatively institu-
tionalized strategic interactions as well, including markets, wars, diplomacy, 
electoral politics, sports, and more (Jasper, 2006).
2. Our ability to see a player as an arena and to see (some) arenas as players 
clarifies, I hope, a confusion in the concept of field: in some cases the field 
is defined more or less as a social movement, composed of individuals and 
organizations sharing goals, while in others it is broadened to include “the 
agencies, organizations, and countermovements that resist or aid the move-
ment. … In this usage, a field of contention is a structured arena of conflict 
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that includes all relevant actors to whom a social movement might be con-
nected in pursuing its claims” (Taylor and Zald, 2010: 308).
3. In Freud’s model of the Unconscious, materials are placed there because 
they are too dangerous to deal with consciously. In contemporary cogni-
tive psychology, on the other hand, there are many processes with which 
we understand the world and use information that are unconscious only 
because they are so numerous that we can’t be aware of them all. I call them 
“feeling-thinking processes.” Some of them can be brought into awareness 
if we stop to think about them, others (such as biochemical signals) cannot 
be.
4. I see this effort to talk about players and arenas rather than social move-
ments and environments as parallel to Bruno Latour’s critique of “the 
social” as hopelessly vague and misleading, as when he says that “to explain 
is not a mysterious cognitive feat, but a very practical world-building 
enterprise that consists in connecting entities with other entities, that is, in 
tracing a network” (Latour, 2005: 103). For me, we explain politics when we 
assemble a long sequence of actions and reactions by players in arenas. (Al-
though, unlike Latour, I prefer to restrict actors to humans, partly because 
emotions are central to action. Objects have causal impacts, but they do not 
have emotions.)
5. In a similar effort, Christoph Haug (2013:710) defines a “meeting arena” as “a 
socio-political setting which evokes expectations regarding appropriate con-
duct, the existence of certain roles, the definition of the situation and other 
aspects of the interaction order that potential participants can expect to 
find during a meeting event in a particular arena.” Meeting arenas, he says, 
vary according to membership, rules, hierarchy, monitoring, and sanctions. 
6. Thompson (1993: 273) asks, “Is market a market or is market a metaphor? 
Of course it can be both, but too often discourse about ‘the market’ con-
veys the sense of something definite – a space or institution of exchange 
(perhaps London’s Corn Exchange at Mark Lane?) – when, in fact, some-
times unknown to the term’s user, it is being employed as a metaphor of 
economic process, or an idealization or abstraction from that process.” The 
same could be said of arenas, and we need to be clear about when we are 
speaking of a physical place and when we are speaking metaphorically.
7. In La Distinction (1979), Bourdieu mapped social classes along two dimen-
sions, those with more or less capital and their proportion (at any given 
level) of economic and cultural capital; for maps of the bourgeoisie alone, 
seniority in the bourgeoisie replaced the amount of capital. Although he 
assumed that classes and class fragments compare and compete with one 
another, these fields were simply maps of different groups or subcultures, 
grouped by variables of interest to the sociologist. They were means of 
describing potential players, not the arenas in which they compete.
His fields of cultural production are similar (Bourdieu, 1993). French 
literary figures of the late 19th century are spread across a two-dimensional 
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grid: more or less established (old or young), and more or less successful in 
the marketplace. The field is actually structured by the outcomes of artistic 
production, as a way of describing the players, not how they compete with 
each other. Arena characteristics disappear into the relative success of the 
players (“bohemia” versus “academy,” for instance). Players, arenas, and 
outcomes are fused in the field, and “the space of available positions” in a 
field seems to be determined outside each field, by other competitive fields 
such as universities, and not by the rules of the field itself.
Fields work better than arenas for Bourdieu because of his reluctance to 
acknowledge that individuals make conscious strategic choices, rather than 
being driven by the early socialization of habitus (Jenkins, 1992: 87). On the 
model of an electro-magnetic field, individuals are influenced by unseen 
forces emanating from the field itself rather than by self-conscious strate-
gies arising from interactions with other players (Martin, 2003). Husu (2013) 
observes that fields have similar strengths and weaknesses as political op-
portunity structures.
8. An arena, which in Roman times could be used for spectacles as well as 
competitions, is usually well structured, but most conflicts cut across 
arenas. Strategic engagements are somewhat like Howard Becker’s “worlds,” 
which “contain people, all sorts of people, who are in the middle of doing 
something that requires them to pay attention to each other, to consciously 
take account of the existence of others and to shape what they do in the 
light of what others do. In such a world, people do not respond automati-
cally to mysterious external forces surrounding them. Instead, they develop 
their lines of activity gradually, seeing how others respond to what they 
do and adjusting what they do next in a way that meshes with what others 
have done and will probably do next.” These activities move in and out of 
arenas. See Becker and Poussin (2006: 277). Lemieux (2011) finds historical 
limits to the concept of field, suggesting that Bourdieu’s more strategic con-
cept of “le jeu,” a game or stakes, is a more general theoretical advance.
9. McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1217) commented, perspicaciously, “The concern 
with interaction between movements and authorities is accepted, but it is 
also noted that social movement organizations have a number of strategic 
tasks. These include mobilizing supporters, neutralizing and/or transform-
ing mass and elite publics into sympathizers, achieving change in targets. 
Dilemmas occur in the choice of tactics, since what may achieve one aim 
may conflict with behavior aimed at achieving another. Moreover, tactics 
are influenced by interorganizational competition and cooperation.” Their 
otherwise useful hypotheses did not really highlight these dilemmas.
10. Interactionists have their own version of this structural trap, when the game 
itself is the center of attention and is allowed to define the players. It is then 
much like a field. I prefer to give players some (relative) autonomy from 
the games they play, which among other advantages allows them backstage 
(internal) preparation for external engagements.
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Francesca Polletta and Kelsy Kretschmer
In June 1966, leaders of the major civil rights organizations descended 
on Mississippi to continue a march across the state begun by activist 
James Meredith. Meredith had been rushed to the hospital when he was 
shot by a sniper. Despite the show of unity, tensions among the leaders of 
the march were near-boiling. Roy Wilkins withdrew the support of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
after the young activists of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Com-
mittee (SNCC) recruited an armed black group to provide protection 
for the marchers. SNCC activists had just deposed their longtime chair 
John Lewis in favor of the f irebrand Stokely Carmichael, and Carmichael 
used the march to publicly challenge the movement’s commitment to 
interracialism and nonviolence. After being arrested in Greenwood, he 
told a crowd after his release from jail, “This is the twenty-seventh time 
I have been arrested. I ain’t going to jail no more. … The only way we 
gonna stop them white men from whuppin’ us is to take over. We been 
saying freedom for six years and we ain’t got nothin’. What we gonna start 
saying now is Black Power” (quoted in Sellers, 1990: 166-167). The slogan 
created a national sensation, with commentators predicting black violence 
and reporters swarming into Mississippi to cover nightly rallies where 
chants of “Black Power” drowned out the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference’s chants of “Freedom Now.” A beleaguered Martin Luther 
King, Jr., tried to hold the contending groups together and to continue to 
advocate for nonviolence. When marchers were attacked by local police 
wielding clubs and tear gas, King complained, “The government has got 
to give me some victories if I’m gonna keep people nonviolent” (quoted 
in Carson, 1981: 210).
Amid the tension on the march, there were moments of levity. SNCC 
activists said that Dr. King proved to be “easygoing, with a delightful sense 
of humor” (Sellers, 1990: 164). When two reporters jockeying for position 
to interview the leaders of the march broke into an argument, marchers 
watched with amusement. They began to chant, “Dissension in the ranks! 
Dissension in the ranks!” Reporters and cameramen got into the spirit of it 
too, chanting in return, “Press Power! Press Power!”
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The episode points to the virtues of a strategic approach to factionalism. 
Where factional battles are often seen as an abdication of strategic good 
sense and as a sign of the organization or movement’s disintegration, this 
episode reveals actors performing factional differences in strategic bids 
for support. Those bids were both competing and overlapping: note, in this 
respect, King’s effort to play off Carmichael’s militancy by suggesting that 
government concessions would help him to keep the movement nonviolent. 
The audiences for the bids were numerous and diverse. In addition to the 
government, both King and Carmichael (and Wilkins) were playing to local 
black Mississippians and Northern white supporters, to Northern urban 
blacks who had sat out the movement so far and to labor and liberal allies 
who were worried about new strains of separatism in the movement, to a 
national press and an international one. And they operated with a keen 
sense of the logics of the different arenas in which they were playing. They 
all knew that reporters wanted stories about movement inf ighting. That 
was the joke. (And the reporters’ joke, in turn, centered on the performative 
aspect of Black Power. As Carmichael acknowledged privately, neither he nor 
anyone really knew what Black Power meant). The trick – the challenge – for 
activists was to capitalize on the logic of the arena while still playing on 
their own terms.
It was not, of course, that Carmichael and King and the others were 
only playing. Carmichael was angry and King surely was dispirited by the 
repudiation of nonviolence. And it was not that their strategies were fully 
worked out or necessarily effective. But the strategies were taken with an 
eye to the likely responses of other strategic players and with a sense of the 
goals that motivated them.
A strategic perspective departs from the literature on factionalism in 
at least two key respects. First, where the literature has tended to treat 
the causes of factionalism as internal to the organization, this perspective 
encourages us to see how actors outside the organization – police and state 
authorities, allies and opponents, funders, and the press – play key roles in 
the emergence of factions and in their trajectories. Certainly organizational 
structures affect the ways in which disputes take shape and are handled. 
But the research on the topic has yielded conflicting findings. Some scholars 
have argued that groups without a centralized structure are more likely to 
face factionalism because they lack a central authority to quell disputes 
(Gamson, 1990; Miller, 1983). Other scholars have argued that groups with 
a centralized structure are more likely to face organizational schisms 
because of their rigidity when it comes to embracing new issues (Valocchi, 
2001). Small, exclusive organizations have been seen as more vulnerable 
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to factionalism because they require greater ideological and membership 
conformity (Zald and Ash, 1966). On the other hand, coalitions may be prone 
to dissolution because they drain resources from member organizations 
(Staggenborg, 1986).
Scholarship on the environmental conditions in which factions are 
likely to emerge is valuable in directing attention outside the organization 
(e.g., Balser, 1997; Staggenborg, 1986; Zald and McCarthy, 1980). But that 
scholarship does not go far enough, we argue, in capturing the interactional 
processes involved. It seems clear that movement actors interpret environ-
mental changes (the passage of legislation, an offer of support by elites, 
and so on) through the lens of their previous interactions with the actor 
or agency in question. These suggest the value of thinking less in terms of 
environmental conditions than in terms of movement players’ relationships 
with other players, and how the typical practices of each player may produce 
divisive pressures on movement groups.
The kind of strategic perspective developed in this volume departs from 
the literature, second, in treating factionalization as a process with multiple 
causes and uncertain outcomes. Social movement scholars have tended 
rather to see factional battles as sounding the death knell for the organiza-
tion (McAdam, 1982; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Stern, Tarrow, and Williams, 
1971). Certainly, factionalism has real and often lasting liabilities for the 
movement. Factional battles absorb activists’ energies and undermine the 
group’s esprit de corps (Benford, 1993). They communicate to supporters 
and the public that the organization is conflicted and fragile, and perhaps 
not worth supporting. They are easily played up by opponents as a way to 
discredit the movement as a serious political contender (Benford, 1993). 
Yet, scholars have also drawn attention to factionalism’s upsides. Factional 
battles are absorbing, and the collective identity that develops within the 
contending groups can keep people in and involved in the organization 
long after they might ordinarily have drifted away (Benford, 1993; Hart and 
Van Vugt, 2006). Factional battles can help to clarify the group’s agenda 
(Ghaziani, 2008) and to raise money from supporters concerned about 
extremists taking over (Haines, 1984). Organizational schisms can lead 
the expelled organization to reach out to new constituencies (Kretschmer, 
2009; 2010) and give new momentum to the organization doing the expelling 
(Balser, 1997).
The point is not only that factionalism has benefits, but also that factional 
battles can unfold in different ways. We need to ask not only, when do fac-
tions emerge, but when do they become organizationally debilitating? Why 
are factional f ights sometimes averted altogether or resolved once they have 
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begun? When factional battles do prove organizationally debilitating, do they 
necessarily foreclose the possibility of future collaboration? Again, to answer 
these questions requires examining not just the organizational conditions 
in which factions emerge, but also the interactions among diverse actors, 
within the organization and outside it, that trigger factional battles and 
shape their trajectories. Indeed, we will show that factions that have broken 
away in fury to found their own organizations have often ended up enjoying 
collaborative relationships with just those organizations. The conditions of 
the original schism matter less than interactions subsequent to the schism.
In line with a strategic perspective, then, we emphasize the influence of 
interactional processes rather than originating conditions. We see actors 
def ining and pursuing their interests in interaction with diverse actors, 
who are themselves in interaction with other actors. We also want to press 
for an expansion of a strategic perspective, however, one that captures the 
fact that, to put it glibly, factional battles are so often about something 
else. Organizational members f ight for a more democratic structure or 
more aggressive direct action and they do so, they say, for a combination 
of ideological and strategic reasons. But often, we argue, the battle is about 
other things: about newcomers’ sense of being excluded from an inner core 
of longtime friends, about conflicts that are based on race or class rather 
than on tactical or ideological differences, or about old battles rather than 
new ones. It is not only that individuals and groups’ goals are often multiple 
and sometimes unacknowledged. It is also that the choices that are on the 
table in a dispute – that is, the means with which to reach groups’ goals – 
are viewed through the lens of preexisting frameworks of meaning. An 
option comes to be viewed as the “black” choice or the “strategic” option, not 
because of any logical connection to what is black or what is instrumental, 
but rather because of structures of symbolic associations that predate this 
particular battle. This necessarily complicates any account of factionalism’s 
causes and of its effects. Of course, disputes within movements are also 
shaped by broad social conceptions of the political, the normative, and 
the strategic. But we believe it is worthwhile focusing on more recent, less 
deep-rooted cultural associations. Doing so, we argue, demonstrates the 
compatibility of a cultural structuralist perspective with a strategic one.
Players
We begin by identifying some of the external actors who often play a role 
in factional battles. They do not act unilaterally; instead, we emphasize the 
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interactions between (incipient) factional movement groups and the media, 
government agencies and actors, and other movements.
Government actors and agencies’ actions may create conflict both by 
creating new leverage for a group within an organization that has not had 
much power in the past and by confronting movement groups with diff icult 
and divisive strategic choices. As an example of the f irst dynamic, when the 
American government passed the National Industry Recovery Act (1933) and 
the Wagner Act (1935), giving workers the right to organize, John Lewis of the 
United Mine Workers saw an opportunity to organize workers in the basic 
industries, who were largely unrepresented by the craft-based American 
Federation of Labor. The AFL refused to organize along industry lines and 
expelled the new Congress of Industrial Organizations, which became a 
rival federation (Balser, 1997; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin, 2003).
As an example of the first and second dynamics, in 1961, Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy offered SNCC activists Justice Department protection and 
foundation funding to launch a Southern voter registration campaign. The 
offer was appealing to some within SNCC who were already interested in 
voter registration work, but others were suspicious. SNCC was getting mas-
sive national publicity for the freedom rides, interracial bus rides that were 
provoking Southern white mob violence and, as a result, federal interven-
tion. Kennedy was trying to buy the group off, some said, by pushing them 
into a form of activism that was simply less contentious. The battle within 
the group between proponents of direct action and voter registration was 
f ierce and threatened to tear the organization apart. It was resolved f irst 
by creating direct action and voter registration wings of the organization, 
and then by joining the two forms of action (Carson, 1981).
Police, FBI, and other repressive agencies also confront movement groups 
with diff icult and often conflict-producing strategic choices. When police 
come down hard on demonstrators, activists must decide whether to adopt 
less assertive strategies. Some within the group may see retreat as the better 
part of wisdom. Others may argue for provoking the police still further, 
with the hope that police overreaction will make for good media copy. And 
still others will be so angered by their experience that they cannot really 
conceive of retreat, whether they argue in strategic terms or not.
As Lipsky pointed out, “Police may be conceived as ‘street-level bu-
reaucrats’ who ‘represent’ government to people” (1970: 1). This helps to 
explain why in new left groups in the United States, Germany, Italy, and 
Japan, some members radicalized, factionalized, and went underground 
after the death of a group member or someone close to the group at the 
hands of police (Zwerman, Steinhoff, and della Porta, 2000). Police actions 
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delegitimized the state for some members of the group and threw them 
into conflict with those who were unwilling to turn to illegal measures 
(della Porta and Fillieule, 2004). Police repression of Russian Bolsheviks 
in the 1890s contributed to a rift between intellectuals and working-class 
members of the party by inflating intellectuals’ sense of bearing the costs 
of radicalism at a time when the working class were hunkering down to 
survive economically (Brym, 1988).
Police do not inevitably come down hard on protesters. To the contrary, 
police are strategic actors too, trying just as hard to read the likely conse-
quences of their actions not only on protesters, but also on reporters and 
local elites. When Southern sheriffs began to back off from the violence 
of water hoses and attack dogs unleashed on civil rights protesters, they 
created conflict within the civil rights movement on what to do next. Direct 
action depended on violent overreaction for its effect. When it no longer 
achieved that, some of those who had been ideologically committed to 
nonviolent direct action began to question its utility (Von Eschen, Kirk, 
and Pinard, 1969). Activists try to anticipate authorities’ next move, but 
what makes it more diff icult is that police agencies operate on the basis 
of logics that are bureaucratic as much as oriented to objective criteria 
of threat or danger. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s COINTELPRO 
(COunter INTELligence PROgram) in the 1960s identif ied national left 
and black organizations as a threat, and then targeted local chapters of 
those organizations – whatever their size, level of militancy, or capacity to 
organize disruptive actions (Cunningham, 2003).
Police agencies may also play a direct role in producing movement con-
flict. When the FBI infiltrated the anti-Vietnam War organization Students 
for a Democratic Society (SDS) as part of COINTELPRO, inf iltrators were 
instructed to play up the battle between the Progressive Labor and National 
Off ice factions within SDS (Marx, 1979). More generally, the suspected 
presence of inf iltrators may undermine the relations of trust within the 
group. Betty Friedan apparently believed that lesbians in the National 
Organization for Women (NOW) were being controlled by the FBI, and 
this was why she did not take their concerns more seriously, she said later 
(Rosen, 2000). If the person you are disagreeing with may be a government 
spy, it is hardly worth the effort to try to work through your differences 
with them.
Media players are undeniably important to movement groups’ chances 
for success. And media coverage poses all kinds of strategic choices for 
movement groups, choices that can create sharp conflict. If the press asks 
to speak to your “leader,” do you insist that you have no leaders, even if the 
movement FAc tIons 41
reporter is likely to hang up and find someone who is willing to call herself a 
leader? Do you continue to speak to the press even if it keeps misrepresent-
ing you? What makes it even more diff icult and divisive, we believe, is 
that activists rarely know just what the effect of media coverage will be. 
They know that reporters are drawn to stories of movement inf ighting, but 
is such coverage good or bad for the movement? Some have argued that 
coverage of movement groups, whatever its tenor, publicizes the group as 
a legitimate political actor (Rohlinger, 2006). By contrast, in their survey 
of coverage of American protest groups, described in Chapter 10, Amenta 
and his colleagues found that when stories centered on group inf ighting, 
the group’s main demands were less likely to be covered.
It is diff icult to choose a strategic option if the likely consequences are 
unclear. Could SDS activists have known that media coverage of the group 
in 1965 would attract not only scores of new members, but also a new kind 
of member – less politically serious, more radical for radicalism’s sake? 
The new members would not only strain the group’s tight-knit community 
but also introduce a confrontational stance that f igured as one side in 
factional battles that enveloped the group in 1965 and 1966 (Gitlin, 1980). 
SNCC workers deliberately sought out white Northern student volunteers to 
bring publicity to the Southern struggle, publicity they knew that a group 
of black activists would not get. Still, when the publicity was forthcoming, 
and centered almost exclusively and admiringly, on the white students, 
SNCC activists were frustrated. Factional battles that later took place over 
the place of whites in the movement had their roots in part in the media 
coverage that SNCC had sought.
Finally, arguments about the deleterious effects of media coverage may 
be fueled by sheer resentment on the part of people in the group: why is 
that person or that group or that tactic getting all the attention? Emotional 
arguments and strategic ones are not necessarily at odds; but, given the 
privileged place of strategy in movement deliberations, it may be easy to 
express (and even experience) one’s resentment about one’s treatment in 
the group as a strategic complaint.
Supporters and allies are important audiences for movement groups’ 
actions, as well as players in their own right. Group members who are 
in close contact with funders, providers of legal support, and other allies 
are probably more sensitive to the dangers of alienating them than are 
members who are not. They may be f irm defenders of a more moderate 
strategy (Bevington, 2009). On the other hand, some members’ proximity 
to elites may become a bone of contention, whether or not those members 
counsel moderation. Battles may be prompted by groups seeking to appeal 
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to a different set of supporters and allies. In 1967 SNCC chairperson Stokely 
Carmichael refused to continue making speeches to white audiences. He 
said that he was coming under f ire from black groups for the hypocrisy of 
calling for a black movement and taking speaking engagements only with 
white audiences. The dilemma, of course, was that white audiences could 
pay better (Carson, 1981).
Movement groups and subgroups interact with other movements and 
movement groups, and these external players can also contribute to faction-
alism. A group’s ability to lure recruits away from other movement groups 
is a sign of success. But new members may bring with them values and 
perspectives that are foreign or unwelcome to the original group members. 
For example, relatively soon after its founding, the National Organization for 
Women began attracting the younger, more radical women associated with 
the women’s liberation movement (Echols, 1989). New members pushed for 
new sets of priorities, in particular, more aggressive stands on issues like 
abortion. But veteran members worried that such a stand might alienate 
the more conservative women that the movement desperately needed. 
The influx of new members led eventually to the exit of conservative Mid-
western women, who went on to form the Women’s Equity Action League 
(WEAL) (Kretschmer, 2010). The environmental direct action group Earth 
First! attracted activists from the peace, labor, and feminist movements, 
who eventually pressed for a social justice focus that was at odds with the 
founders’ focus on biocentrism and led to an organizational schism (Balser, 
1997). The environmentalist Sierra Club was plunged into a factional battle 
over whether to propose a tighter immigration policy after anti-immigration 
activists f looded the organization in a deliberate attempt to take over the 
organization (King, 2008).
Other movements may also play a less direct role in internal movement 
battles. They may be less a recruiting ground or hijacker than a desired ally 
or competitor. For example, Students for a Democratic Society expelled the 
Progressive Labor faction within the group when they were directed to do so 
by the Black Panther Party. The Black Panthers had no formal authority over 
SDS, but the group was eager to prove its allegiance to a black nationalist 
agenda and the Panthers had decided that Progressive Labor was at odds 
with that agenda (Balser, 1997). Similarly, in SNCC, those who forced the 
expulsion of whites from the organization in 1966 insisted that remaining 
interracial would cost the group alliances with black nationalists as well as 
recruiting opportunities among Northern urban black youth (Carson, 1981).
So far, we have emphasized the diff icult choices presented to movement 
groups by external actors. Some people within the group may believe that 
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one option, say, responding aggressively to police repression, makes the most 
sense, and others may disagree. That may lead to diff icult and sometimes 
debilitating battles. However, movement groups are rarely of one mind even 
before they are confronted with these diff icult choices. There were SNCC 
activists who wanted to shift to voter registration well before the Justice 
Department proposed just that; in fact, those activists eagerly courted 
administration off icials. In this respect, we need to think of incipient fac-
tional groups as strategic actors themselves, looking to impress their goals 
on sometimes reluctant organizational comrades. In other words, although 
external actors sometimes force divisive choices on groups, more often, 
those choices are taken up and promoted by players within the group. This 
is especially clear when it comes to outside movement groups. The SNCC 
activists who argued that expelling whites would increase their credibility 
with Northern urban black youths had already defined their goals as in line 
with those being promoted by black nationalist groups. Their identif ication 
with a black nationalist agenda preceded their recognition of the benefits 
of appealing to young black Northerners. Movement organizations are 
thus themselves arenas of contention. People within the group see and act 
on opportunities to press their goals and priorities by interpreting signals 
from outside the group.
Note also that groups within the organization or movement may be 
motivated less by their determination to press a particular tactic or agenda 
or to increase their own inf luence than by more fundamental identity 
concerns. Organizational schisms emerged in the Italian Communist Party, 
the Church of England, and a right-wing Italian party when some within 
the group came to believe that a planned change threatened the group’s 
fundamental identity (Sani, 2008). Dissidents felt that the organization was 
not what it had been, that it had lost touch with its original purpose, and that 
they had no kinship with the future of the organization. In the Amsterdam 
squatters’ movement, those who argued for escalating the struggle did so 
on the basis of a story about the movement’s past victories that, despite its 
inaccuracy, captured their sense of who they were (Owens, 2009). Indeed, 
it is probably rare that contenders’ goals are purely instrumental.
That said, we have argued that even groups that are unif ied around 
a common goal and means of achieving it are vulnerable to disputes. 
Activists struggle to predict the likely actions of other political players 
(both within and outside the organization) and to predict how those 
actions are likely to be interpreted by diverse audiences. Not only do 
movement players face hard choices, they do so with limited informa-
tion. You may not know that the guy who is arguing so persuasively for 
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breaking with the group’s commitment to nonviolence is an FBI agent. 
You may not be able to predict that the eager new members you have 
recruited to the group will bring in a sensibility that is at odds with 
that of veterans. You may not know that the people who are arguing 
vociferously against having anything to do with the press are mainly 
resentful that they have never been interviewed. You may not know 
that some of the people who are arguing just as vociferously to keep 
talking to the press brought the issue up because they wanted to force 
out members whom they saw as politically impractical. People’s goals are 
multiple, ambiguous, and often opaque, even to themselves. That makes 
anticipating their actions diff icult. In particular, we have argued that 
external actors like the police, press, and government agencies operate 
on the basis of institutional logics that may lead them to behave in ways 
that are diff icult to anticipate. These sources of uncertainty undermine 
activists’ ability to avoid potentially divisive internal conf licts. They 
suggest, however, that we pay attention to the conditions in which groups 
are able to defuse or resolve such conflicts.
Factional Battles Defused, Diverted, or Overcome
When are factional battles defused or overcome? There is surprisingly little 
attention to this question in the social movement literature. In a study 
of church factionalism, Dyck and Starke (1999) found that churches that 
brought in external mediators were less able to overcome their conflicts 
and prevent the faction from leaving the church than those that relied on 
internal mediators. But the line between internal and external when it 
comes to mediating factional battles may be nuanced. Factional battles in 
a number of movements have been defused by the presence of movement 
mediators: people who are respected by members of the group, indeed, 
are seen as part of the group or close to the group, but are not seen as 
invested in the conf lict. They are above the fray. For example, in 1961 
the battle in SNCC over the merits of voter registration or direct action 
was defused when SNCC advisor Ella Baker suggested that group pursue 
both strategies simultaneously. Baker was older than SNCC members, had 
experience in a variety of movements, and took special pains not to be seen 
as directive, even though, former SNCC activists acknowledge now, she was 
tremendously influential (Polletta, 2002). Longtime pacif ist A. J. Muste was 
famous in the peace movement for mediating among contending factions. 
Marguerite Rawalt, a highly respected lawyer and founding member of 
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NOW, served as a bridge among feminists and more conservative women’s 
organizations in the 1970s, helping the otherwise antagonistic groups 
cooperate on gender discrimination lawsuits (Paterson, 1986). Leaders 
in the 1980s Brazilian student movement who were positioned at the 
intersection of multiple institutions (party politics, religion, professional 
associations, and popular protest) drew communicative resources from 
those institutions to bridge factional groups within the movement (Mische, 
2008).
Along with the availability of a mediator, taking actions designed to 
make a factional group feel that it has a voice in the organization seems 
to be important to avoiding schism. Sani’s (2008) study of factionalism in 
the Church of England and in Italian political groups showed that when 
groups were convinced that they would continue to have a role and voice in 
the organization, in other words, that their dissent would not marginalize 
them, they were unlikely to secede from the organization.
Organizational and movement cultures variously supply incentives and 
resources for defusing inf ighting – or for stoking it. In SNCC in the early 
1960s, it was perfectly appropriate in the middle of a f ierce battle over 
strategy to pause and ask everyone to hold hands and sing “We Shall Over-
come.” In SNCC after 1965, such a proposal would have met with derision. 
In progressive movements more generally during that period, sticking to a 
rigid ideological line that brooked no compromise was seen as a marker of 
one’s commitment and radicalism. A propensity for interpersonal conflict 
and factional battle was a favored activist style. In Brazilian student politics 
of the 1990s, an embrace of “nonsectarianism” became the favored activist 
style. Activists who had come of age in the late 1980s were much more 
used to overtly partisan contention; in this new climate, factions seemed 
to one-up each other in their renunciation of factionalism (Mische, 2008).
In their study of radically democratic German movement groups, Roth-
schild and Leach (2007) found “conflict avoidant” cultures, where members 
strove to avoid battles, and ignored hierarchies of influence when they 
showed signs of emerging, and “f ight” cultures, where members thrived 
on internal battles. The organizations attracted people with contentious or 
conflict-averse sensibilities, and then members perpetuated those styles. 
All the organizations were formally participatory democratic, but they 
practiced their commitments in very different ways, and behavior that 
might have caused an organizational crisis in the conflict-avoidant groups 
was seen as normative in the fight-oriented groups. This suggests, again, that 
a group’s formal organizational structure may not predict its propensity to 
factionalism: its culture matters, too.
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After the Schism
If movement scholars have tended to treat factionalism as leading straight-
forwardly to organizational schism, they have tended even more to see 
organizational schisms as permanent. But they may not be. In her study of 14 
organizations that broke away from the National Organization from Women 
between 1968 and 2009, Kretschmer (2009; 2010) found that the conditions 
in which the new organization was founded did not account for whether the 
group ended up later in a supportive or conflictual relationship with NOW.
What accounted for the different scenarios? Conflict between the breaka-
way group and NOW was often hardened when the new organization allied 
with a different movement. The new alliance often led the breakaway or-
ganization to accentuate its differences of priority with NOW. That dynamic 
was exacerbated by an influx of new members from the allied movement. 
For example, the October 17th organization, so named for the day it split from 
NOW (it later changed its name to The Feminists), was readily absorbed 
by the Women’s Liberation Movement (WLM). Members of the WLM fre-
quently accused NOW of mimicking oppressive male systems and criticized 
its hierarchical organizational structure and reform-oriented goals. Despite 
continuing friendships between The Feminists’ founder Ti-Grace Atkinson 
and NOW leaders, The Feminists recruited WLM activists who would have 
nothing to do with NOW. The Feminists formally disavowed any connection 
to NOW, and refused to participate in any event run by NOW (Kretschmer, 
2010). Similarly, Feminists for Life (FFL), a splinter group that disagreed with 
NOW’s abortion stance, initially tried to collaborate with NOW on other 
issues. At the same time, however, the group was enthusiastically embraced 
by the religious pro-life movement, which invited FFL to its conferences 
and meetings. As more religious women joined FFL, its pro-life identity 
began to supersede its feminist identity. It began to cast NOW, along with 
other feminist organizations, as enemies to be fought (Kretschmer, 2010).
Allying with another movement drew breakaway organizations into 
permanent conflict with the parent because contrasting themselves to 
the parent helped in marketing the group to new audiences. However, the 
character of breakaway organizations’ long-term goals mitigated these pres-
sures. When breakaway organizations maintained the institutional reform 
goals held by the parent, the new group was likely to deemphasize the prior 
conflict between the organizations. For example, Women’s Equity Action 
League (WEAL) formed when a faction of Midwestern women broke with 
NOW after a series of unpopular policy stances taken by leaders. Despite 
the contentious break and continued conflict with NOW president Betty 
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Friedan, founder Elizabeth Boyer insisted that WEAL present a united 
front with NOW to audiences outside the movement. The two organizations 
frequently met with congressional representatives together and provided 
opportunities for each other to testify before Congress about gender equality. 
WEAL leaders intentionally downplayed conflict with NOW to institutional 
elites, believing that a united feminist movement would produce greater 
pressure for legal reforms. Together, these cases suggest that where allying 
with other movements pulls organizations born of schism farther apart, 
the pressures of reform politics may pull them back toward each other.
Structure and Strategy
So far, we have sketched some of the ways in which a strategic, processual 
approach that is focused on players operating in fields in which other players 
are also operating is useful in understanding the causes and consequences 
of factionalism. Activists are strategic when they f ight as much as when 
they cooperate. They battle, break away, and refuse to collaborate down 
the road when it makes good sense. But this is not the good sense of game 
theory. As we have shown, activists are driven as much by identity as by 
interest, and as much by anger and resentment as by a cool calculation of 
costs and benefits. They are motivated by goals, but goals that are multiple, 
ambiguous and changing.
This is a complex picture. To gain analytic purchase on strategic choice 
in the swirl of multiple players, audiences, and arenas, complex goals, and 
ambivalent emotions, Jasper (2004) introduces the concept of strategic 
dilemmas, a concept that is developed in this volume. We, too, have referred 
to strategic dilemmas in accounting for activists’ choices. But, as we discuss 
in these concluding pages, we also believe that the concept of strategic 
dilemmas makes only partial sense of what is often at stake in factional 
battles. Accordingly, we argue for integrating more of a cultural structuralist 
perspective into the strategic one developed in this volume.
Dilemmas are diff icult choices, choices with trade-offs: for example, 
whether to try to speak to a broad constituency or mobilize the faithful 
(the Extension dilemma), whether to focus on one agenda item or multiple 
ones (the Basket dilemma), whether to use unsavory means for virtuous 
ends (the Dirty Hands dilemma). Not all movement groups face all the 
same dilemmas, nor do they experience or respond to them in the same 
way, but they do encounter these dilemmas with enough regularity that we 
can use their experiences to build a more sociological understanding of the 
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dynamics of strategic choice. Internal movement conflicts are especially 
revealing in this regard, as they usually involve people struggling with these 
dilemmas (Jasper, 2004: 10). Conflicts shed light on which groups typically 
encounter certain dilemmas, as well as which people in the group are likely 
to be invested in one solution rather than another, why certain dilemmas 
seem more dilemmatic than others, and what the trade-offs end up being. 
Practically, this also means that groups should be able to mitigate conflicts 
by drawing attention to the dilemmas that underpin them (Jasper, 2004).
Again, in our discussion, we have drawn attention to many of the strategic 
dilemmas that Jasper identif ies. But here is the problem. Factional battles 
are often not what they seem to be about. They are often not even what 
activists think they are about. That means that a well-meaning activist who 
tried to convince the contenders to focus on the dilemma that was dividing 
them would not be especially successful. For example, when in 1964 and 
1965, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee was riven by a battle 
over the merits of participatory democratic organization, it seemed like a 
classic iteration of Jasper’s Organization dilemma. Some SNCC activists, led 
by executive secretary James Forman, argued that the organization’s new 
size and political stature demanded that it implement more hierarchical 
and centralized decision-making. Others, led by Mississippi organizer Bob 
Moses, protested that doing so would stif le the initiative that had been 
responsible for the group’s greatest successes.
The problem with this characterization is that the battle was also, and 
over time, centrally, about race. Proponents of participatory democracy, 
“freedom highs,” were cast as intellectual, self-indulgent, and white. “Hard-
liner” proponents of centralized and top-down organization were, increas-
ingly, black. By the end of the battle and the triumph of the hardliners, 
most whites had left the organization. So, perhaps one could say, in Jasper’s 
terms, that the real dilemma was the racial one. It was about the place of 
whites in an organization that had always been both proudly interracial 
and a predominately black student movement (the Extension dilemma). 
But that rendering would miss, f irst, the way in which the two battles were 
connected. In an important sense, the battle over organizational structure 
allowed black activists to begin to articulate their complaints about whites. 
It did not so much reflect preexisting racial conflicts as it helped to forge 
them, along with the collective identities on which they were based. Second, 
it would miss the fact that once participatory democracy had come to be 
seen as white (and as ideological, self-indulgent, as antithetical to power and 
strategy), it became diff icult to argue for participatory democracy, both in 
SNCC and in a variety of movements since then, as strategic (Polletta, 2005). 
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The larger point is that the very criteria for assessing options – as strategic 
or ideological, practical or naive – are shaped by cultural structures that 
predate this particular instance of decision-making.
We want to distinguish this point from a more familiar structuralist 
perspective. Such a perspective would claim to be able to predict contend-
ers’ goals in a factional battle from their social position. It would predict 
that veterans would have a stake in whatever options allowed them to keep 
the power that came with seniority while newcomers would be much more 
willing to rock the boat (Barakso, 2004; Staggenborg, 1991). Groups would 
often fragment along lines of race, gender, class, religion, and sexuality (Zald 
and Ash, 1966; Benford, 1989; Stark and Bainbridge, 1985). In this perspec-
tive, activists have agency, but the explanatory emphasis is on patterns of 
conflict that have their origins outside the group and have little to do with 
the actions of this group’s members. Groups’ structural position shapes how 
they understand what is at stake in a dispute and what they want from it.
We argue that what is structured is less people’s goals than how the 
options for meeting those goals are viewed: as strategic or ideological, as 
bourgeois or radical. These views are structured in the sense that they are 
logically arbitrary and they are resistant (though not immune) to challenge. 
Unlike a structuralist approach, this one would expect that most contenders 
would view the options in the same way. Indeed, the surprise is that they 
would do so, even though, given their goals, they might be expected to 
evaluate an option quite differently. For example, when the anti-nuclear 
Clamshell Alliance was wracked by a battle between members who were 
committed to strict consensus and those who were willing to relax the 
requirement of strict consensus in the interests of political eff icacy, most 
members interpreted it as a conflict between values of egalitarianism and 
instrumentalism. When, in a debate over whether to illegally occupy the 
Seabrook nuclear plant, some members argued that a plant occupation was 
not successful if it did not produce a “grassroots movement,’’ their position 
was seen as privileging egalitarianism over instrumentalism (Downey, 
1986: 370). But why was galvanizing local activism seen as the expression 
of an egalitarian commitment rather than an instrumental one – even 
by those who argued for it? In fact, initially it was not seen that way. The 
conflict between instrumentalists focused on stopping the construction 
of the Seabrook nuclear power plant and egalitarians committed f irst to 
eradicating domination within their own ranks developed over time. To 
understand the factional battle, we need to understand how some practices 
came to be associated with an egalitarian commitment and some came to 
be associated with an instrumental one.
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What is striking here is the association of particular strategies, tactics, 
targets, organizational forms, or deliberative styles with particular groups of 
people. To argue for that strategy, tactic, target, form, or style then is taken 
as a sign of one’s allegiance to that group. In similar fashion, to argue for a 
bureaucratic structure in the women’s liberation movement was to align 
oneself with men and the political establishment. That association was 
not only more important than assessments of bureaucracy’s effectiveness; 
it also structured assessments of bureaucracy’s effectiveness. To argue for 
participation in government-sponsored public forums in the 1990s South 
African environmental movement was to define oneself against the disrup-
tive protest tactics used during the apartheid era, and by association, against 
the radical commitments of that era (Barnett and Scott, 2007). To adopt a 
partisan style in the Brazilian student movement of the late 1980s was to 
identify oneself with opportunistic and corrupt party politics (Mische, 
2008).
Elsewhere, Polletta (2006) has argued that one can get at the symbolic 
shaping of strategic choice by studying the metonymic associations between 
people, on the one hand, and strategies, tactics, and forms, on the other, that 
emerge in internal movement deliberations. When SNCC workers attacked a 
“freedom high” penchant for loose structure as white and as the cause of the 
group’s organizational paralysis, they not only ignored the fact that many 
people arguing for loose structure, initially at least, were black; they also 
failed to explain how implementing top-down structure would supply the 
programmatic initiative that was desperately needed. When union off icials 
in the 1960s farm workers’ movement rejected boycotts and marches as “not 
the union way” (Ganz, 2000), the “union way” stood in for a variety of things: 
political secularism, an unwillingness to engage in moral and emotional 
appeals, and an approach that was not that of the civil rights movement or 
a religious campaign. The shorthand indicated the conventionality of the 
association; but it also prevented union representatives from considering 
tactics that might have served their unions’ cause.
As the examples above suggest, the symbolic associations that structure 
strategic choice are not set once and for all time. Indeed, they sometimes 
shift within a single movement organization over the course of a few years. 
Participatory democracy was appealing in SNCC in the early 1960s because 
it was seen as “black”; only a few years before it became decisively, and 
debilitatingly, seen as “white.” To say that marches were “not the union way” 
would have made little sense to labor activists for much of the movement’s 
history. Activists can also deliberately try to change the symbolic associa-
tions of a given option, as some feminists did with respect to bureaucratic 
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organizational forms in the 1970s and 1980s. They are sometimes successful. 
In other words, the cultural constraints created by the prevailing structure 
of symbolic associations can be overcome, just as a deficit of funding or the 
demobilizing efforts of a repressive regime can be overcome. But often they 
are not overcome, with predictable consequences.
Conclusion
Factional battles are absorbing and enervating. Contending groups often 
have a sense that everything is at stake in the battle; that what might seem 
to outsiders a trivial tactical difference is actually a dispute about what the 
organization most fundamentally is. We have argued that they are not wrong. 
There are often diff icult strategic dilemmas involved in factional battles 
but there are also questions about whose organization or movement it is: 
whites or blacks, newcomers or veterans, radicals or moderates. What makes 
it complicated is that those identity questions are often expressed – and 
experienced – in terms of strategy. Veterans argue for the tactical superiority 
of an option because it is their tactic. What makes it even more complicated 
is that once a strategy, tactic, or form gets associated with one social group 
(with whites or radicals, newcomers or men), it becomes difficult to argue for 
or against the option without being heard as arguing for or against the group.
The latter is just one of the ways in which groups outside the movement 
organization shape the battles that take place within it, albeit, in this case, 
through symbolic association rather than direct action. In this chapter, 
we have argued against the standard treatment of factionalism in terms of 
the organizational conditions that facilitate or inhibit it. Instead, we have 
depicted activists interacting with a variety of actors, within the movement 
and outside it. When the police clamp down on protesters, some within 
the group may argue for pulling back and others for pressing ahead more 
assertively. Their arguments may be strategic; they may be strategic and 
emotional; they may be emotional posing as strategic. When another move-
ment group that this movement group admires pushes it to take a particular 
line on membership or tactics or targets, some within the group may argue 
for the staying true to the group’s original mission on ideological grounds; 
some within the group may argue for doing that on strategic grounds; and 
some may argue against doing that – either on strategic or ideological 
grounds. External actors such as the police, government agencies, other 
movement groups, and the media push movement groups into making 
choices and often those choices divide group members.
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Rather than seeing organizational schism as the inevitable denouement 
of factional battle, we have pointed to several factors – some clearly within 
the control of activists, others less so – that may play a role in moderating 
or resolving factional disputes and preventing organizational schism. But 
even an organizational schism does not necessarily spell the demise of 
the relationship. In a second departure from the standard treatment of 
factionalism, we have rejected a view of factionalism leading inevitably to 
permanent organizational schism. A group that breaks away in fury from its 
parent organization may end up working collaboratively with it. The ferocity 
of the schism seems to matter less to the prospects for future collaboration 
than the group’s assessment down the road of the benefits of working with 
their former antagonist. Again, however, it is diff icult to separate strategy 
from identity: radical groups might be served well by collaborating with 
moderate groups, but they are unlikely to even consider that possibility.
In sum, activists are strategic actors as much when they battle one 
another as when they cooperate. They are not only strategic actors, how-
ever, and their ideas about what counts as strategic are shaped by cultural 
associations that they sometimes challenge but more often do not.
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2 Fractal Arenas
Dilemmas of Style and Strategy in a Brazilian Student 
Congress1
Ann Mische
The dilemmas underlying all forms of social movement mobilization can be 
diff icult to see from the standpoint of movement success. When things go 
well, it seems obvious that the choices and trade-offs made along the way 
were the right ones for the right times; any previously experienced tensions, 
ambivalences and uncertainties are easy to sweep under the carpet of 
memory. When things do not go as planned – despite the skilled, committed 
and strenuous efforts of organizers – such dilemmas can become more 
evident to the retrospective eye (although postmortem evaluation sessions 
can be painful and diff icult). But when we observe a fraught episode of 
movement breakdown unfolding forward – watching the hopes, strategies, 
mobilization efforts, disappointments, and repair attempts of contending 
camps develop interactively over time – those dilemmas can leap into clear 
relief. In such episodes, the tensions generated by the internal complexity of 
movement arenas become particularly salient and visible, and the interac-
tion of durable relations, individual choices, and situational contingency is 
particularly potent and f ierce.
In this chapter, I analyze a case of the breakdown of an internally frac-
tious movement arena, looking at the interaction of leadership styles and 
strategies in the dispute over power in a flagship student organization. I 
focus on the often contentious political arenas that are internal to social 
movements, in which different camps, factions, and leaders dispute or-
ganizational power, access to resources, ideological platforms, action plans, 
and coalitional tactics. Beyond these explicit stakes, there is often a deeper 
symbolic contest as well. Actors are disputing the meaning and practice 
of core political values – democracy, justice, revolution – as differentially 
interpreted and performed by movement actors. While these symbolic 
battles are conditioned by – and aim to direct and control – the movement’s 
positioning in broader political f ields, they are also directed internally, 
toward the local “rules of the game” and the formal procedures and informal 
practices by which the movement itself is organized.
I discuss how these dynamics unfolded in the 1997 annual congress 
of Brazil’s historic National Student Union (UNE), held at the Federal 
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University of Minas Gerais. This congress marked UNE’s 60th anniversary, 
a cause for ritual celebration of UNE’s historic role in the country’s debates 
and struggles. Thousands of student delegates gathered in Belo Horizonte, 
representing department-based student organizations from universities 
around the country. Most students were also associated with national and 
local political factions linked to an array of left-of-center political parties. 
The congress began with high hopes from the contending camps. UNE’s 
governing faction (associated with the Communist Party of Brazil [PCdoB]) 
hoped to build bridges with rival factions and perhaps create a united 
mega-slate. An emergent alliance of left-wing parties and factions hoped 
to create a “unif ied front” of the left to contest control of UNE. And the 
moderate center-left factions hoped to expand their visibility and share of 
the leadership pie.
However most of these efforts fell through as the congress imploded, leav-
ing all of the political forces except the communists split into pieces. Nearly 
a third of the registered delegates withdrew from the congress altogether 
in a dramaturgic display of public repudiation. Badges and banners were 
burned, T-shirts turned backwards, and angry drums resounded through 
the f inal plenary as furious delegates marched out of the stadium. Not only 
did the congress not end in unity (which no one had really expected), but it 
also resulted in the internal splintering of most of the forces and the rejec-
tion of the legitimacy of the congress altogether by a large proportion of the 
participants. While UNE was certainly not destroyed by this episode – it had 
too strong a position of symbolic and material value in the Brazilian political 
f ield – the near collapse of the congress intensif ied media critiques of UNE, 
left its scars on the contending factions, and contributed to a realignment 
of forces within the student movement.
Why did this political arena break down so dramatically? Why were the 
leaders unable to articulate the strong alliances that they had predicted so 
optimistically at the outset? And why did the tumultuous congress lead not 
simply to ideological and electoral polarization, but to the internal splitting 
of camps and mutual accusations of anti-democratic, morally unethical, 
and politically hypocritical behavior? In many of the postcongress internal 
discussions, this was chalked up to failures of “political skill” (habilidade 
política) on the part of leaders, who were not able to do the necessary 
“articulations” to stitch the expected alliances together. Social movement 
analysts might also note the importance of conjunctural factors having to 
do with the opportunities and constraints offered by the current politi-
cal situation in Brazil. In particular, the liberalizing reforms of the social 
democratic president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, created both polarizing 
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pressures and internal tensions for certain sectors of the left, contributing 
to the dilemmas and trade-offs at the congress.
While there are elements of truth to both leadership and conjunctural 
accounts, they miss key elements of the story. The near breakdown of the 
UNE congress in 1997 was not predetermined by the political conjuncture or 
a direct result of leadership failures; rather, the congress seemed to spin out of 
the hands of skilled, hard-working mediators at the last minute, leaving most 
of the participants stunned and chagrined. In contrast to these accounts, I 
argue that the unraveling of the congress was set in motion by the dilemmas 
generated by particular styles of leadership and communication in volatile, 
fractally structured arenas. The emerging dispute over styles of political 
practice was, I suggest, even more symbolically potent than the dispute over 
ideology or agenda. These styles were shaped by the positioning of groups and 
factions in multi-organizational fields, as well as by the trajectories of leaders 
through overlapping institutional sectors. Leaders who were highly skilled 
in particular modes of communication – oriented toward cooperation or 
confrontation, ideas or actions – that had served them well in certain contexts 
had trouble adapting their skills to a rapidly changing political situation.
The Fractal Structuring of Political Arenas
Social movements – especially ones that transcend the local scale and begin 
heading toward various degrees of institutionalization – are internally 
complex and often fractious entities. As many scholars have noted, it can 
be diff icult to delimit the boundaries of social movements, composed of 
participants with varying backgrounds, commitments, and organizational 
trajectories. Participants often f low in and out of movements over time 
as they juggle multiple commitments in activism and personal lives. The 
smaller, more homogenous and more intimate the movement (or movement 
group), the greater the chance it will generate a cohesive and solidaristic 
collective identity, as a number of recent scholars have shown (Friedman 
and McAdam, 1992; Polletta, 2002; Blee, 2012). As a movement expands, 
diversif ies and institutionalizes its procedures, it also increases the pos-
sibility for ideological and stylistic contention and heightens the material 
and symbolic stakes involved in organizational leadership and control. 
Jasper (2004; 2006) calls this the “extension dilemma”; expansion brings 
many benefits but also some trade-offs in relation to unity and coherence.
While many scholars have noted that movements have internal divisions, 
less attention has been paid to the fact that movement factions themselves 
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are often internally divided. Parties and factions often have formal and 
informal subfactions, sometimes gravitating along fined-grained ideological 
distinctions, but just as often swirling out of more subtle commitments to 
particular leaders, friendship groups, local organizational histories, or styles 
of political practice (and at times, several of these interwoven together). 
Participant accounts of these subgroupings – often in terms of ideological 
and stylistic aff inities – become the basis for the articulation of larger coali-
tions, caucuses, or institutionalized camps within a movement. These more 
visible alignments can take on symbolic, dramaturgic and regulatory lives 
of their own as a form of political discipline and mobilization, particularly 
when organizational control is at stake. But they often appear more stable 
and cohesive than they in fact are when you zoom the lens in more closely.
These divisions often have a fractal character: lower-level groupings 
and split mirror higher-level conf igurations, ref lecting core organizing 
tensions and dilemmas that reverberate up and down a political arena. 
Abbott (2001) argues that such fractal divisions provide both change and 
stability; groups are always breaking down, but the concerns of the losing 
side are often appropriated by (or remapped onto) the dominant side. Dis-
sident or hybrid groups reemerge, leading to further tension, generating 
cycles of split, conflict, and ingestion. Old ideas receive new formulations 
in successive cycles of debates, as core divisions are reconfigured in new 
alliance systems.
In political arenas such as those addressed in this book, such tensions 
become part of the strategic landscape. They provide opportunities for 
coalition-building and expansion (often via the appropriation of rival tactics 
and discourses), as well as the danger that one’s own coalition will dissolve 
or followers be attracted by a competing camp. Moreover, these tensions 
are only provisionally resolvable – and all resolutions involve trade-offs and 
sacrif ices – which means that any reconfiguration generates new conflicts 
and dilemmas. In many social movement arenas, divisions between “moder-
ates” and “radicals” (or between institutionalists and agitators, or between 
consensus-builders and combativos) cause tensions between and within 
camps, frequently generating further internal splits, hybridizations, or 
bridging efforts.
In the Brazilian case, the student arena was structured by the associa-
tion of most of the delegates with political parties and organized factions, 
although these weren’t the only aff iliations the students brought with them 
into the arena. Many of them participated in other kinds of activism (either 
concurrently or in the past), ranging from church-based popular move-
ments in poor communities to labor unions, NGOs, anti-discrimination or-
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ganizations, and professional associations. All voting delegates represented 
independent student associations (centros acadêmicos) based in university 
departments; the fact that they were elected “at the base” – rather than at 
lower-level regional congresses – became an important item of contention 
in the 1997 congress.
At stake in the congress was control of the directorate of the National 
Student Union (UNE), Brazil’s traditional student organization, which 
had a long and celebrated history going back to the 1930s. Many of Brazil’s 
politicians, judges, and other public leaders had wet their political feet in 
the historic organization, which prided itself on being present at the major 
moments in contemporary Brazilian history. After decades of repression by 
Brazil’s military dictatorship, UNE felt itself to be back on its feet, resuming 
its historic role in defining Brazil’s education policy and intervening in other 
civic questions of the day. At the same time, it had also been subjected to 
a barrage of recent criticisms in the media as well as from some student 
groups, which objected to what they saw as an overly partisan, adversarial 
climate, lack of attention to issues of racial and gender discrimination, and 
lack of internal democracy. Despite these criticisms, most student factions 
were heavily invested in competition for control of (or failing that, a seat 
in) UNE’s directorate. Leadership in UNE gave student activists a voice in 
higher education debates, along with a national media platform, access to 
infrastructure and resources, and a symbolic position from which to launch 
careers in a variety of political and professional arenas.
Partisan divisions within the student movement reflected alignments 
and oppositions in the larger political arena, including local and national 
governments as well as specialized sectors such as the labor movement. 
The 1997 UNE congress took place amid a deepening split in the left over 
how to respond to the liberalizing reforms of President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, the sociologist turned politician who had been elected in 1994. 
Cardoso’s social democratic government made symbolic overtures toward 
civic organizations at the same time as it pursued policies of global eco-
nomic integration, privatization, and institutional reform. This infuriated 
the radical left while moderates struggled over whether to participate in 
government-sponsored forums on education and other issues. These recur-
ring conflicts reflect what Jasper (2006) calls the “radicalism” and “naughty 
or nice” dilemmas, with tendencies for radicalization and moderation each 
turned into symbolic virtues and deployed as means of distinction from 
opposing groups. This tension generated some of the mutual accusations of 
“appeasement” and “rigidity” that opposing camps of the student movement 
hurled at each other.
60 Ann mIsche 
The major partisan alignments going into the 1997 congress are listed in 
Table 1. For most of the period since UNE’s postdictatorship reconstruction 
in 1979, UNE had been controlled by the youth of the Communist Party 
of Brazil (PCdoB), with a short interval of control by the Workers’ Party 
(PT) from 1987 to 1991. The PT itself was divided by a complex system of 
formally recognized internal “tendencies”; in 1997 these could be grouped 
into alliances on the left and right of the party, themselves composed of 
several internal groups, each with their own leadership and base. On the 
far left side of the ideological spectrum were several radical Trotskyist 
factions, some organized as semi-autonomous tendencies within the PT 
(e.g., O Trabalho), while others constituted their own political parties (such 
as the PSTU [Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unif icado]). On the 
other end were a number of socialist, popular democratic and democratic 
labor parties, with their own loose alignments and internal tensions (PDT 
[Partido Democrático Trabalhista], PPS [Partido Popular Socialista], PCB 
[Partido Comunista Brasileiro]).
All of these “forces” (as they referred to themselves) considered themselves 
to be in opposition to Cardoso’s social democratic (PSDB) government. 
These partisan groupings in turn launched “theses” – often with colorful, 
stylistically resonant names – stating their initial platforms on issues related 
to national politics, educational policy, and the internal structure and 
procedures of the student movement. These “theses” were the starting 
point for the negotiation of electoral slates for UNE’s proportionally elected 
Table 1 Major partisan alignments in the 1997 Congress of UNE
 
Political parties/factions Congressional “theses” and affiliation profiles 
Communist Party of Brazil 
(PCdoB).  Controlled UNE from 
1980-87 (after reconstruction) 
and since 1991 
“One Step In Front”: Deeply invested top and mid-level 
leadership involved in partisan, student and socialist 
organizations; looser but disciplined base.   
 
Workers’ Party (PT) 
Controlled UNE from 1987-91; 
divided by complex system of 
internal “tendencies” 
RIGHT: “Pleasure in Transforming”:  highly partisan top 
leadership; mid-level involvement in specialized/professional 
student movement; less deeply invested “festive” base.  
LEFT: “I Won’t AdaPT”: Politically “dense” leadership with 
strong and deep overlap with student, labor, popular and 
professional movements. 
Radical Trotskyist parties  
(PSTU, O Trabalho) 
 
“Full Reverse” and “Not One More Day for FHC”: Deeply 
embedded militancy often involved in popular and labor 
movements in addition to student movement.  
Socialist/Populist/Popular 
Democratic (PDT, PPS, PCB) 
“Turning the Tables,” “Constructing the Future,” “I’m Crazy”: 
Student and partisan involvement with less cross-sectoral 
investment of base; some tendency toward clientelism. 
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directorate. Most forces had a stronger chance of winning leadership slots 
through coalitions rather than running alone, although those coalitions 
were only settled through intensive negotiations over the course of the 
congress.
Modes of Communication and Stylistic Tensions
As Table 1 indicates, the political forces varied in internal composition, 
including in their members’ trajectories through and aff iliations with other 
kinds of activism. As I have discussed in more detail elsewhere (Mische, 
2008), these varying aff iliation prof iles contributed to important differ-
ences in their styles of political communication, with fractal tensions visible 
between and within camps. By styles, I refer to the performative dimension 
of political practice, that is, how participants communicate their identities, 
purposes, and relations in interaction settings (see Goffman, 1974; Goffman, 
1981; Eliasoph, 1996; Eliasoph and Lichterman, 2003; Lichterman, 2012; Mis-
che, 2008). Styles do not necessarily involve one singular, all-encompassing 
set of practices, but rather are composed of the ways in which people switch 
between what I call modes of communication – similar to what Goffman 
calls “footings” – in particular relational contexts.
Four important modes of communication in democratic politics are 
summarized in Table 2, organized along two dimensions (collaborative 
versus competitive and oriented toward ideas versus actions). I refer to these 
as exploratory dialogue, discursive positioning, reflective problem-solving, 
and tactical maneuver. We can see these four modes as f inding justif ication 
in the ideas of Habermas, Gramsci, Dewey, and Machiavelli, respectively, 
at least as they have entered into practical political philosophy as it cir-
culates within these (and other) movements. What I am calling a “style” 
refers to the patterned ways in which actors in particular institutional 
contexts emphasize, combine, avoid, and switch between these different 
communicative modes.
Each of these four modes represents a typif ied form of talk in group set-
tings, as well as a valued model of political practice more generally. In addi-
tion, each has characteristic strengths and weaknesses, which can translate 
into dilemmas in political practice.2 The choice to engage in any of these 
modes of communication involves trade-offs: more focus on open-ended 
dialogue may entail less ideological clarity or practical resolution; a f ixation 
on resolving practical problems may entail less tactical f lexibility or long-
range transformative vision; strong assertion of identity and boundaries can 
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block possibilities for mutual learning and coalition-building; adeptness 
in negotiation and bargaining can lead to a loss of idealism and a cynical 
perception of one’s activism by oneself and others.
However, we should note that such performances are more than just 
freely exercised “choices”; they are also skills and routinized practices 
learned through previous trajectories through particular political and 
institutional contexts. Skills that serve people well in one context may fall 
flat in others, or leave them ill-equipped to deal with changing or emergent 
situations. Leaders may become locked into accustomed ways of responding 
to problems and challenges, f inding it hard to see alternative forms of 
communication that might get them through an impasse.
Table 2 Discursive practices in four modes of communication




 open-ended discussion,  
moving toward consensus 
 tentative, exploratory or 
experimental exchanges 
 attempts to draw the other out, 
understand what they mean  
 careful listening and subsequent 
rethinking of positions 
 
STRENGTHS 
 allows oxygenation of ideas, 
considering other points of view 
 
WEAKNESS: 
 tendency toward idealism: 
detached from practical and 
political consequences 
 
DISCURSIVE POSITIONING  
(Gramsci) 
 construction of boundaries: 
similarity and difference  
 articulation of subject position:  
as whom you are arguing 
 adversarial self-righteousness; 
moral-ethical critique 
 attempt to build camps and 




 recognizes incommensurability 




 tendency toward purism: lock-in 




 evaluation of strengths and 
weakness of historical 
experience 
 imaginative projection of 
possible future actions 
 weighing of group priorities; 
moral/practical consequences 
 consideration of values 




 contributes to institutional 
learning and collective 
adaptation to change 
 
WEAKNESSES 
 tendency toward 
appeasement: avoidance of 
conflict or dispute 
TACTICAL MANEUVER  
(Machiavelli) 
 control and manipulation of 
information, symbols, and rhetoric 
 cost-benefit analysis of tactics and 
strategies 
 backstage bargaining over 
alliances, rules, and resources 
 frontstage displays of prestige and 
support 
 tactical adaptation and flexibility, 
valuing ends over means 
 
STRENGTHS 
 facilitates institutional alliances, 
projects of command and control  
 
WEAKNESSES 
 tendency toward cynicism: 
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Moreover, actors may become morally, emotionally and politically in-
vested in a given stylistic orientation, so that any departure from it is seen as 
betrayal, hypocrisy, or lack of ethics. Jasper (2006) calls such commitments 
“tastes in tactics.” In fact, disputes that appear, on the surface, as disagree-
ments over programs and alliances may more accurately revolve around 
questions of style, that is, the models of thought and action that actors think 
are (or should be) in play. The weaknesses that are inherent in a given style 
become grounds for ethical condemnation, with little acknowledgement of 
the strengths of the communicative practices involved.
Contending Styles among Partisan Forces
During the 1997 UNE congress, the contending forces had recognizably 
different stylistic orientations. While these styles were routinized and 
institutionalized in various ways, they were not static and f ixed. Rather, 
many of the groups were undergoing a process of internal reevaluation of the 
practices that they considered to be ethically, politically, and institutionally 
desirable, generating fractal stylistic divisions within the groups. Figure 1 
maps the major political forces onto the four communicative modes. The 
main locations of the forces in Figure 1 are based on history and reputation, 
while the arrows note their internal stylistic complexity, that is, the extent 
to which their members were engaging, or considering engaging, in modes 
Figure 1 Fractal stylistic orientations among partisan forces
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One Step in Front 
(PCdoB)  






(PDT, PPS, PSB) 
 
64 Ann mIsche 
other than what was generally considered (by themselves and others) to 
be their dominant mode.
All the political forces had at least some fractal tendency toward the 
Machiavellian mode of tactical maneuver, concerned with seeking and 
maintaining institutional control. This was primarily represented through 
their top-level leaders, who were most invested in the contest for control of 
the national student organizations, but students at all levels who engaged 
in local leadership contests had a taste of this. The institutional structure 
of the UNE congresses supported (and even demanded) this mode, since 
leaders had to dedicate a good part of their energies to tactical alliance-
building, backstage bargaining, and frontstage displays of symbolic power 
in the battle for control of the organization. Not all of the mid-level or “base” 
activists were as invested in the struggle for institutional control; some 
were downright scornful of the strongly adversarial, sectarian orientation 
of the student movement. At times they were even suspicious of their own 
leaders, whom they suspected of “selling out” the ideological and/or stylistic 
orientation of the group in the interest of political “opportunism” or projects 
of political self-promotion.
In their primary positioning, the right and left camps of the PT tended 
to gravitate toward the upper two quadrants (focused on ideas), while the 
socialists and communists gravitated toward the lower half (focused on 
actions). While all factions created their platforms with care, the debate 
over ideas among PT activists had an organic vigor that I did not see in most 
other camps. Within the PT (as well as in some Trotskyist groups, many of 
which were or had been associated with the PT), any individual or group 
could develop and circulate their “texts” without the top-down centralism 
of the more traditional left. However, PT activists differed in their emphasis 
on the consensual or adversarial character of ideas. In the left wing of the PT 
and the Trotskyist groups in particular, ideological positioning was taken 
very seriously (often with left-flank pressure toward even more ideological 
clarity and consistency). The right wing of the PT had more of a tendency 
toward ideological looseness, with a stronger commitment to open-ended 
dialogue and consensus-building (and had right-flank pressure toward even 
more of a dialogic orientation in order to attract less ideological recruits 
at the base).
In contrast, the socialists and communists focused more on the prag-
matic and tactical modes. For the socialist and populist groups in the lower 
left quadrant, this meant a stronger emphasis on civic participation and 
institution-building. While all parties were critical of the Cardoso govern-
ment, for example, most of the socialist/populist camp advocated participat-
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ing in the education councils initiated by federal and local governments as a 
pragmatic means of influencing change from within the system (a position 
vigorously opposed by the left-wing groupings as co-optation and/or selling 
out). The right wing of the PT was ambivalent about these kinds of state-
sponsored forums but had more civic-institutionalist leanings, while the 
PCdoB saw such institutional participation as tactically important in order 
to establish a foothold in the apparatus of power. While the communists 
were seen by most of the other groups as oriented toward Machiavellian 
scheming (“they’ll do anything to win”), they had recently begun to make 
overtures in more dialogic and institution-building directions. They were 
concerned with what they called the “governability” of UNE, and were try-
ing to engage the other factions in a constructive and integrative manner so 
as to reduce the adversarial climate within the organization. However this 
was a recent development and not well trusted by the other forces, which 
still saw the PCdoB as focused on achieving institutional control at any cost.
Dilemmas of Alliance-Building
Styles are often important for relations-building, providing reasons for and 
against forming collaborations or alliances with other groups. Perceived 
weaknesses in communicative styles can be used as ethical and political 
weapons to discredit opponents. For example, the left PT activists associated 
with I Won’t AdaPT condemned the PCdoB as cynical, manipulative and 
authoritarian (i.e., Machiavellian), as well as willing to appease the forces 
of the right through its pragmatic stress on civic institutionalism. While 
they were not quite as harshly critical of Pleasure in Transforming, they were 
openly scornful of what they saw as their copartisans’ stylistic weakness; 
in their eyes, the right of the PT was ideologically mushy, overly idealistic, 
and lacking in combativity, as a result of its anti-dogmatic embrace of 
exploratory dialogue.
In contrast, the leaders of Pleasure in Transforming saw these same 
practices as demonstrating the stylistic virtues of their own group: a con-
cern with open dialogue and practical institution-building (as opposed 
to rigid ideological critique) as well as stronger attention to the personal 
learning and reflective experiences of their members. In these cases, styles 
become the metonymic stand-in for groups, in the symbolic shorthand that 
constitutes players within arenas (see Polletta, 2006).
These mutual stylistic evaluations played an important role in the stra-
tegic dilemmas of alliance-building that emerged at the congress. Figure 2 
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depicts each camp’s opening position in the form of a proposed “arc of 
alliances.” The preferred alliance of each force is darkly shaded, and those 
that it considered possible (but unlikely) have lighter shading.
The PCdoB off icially wanted to encompass everyone in a “unif ied slate,” 
although this was generally considered to be impossible. Pleasure in Trans-
forming seemed happy to include the socialists, uneasy in relation to the 
PCdoB, dubious about the left of the PT, and opposed to the radical Trotsky-
ists. The left of the PT (I Won’t Adapt) was hoping to construct a “united 
front of the left” in alliance with the Trotskyist groups; they categorically 
excluded the socialists and the PCdoB (on ideological and ethical grounds, 
respectively) and were conditionally open to the right of the PT (“if they 
decide that they are of the left”). The Trotskyists were willing to include 
all of the PT and the PCdoB, but under no terms would they ally with the 
socialists (the “parties of the right”). The socialists, in turn, rejected an 
alliance with the ideological left, openly courted the right wing of the PT, 
and were open but uneasy in relation to the PCdoB.
Given these opening tactical predispositions, there were a number of 
different ways the forces could have settled into electoral slates, depending 
on interforce negotiations. Note, however, how this configuration generates 
particular dilemmas and cross-pressures for Pleasure in Transforming. All 
of the forces, in effect, declared themselves willing to include the right of 
the PT in their coalitions; yet all of their potential allies (except for the 
PCdoB) had restrictions against its other potential partners (i.e., the left of 
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the PT rejected the socialists, the socialists rejected the left of the PT and 
the Trotskyists, and everyone else was uneasy, if not downright hostile, 
toward the PCdoB).
Moreover, any of the alliances could be perceived by the activists within 
Pleasure in Transforming as an ideological, organizational, or ethical self-
betrayal. If they allied with the left of the PT, they would betray many of 
their own proposals, which tended to place more stock in institutional 
change – and less on class confrontation – than their copartisans. If they 
allied with the socialists, they risked accusations of partisan betrayal for 
siding with the “parties of the right.” And if they allied with the communists, 
they risked ethical self-betrayal, given their historic condemnation of the 
style and method of the PCdoB. While the camp leaders enjoyed being 
courted in the early phase of the congress, these dilemmas intensif ied over 
the next few days as the negotiations developed.
Positioning and Negotiation
Some of these tensions were visible in the physical positioning of the forces 
in the collective space of the congress. All the major plenaries took place 
in a large sports arena near the university, with the contending forces ar-
rayed in the bleachers in a semi-circle facing the platform with speakers 
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and presiding student leaders at the front. For the most part, the seating 
arrangements were traditional, with the more left-wing forces on the left 
side of the stadium, the socialists and independents in the middle, and the 
reigning PCdoB on the right side.
This year, however, an important difference in the seating arrangement at 
the opening plenary signaled the potential realignments in play. The youth 
in Pleasure in Transforming were seated around the right curve, between 
the socialists and the PCdoB, a departure from this group’s usual position 
further left, next to their copartisans in the left of the PT. The physical 
separation of Pleasure in Transforming from the rest of the PT, along with 
the proximity to the PCdoB, signaled the heightened climate of factional 
dispute within the PT as well as the new spirit of collaboration with the 
PCdoB, at least among top leaders. However, the grassroots delegates as-
sociated with Pleasure in Transforming had a marked tendency (infuriating 
to the leadership) to disperse around the stadium, perhaps reflecting their 
weaker ideological commitment as well as their discomfort at this unusual 
location next to the PCdoB.
This stadium was the location of the major deliberative plenary sessions, 
in which the congress voted on proposals in three main areas: the National 
and International Conjuncture, the University, and the Student Movement. 
The proposals were gathered through discussion groups, organized by a 
“systematization committee,” and boiled down to consensual vs. noncon-
sensual resolutions. Most resolutions were consensual, requiring simply 
a blanket mass approval. However, in the controversial areas, contending 
proposals were hotly defended in speeches by top leaders, accompanied by 
dramaturgical displays of support and repudiation.
The 1997 congress witnessed an especially heated debate about UNE’s 
position on national alliances, that is, on whether to advocate a broad 
“democratic and popular” front in opposition to neoliberalism and the 
Cardoso government, or whether to support a class-based alliance for a 
“government of the workers,” which would “unify students and workers, 
of the country and city.” The “broad front” proposal was supported by the 
PCdoB, the right of the PT and the socialist bloc, while the “classist front” 
proposal was supported by the left of the PT and the radical Trotskyists. 
Votes on these platform issues, in turn, were used to measure the relative 
strength of the forces in the f inal dispute of leadership slates and thus to 
determine coalitional strategies. In the opening plenary, the “broad front” 
proposal won by a surprisingly small margin, intensifying the left-wing 
camps’ perception that they were within reach of a historic consolidation 
of the “class-based” left.
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Over the f ive days of the congress, the negotiations within and between 
the camps were intense. Sometimes these took the form of small leadership 
meetings in back rooms, while at other times they consisted of internal 
plenaries in which delegates could debate and vote on their groups’ propos-
als and alliances. Top-level leaders were constantly shuttling between these 
internal discussions and their negotiations with leaders of other forces. 
Some of these internal plenaries did little more than approve the leadership 
accords worked out behind the scenes, while others (particularly those of 
the PT) had lively, contentious debates.
Within the Pleasure in Transforming camp the debates were particularly 
anguished, as participants considered which among their contending “suit-
ors” they should ally with in the f inal slate (or alternatively, whether they 
were strong enough to go it alone and still gain a leadership slot in UNE’s 
directorate). Tensions between state delegations as well as between top and 
mid-level leaders were beginning to appear, particularly in relation to the 
possibility of forming an alliance with the communists. Those in favor of 
allying with the PCdoB – mostly national and São Paulo leaders – argued 
that the alliance was important to combat sectarianism, dogmatism and 
ideological rigidity in the student movement. Those opposed – particularly 
mid-level leaders engaged in state and local disputes with the PCdoB – said 
it would be a betrayal of their historical critique of what they saw as the 
manipulative and cynical political practice of the communists.
Note the critique of style as a justif ication for (or against) particular 
alliance strategies, and in defense of a particular group self-conception: 
“we” should choose partners who are neither dogmatic nor cynical. Allying 
with the socialists was one solution to this dilemma, although it meant 
splitting further with their copartisans in the left of the PT, painful to many 
at the base. And some of the top leaders (as good Machiavellians) worried 
that joining with the socialists would give them a less powerful position in 
UNE’s directorate than an alliance with the PCdoB.
Confrontation and Crisis
By the second major plenary session, on the afternoon of the fourth day, it 
looked like alliances were coming into focus. The forces of the left – I Won’t 
AdaPT, Full Reverse, Not One More Day – were on the verge of settling an 
accord for a unif ied slate of the “classist” left, with a few thorny details on 
the distribution of leadership positions still to be worked out. Meanwhile, 
Pleasure in Transforming was engaged in heavy flirtation with the social-
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ists and independents, dramatized by wearing each other’s stickers and 
intermingling in the bleachers to a joyful dance beat. Leaders reported 
that a tentative agreement between these forces had been reached, which 
was a relief to many Pleasure activists who had been wary of an alliance 
with the PCdoB. Meanwhile the PCdoB, conf ident of its own numerical 
dominance, continued negotiations for a unif ied slate even as it won every 
vote, joined on nearly all of them by the right of the PT. Before the day was 
through, however, this nearly settled configuration of forces erupted into 
confrontation and crisis, as the contingencies of the evening triggered the 
fractures between and within nearly all of the opposition forces.
What brought the crisis to a head was a controversial proposal by the 
youth of the PCdoB to change the rules of the game. They proposed changing 
the election of delegates to UNE’s national congress to a “funnel” procedure, 
in which UNE delegates would be elected in prior regional congresses, 
rather than elected directly in “base” student organizations in university 
departments. The PCdoB claimed that it was adopting a historic proposal 
of the PT for the democratization of the student movement, a claim hotly 
contested by the left of the PT. The left saw the proposal as an attack on 
the democracy of the student movement and an attempt to “distance UNE 
even more from the students” through smaller, more manipulable regional 
congresses. The PCdoB argued that smaller regional congresses would allow 
for a higher quality of political discussion and problem-solving than was 
possible in the current huge and sprawling national congress.
Note the dispute over style: the left argued that the proposal smacked of 
Machiavellian manipulation, while the PCdoB declared that it would turn 
UNE toward Deweyian deliberation. Here we see a vivid reflection of the 
“rules” dilemma (Jasper, 2006), in which efforts to change an arena end up 
embroiled in the rules of that same arena. The student opposition from 
the PT had been trying for over a decade to change the electoral process 
within UNE, through proposals for direct elections, regional congresses, 
and more inclusion of “course-based” organizations (a PT stronghold). While 
these proposals were defended in the name of “democracy,” PT activists 
clearly thought these reforms would provide an advantage for their own 
(more mass-based) approach to politics. The PCdoB successfully resisted 
these proposals, and the PT was forced to play by existing rules in order to 
enjoy the material and symbolic benefits of UNE directorship. However, 
at the 1997 congress, the PCdoB itself attempted to change the rules by 
claiming that it was appropriating the ideas of the opposition. (In fact, the 
PCdoB’s “funnel” proposal was quite different from original PT plan for 
regional congresses, which would have maintained direct elections at the 
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base.) In the ambiguity and surprise at the stealthily launched proposal, the 
motives of the PCdoB were called into question, exemplifying the “sincerity” 
dilemma, in which appearances, reputation and motives may clash. As a 
result, the proposal for rule change was denounced as an anti-democratic 
coup rather than as a genuinely democratizing move.
The vote was called, following heated denunciations from the podium 
by most of the opposition leaders (with the exception of Pleasure in Trans-
forming, which was oddly silent, despite the fact that it was the only force 
that had a proposal for regional congresses as part of its precongress 
platform). As UNE off icials began counting badges raised for and against 
the measure, drums began rolling, chants were pounding, and the whole 
plenary underwent a shift. The socialist and independent delegates began 
to migrate toward the left of the stadium in order to join the left-wing forces 
and display a stronger density of votes against the measure. Meanwhile, 
the PCdoB delegates were shepherded into a more concentrated position 
on the right side to show votes in favor. The call “True delegates, elected by 
the base!” resounded from the left side of the stadium from the PSTU all 
the way over to the PPS, with the two percussion sections of these usually 
opposing groups exuberantly joining forces. The new configuration in the 
arena is depicted in Figure 4.
At this point Pleasure in Transforming entered into crisis. Their delegates 
had in fact approved the proposal for regional congresses in their internal 
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plenary earlier in the day, as part of an accord with the PCdoB. However at 
this dramatic moment, the vote took on other proportions, which superseded 
the merits of the proposal itself. This was the principal polarizing moment 
of the congress, the one slight chance that the unif ied opposition might 
have to defeat the PCdoB. Even if they lost, it was a dramaturgic chance 
to deliver a general repudiation of the politics of the PCdoB in the student 
movement. As such, some of the orange-shirted Pleasure in Transforming 
activists began to move left toward the rest of the opposition.
This evoked a storm of protest among the Pleasure leaders, who tried to 
discipline their base to move right toward the PCdoB. An anguished and 
angry discussion ensued in the bleachers, while the left side of the stadium 
joined in chanting “Come over here, Pleasure in Transforming!” The left of 
the PT further escalated the pressure by pushing the party loyalty button 
with the classic PT chant, “Party, party, is of the workers!” PCdoB leaders 
swooped over to see what the problem was, as the right of the PT huddled 
in furious debate, strongly worded in terms of loyalty and betrayal. With 
many of the delegates nearly in tears, the top Pleasure leaders f inally agreed 
to release their group members to vote their conscience and discuss it 
afterwards. At this point the huddle erupted and split into two parts, as 
half went to join the opposition and half entered the bleachers occupied 
by the PCdoB.
The proposal for regional congresses was approved by a very small 
margin. As the vote was announced, another sea change began in the 
stadium. The delegates of I Won’t AdaPT started f iling out of the arena in 
protest, as the stadium echoed with their ominous chant, “True delegates, 
elected at the base!” The radical Trotskyists in Full Reverse were furious at 
their allies’ departure from the plenary, as they needed their support on 
a couple of critical votes ahead. “Stay to f ight!” they chanted to their own 
furious drumroll.3
What followed was a long night of tense negotiations within and between 
the various opposition forces. The internal PT tendencies that composed 
I Won’t AdaPT were strongly divided about whether or not to exit the 
congress altogether and thus give up their chance at positions in UNE’s 
directorate. While all factions denounced the “authoritarian coup” of the 
funnel proposal, there was passionate disagreement about whether to break 
definitively with the practices of the PCdoB and rebuild the student move-
ment at the grassroots level, or stay within the historic student organization 
to try to build the “front of the left” from within. Here we see echoes of 
the “engagement” dilemma, and its f lip side, what we might call the “exit” 
dilemma, as cogently described by Hirschman (1970). Jasper (2006) discusses 
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these dilemmas in terms of the trade-offs involved in “switching arenas.” 
Actors may move to a new arena when blocked, or in order to “signal the 
seriousness of the interaction or conflict,” but this removes them from the 
local strategic advantages that come from “being there” in the original 
arena of conflict.
Within Pleasure in Transforming, emotions ran equally high about 
whether or not the group should enter into alliance with the communists, 
especially now that the socialist factions had angrily withdrawn from 
the near-settled alliance as a result of Pleasure’s “accord” with the PCdoB. 
They didn’t have the numbers to make it into UNE’s executive by going out 
alone, and the top leaders were determined to secure the vice presidency or 
another top position. However, the mid-level Pleasure leaders felt betrayed 
by the top-level negotiations and argued that they could not possibly defend 
an alliance with the PCdoB back in their home states and universities.
There were several other twists and turns in this drama over the course of 
that night and the next morning, but the upshot was further fragmentation 
and splintering. Pleasure in Transforming held an anguished late-night vote 
that narrowly tipped against the alliance with the PCdoB, causing angry 
protests against sectarianism by its right-flank leaders. However this vote 
was overturned the next morning in an internal plenary that approved the 
alliance with the communists, sparking a f istf ight and furious withdrawal 
by a group of mid-level leaders. In the f inal plenary of the congress, this dis-
sident Pleasure group entered the stadium with their orange shirts turned 
backwards (painted with the slogans “For ethics in UNE” and “I won’t sell 
myself”) and burned a group flag in repudiation of their own leadership.
After several equally tense internal plenaries, I Won’t AdaPT voted by a 
very close margin to exit the congress, which they did with dramaturgical 
flourish that included parading back into the stadium with chanted denun-
ciations and the burning of badges by some delegates. However, the losing 
factions within I Won’t AdaPT continued to have deep misgivings about 
the withdrawal; soon after the congress they split with the rest of the camp 
and ended up entering UNE’s directorate through backstage negotiations.
The withdrawal from the congress was furiously repudiated by Full 
Reverse, which shouted, “UNE in struggle, opposition, down with division!” 
as their near-allies made their f inal exit from the stadium. The Trotskyists 
launched their own slate and were strong enough to win an opposition slot 
in the executive. Several of the socialist parties also withdrew from the 
congress in protest, while small splinter groups from each of these joined 
what remained of Pleasure in Transforming in a broad but shallow alliance 
with the PCdoB. To no one’s surprise, the communist-led slate won once 
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again, and the PCdoB continued in f irm control of UNE, with Pleasure in 
Transforming gaining the vice presidency as a condition of the alliance.
Dilemmas of Style in Fractal Arenas
How can we account for the tumultuous ending and near breakdown of the 
1997 congress? Why did almost every force at the congress end up fractured 
(with the exception of the PCdoB)? To understand this breakdown, I argue 
that it is not enough to examine only environmental or conjunctural factors. 
While the larger political situation generated some initial divisions and 
cross-pressures, we further our understanding of the crisis by looking at 
communicative processes among players within the (literal and f igurative) 
arena of the congress.
These processes were driven in turn by fractal divisions and subdivi-
sons along both ideological and stylistic lines. While most factions were 
associated with a “dominant” mode of communication (oriented toward 
exploratory dialogue, discursive positioning, reflective problem-solving or 
tactical maneuver), in fact most of them had several different modes in the 
mix, generated in part by the multiple aff iliations and leadership positions 
of their members. These stylistic orientations, in turn, constrained the 
mediating skills of particular leaders as they attempted to respond strategi-
cally to the emerging crisis, generating painful dilemmas and trade-offs. 
Notably, the leaders of Pleasure in Transforming and I Won’t AdaPT were 
both criticized for lack of “habilidade politica,” that is, political ability, or 
what I call skill. In both cases their well-honed skills in mediation, while 
effective in other venues, were limited both by their habitualized practices 
and by their political and ethical commitments to particular modes of 
communication.
The most stylistically divided of the forces at the conferences was 
Pleasure in Transforming. As we have seen, there were stylistic tensions 
between top-, mid-, and low-level leaders, as well as between the different 
internal PT tendencies within the group, some of which veered in either 
more pragmatic-institutionalist or more dialogic-exploratory directions. 
They united in condemning what they saw as the narrow sectarianism and 
ideological rigidity of the traditional left (i.e., its reliance on Gramscian 
positioning) as well as the Machiavellian maneuver that they associated 
with the PCdoB. Nevertheless, while politically and ethically condemning 
these two competitive modes, they were drawn into them as well. The 
institutional structure of UNE demanded skill in tactical maneuver to 
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win space in the directorate, especially among the higher level leaders. 
Moreover, many mid-level Pleasure activists were concerned to show that 
they weren’t just naïve idealists or pragmatic accommodators, but could be 
combative and dispute hegemony as well (the “naughty or nice” dilemma). 
This contributed to their angry, principled break with their own top leader-
ship.
However, Pleasure’s leaders were less skilled in discursive positioning 
and tactical maneuver than their counterparts in I Won’t AdaPT and the 
PCdoB, and these stylistic weaknesses undermined their ability to respond 
to the crisis. While exploratory dialogue allows for exchange of ideas and 
consideration of other points of view, it can be diff icult to reach closure on 
political projects (and when such closure is required, it tends to be vague, 
idealistic, and ambiguous). This can contribute to the dispersion of ideas 
and people, as well as to a lack of commitment to positions. In this case, 
the base Pleasure delegates were so uncommitted to their own proposal for 
regional congresses that they abandoned it in a flash when cross-cutting 
partisan pressures besieged the group. Moreover, the group’s nonhierar-
chical, pleasure-oriented ethic also undermined collective discipline in 
“marshalling the troops,” a key component of the PCdoB’s repeated electoral 
success. As a result of these weaknesses in positioning and maneuver, 
dispersion was a chronic problem for Pleasure in Transforming, perhaps 
more than for any other force.
Within I Won’t AdaPT, the stylistic tension was different. The camp 
as a whole took its discursive positioning extremely seriously, debating 
ideological proposals thoroughly in order to build cohesion and commit-
ment throughout the camp. They spent most of the congress repudiat-
ing the Deweyian idea of bringing all of the forces of UNE into one big 
institutional tent, but rather worked hard to consolidate a clear boundary 
between the “classist” left (themselves and the radical Trotskyists) and the 
“forces of the right” (the communists, socialists, and social democrats). As 
a result of this intense effort in ideological and stylistic boundary work, 
the base of I Won’t AdaPT entered the congress with more commitment 
(and hence, less ideological or interpersonal dispersion) than Pleasure in 
Transforming.
However, this highly ideological mode also involved trade-offs that 
played a role in the congressional crisis. I Won’t AdaPT ’s strongly adversarial 
positioning helped to generate intra-camp cohesion, but it contributed to 
inflexible and absolutist evaluations of the other forces (a variation on 
the “Janus” dilemma, in which internal radicalism makes external com-
munication diff icult). They dismissed the proposal for regional “funnel” 
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congresses as anti-democratic, completely rejecting the PCdoB’s contention 
that this would allow for a higher quality of discussion. Rather, they saw the 
proposal as a cynical attempt at manipulation that needed to be ethically 
and politically repudiated. While there was probably some grounds for 
this skepticism, it meant that they were not willing to admit or engage 
the PCdoB’s new (admittedly partial and tentative) receptivity to dialogue 
and problem-solving in relation to the structural problems of the student 
movement. Instead, they decided to radicalize their critique of the anti-
democratic tendencies of UNE and exit the arena altogether, much to the 
chagrin of some of their own members and allies.
In these ways, the trade-offs built in to the dominant styles of Pleasure 
in Transforming and I Won’t AdaPT helped to undermine their projects 
and alliances. While Pleasure leaders stressed exploratory dialogue, these 
conversations were often idealized, ambiguous, and open-ended, and their 
pragmatic tendencies left them vulnerable to accusations of appeasement. 
In contrast, I Won’t AdaPT leaders were more adept at discursive positioning, 
but this reduced their tactical f lexibility in a moment of crisis.
These kinds of stylistic tensions and limitations were also evident in the 
PCdoB. The PCdoB was experimenting with a new, hybrid repertoire that 
maintained the party’s well-honed skills in tactical maneuver and hard-nosed 
institutional control, while cultivating more pragmatic and dialogic relations 
with other groups. They understood this as a response to their critics and as 
an appropriation of some of the stylistic qualities of other groups. The lack of 
trust from other forces toward their new approach shows the inherent weak-
ness of the Machiavellian mode, which tends to engender cynicism about mo-
tive and method. At the same time, the PCdoB contributed to the breakdown 
in communication through its own weak skills in cross-partisan articulation. 
The communist leaders’ forays into dialogue and problem-solving were still 
so tentative that they did not adequately discuss their reform proposals with 
the other forces. Afterwards, the leaders seemed bewildered and exasperated 
at the accusation that this was a last-minute coup. Clearly, the PCdoB did not 
exercise the mediating skills that might have allowed the contentious vote 
to go forward without blowing the congress apart.
In all of these cases, it was not simply lack of skills that was the problem; all 
of the leading players were highly skilled, committed activists. Rather the skills 
themselves contained the seeds of their own undoing. Stylistic proclivities 
and tensions generated strategic dilemmas for factional leaders, at the same 
time as they channeled the leaders’ responses to the emerging crisis. The 
leaders’ adeptness in (and political-ethical commitment to) particular styles of 
communication – as well as internal stylistic tension within the camps – con-
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tributed to the breakdown in communication and the fracturing of alliances 
and subgroups, along with the disruption of the UNE congress as a whole.
Lessons and Cycles
As Abbott (2001) has noted, fractal divisions contribute to both stability and 
change, via the mechanisms of appropriation, hybridization, dissidence and 
coalition formation. The tumultuous ending of the 1997 congress did not destroy 
the student movement, nor most of the factions involved. The “classist left” – 
including both those who exited and those who “stayed to fight” – reconfigured 
and within a few years had overturned the proposal for a funnel congress and 
consolidated its strength as an opposition force in the student movement. At a 
higher level in the fractally structured field, the alliance between the right of the 
PT and the PCdoB at the 1997 student congress contributed to the institutional-
ist coalition that elected President Lula a few years later. In counterreaction, 
a segment of the leftist factions withdrew from the PT altogether and formed 
their own political party, out of disillusionment with the policies and practices 
of the “moderate” President Lula. And so the fractal cycle continues.
For the purposes of this volume, the important lesson here is that fractal 
subdivisions within political arenas generate persistent dilemmas that can 
only be provisionally resolved with each new configuration of alliances and 
power relations. I have argued that these divisions are not just ideological, but 
also stylistic, shaped by shifting orientations toward collaboration and com-
petition, or toward ideas and actions. Those divisions reappear in successive 
cycles or waves – in part because each of the four modes of communications 
that I have described has characteristic strengths and weaknesses. Their 
strengths solve some political problems but generate others; their weaknesses 
invite repudiation and critique. Innovation often comes through hybridiza-
tion and bridging efforts, but these can be thwarted by their own histories 
and routines. Losing sets of ideas and practices often revive within or outside 
of the dominant force, generating new challenges, dilemmas, and realign-
ments. In this way, political arenas that seem stretched to the breaking point 
regenerate in new forms, yet bearing the same core tensions and dilemmas.
Notes
1. This chapter adapts, condenses and theoretically reformulates some of the 
ethnographic material presented in Chapter 9 of Ann Mische, Partisan Pub-
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lics: Communication and Contention across Brazilian Youth Activist Networks 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). It is used here with the 
permission of Princeton University Press.
2. These modes reflect many of the dilemmas described by Jasper (2006). The 
Machiavellian mode involves an intertwining of the Dirty Hands and Sin-
cerity dilemmas, while the Gramscian mode reflects some of the trade-offs 
involved in the Articulation and Radicalism dilemmas. The Deweyian and 
Habermasian modes both run some of the risks of the Universalism, Exten-
sion and Whose Goals dilemmas, with the Deweyian mode also reflecting 
the flip side of the Naughty or Nice trade-off and the Habermasian the flip 
side of Articulation. Many of these dilemmas are reflected in the account 
that follows.
3. The translation of these chants loses the resonant rhyming of the Portu-
guese wordplay. The four chants noted above consisted of the following: 
“Venha para cá, Prazer em Transformar!”; “Partido, partido, é dos trabal-
hadores!”; “Delegado, de verdade, eleito pela base!”‘ and “Fica pra lutar!”
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3 Beyond Channeling and 
Professionalization
Foundations as Strategic Players in Social Movements
Edward T. Walker
Social movements research has been subject to a growing body of criticism 
for being generally too movement-centric (Walder, 2009; McAdam and Bou-
det, 2012; Fligstein and McAdam, 2012), and, when scholarship does examine 
the role of external context in shaping movement practices and strategies, 
it focuses too heavily on the state (Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008; Walker, 
Martin, and McCarthy, 2008). Similarly, social movement outcomes research 
has been challenged for selecting on the dependent variable in the sense of 
searching for successful cases of collective mobilization (for critiques, see 
McAdam and Boudet, 2012; Burstein and Sausner, 2005). However, the turn 
toward new approaches to movements research – reflected in the diverse 
contributions to this volume – that highlight how contentious claims-makers 
are only one player among many pressing forward their interests in myriad 
societal arenas, helps to remedy this limitation and to widen our focus to the 
place of social movements in civil society, the state, and the marketplace.
This chapter encourages a rethinking of foundations and their place 
in social movements and advocacy more broadly. Consistent with the 
movement-centric focus of much prior research on contentious politics, 
analysts tend to see foundations as instrumental in promoting moderation 
and professionalization among the social movement organizations (SMOs) 
that receive their support through grants and in-kind contributions (Mc-
Carthy and Zald, 1977; Jenkins and Eckert, 1986; Minkoff and Agnone, 2010; 
Brulle and Jenkins, 2005). The central point in much of this research is that 
foundations tend to select more moderate organizations for support, in part 
because professionalization and moderation are linked, and grant-makers 
often require extensive compliance measures and reporting standards that 
only more professionalized organizations can meet (Brulle and Jenkins, 
2005). In addition, foundations funding SMOs face potential concerns about 
prismatic network effects (Podolny, 2001), such as the potential fallout for 
foundations that are connected to politically radical SMOs.
The focus of this research, then, still remains largely on the consequences 
for movement actors; that is, most research studies what foundation funding 
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means for the SMOs that receive support, with relatively little attention to 
the organizational and institutional dynamics of the foundations them-
selves (but see Ostrander, 1995; Silver, 1997; Silver, 1998). In addition, most 
of this research neglects other interventions that foundations make into 
social movements beside grant-making, such as the provision of techni-
cal assistance and direct facilitation of public participation in advocacy 
campaigns (Walker, McCarthy, and Baumgartner, 2011), or even through the 
creation of new organizations or whole sectors from the top down (Bartley, 
2007; Duffy, Binder, and Skrentny, 2010).
Moving beyond movement-centric perspectives, this chapter argues that 
the heavy scholarly focus on foundations’ role in channeling and professional-
izing movement activity has unnecessarily narrowed our understanding of 
the true scope of their engagement in collective arenas. Foundations, as or-
ganizations in their own right, face pressures of their own from their donors, 
their foundation peers, the state, and other stakeholders (see Anheier and 
Hammack, 2010). However, despite these pressures, foundations are nonethe-
less strategic in aligning the interests of their donors with the activities of the 
SMOs they fund. The study exploits evidence from corporate foundations in 
the health sector – highlighting interorganizational factors that shape their 
giving patterns, as well as their strategic alignment of grant-making with the 
interests of their donors – in order to evaluate these claims. This evidence 
illustrates how the organizational and institutional dynamics of foundations 
help to direct their strategic interventions in broader arenas. It also provides 
initial evidence of the scope of social movement influence on foundations.
I start by providing background on how foundations should be defined 
and how they affect social movements. Then, the core of the chapter (a) pro-
vides evidence of how the amount given by foundations is influenced more 
by the interorganizational and resource pressures faced by foundations and 
less (but still signif icantly) by the presence of SMOs and advocacy groups, 
and (b) shows how the recipients of giving by foundations often reflect the 
strategic interests of their donors. I conclude by drawing attention to the 
importance of a less movement-centric understanding of foundations as 
players in societal arenas.
Conceptualizing Foundations in Contentious Arenas
Although foundations in various forms have existed since antiquity, the 
modern grant-making foundation became a distinct organizational form 
in the late-19th-century United States (Prewitt, 2006: 355; Anheier and Ham-
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mack, 2010). At this time, US foundations shifted from their colonial-era 
model of a trust or bequest dedicated to a particular institution and moved 
toward applying the spectacular wealth of robber-baron magnates like John 
D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie to the pressing social issues of the day. 
They did so in a fashion that brought the ideas of the Protestant Ethic to bear 
by converting the spoils of capitalist accumulation into socially beneficial 
causes (Prewitt, 2006: 361-362). Since that time, the defining features of a 
foundation are that they have relatively permanent assets that are
not committed to a particular institution or activity, [which] provide 
a grant-making capacity reaching across multiple purposes and into 
the indef inite future. A permanent endowment attached to a broad, 
permissive mission is a def ining characteristic of present-day founda-
tions. This conf iguration provides considerable latitude for changing 
priorities as new conditions emerge and differentiates the foundation 
from a long tradition of bequests for a narrow purpose or particular 
institution, though in this … there are exceptions. The endowment also 
sharply distinguishes the foundation from the much larger number of 
institutions in the nonprof it sector that survive through membership 
dues, fees for services, government contracts, or product marketing. 
(Prewitt, 2006: 355)
Nearly a century before the contemporary movement for creating a more 
socially responsible business sector through corporate social responsibility 
(Lim and Tsutsui, 2012; Vogel, 2005), then, foundations helped convert the 
great fortunes accumulated through the capitalist system into concrete 
social benefits. In the weak state of the United States, foundations could 
serve the broader public good with resources gained through private en-
terprise and help to provide for citizen needs unmet by the state. Indeed, 
foundations were encouraged by the state to fulf ill such needs (Anheier 
and Hammack, 2010).
However, despite the historical legacy of providing an indirect justif ica-
tion for capitalist accumulation, the foundation sector has a long history 
of supporting citizen efforts to change policy, whether through social 
movements or through other forms of grassroots advocacy (Jenkins, 1998). 
Foundations are, some analysts suggest, at their core organizations that 
seek to improve society and generate positive social change (Prewitt, 2006: 
366; see also O’Connor, 2010).
They do so through a variety of means, including by providing support for 
social service delivery, supporting education and the creation of knowledge, 
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applying that knowledge through interventions in areas such as health 
policy, agriculture, environment, and development, making efforts to 
improve public policy and make institutions more accountable, and, most 
notably here, grant-making to SMOs and other policy advocacy groups. 
Importantly, although foundations tend to emphasize their support of social 
change initiatives, this need not imply an inherently progressive orienta-
tion. While the foundation sector is still dominated by socially progressive 
causes, conservative foundations have risen to prominence in the US since 
the 1970s (Stefancic and Delgado, 1996; Teles, 2010).
Indeed, foundations have provided substantial resources in support of 
mass social movements. This has been true not only through US-based 
social movement funding by such grant-makers as the Ford Foundation, but 
also internationally in foundation funding of grassroots NGOs involved in 
empowerment efforts. The latter include especially grassroots programs for 
economic development, as well as social enterprises such as micro-credit 
lending (Watkins et al., 2012). Foundations have been active in supporting 
the civil rights movement (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986), women’s rights (Goss, 
2007), grassroots urban community organizing (McQuarrie, 2010), and 
environmental issues (Brulle and Jenkins, 2005). And, as I describe below, 
they have engaged with health-based advocacy organizations as well.
A powerful refrain in research on how foundations support contentious 
politics is that foundations tend to be rather conservative in their approach, 
even if not in their politics (Jenkins, 1998; Brulle and Jenkins, 2005; Jenkins 
and Eckert, 1986). As Minkoff and Agnone (2010: 347) argue, there are 
two common narratives for how foundation funding of social movement 
activity leads movement groups in the direction of greater moderation. 
In one version, foundations more or less explicitly support more moder-
ate organizations in order to maintain their own elite position in society, 
with foundations serving as representatives of a sort of civic establishment 
(see Dye, 2002). Another version – which nonetheless leads to the same 
conclusion – suggests that the mechanism of moderation is that funded 
organizations need to survive and require resources in order to do so; 
these demands tend to encourage both moderation and professionalization 
among the SMOs that receive foundation funding (Brulle and Jenkins, 2005).
Research to support these suggestions is widespread, especially in 
highlighting the consequences of foundation funding on the governance, 
tactical mix, and goals of movement organizations. Following in the re-
source mobilization tradition of McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1977), Jenkins 
and Eckert’s (1986) classic study of patronage of civil rights organizations 
found that foundation support went predominantly to professionalized 
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groups such as the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund rather than 
grassroots civil rights organizations. Herbert Haines (1984) argued that 
the key mechanism of a “radical f lank effect” operated in the civil rights 
movement through a dynamic by which confrontational protest tactics by 
more radical actors helped to promote foundation funding of comparatively 
moderate civil rights groups.
Other work, by Brulle and Jenkins (2005: 159), f inds that foundation 
funding of environmental organizations favors more professionalized or-
ganizations and also more moderate discourses of environmentalism (such 
as preservation or liberal environmentalism) over more radical ones (such 
as environmental justice or deep ecology). Rojas (2007: ch. 5) shows how the 
Ford Foundation shifted its funding strategy away from African-American 
political organizations and toward professional academic Black Studies 
departments by the 1970s and 1980s. Additionally, Minkoff and Agnone 
(2010: 367) f ind that the “grants economy” for women’s and minority rights 
SMOs is dominated by a small set of large and well-endowed foundations, 
and that these foundations are “relatively risk averse” in that their politically 
evenhanded strategy has kept them from engaging in more path-breaking 
forms of philanthropy.
However, more recent investigations have challenged this focus of 
research on foundation support for social change initiatives, noting that 
foundations engage in contentious arenas in ways other than grant-making 
and providing moral support to the SMOs they select for patronage. These 
new studies show that the interests of a wide variety of stakeholders often 
drive foundation support, and that it need not necessarily involve the chan-
neling of movements into more moderate forms.
Bartley argues that in forest product certif ication, foundations “co-
ordinated their grant-making to build an organizational f ield in which 
disruptive protest and market-based forms of governance were at times 
synergistic rather than contradictory” (2007: 231, emphasis in the original). 
One part of Bartley’s argument is partially supportive of the dominant 
channeling model described above, in that foundations did indeed sup-
port forest certif ication rather than funding those SMOs who might 
boycott timber companies. Still, Bartley found that the development of 
certif ication programs involved a type of institutional entrepreneurship 
in which foundations were key players in the formation of a new sector, 
thus generating real social change through their programs. Similarly, in a 
study of a foundation created in response to a contentious land use battle 
over the redevelopment of a former airport site, Duffy, Binder, and Skrentny 
(2010) also showed how foundations can serve as elite players in the direct 
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mobilization of social change at the stage of policy formation (independent 
of much mass movement involvement).
Overall, these studies suggest that our view of foundations should 
not be so oversimplif ied as to suggest that they are either (a) powerful 
civic representatives of wealthy elite interests, or (b) well-intentioned-
but-nonetheless-influential agents of movement professionalization and 
moderation. Foundations themselves are strategic actors, but this need not 
mean that their actions necessarily promote inequality or reduce the power 
of social movements. And, although they are selective in their judgments 
of which SMOs or other causes are worthy of their support, foundations 
may be active in engendering broader social change even if promoting 
organization-level professionalization (for a similar point, see Clemens, 
1993; Clemens and Minkoff, 2004).
Understanding Foundations in Broader Arenas
Moving beyond more movement-centric approaches, I shift attention now 
to describing the multiple pressures faced by foundations within their 
institutional environments. Of course, outside of those foundations which 
are quasi-SMOs in their own right (Ostrander, 1995; Silver, 1997; Silver, 1998), 
for most foundations, funding social movement activism tends to represent 
only a modest portion of their grant-making. Considering this as well as how 
foundations influence movements in a variety of means beyond channeling, 
it seems worthwhile to take a step back and examine foundations in a 
broader context.
First, in the US context, foundations take four primary forms. Inde-
pendent grant-making foundations are the dominant form, and these 
foundations are characterized by a signif icant amount of diversity both 
in their primary fund sources and also in the recipients of their largesse. 
Corporate foundations, by contrast, receive the overwhelming majority of 
their funds from their corporate sponsor – especially during high-prof it 
years (Galaskiewicz and Colman, 2006) – and tend to focus their giving on 
areas of their sponsor’s market interest. I will say more about these below. 
Third, community foundations tend to be smaller and are often closely tied 
to the particular locality after which they are named. Lastly, operating 
foundations are def ined by the IRS as “a private foundation that devotes 
most of its resources to the active conduct of its exempt activities.”1 In 
practical terms, this means that an operating foundation engages more 
directly in areas beyond grant-making, through such activities as providing 
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technical assistance to other organizations (or other types of foundations), 
hosting conferences, publishing reports, and other practices that f it within 
their recognized exempt purpose.
In sum, although these types of foundations tend to differ in their fund 
sources, the scope of their grant-making, and the extent to which they 
engage in activities beyond grant-making, it is nonetheless the case that 
recipients of foundation grants are only rarely in a position where they need 
to be aware of these distinctions between foundation types (Prewitt, 2006: 
365); they matter more to the foundations themselves than their grantees.
These distinctions do, however, have particular sets of legal rules that 
apply to each type, and therefore shape the actions of foundations. Most 
signif icant is the rule that foundations in general are legally obligated to 
make annual distributions of their funds, or else face a 30 percent excise 
tax on the foundation’s income that was not distributed.2 The required 
annual distribution amount, known by the IRS as the “minimum investment 
return,” represents 5 percent of the combined market value of all assets held 
by the foundation with the exception of assets retained for uses that f it with 
the foundation’s purpose of tax exemption, as well as any indebtedness 
that results from the purchase of assets.3 These rules apply primarily to 
independent, community, and corporate foundations; operating foundations 
are not subject to the excise tax for the failure to distribute income, given 
that their IRS-granted tax exemption allows for regular activities well 
beyond grant-making.
There are also particular US federal laws that prohibit so-called “self-
dealing” in which those closely tied to a foundation receive grants or other 
benefits resulting from those ties. These individuals or organizations are 
known as “disqualif ied persons,” and self-dealing rules also vary somewhat 
depending on the type of foundation as described above. Certain types of 
individuals are almost always considered disqualif ied: foundation board 
members, off icers, any employee of the foundation, substantial contribu-
tors/donors to the foundation, family members of any of the prior four 
categories, and certain government off icials. In addition, companies, 
partnerships, trusts, or estates that are more than 35 percent owned by a 
person in any of the previous categories are also disqualif ied.
This has obvious implications for corporate foundations, which often 
have company executives on their board and also have particular rules that 
apply to the company’s off icers and/or executives not on the foundation’s 
board. Importantly, however, as I describe further below, these rules do not 
prohibit corporate foundations from making grants to organizations that 
benefit indirectly the business of the foundation’s corporate sponsor. Thus, 
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in some respects, the donations made by corporate foundations can serve 
as a covert (and yet fully legal and tax-exempt) marketing mechanism for 
those foundations’ corporate parents.
Corporate Foundations: Institutional Pressures and Strategic 
Interests
An ideal place to examine foundations as strategic players in collective 
arenas is found in the domain of corporate foundations in the health sector, 
especially in looking at the funding of advocacy by these foundations. I 
focus on corporate foundations in the health sector for a variety of reasons. 
First, corporate foundations are often overlooked in studies of the funding of 
contentious politics, despite the fact that they make up a substantial portion 
of overall foundation giving (Boris and Steuerle, 2006: 70). Second, although 
scholars have come to recognize the ways that social movements influence 
change processes within corporations (for reviews, see King and Pearce, 
2010; Walker, 2012a), relatively little attention has been paid to the role of 
corporate-sponsored foundations in mediating corporate engagement in 
contentious politics. Like other areas of corporate engagement in the public 
sphere such as grassroots lobbying (Walker, 2009; 2012b; 2014), corporate 
foundation grants may represent a means of cultivating the socio-political 
legitimacy of a company’s practices, products, and/or the f irm itself.4 Third, 
as I illustrate in greater detail below, corporate foundations often fund 
SMOs and other advocacy organizations, although they do so in a way 
that is not entirely consistent with the dominant “channeling” framework 
described earlier. Lastly, I focus on the health sector both because of the 
substantial resources in this foundation sector (given the health sector’s 
vast and growing share of the economy) as well as because of popular and 
scholarly concerns about how donations by health f irms toward health 
advocacy groups may often exploit public trust in seemingly independent 
advocacy organizations (Rothman et al., 2011).
I examine both (a) the factors that lead foundations to give greater (or 
lesser) amounts in a given year and also (b) which types of organizations 
are most likely to be the recipients of that giving. These questions allow 
me to address the question of how foundations engage in strategic action 
as players in broader arenas, both with respect to the interorganizational 
pressures they face and also in how they make strategic efforts to align their 
giving with the market and political interests of donors. To do so, I utilize 
two unique data sources about corporate foundations in the health sector 
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and apply these data to the two prior questions, respectively: (1) data from 
the IRS-990-PF tax return f ilings for all such foundations, (2) data from 
Foundation Center on the recipients of giving by these foundations.
Expectations
Thus, turning to the f irst question above, which pressures should be most 
relevant in encouraging foundations to give greater amounts in a given 
year?5 Foundation giving should in some part be shaped by (1) the presence 
of advocacy organizations that could receive their funds. However, shifting 
away from a movement-centric approach, I expect that corporate founda-
tion giving is affected more heavily by two interorganizational influences: 
(2) giving by noncorporate peer foundations in the same community as 
ego foundation (community pressures), and (3) giving by other corporate 
foundations in the same subindustry (for example, pharmaceuticals or 
health insurers) as ego f irm (industry pressures). I also expect (4) that giving 
by these foundations is influenced by the characteristics of the foundation’s 
corporate parent, especially in how heavily the f irm’s board of directors 
prioritized shareholder interests over other corporate priorities.
Regarding the recipients of foundation grants, I expect that (5) recipients 
are most likely to be SMOs and other advocacy organizations with goals 
consistent with the marketing and/or political interests of ego foundation’s 
corporate sponsor. In the health sector, these are often SMOs and other 
advocacy groups that raise awareness of the conditions that the corporate 
sponsor’s products help to treat.
Data
The data for this study, described in detail elsewhere (Walker, 2013), come 
from a broader study of giving by the largest f irms in the health sector both 
through corporate foundations (among those f irms with a well-established 
enough giving program to warrant the founding of a corporate foundation) 
and also through direct corporate giving. Of the leading publicly traded 
f irms in the health sector, 82 currently have corporate foundations, and 
this study focuses on giving amounts and benef iciaries among those 
foundations. The corporate foundations in the data are associated with the 
following industries: pharmaceuticals (32.9 percent), device manufacturers 
(19.5 percent), health care providers (19.5 percent), health insurers (15.9 
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percent), medical sales (9.8 percent), and medical research (2.4 percent). 
The study tracks giving by these f irms over the period 1995-2007, including 
in the statistical models only those foundation-years in which a foundation 
was in place (N=735 foundation-years). Thus, the mean f irm is observed for 
approximately 9 years during the window of the study.6
The dependent variable in the models presented in Table 1 below is the 
amount of real 2011 dollars given out by each corporate foundation in a given 
year. Data were extracted from the Core-PF data f ile held by the National 
Center on Charitable Statistics (NCCS).7 These data were culled from line 25 
of IRS Form 990-PF, in which foundations are asked to “enter the total of all 
contributions, gifts, grants, and similar amounts paid (or accrued) for the 
year.” A secondary dependent variable, illustrated in Figure 1 below, utilizes 
data from Foundation Center’s Foundation Directory Online to categorize 
the recipients of these foundations’ giving.
Independent variables are all lagged one year prior to foundation giving. 
These include, first, measures of the density of disease advocacy organizations 
in the health sector (also from NCCS), giving by other foundations in the health 
sector in the same metropolitan area (“community” effects), and giving by 
other corporate foundations in the same health industry (for example, pharma-
ceuticals or insurers; these are “industry” effects). In addition, models control 
for the number of “outsiders” on a company’s board of directors,8 as well as the 
corporate parent’s employee size, gross profits, and assets. All models control 
for the size of the local population in the company’s headquarters metropolitan 
area – foundations in large metropolitan areas might feel pressured to give 
more to charity – although these coefficients are not shown in Table 1.
Findings: Charitable Giving
Table 1 presents the f indings from a series of f ixed-effects regressions of 
logged foundation contributions to charitable causes in a particular year. 
Fixed-effects models are appropriate for the present purposes because 
of the study’s interest in accounting for unobserved heterogeneity at the 
foundation level, while also accounting for variation within foundations 
across years of observation.9
Model 1 includes only the effects of health advocacy organizations 
and f inancials of the corporate parent. Model 2 replaces the advocacy 
organization measure with variables associated with giving by peers in 
the foundation’s interorganizational environment. Model 3 includes all 
variables in the f inal estimation.
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First and foremost, the estimates in Table 1 suggest that giving does seem 
to be somewhat responsive to variation in the density of health advocacy 
groups in their local community. In particular, the coefficient for the disease 
advocacy measure shows that an expanding population of disease advocacy 
organizations is associated with a signif icant increase in the amount of 
corporate foundation giving in the following year, regardless of any f ixed 
characteristics of a particular foundation. Although it is well established 
that SMOs respond to expanded resource pools (McCarthy and Zald, 1973; 
1977), this evidence suggests that foundations also respond to changes in 
the advocacy organizing.
Still, a more important f inding is that a larger share of variation is ex-
plained by interorganizational influences and factors associated with the 
foundation’s corporate parent than with the influence of advocacy groups. 
In particular, foundations appear to be responsive to signals sent by other 
health-related foundations in their community that are not linked directly 
to a corporation.
Table 1  Fixed effects panel regressions of logged foundations giving on advocacy, 
interorganizational, and corporate parent characteristics
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Health Advocacy Groups





Community: Foundations in MSA (logged real $) 
Industry: Corp. Foundations in Industry (logged real $) --- 0.270* 0.239
--- (0.114) (0.124)
Corporate Parent Characteristics
Outsiders on Board (proportion) -2.732* -3.280** -3.472**
(1.085) (1.129) (1.088)
Employees (logged) 1.151* 0.367 0.257
(0.564) (0.414) (0.419)
Gross Profits (logged real $) 10.65 4.667 6.442
(5.534) (3.789) (3.642)
Assets (logged real $) -1.789 -1.295 -1.551
(0.978) (0.880) (0.844)
Constant -136.9 -77.71 -94.60
(72.13) (53.18) (52.49)
Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes
N Observations 658 422 422
R-squared 0.176 0.194 0.211
N Foundations 73 59 59
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Significance Levels : *** = p < 0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05
90 edwArd t. wAlKer 
Corporate foundations, then, appear to take their signals from their 
noncorporate peers, and these estimates indicate that a 10 percent increase 
in giving by peer foundations in a f irm’s community is associated with an 
increase of approximately 8.49 percent in the giving by corporate founda-
tions. They are also especially responsive to one particular characteristic of 
their corporate parent: the number of members of the company’s board of 
directors who are “outside” members without a direct tie to the company’s 
executives (such as, for example, also serving as CEO). Each additional 
percentage point increase in outside board members is associated with a 3.6 
percent drop in foundation giving in the following year. Thus, it appears that 
these foundations are also swayed to some extent by corporate practices 
and the ability of outside directors to press for the interests of shareholders 
in reducing the “agency cost” of philanthropic giving.
Interestingly, the other measures show mixed results. Foundations with 
corporate parents who see changes in their employee bases, levels of profit, 
or overall assets do not experience signif icant changes in the amount they 
contribute in the following year. The models also show inconsistent effects 
of the interorganizational pressure represented by a f irm’s industry peers, 
such that the variable is not signif icant in the f inal model. It appears that 
the key interorganizational pressure influencing foundation giving is found 
at the community level, consistent with previous work by Galaskiewicz and 
his collaborators (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989) and also with the 
conceptualization of Marquis, Glynn, and Davis (2007).
Findings: Recipients of Giving
To which causes do corporate foundations in the health sector give? Figure 1 
utilizes the data from the Foundation Directory Online in order to illustrate 
how patterns of giving by substantive area differ across the four (of six) 
industries best represented in these data: pharmaceuticals, insurance firms, 
device manufacturers, and for-profit health-care provider organizations. 
The f igure compares these industries across the f ive most common types 
of causes to which corporate foundations give: arts and culture (NTEE 
category A), educational institutions (B), health institutions (E; these are 
nonprofits active primarily in providing care), health advocacy organiza-
tions (G; advocacy organizations in the health sector, disease awareness 
and support groups, and other associations in the health sector),10 and 
philanthropic/voluntary associations (T). The rightmost column displays 
the percentage of grants within each industry to all other NTEE categories.
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Importantly, these f indings illustrate, as suggested above, that philan-
thropic giving by corporate foundations in the health sector is, although 
beneficial to society, often quite strategic in nature. Examining industry-
level differences in giving to health advocacy groups, for instance, it becomes 
clear that the two manufacturing industries represented here – device and 
pharmaceutical f irms – give much more to such associations. This f inding 
is consistent with the work of Rothman et al. (2011), who f ind that major 
pharmaceutical f irms tend to target their giving at patient advocacy or-
ganizations that promote a medicalized view of mental illness, in a fashion 
ultimately consistent with the marketing aims of the donor; the present 
research expands upon this by f inding that foundations linked to device 
manufacturers are almost as likely as drug companies to fund advocacy 
groups that may indirectly facilitate the f irm’s market aims, such as when 
device manufacturers hope to raise awareness of heart conditions that their 
devices can help to treat. Again, such giving is generally well within the law 
in terms of the self-dealing rules outlined by the IRS.
The giving patterns of health insurer-backed foundations are also note-
worthy for their apparent strategic aims, in that they are the most likely 
to give to nonprofit health provider organizations, as these are often the 
providers through which their enrollees receive coverage; insurers are in 
regular negotiation with them over pricing. Insurers have a strong interest 
in encouraging providers to keep their costs down, such that premiums are 
kept as low as possible for subscribers. This evidence, then, suggests that 
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insurers’ foundations may offer such charitable donations as a means of 
rewarding those providers that do the most to keep their costs in check. 
Although important, this f inding is preliminary and warrants further 
research.
Provider-backed foundations, for their part, differ in marked ways from 
the other foundations included in this study, as they are the industry that is 
most closely rooted in local communities and their parent companies also 
face the most direct competition from nonprofit organizations within their 
subfield (Schlesinger et al., 1996). Accordingly, providers’ foundations give 
very little to other health providers, with only a few rare exceptions. Provid-
ers’ largesse is directed instead primarily to educational institutions at a 
dramatically higher rate than any other health industry; nearly 60 percent of 
all charitable gifts by providers go to education. Providers, importantly, are 
much more dependent than other industries upon educational institutions 
for training the next generation of their sizable staffs. Indeed, whereas the 
median provider f irm in the data has over 20,000 employees, median f irms 
in the other three respective large industries have no greater than 12,500 
employees. Thus, giving to education by providers’ foundations may be 
strategic in facilitating high quality human capital flows into their organiza-
tions. On a less strategic level, however, providers of care give notably more 
to local arts and cultural causes than any other health industry, as they seek 
to maintain goodwill in the communities where their operations are rooted.
Conclusion
Consistent with the other contributions in this volume, this chapter sought 
to illustrate how a fuller understanding of foundations in collective arenas 
can be reached by moving beyond movement-centric perspectives. Such 
perspectives, while generally quite illuminating, overemphasize dynamics 
of channeling and professionalization among the SMOs and other advocacy 
groups that receive support from foundations.
The contribution of this study is both to shift the perspective away from 
the movement by investigating foundation practices more broadly and also 
to illustrate how social movement groups may unintentionally help to fulfill 
the strategic interests of the foundations who support them (and those of 
foundations’ donors).
To these ends, the study illustrated that within the domain of corporate 
foundations in the health sector, charitable contributions are only some-
what responsive to changes in advocacy. Stronger influences on foundation 
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giving come instead from their foundation peers (especially other noncor-
porate foundations in the health sector, who are more influential players 
than corporate foundations) and also from the f inancial and governance 
characteristics of their corporate parents (especially the proportion of the 
corporate parent’s board that is controlled by outside directors).
The study also illustrated that these corporate foundations tend to be 
strategic in aligning their giving with the marketing interests of their 
corporate parents. Much of the money for patient advocacy groups comes 
from pharmaceutical f irms and device manufacturers, who have an interest 
in supporting those who raise public awareness of the conditions their 
products treat. Drug-maker Eli Lilly, for instance, is a major supporter of 
the National Alliance on Mental Illness, which promotes a medicalized 
view of mental illness (Rothman et al., 2011). I also found that corporate 
foundations associated with for-profit health-care providers, as the industry 
most in need of vast pools of employees to staff hospitals and treatment 
centers, give disproportionately to education, and that insurers give most 
to nonprofit health-care provider organizations. It appears that these dona-
tions effectively skirt the narrowly written IRS regulations concerning 
self-dealing by corporate foundations, which, surprisingly, allow corporate 
foundations to serve covert marketing ends for their parent companies.
Foundations, then, appear to act as strategic players in their own right. 
While foundations do respond to SMOs, they are much more responsive to 
other pressures in their environments. These pressures especially include 
those emerging from their peers and from those who provide resources 
passed through as contributions, just as policy-makers are often much 
more attentive to factors such as overall public opinion rather than the 
mobilization of SMOs (Soule and King, 2006). A less movement-centric 
understanding of foundations leads to a less distorted view of those who 
provide resources to support collective action, and one that more adequately 





4. Foundations that use the wealth of former health industry executives or direc-
tors are not considered corporate foundations, as they are not directly linked 
to the company, its brands, or its interest in promoting its market interests.
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5. Note that the requirement that foundations distribute at least 5 percent of 
their assets, described earlier, tends to set a floor (although an imperfect 
one) on foundation giving in a particular year. 
6. The discrepancy between this mean (9) and the period of observation (13 
years) is due largely to the fact that certain firms did not establish their 
foundations until the later years of this window.
7. Used with permission. Thanks are due to the Urban Institute for granting 
access to these data.
8. Studies of corporate philanthropy suggest that outside directors, as more 
independent agents of shareholders (Brown et al., 2006), should have a 
significant negative influence on giving. Thus, corporate parents should be 
more likely to rein in the charitable giving of their corporate foundation 
when the board has a heavier presence of outside directors. 
9. Further, Hausman test results were significant in the final model, thereby 
indicating that a random-effects model would be incorrectly estimated. 
The necessity of a fixed-effects specification ruled out the inclusion of 
industry-level controls, as industry is completely determined by the identity 
of the foundation’s corporate parent. In additional random-effects models 
(available by request) carried out as a check on the findings, industry-level 
dummy measures were not significant predictors of logged giving. 
10. Note that this variable is more encompassing than the independent vari-
able used for the models in Table 1, which focused on disease advocacy in 
particular.
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4 Mind the Gap!
Strategic Interaction during Summit Protests
Christian Scholl
Summit Protests as Protest Wave
Triggering a series of tactical interactions between authorities and protest-
ers, the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle unleashed a wave of summit protests. 
While the ideas and the organization of the counterglobalization movement1 
have received ample scholarly attention (Pleyers, 2010; Maeckelbergh, 2009; 
Juris, 2008; della Porta, 2007; Freyberg-Inan, 2006; Starr, 2005), the interac-
tions of this movement with authorities and other players are surprisingly 
unexamined (Scholl, 2012). The analysis of interactions during summit 
protests may, f irst, help us to understand the development of the counter-
globalization movement, and, second, enrich our scholarly understanding 
of tactical interaction, especially in transnational arenas.
This chapter analyzes summit protests as a chain of tactical interactions. 
Bringing back agency by focusing on what different players are doing and how 
this creates, shapes, redefines, and reproduces political arenas, I will consider 
f ive players, constituting, at the same time, arenas for dynamic interactions: 
counterglobalization movements, intergovernmental organizations, govern-
ments, police, and the media. As pointed out in the introduction to this 
volume, these kinds of compound players are neither homogeneous nor stable.
The analysis of the dynamic interactions between the players is based on 
several years of ethnographic f ieldwork, qualitative interviews, documenta-
tion, and f ilm analysis. The time span covers summit protests from 2000 
to 2009, with a geographical focus on Europe. Where necessary, however, 
background information on previous protests and other geographical areas 
is included.
In the next section, I discuss how tactical interaction has so far been 
grasped and how we can build toward a useful framework for understanding 
tactical interaction in various transnational arenas. I then examine the f ive 
key players at summit protests and the arenas they constitute through their 
interaction. In my conclusion I reflect on the dynamic interactions that took 
place during counterglobalization protests in the past decades and argue 
that the initial tactical innovations by protesters were neutralized, which 
therefore made summit protests “events without events.”
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Tactical Interaction
Tilly (1986: 4) argues that a contentious repertoire of action comprises all 
the means a group has available to make claims. In this chapter, however, I 
focus on tactical repertoires: all those action forms contentious players use 
consciously to protest. Although protest mainly takes place in the streets, 
social media show that it does not necessarily have to be so. However, online 
and street protest have become increasingly connected and intertwined 
(Gerbaudo, 2012; Van Laer, 2010).
Looking at tactical interaction means looking at the actual doing of 
purposeful actors. This has consequences for how we study social move-
ments and their interactions. So far, what social movements or police say 
is more often the object of inquiry than what they do (and how they do it). 
Systematic ethnographic f ieldwork, but also f ilm and photo analysis are 
important methods to foster deeper understanding into the dynamics of 
interaction during public protest.
The proposal of this volume to focus on strategic interaction rather than 
on political opportunities is very useful in this respect. Strategic arenas 
create a context in which various players interact with each other. The 
context is no longer seen as a set of “structures,” but as other players who 
use their tactical tools to influence the other players. This chapter also 
takes into account a temporal perspective: summit protests throughout 
the past decade as a chain of interaction. How do we analyze the process 
of interaction over time?
The most exhaustive long-term study of tactical interaction is probably 
McAdam’s (1983) study of the “pace of black insurgency.” In his work, he 
highlights that a process of interaction is structured by tactical steps in 
response to each other, stressing the necessity of protesters to introduce 
new tactical dilemmas each time.
In looking at the tactical repertoires of the players involved in summit 
protests, I also want to foreground the process of tactical innovation and 
tactical adaptation, and the moments in which new tactical dilemmas have 
been created.
The above account of innovation and adaptation might suggest a certain 
symmetry between protesters and authorities. However, this would be 
misleading. The “doing” of protest requires entirely different tactical choices 
than the “doing” of social control (see Scholl, 2012). As many scholars have 
argued, disruption is an important tool of social movements (Piven, 2006; 
Gamson, 1990; Piven and Cloward, 1977). Della Porta et al. (2006) admit that 
the earlier observed shift in policing protest in the Western world from 
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escalated force toward negotiated management (della Porta and Reiter, 1998) 
has not necessarily been beneficial for protest movements. Protest became 
normalized, regulated, channeled, and, ultimately, ineffective (McPhail and 
McCarthy, 2005: 6). Hence, transgressive summit protest can also be seen 
as a reaction to the pacif ication of protest in the decades before.
As opposed to protesters’ attempts to disrupt summit meetings, the po-
lice try to control them. Their activities are typically called “policing” in the 
literature. This term and its operationalizations, however, tend to eradicate 
the more subtle forms and effects of police work, and it also neglects the 
fact that a lot of “policing” takes place during and around summit protests 
and involves many other players such as intelligence services, cross-border 
security agencies and think tanks, armies, and corporations. Elsewhere, 
we therefore suggest the term “social control” as a better term to grasp the 
subtle, pervasive and networked character of contemporary police work 
(Starr, Fernandez, and Scholl, 2011).
The different “doings” of protesters and police are thus contradictory. 
Whether confrontation or even violence happens or not, there is an underly-
ing antagonism within any street interaction. Too often scholarship has 
internalized and interjected the police view into its analytical categories, 
for example, by relating “less violent events” to “more democratic policing.” 
Knowing about the contradictory logic of doing protest and doing control, 
we also need to unravel it in the micro-events of protest interactions.
However, protesters do not only interact with police. Governments, me-
dia, and – in the case of summit protests – intergovernmental organizations, 
are equally important to understand the dynamics of protest interactions. 
In the literature on protest policing, these players often do not receive 
systematic attention, partly because analyzing the interactions between 
several players is fairly complex. Since all these players constitute important 
arenas as well for other players and, therefore, influence their tactical con-
siderations, innovations, and adaptations, this chapter attempts to move 
our understanding of multiplayer interactions forward.
Players in Transnational Contention
In the following section, I unravel the complex interactions during summit 
protests by looking at f ive key players that shape this process: counterglo-
balization movements, police, media, intergovernmental organizations, and 
governments. By presenting them as f ive distinct players, I do not want to 
suggest that they are homogeneous or cohesive. Protesters, governments, 
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the police, and the media are compound players and can have different and 
often conflicting but also shifting views on tactical choices. Where possible, 
my analysis will point out these conflicts. Moreover, I do not want to suggest 
that empirically they appear as “one” actor. Protesters do many things at 
the same time and can stage several actions parallel to each other. In a 
similar way, one police unit can use tear gas against protesters at one spot, 
while a nearby unit leaves a sit blockade in peace. Last but not least, all of 
these players constitute arenas as well with certain rules and resources that 
shape the interaction of various players within (and across) certain arenas.
Counterglobalization Movements
Social movements are necessarily a different sort of player than the others: 
although formal organization may take part and play vital roles in social 
movements, there are many other participants and networks much less 
institutionally embedded, and normally come together to effect some sort 
of social change. This makes them more fluid and less stable, heterogeneous, 
and, at times, contradictory. The diversity of counterglobalization move-
ments has been a point of attention and might make it a special movement 
in this sense.
Hardt and Negri (2004) nicely capture this point with their term “mul-
titude” (as opposed to the homogenizing idea of a “mass” movement) and 
compare the first summit protests with the list of grievances French citizens 
presented in 1789 to King Louis XVI in the “Cahiers de Doléances.” In order 
to coordinate the diversity of people and struggles that came together 
under the frame of global justice, counterglobalization movements organize 
above all in networks. Although not free from hierarchies, these relatively 
flat and horizontal networks enable a rapid exchange of information and 
coordination of large-scale actions (Maeckelbergh, 2009). Nevertheless, 
the diversity has led to certain tensions between various currents that 
calibrated over the years (see Pleyers, 2010: 181 ff.).
Shifting and developing, throughout the past decade summit protesters 
have consolidated a certain repertoire. The summit repertoire consists of 
a number of elements. Notable is the combination of the logic of numbers, 
the logic of damage, and the logic of bearing witness (della Porta and Diani, 
2006: 171). Summit protests are mass protests attracting ten to hundreds of 
thousands of protesters that converge close to the venues of summit meet-
ings. However, they do not only converge and protest; they also attempt to 
disrupt these meetings by applying transgressive tactics such as blockades 
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or collective intrusion into the red zone. Underlying these disruptive tactics 
is the logic of damage: by trying to “shut them down” (Harvie et al., 2005), 
protesters heighten the costs of summit meetings and the scope of the 
logistical operations. Finally, summit protests also bear witness. Many 
protesters organize or participate in symbolic actions that are intended to 
(globally) send out a message about global inequalities and specif ic policies 
established during summit meetings.
Influenced by the British anti-roads movement, “Reclaim the Streets,” 
combining joy, creativity and protest during mass actions in the streets (see 
Scholl, 2011), summit protests in the late 1990s were often called “Carnival 
against Capitalism.” This was a conscious decision by organizers in order to 
revive the dull practice of mass rallies but also to invoke unpredictability. 
Many action forms attempted to imitate carnival by “putting the world 
upside down.” Mocking authorities and the police, Pink and Silver protesters 
danced in pink (and silver) costumes and feather boas to the energetic music 
of samba bands, without avoiding battle with police lines. The “Clandestine 
Insurgent Rebel Clown Army” (or CIRCA) consisted of protesters dressed as 
clowns in military uniforms, marching, crawling, and mocking the police. 
Humor was an important instrument to create confusion (see Scholl and 
Duyvendak, 2010). It also helped to create a sympathetic image for bystand-
ers and an attractive one for potential participants. Tactical carnivals also 
created dilemmas for the police. How do you tell a clown to stop playing? 
However, not everyone agrees with the tactical use of humor and some 
action forms also ended up being purely about having joy and fun. The more 
militant protesters saw this as counterproductive to their confrontational 
or “serious” actions. Reversing a famous statement by Emma Goldman, 
one activist commented to me: “If I have to dance, I am not part of your 
revolution.”
Another important tactical innovation of the summit protest repertoire is 
the use of “swarm intelligence.” Swarm intelligence refers to the capacity to 
converge from many sides toward one point (in this case the summit venue 
or the red zone) without centralized command and control. Nunes (2005: 
305) points out that “swarm networks must be able to coalesce rapidly and 
stealthily on a target, then dissever and redisperse, immediately ready to 
recombine for a new pulse.” Even the military think tank RAND researched 
extensively the swarming logic of networks as an organizational practice of 
oppositional movements that could inspire counterinsurgency initiatives 
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001).
Decentralized swarming tactics created a number of dilemmas for police: 
it forced them to disperse off icers and attention, it made it diff icult to use 
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the police tactic of arresting or neutralizing central leaders, and it was 
diff icult to avoid reconfiguration after a police intervention (for example, 
protesters joining another rally or action after being stopped by police). At 
the 2007 G8 protests in Heiligendamm, protesters innovated decentralized 
swarming and purposefully stretched police lines each time by splitting up 
into “f ive f ingers.” So much space came free in-between police off icers that 
protesters could just glide through. “Mind the gap” was the advice a German 
action network gave to the protesters. This advice also nicely captures the 
interaction between police and protesters on a more general level.
Swarm intelligence was frequently combined with another innovation: 
“tactical diversity.” This was the result of a creative resolution of a tactical 
dilemma many mass protest movements face: how to deal with the fact that 
there is not one leader but many tactical preferences that may imply very 
different risks and police responses (see also Hurl, 2005). In the absence of 
a central command center, protesters at the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle 
decided to take the WTO venue as the center and divide the space around 
it into slices like a cake. These slices had different colors signaling differing 
levels of militancy and risk (Dixon, 2009). Next to organizing the protesters 
for swarming from multiple directions toward the WTO meeting, this ap-
proach, while still acting in common, also helped to keep different tactics 
spatially separated. A similar tactical approach was applied at the 2000 
IMF/World Bank protests in Prague. Protesters broke up into three marches 
designated by different colors and each march applied different tactics to 
encircle the conference center.
Finally, summit protesters have introduced a number of innovative tacti-
cal uses of the body for street protest. The centrality of the body also reflects 
the logic of damage and the choice for direct action and civil disobedience 
tactics. In both traditions, the individual and the collective bodies of protest-
ers are put in the way in order to create obstacles for the opponent. However, 
each tactical use of bodies differs. The Italian Tute Bianche (White Overalls), 
for example, padded their bodies and used huge shield constructions to pro-
tect their bodies from police attacks and to highlight the violence of police 
resulting in theatrical and comical clashes. The aforementioned CIRCA 
poses a very different dilemma to police, as do the Pink and Silver protesters. 
Both action forms use the body for cross-dressing, art, and confusion.
Counterglobalization movements also constitute an arena, f irst and 
foremost, for the involved activists. Because of identification and the projec-
tion of hope for change, movements can easily result in internal conflicts 
on ideological, organizational, and tactical questions. The various tactical 
preferences described above, have frequently triggered f ierce debates and 
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mutual accusation, above all on the question of confrontational tactics (see, 
for example, George, 2001).
Counterglobalization movements also serve as arenas for some politi-
cians or business leaders who want to prof ile themselves by subscribing 
to (some of) the ideas of the movements. They are also an arena for police 
to carry out investigations, for example, with undercover cops inf iltrating 
the movements. Even the media sometimes “inf iltrates” the movement in 
order to get exclusive coverage. In order to avoid such types of inf iltration, 
the internal arena of counterglobalization movements may be protected 
(for example, avoiding online communication on action plans).
Intergovernmental Organizations
Disruptive mass protests during summit meetings did not remain unan-
swered. Intergovernmental organizations responded by making summit 
meetings arenas for relegitimation of their meetings and policies. Relegiti-
mation included a number of co-optation tactics.
Many intergovernmental organizations exist, and new ones are cre-
ated, so they constitute a compound player. Despite their differences, they 
can also act in a coordinated way, such as the classical Bretton Woods 
organizations: the World Bank, the IMF, and the GATT (forerunner of the 
WTO). Those three organizations, and the EU and the G8 (reflecting the 
hegemony of the rich Western countries in all the other organizations) 
have also been the most frequent target of counterglobalization protests. 
Generally, it concerns organizations that serve as important arenas for 
global economic decisions and that have been carrying out neoliberal ideas 
and policies since the 1970s (which is not to say that they are the only actors 
of neoliberal capitalism; see Harvey, 2007).
A f irst step undertaken by intergovernmental organizations was to 
use the visibility created by the very protests for their messages. Having 
a spotlight turned on their major meetings, intergovernmental organiza-
tions could not, as they did previously, hold their meetings far removed 
from public attention. The f irst G5 and later G6 meetings in the 1970s, 
for example, were fairly informal meetings. After being faced with mass 
protests in front of their doors, intergovernmental organizations now try to 
come up with ambitious agendas for their meetings that are made public in 
the media. Using the visibility of their meetings, they now claim to discuss 
and solve global problems. Depending on attention issue waves, however, 
the exact topic may change quite frequently (Dowling, 2010).
104 chrIstIAn scholl 
Another co-optation tactic of intergovernmental organizations was to 
project increasing inclusivity by selectively expanding access for previously 
excluded players. This could be representatives of big NGOs, such as at 
the 2000 IMF/WB meeting in Prague, or government off icials of Southern 
countries, such as at the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa. Responding to the 
critique of being undemocratic elite spaces, this rather tokenistic practice 
nevertheless transmits the idea that summit meetings are engaging in 
serious dialogue with civil society and the developing world.
In response to the critique of the content of their policies, intergovern-
mental organizations started to selectively address – if only rhetorically 
– certain demands of counterglobalization movements. In fact, this process 
started already in the 1980s when AIDS, hunger, and poverty were making it 
to the top agendas of these meetings. In the f irst years of the 3rd millennium, 
a number of summit meetings responded to the recent wave of counterglo-
balization protest by addressing poverty, debt, and climate change. Final 
declarations caught worldwide attention, such as the G8’s 2005 statement 
to alleviate poverty of the world’s 20 poorest countries and helped to create 
an image of benevolence suggesting that these organizations respond to 
criticisms from civil society and are, after all, not that undemocratic.
This selective interaction with their critics was accompanied by a geo-
graphical move that helped intergovernmental organizations to insulate 
themselves from counterglobalization movements (Scholl and Freyberg-
Inan, 2013). For many years after the 2001 G8 protests in Genoa, summit 
meetings took place in remote rural areas that were diff icult for protesters 
to access. Although this geographical move did not stifle big counterglo-
balization mobilizations, it made it harder for protesters to apply their 
disruptive repertoire of blockading. Moreover, it helped intergovernmental 
organizations to organize their meetings as exclusive spaces for political 
debate on global problems. Anyone outside of the large fenced areas was 
associated with political hooliganism rather than with political dissent.
Being an international platform for national governments to meet, 
discuss, and make decisions, intergovernmental organizations function 
as well as arenas. Governments may use these organizations to (re-)gain 
legitimacy on the national level, to portray a positive image of their country, 
to make strategic alliances, and to push certain (often economic) decisions 
supposedly to benefit their national economies.
Counterglobalization movements, as I have shown above, have used 
summit meetings of intergovernmental organizations to confront neoliberal 
capitalism. Whether protests at summit meetings were a good tactical 
choice or not, they definitely had a visualizing effect. Power holders and 
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relations on the transnational level are not easy to unmask and pinpoint 
(Uitermark, 2004). In this sense, summit protesters acted foremost as ge-
ographers by saying, “Here is where decisions on transnational affairs are 
being made.” The transnational capitalist class of neoliberal globalization is 
not an abstract idea; it is a concrete reality, with meetings, suppers, hotels, 
big limousines, press conferences, logistical operations, and so on. It is an 
entire world opened for staging protest, intervening disruptively, and by 
doing so, creating transnational contention.
For the media, summit meetings accompanied by large protests are 
“hot” items, and constitute an arena to get access to the discussions and 
procedures of intergovernmental organizations, but also to counterglobali-
zation movements, their ideas, action plans and spokespersons. As events 
with global repercussions, summit protests can provide a competitive 
arena for mainstream media to prof ile themselves (to an international 
public) as the best, quickest, and most exclusive news outlet covering 
the events.
Also for police, international summit meetings serve as an arena. On 
the one hand, they like to show that they can manage such events in a 
professional and smooth way. Policing summit meetings is always a chance 
for police commanders to profile themselves and prepare their next career 
steps. The police chief of the 2005 UK G8 security operation, for example, 
became head of the International Permanent Observatory on Security dur-
ing Major Events (IPO). On the other hand, summit meetings serve as an 
arena for police to introduce, test, and present new police tactics, ranging 
from the use of less-lethal weapons (such as taser guns or rubber bullets) 
to cooperation with military forces. These new weapons and tactics often 
continue to be used after summit meetings and can durably change the 
practice of protest policing in certain countries.
Governments/Politicians
Governments act as compound players taking on various roles in the inter-
action with counterglobalization movements. On the one hand, national 
governments act as the official hosts of international summit meetings, and 
therefore are responsible for all the logistical and security-related prepara-
tions. Summit meetings are often seen as a chance to put the spotlights on 
the hosting country, and national governments therefore desire a smooth 
and sometimes glamorous course of the meetings. However, due to the 
increasing intensity of the security preparations in response to the f irst 
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mass protests since the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle, and the potential 
damage to the city, few cities queue for hosting a summit meeting.
On the other hand, governments may respond to counterglobalization 
movements beyond such summit protests. Their responses comprise 
various forms of social control, such as co-optation, surveillance, and 
prosecution. One way of co-opting counterglobalization critique is by 
selectively inviting certain moderate groups for consultative talks. This 
way, in 2007 the German government suggested that there was no reason 
for protest, since the critique was part of the off icial summit. Another 
form of co-optation is to rhetorically integrate some of the discourses, 
arguments, and values of counterglobalization movements. A good exam-
ple is President Clinton, who immediately after the 1999 Seattle protests 
suggested that he understood and shared the critique of the protesters 
(see the 2000 f ilm This Is What Democracy Looks Like [dir. Jill Friedberg 
and Rick Rowley]).
Monitoring of counterglobalization networks and groups on a national 
scale has become a continuous effort. This can happen through police 
inf iltration, paid informants, and phone and computer tapping. In order to 
stop certain activists at the border governments keep lists that may also be 
exchanged in case of a concrete mass protest. At the 2009 NATO summit in 
Strasbourg, for example, German police used data collected at the 2007 G8 
protests to return hundreds of Germans at the French border.
An additional aspect of governments as compound players is their ac-
cess to the judicial apparatus in order to maintain the public order. State 
prosecution usually starts many trials after summit protests, sometimes 
against individual protesters perceived as leaders (for example, two girls 
supposedly having shouted “Push!” to other protesters in front of police lines 
at the 2009 UN climate conference in Copenhagen), or against entire groups 
(such as the 25 protesters charged for ransacking the city of Genoa in 2001, 
10 of whom were sentenced for a total of 98 years’ imprisonment), or against 
random protesters arrested in the streets in order to set an example. The 
fact that police off icers (or governments) are rarely charged demonstrates 
that access to and use of the judicial apparatus are not symmetric.
Governments can play a role on the national, provincial, and local level. 
For the 2009 UN climate summit, the city of Copenhagen introduced a 
special law package enhancing the discretionary responsibilities of police 
and restricting the rights of protesters. Before the 2000 IMF/WB protests 
the mayor of Prague suggested that the local population not leave their 
houses during summit or even leave the city (German, 2000). Hence, beyond 
national politics, local governments have their own agency.
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Governments also constitute a contested arena that is used by other 
players. In the f irst place, governments may constitute an arena for political 
debate on the national scale. This can be a debate about the central issues of 
a summit meeting, or about the critique articulated by counterglobalization 
movements. The debate can also focus on the legitimacy of the summit, or 
the government itself. An example is the government of Berlusconi and his 
Minister of Internal Affairs, who were at the center of a f ierce debate after 
the police violence at the 2001 G8 summit.
Counterglobalization movements use this arena for voicing their critique, 
gaining legitimacy, and questioning the impact of the security prepara-
tion on the right to protest. Sometimes they f ind allies among members of 
parliament or even the government, who may help to push parliamentary 
investigations around the security operations. An important entry for stir-
ring parliamentary debates is the extensive cost of such security operations 
(see Starr et al., 2011). After the 2003 G8 in France, parliamentary debates 
heated up in Switzerland because this non-G8 member country had to carry 
huge security costs for the operations taking place largely on Swiss territory. 
Also after the 2007 G8 in Germany, a number of German parliamentarians 
questioned the government about the costs, above all of the deployment of 
the army (see, for example, Ströbele, 2007).
By critically interrogating government representatives and monitoring 
their decisions, the media can amplify such debates. The media’s general 
interest in contentious issues makes them receptive to discussions of con-
troversial security preparations. One example, are the ever higher and larger 
fence constructions erected for summit meetings to keep intergovernmental 
institutions separated from protest. Besides their gigantic costs, the fences 
trigger media attention as visible manifestation of the fear of governors. 
However, not all media outlets are critical toward such government meas-
ures, and those who are usually are not all the time.
Police
Police are compound players for many reasons. Police forces consist of many 
departments and differing scales of responsibility (local, state, federal, 
international), and all of them can be involved in the control of counterglo-
balization protest at summit meetings. Police are the visible representation 
of the state’s internal monopoly on violence (Lipsky, 1970); at the same time, 
they can retain varying levels of discretion (Waddington, 1998: 128). Big 
police operations usually involve the government, parliaments, the judicial 
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apparatus, and police unions. The variety of police unions in many countries 
also shows that police cannot be seen as a single player.
Various scholars have observed a shift in police tactics in response to 
counterglobalization protests (Scholl, 2012; Starr et al., 2011; Fernandez, 
2008; Vitale, 2007; Vitale, 2005; Peterson, 2006). Della Porta and Reiter’s 
edited volume (1998) discerned a shift in Western democracies after the 
1960s and 1970s from an escalated force approach toward a negotiated 
management approach, focusing on the channeling of protest. This polic-
ing style came under pressure by the counterglobalization movement’s 
disruptive and confrontational tactics. In response, policing has been both 
violent and subtle, ranging from massive use of pepper spray and batons to 
the extensive preparatory manipulation of the media and the geography of 
summit meetings (see Scholl, 2012).
The new approach is often preemptive and focuses on the preclusion of 
undesired events (read: disruption). This translates into increasing focus 
on preparations, such as information gathering, preventive monitoring, 
constant risk assessment, but also into a prevalence of certain tactics during 
street protests, such as corralling, constant surveillance, and the use of 
less lethal weapons instead of baton charges. Notwithstanding differences 
between national police cultures, the shift toward such tactics marks a 
difference between the early counterglobalization protests and the ones 
after the 2001 G8 in Genoa.
One of the remarkable features of police work around counterglobaliza-
tion protests is the increasingly networked collaboration and the exchange 
of standardized information and procedural protocols. This collaboration 
not only happens through traditional outlets such as intelligence services, 
liaison off icers, and heads of police departments, but also through newly 
created security think tanks and agencies, such as the EU’s UNICRI and 
IPO program. Conflating a football championship with a G8 protest, these 
intergovernmental agencies give general advice and develop security pro-
tocols for what they call “major international events.” Various handbooks 
are in circulation, as well as several undercover police agents operating 
across various countries (Monroy, 2011).
The police are an arena for internal conflict; various fractions within 
police forces may disagree about the legitimacy, strategy, or organization 
of certain operations. These conflicts are sometimes reflected in reports 
and publications of police unions. One example is the biggest German 
police union criticizing the diff icult circumstances and the poor provision 
of rank-and-f ile police off icers during the 2007 G8 protests (Gewerkschaft 
der Polizei, 2007).
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Defending the preparations and operations of “their” police forces, 
governments can also enter the arena of the police. However, governments 
may also be urged to respond to public critique and outrage in reaction 
to police brutality or police actions widely seen as disproportionate. 
The 2001 G8 protests in Genoa, above all the violent raid of two protest 
convergence centers and the subsequent torture of the arrestees, provide 
a case in point. Although the Italian government felt pressured to react 
to criticism, no senior police off icer was suspended, and the then-head of 
the Italian police served afterwards as the head of the Italian intelligence 
services.
Through media attention conflicts around police brutality may receive 
more urgent scrutiny. Though usually being a rather useful arena for the 
police, media can also enter the arena of the police through critical inves-
tigation of certain methods or entire operations. This is especially the case 
when journalists themselves become the target of police brutality, such 
as at the 2001 protests in Genoa. When police preparations become more 
and more extensive and visible in the months before the actual summit 
meetings, media play an important role in questioning the sense, extent, 
and costs of such operations. The construction of the 12-km-long barbed 
and razor-wired fence in Germany for the 2007 G8 meeting lasted nearly 
f ive months and triggered many news features with critical remarks about 
the security operations (see Scholl, 2012).
The 2001 G8 protests in Genoa are a good example for seeing how activist 
footage feeds into mainstream media coverage. This combination made the 
Italian police violence widely accessibly and visible to an international audi-
ence. Like this, activists often document incidences of police misconduct to 
feed the mainstream media and stir a debate about certain police methods, 
the entire operation, or even the police as an institution (see also Scholl and 
Bril, 2012). For the 2007 G8 protests in Germany activists cooperated with 
a network of left-wing lawyers to observe and document police behavior 
during the street protests.
Media
Frequently mistaken for a dataset, media are themselves an important 
player during counterglobalization protests. Media do not simply reflect the 
reality of protest events; they actively intervene in them and shape social 
struggles. Given the multitude of outlets, media clearly are a compound 
player with varying interests and values. Nevertheless, as Herman and 
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Chomsky (1988) pointed out, a number of structural f ilters ref lect the 
corporate media’s tendency to reproduce the view of the elite.
Media often claim to “represent” the voice(s) of a movement in an 
adequate way, and for many people these “representations” then become 
the f irst access to learn about a social movement. In trying to represent 
the movement, most journalists try to speak to what they consider the 
“representatives.” In the case of counterglobalization movements, this 
causes frequent trouble: many networks and action groups explicitly refuse 
to have “representatives” (see Wood, 2005); they are easily outflanked in 
media representation by networks and especially bigger organizations that 
do have visible media spokespersons. As the research on the 2007 G8 in 
Germany by Rucht and Teune (2008) shows, media cited repeatedly a very 
small number of spokespersons (typically belonging to big organizations).
Through the selection mechanisms in the search for movement repre-
sentatives media actively shape the representation of the movement and, 
moreover, create a contrast between “professional” activists and the “rank-
and-f ile” protesters. Incited by the occurrence of confrontational protests, 
this can lead to a perceived division between “good” and “bad” protesters. 
After the 2001 G8 protests in Genoa, for example, European corporate 
media univocally demonized the so-called black bloc. The effects of such 
media categorizations are far-reaching and can result in internal move-
ment splits, loss of support and sympathy, and outright criminalization of 
(parts of) the movement. In the case of counterglobalization movements 
in Europe, this has frequently happened, not without associating coun-
terglobalization protesters in general with violent terrorists (Fernandez 
and Scholl, 2013).
Media are a contested arena as well and many players consider it an 
important arena to be visible. Politicians and police communicate the 
justif ication of the security measures to the local and national population 
via the media, activists try to disseminate their critique and independent 
coverage of their actions. The battle for media presence of all these play-
ers reflects the battle for the sympathy of (the so-called) public opinion. 
Though unclear what exactly that is, many of the players perceive media 
representations as a reflection of the reality of that public opinion. Visibility 
in the media, then, can be seen as a legitimation strategy invested by various 
players in order to achieve credibility.
The increasing effort that many counterglobalization activists invest in 
media campaigns and press management testif ies to the contestation of 
the media arena. Even the more radical networks at the 2005 and 2007 G8 
protests in, respectively, Scotland and Germany, had press working groups 
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producing daily press releases and establishing contacts with journalists 
and interview partners. At G8 protest in Germany there were attempts to 
bring together the press teams of various protest networks in a daily press 
conference. However, the proactive management of the movement’s media 
representation, such as receiving journalists at the entry to a summit protest 
camp, contradicts the wish of other protesters to remain anonymous and 
uncooperative with the corporate press. Quite some energy has therefore 
gone into the elaboration of independent media outlets, such as Indymedia, 
a website for participatory and shared news reporting (Kidd, 2003). This cre-
ates a new media arena, equally interesting to other players, such as police 
and journalists. Other action forms, such as the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel 
Clown Army (see Scholl, 2012), explicitly aim to create frivolous but friendly 
photo ops for the mainstream media.
For intergovernmental organizations the media are an important arena 
for responding to critique and opposition by shedding a benevolent light on 
their meetings. The harmonious f inal group photo with all the leaders for 
the front pages of daily newspapers is a crucial part of this. At the 2007 G8 in 
Germany, some protesters successfully blocked the access of journalists to 
the summit. Because of bad conditions on the water that day, the alternative 
route via the sea was also blocked, so in the end no journalists could make 
it to the off icial photo shoot.
Throughout the summit protests in the past decades, police have 
improved their media management. Nowadays, they devote much more 
money, personnel, and time to their press work. International manuals for 
securing summit meetings include extensive sections on police media work 
and ensure that best practices can circulate internationally. The German 
police copied the activist practice of hosting information evenings and, on 
several occasions in the months preceding the G8 summit, invited the local 
population to attend them. Preparations also included the construction of a 
special media center close to the summit (and far from the protesters) and 
an accreditation procedure for journalists wanting access to this center. The 
off ice of the German Federal Criminal Police refused to give accreditation 
to a number of journalists. During the week of summit protests, the police 
were present with several mobile information vehicles to facilitate easy 
access for their version of the events to journalists. They also released several 
press brief ings on a daily basis, some of which turned out to contain false 
and misleading information discrediting the protesters (Backmund, 2009).
Governments also found corporate media a useful arena in their response 
to the f irst major counterglobalization protests. Their legitimation strategy 
often includes co-optation. This means that parts of the movement’s critique 
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is (rhetorically) integrated, which makes it harder for the more radical and 
anti-systemic messages to be heard. This way, governments regain agency 
in the debate on global justice. During the 1990s governments already 
invited civil society representatives to their summit meetings, normally 
high-ranking off icials of large NGOs. These kind of initiatives are widely 
circulated in the press and do suggest that governments are responsive 
to critique. For the 2005 G8 protests in Scotland, the British government 
designed an even more elaborated media campaign including pop stars such 
as Bono and Bob Geldof, a free pop concert (possibly distracting people from 
participating in the protests), and a broad alliance of large NGOs supporting 
the British government in their supposed attempt to come with solutions 
concerning global poverty (Dowling, 2010).
Summit Protests as Dynamic Interactions
Interaction during counterglobalization protests is a complex phenomenon 
and not easy to unravel. Many compound players are involved, and each 
of them, in turn, can constitute an arena for all the others. Nevertheless, a 
careful, systematic, and patient attempt to take them apart and relate them 
to each other can broaden our understanding of what happens during a 
single summit protest, but also of how players (in different arenas) respond 
to each other over time.
We have seen how intergovernmental organizations, governments, and 
police have reacted to certain tactical innovations of counterglobalization 
movements, and how those, in turn, try again to innovate in their tactical 
repertories. Innovation and adaptation are important mechanisms to 
understand tactical interaction throughout time. They can explain the 
continuation, transformation, but also the sudden end of certain interaction 
dynamics. In the case of counterglobalization protests, we can observe 
successful adaptations of authorities and a standstill in tactical innovation 
on the side of protesters, which channeled the initial vibrant interaction 
dynamic into more predictable and contained interaction rituals.
After having staged a number of tactical innovations, such as decentral-
ized swarming and tactical diversity, which became central to the summit 
protest repertoire, counterglobalization movements found it difficult to move 
forward and to pose new tactical dilemmas to authorities. Governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, and police, on the other hand, have adapted 
their co-optation and control tactics to these early innovations and neutral-
ized them in large part. The media have been a useful arena for their purposes.
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Summit meetings as an arena for transnational contention thus have 
revealed a dynamic interplay of contestation, co-optation, and control. 
However, even though many players interact in various arenas, street 
protest still reflects the underlying antagonism between contenders and 
authorities, the “doing” of protest and the “doing” of control. So far, authori-
ties – police, governments, and intergovernmental organizations – have 
been successful in forming a law-and-order alliance to control the disease 
of counterglobalization dissent. Where anti-austerity protests take it from 
here, is yet to be seen.
Note
1. I prefer the term “counterglobalization” over “alterglobalization” or “global 
justice movement,” because it stresses the oppositional character of the 
alternative practices in question.
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5 Corporations as Players and Arenas
Philip Balsiger
Dissatisfaction with the contentious politics framework has been voiced 
time and again. Perhaps reflecting the rules of the academic arena, op-
ponents of the dominant model have – while raising fundamental points 
– mostly used moderate action forms and pursued a reformative agenda, 
if at times spiced up with provocative language (Goodwin and Jasper, 
2004; McAdam et al., 2001; Fillieule, 2006; Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008; 
Goodwin and Jasper, 2012). The classic agenda offers a mostly static and 
dichotomous analysis. Some of the founding case studies trace movements 
over time (McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1989), but they tend to stress changes in 
structural factors over the dynamics of contentious action. Even studies of 
waves of contention (Koopmans, 2004) mostly build on aggregate data of 
individual protest events and fail to address the relational character that 
link one event to the other, different collective actors in those events, and 
actors with each other in networks or coalitions (for a similar point, see 
Diani, 2011). The static analysis has, in addition, led to a perspective where 
a movement’s targets are pictured merely as context (Jasper, 2012).
To use a sports metaphor, the dominant conceptualization of social 
movement activity resembles a tennis player f iring balls against a wall. 
The tennis player is the social movement, using different tactical action 
repertoires – slice, stop balls, lobs – and having specif ic resources and 
skills. His opponent, meanwhile, is pictured as a wall: exhibiting certain 
structural characteristics – the wall may be made of uneven concrete, 
with spots where the ball rebounds particularly well – it is incapable of 
strategy, it cannot “play.” It is time for a dynamic perspective where the 
tennis player has another tennis player as her opponent; both can adapt 
to the repertoire of shots from each other; sometimes doubles are played 
and the two players on each site have to coordinate; and a match can go 
on over several sets, where winning or losing one set does not necessarily 
mean losing the match. Emotions are important, and surprise shots may 
make the opponent lose his temper.1
The tennis metaphor is apt to capture the dynamic aspect of protest and 
f its contexts where movement players mostly oppose their targets directly 
and contentiously. But a player’s goals are usually not as evident as in a 
tennis match and may be multiple and even contradictory. In many cases 
strategies are not limited to contention, but may include forms of collabora-
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tion, switching arenas (as when disputing the result of a game in a sports 
court) or the establishment of a new game, with slightly different rules, 
outside the f irst arena. In this chapter I build on the players-and-arenas 
approach to explore the interactions of movements and corporate players, 
using the example of an anti-sweatshop campaign in France.
As of late the analysis of movements and markets has greatly developed, 
as part of a call to study protest in other institutional arenas than the state 
(Van Dyke et al., 2004; Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008; Taylor and Zald, 
2010). Markets are the site of a great variety of protest activity (Raeburn, 
2004; Schurman, 2004; King and Pearce, 2010; Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 
2008; McAdam and Scott, 2005; Soule, 2009; Soule, 2012; Walker, 2012). 
Movement players launch boycotts and public campaigns, develop and 
promote alternative forms of production and consumption, or collaborate 
with firms to change their practices. Corporations react to protest in diverse 
manners: they shut down production facilities, mobilize important com-
munication resources to delegitimize protesters, try to inf iltrate them, 
or use the judicial arena for processes against campaigners. But they also 
f ind themselves changing business practices, negotiating with movement 
organizations, creating new activities, investing in new markets. How 
does protest work when targeting corporate players? What kind of action 
repertoires are used by protest players? What actions do corporate players 
take to react to movement demands?
I start with a very brief overview of economic sociology’s theories of 
corporate action in order to understand the goals and interactions of 
corporate players in market arenas. From there, I use the empirical study 
of the anti-sweatshop movement campaigns in France (and occasionally 
Switzerland) to show the interactions between movement players and 
discuss the functioning of protest in markets.
Corporate Players and Markets
Economic sociology and studies using it to explain the role of movements in 
markets for the most part do not adopt a strategic perspective. In opposition 
to neoclassical economics and also to some earlier organizational theories, 
the most important insight of economic sociology is that f irms are seen as 
part of (or embedded in) networks, f ields and institutional environments, 
which decisively shape their strategies and structure (Davis, 2005). Institu-
tional theory and economic sociology have developed structural theories 
explaining stability in markets; studying tactics of avoidance or resistance 
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are not part of their traditional agenda (Campbell, 2005). This has changed, 
however, with growing attention to institutional change, including the role 
of institutional entrepreneurs and social movements (King and Pearce, 2010; 
Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008). Studies stressing the open polity of f irms 
(Zald et al., 2005) encourage analysis of the strategic struggles within f irms. 
Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) recent formulation of a general theory of 
f ields further accentuates the idea of contentiousness and struggle within 
f ields, whether it be everyday jockeying for positions or transformative 
change triggered by exogenous shocks. Their f ield perspective, however, 
tends to focus on interactions within a given f ield, while the players and 
arenas approach concentrates on players acting strategically across arenas.
Corporate players pursue different goals. In classic economic terms, a 
corporate player’s only goal is profit. Balancing this view, economic sociolo-
gists have suggested corporate player’s ultimate goal is market stability 
(Fligstein, 2001) to overcome the coordination problems at the core of 
markets (Beckert, 2009). They also point at corporate players pursuing 
symbolic goals: they care for their reputation and legitimacy with regard 
to social norms and institutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and build up 
corporate identities. Goals can be complementary: pursuing symbolic goals 
may favor profit because it avoids risks of public shaming by campaigns; 
building up corporate identities can help to create stability by establishing 
a niche, ultimately favoring profit. But goals are also often conflicting: a 
f irm that cares for its reputation and therefore subscribes to a voluntary 
program of code monitoring may jeopardize its profits. Corporations can 
themselves be seen as arenas where different individual and collective (i.e., 
departments or off ices) players face each other. Within such a corporation-
as-arena, players may privilege competing goals and interact strategically 
to advance them.
Corporate players interact with each other within market arenas. The 
defining logic of interactions in market arenas is competition: corporations 
jockey for position and f ight for market share, through imitation or dif-
ferentiation, resulting in convergence and divergence of practices (Beckert, 
2010). On the one hand, neoclassical and neoinstitutional economic theory 
expects all market participants in competitive markets to adopt the most 
eff icient practices, pushing them to convergence. Institutional theory in 
sociology has put forward other mechanisms that provoke convergent prac-
tices among market players: coercion, normative and mimetic isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Firms come to imitate each other because 
they are submitted to formal rules, because of the attraction of models 
diffused through networks and professional groups, and through simple 
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imitation as a response to uncertainty. On the other hand, interactions in 
market arenas also lead to the adoption of practices of differentiation. To 
secure market positions, corporate players try to specialize and build up 
distinctive product and producer identities (Chamberlin, 1933; White, 1981).
Ultimately differentiation allows producers to create niches that avoid 
direct competition. This can also be achieved when f irms cooperate and 
coordinate their actions. Cooperation can take many forms. It may be 
informal through interfirm networks, or be conducted through business as-
sociations, distinct players that represent corporations. Cooperation is also 
used to lobby state players for favorable legislation; in turn, states may f ight 
against cartels and advocate competition. Cooperation does not necessarily 
involve all players of a market; there may be different competing groups 
that cooperate, such as chain retailers and small independent retailers.
When can we expect f irms to do what? The characteristics of market 
arenas are likely to play an important role in the goals and strategies used by 
firms. In markets where producers cater to individual consumers, reputation 
is likely to be much more important than in business-to-business markets 
where corporations exchange goods with each other. This is especially 
true for markets with fewer players where brand recognition is high. The 
positions of corporate players within market arenas are also capable of 
shaping their strategies (Fligstein, 2001). Big and incumbent f irms can be 
expected to be more conservative, to imitate each other’s practices and 
possibly to collaborate to commonly defend their interests. This also means 
that when an incumbent f irm actually changes its practices, it is likely to be 
followed by its immediate competitors (Briscoe and Safford, 2008). Smaller 
challenger f irms may be more prone to strategies of differentiation and 
niche creation (Schurman, 2004).
Strategic Interactions of an Anti-Sweatshop Campaign
I will illustrate the advantages of the players-and-arenas (P&A) perspec-
tive with a social movement campaign targeting clothing retailers in 
France (with occasional illustrations from the Swiss case, too). The case 
study is based on interviews with key actors, publications by f irms and 
the campaign, and the campaign archives. The study initially focused 
on campaign activity and data collection concerns mostly these players. 
Ideally, a symmetrical effort of data collection should have been done for 
corporate players – interviews with executives and off icials involved in the 
interaction with campaigners, f irm archives. Such symmetry, a key require-
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ment of a P&A approach, proved diff icult to achieve. Access to business 
executives, especially those with decision-making power, is more diff icult 
than access to movement off icials, especially for controversial and ongoing 
issues like production conditions. Even in interviews, the researcher is 
often confronted with formatted discourses that do not give insight into 
decision-making processes. However, this does not rule out an interaction-
ist perspective insofar as publicly accessible sources (in particular press 
articles, f irm reports, documents published by business associations, the 
information gathered by the campaign) allow us to reconstruct in detail 
the strategies employed by f irms and business associations in reaction to 
campaigns.
In the following, I f irst analyze the rise of the French campaign and 
show how it used different arenas to f ight for its goals. I then turn to the 
strategies its corporate targets used to f ight back against the campaign, by 
building up a new player through cooperation. A quick look at the Swiss case 
highlights a different interaction dynamic with corporations competing 
over ethical records and creating a new market arena for ethical clothes. 
A f inal section brings together the insights from these illustrative cases 
to put forward the contribution of the P&A perspective to understanding 
movement-corporate interactions in markets.
The Formation of the Player
In France, the campaign that would later be part of the European-wide 
coordinated Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) started as a project by one fair 
trade organization to launch its own public campaign on the broad issue of 
“conscious” consumption. The exact outlook of the campaign owed much 
to historical circumstances. At the time – the early 1990s – anti-sweatshop 
campaigns had started to appear in the US and some European countries, 
especially the Netherlands. In France, the debate on production offshoring 
was vivid, with prominent cases of factory closings in the textile sector. 
And there were ongoing discussions among development aid organiza-
tions and unions about the possibility of adding a “social clause” to the 
General Agreement on Taxes and Trade (GATT), that is, the obligation of 
trade partners to respect minimal labor standards set by the International 
Labor Organization. Finally, the European Union was funding civil society 
initiatives promoting “citizen-consumption.”
In this context, the fair trade organization drafted a proposal for a 
public campaign for consumer mobilization targeting clothing retailers. 
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From the beginning, the organization sought to enroll other players to the 
campaign to form a coalition, both in order to secure public funding and 
with the rationale that the broader the coalition, the larger its appeal and 
legitimacy. The coordinator of the campaign therefore explicitly sought 
out reform-oriented actors such as a Catholic development aid NGO and 
the Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (French Democratic 
Confederation of Labor, or CFDT) rather than radical unions like the Con-
fédération Générale du Travail (General Confederation of Labour, or CGT) 
or Solidaires Unitaires Démocratiques (SUD). The result was a coalition 
that brought together movement players with very different backgrounds 
(consumer associations, unions, development aid and solidarity organiza-
tions), which, in the eyes of the coordinator, was most likely to have an 
impact on clothing brands.
Fighting against Sweatshops in Different Arenas
The nascent French Clean Clothes Campaign chose to place its actions in 
the market arena. It wanted to f ight for improving working conditions in 
the global garment industry, but it also had as a goal the promotion of a 
political form of consumption by making the issue of production conditions 
an aspect of consumption decisions. Questioning firms about their practices 
constituted a novel and promising strategy to raise consumer awareness 
and built on a repertoire of public campaigning that had recently emerged. 
Retailers were chosen as targets because they could be reached through 
consumer pressure. Thus, the choice of corporations as targets and markets 
as an arena for action was closely linked to the campaign’s more immediate 
goals of promoting political consumption.
Other potential targets could have been chosen to achieve goals of improv-
ing worldwide labor standards: national and transnational policy-makers 
as targets would have brought the interaction to different arenas. At the 
beginning, especially the transnational arena was equally in the spotlight, 
as many NGOs lobbied national decision-makers for the adoption of a social 
clause in the GATT. Actions took place in both arenas: there was a sort of 
division of tasks between social movement players pursuing different yet 
complementary strategies at the same time. When it f inally turned out to be 
impossible to achieve the adoption of a social clause through international 
regulation – when a majority of states clearly opposed such a measure and 
social movement players therefore no longer perceived any opportunities 
in the GATT negotiation process – the targeting of corporations and the 
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solution of “private regulation” through codes of conduct, standard setting, 
consumer awareness and independent monitoring organisms became the 
main strategy to advance workers’ rights in producing countries.
But the question of the arena in which claims should be raised was not 
decided once and for all. Three consecutive “campaign rounds” focused on 
clothing retailers, each one consisting centrally of a petition and attempting 
to pressure f irms using consumer power and public opinion. After this, the 
campaign paused for a year with the goal of advancing negotiations with 
f irms and building a model for independent monitoring. During this break, 
political players came into the focus of the campaign. Initially, it was due to 
an action that had nothing to do with the campaign. The children’s parlia-
ment – an assembly of kids taking place every year – passed a resolution 
to ban child labor in the production of school equipment. As is customary 
with these resolutions, a deputy went on to elaborate a legislative proposal 
based on it. This deputy asked the campaign coalition for help due to its 
expertise on questions of working conditions. For the coalition, this led to 
the developing of a campaign targeting municipalities. It demanded that 
municipalities adopt resolutions requiring minimal social standards for 
public purchases such as uniforms or school equipment.
This campaign, called “Let’s Consume Ethically for School,” targeted the 
local political players, in particular local deputies and local governments in 
their role as legislators, but with the ultimate goal of affecting municipalities’ 
purchasing behavior. Ethical consumption by these collective consumers 
should serve as a further incentive for producers to adopt codes of conduct. 
Local governments who adopted such resolutions eventually even became 
part of the campaign coalition, through the organization Cités Unies; thus 
they transformed from intermediate targets to allies. Some state-owned 
companies, such as La Poste (the French postal service) or SNCF (the French 
rail service), also committed to buying products respecting certain ethical 
standards (but without becoming part of the campaign).
The campaigns thus used the connectedness of local and regional 
political arenas and markets to create leverage for action (Evans and 
Kay, 2008), using local governments as collective consumers. But this 
action in the local political arena did not replace the campaign’s directly 
targeting corporations. Both ran in parallel. While local administrations 
act as consumers, they do not buy that many clothes, which reduces their 
potential impact. Worse, this leverage did not allow the campaign to reach 
the same targets as those at the center of its direct campaigns of denun-
ciation, that is, the big retailers. Markets are structured into different 
niches (Aspers, 2010), each one constituting an arena. The denunciation 
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campaigns reached one such arena – well-known retailers competing 
with each other – whereas the action involving local administrations 
reached another one. Municipalities as well as state-owned companies 
don’t go to the supermarket or branded retailer stores in the city center 
to buy clothes; they mostly purchase in a specialized market, constituted 
of middle-size f irms producing working gear. In this market, a number of 
small f irms adopted “ethical” criteria for their commodity chain. These 
f irms were actually never directly targeted by the campaign as the big 
retailers were, but they adopted social standards at least in part because 
of the demand for ethical uniforms, that is, the change in procurement 
policies by municipalities and state-owned f irms.2
After the break, the campaign launched a new round of activities target-
ing big retailers, this time with an evaluation of corporate players’ ethical 
performances as the main tactic. The campaign makers wanted to renew 
pressure to push companies to yield to movement demands. The strategy 
of directly targeting corporations in the market arena only started to be 
questioned when, after about four years of campaigning, f irms had crafted 
a counterattack, and the campaign found itself in a deadlock. The achieve-
ment of the campaign’s main goals – having companies collaborate with 
protagonists from the campaign in an independent agency to monitor codes 
of conduct – seemed more and more unlikely, which put the coalition into 
a strategic dilemma over the arena where further action should be fought. 
Although ideological differences between organizations had been present 
in the coalition all along, they mattered little as long as the participants 
in the coalition perceived some chances of success of their strategy. All of 
them agreed on targeting retailers in the market arena through consumer 
pressure. Now, facing the strong counterstrategy by the targeted retailers, 
such chances seemed to dim, and coalition members started to break apart. 
The moderate organizations in the coalition still wanted to continue on the 
same track and opposed more radical ones – in particular, the founding 
of a fair trade organization – who wanted to adopt a much more critical 
attitude. The former feared that such an attitude would foreclose any pos-
sible collaboration. The latter, on the contrary, wanted to drop the goal of 
collaboration and pushed for a political strategy – an arena switch to the 
political arena (national or European) – advocating for legislative action. 
However, it was not clear how that should work, as nation-states do not have 
legislative power over subcontractor f irms in textile production countries 
such as China, Bangladesh, or Guatemala. In the end, the campaign coali-
tion ceased its activity due to f inancial problems, which cut short these 
discussions.
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Choosing Corporate Targets
Within the market for clothes, the campaign coalition had to choose its 
targets. Given that any market is composed of several players, the selection 
of targets is tricky for social movements. On what criteria was this selec-
tion based, and what consequences did the selection have? The goal of the 
campaign was to target the entire clothing market, but its petitions needed 
a specific addressee. For the f irst one, the campaign organizers picked three 
companies without any particular justif ication; one of them was not even 
a French f irm. It turned out that this created some confusion: were these 
companies particularly bad concerning production conditions? And did 
that mean that others did better? Officials of the targeted firms complained 
about that, and the campaign makers (unoff icially) admitted that they had 
made a mistake. For the second round, they picked three companies on more 
objective criteria: three leaders of three sectors – mail-order businesses, 
specialized stores, and sports retailers; in addition, a business association 
was also explicitly targeted. The idea, again, was that these f irms stood for 
a broader trend in the whole market. For the third petition, big retailers – 
specialized sports retailers and general retailers – became the main focus. 
Those f irms would then remain the main targets.
What was the thinking that drove this target selection? Two criteria 
were crucial: f irst, the public visibility of a company – the campaign 
targeted brands that were known and could be linked to broader issues, 
such as sports wear retailers when the campaign takes place during the 
World Cup. Second, prior public commitments made a company become 
more likely to be targeted. For the second petition, the campaign targeted 
companies that had shown “an interest” in the issue by contacting the 
campaign. To the campaigners, this signaled that something could be 
achieved with such companies. The f irms that had publicly engaged 
themselves could then be held accountable against their own standards, 
using the “accountability politics” strategy identif ied by Keck and Sikkink 
(1998: 17). Paradoxically, the more a f irm did, the more it came under the 
spotlight of campaigners.
Focusing on these targets had important consequences for the campaign. 
It meant that its opponents were powerful companies with a strong busi-
ness association behind them. Through this organization, they would start 
collaborating and put in place a counterstrategy to oppose the campaign. 
Thus, what was at f irst a reaction to some encouraging signs turned, with the 
strategy employed by the campaigns, to a major drawback for the campaign 
coalition.
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Fighting Back: What Corporate Players Do
Corporations reacted with an array of strategies. At f irst, they ignored the 
movement or denied responsibility (Barraud de Lagerie, 2010; Merk, 2007; 
Featherstone and United Students against Sweatshops, 2002). But quickly, 
many yielded to demands by adopting codes of conduct. They seem to 
have realized that this measure alone did not imply much beyond a public 
statement. The concession was mostly cosmetic (Soule, 2009), with minimal 
concession costs (Luders, 2006). The two biggest French retailers, Carrefour 
and Auchan, reacted most to the campaign; others did nothing beyond 
adopting a code. Carrefour started a program to attest to its respect for 
human rights in partnership with a human rights NGO that was not part 
of the campaign. By cherry-picking a competing social movement player 
and associating with it, the retailer thus sidestepped campaign demands 
and tried to divide its opponent. The organizations in the campaign coali-
tion were extremely critical of this partnership and dismissed the NGO as 
selling out. Auchan later also attempted to establish such a partnership 
with Amnesty International. But at that time, Auchan had already agreed 
to collaborate with the campaign coalition, working on the improvement 
of labor standards in some production factories. Training sessions with 
buyers were organized with the goal of raising their awareness of social 
issues, and several visits to factories producing clothes for Auchan were 
carried out. This was the biggest success of the campaign, but it fell very 
short of an encompassing monitoring system and revealed the gap between 
the participants’ goals and their favored means.
Was it because of the diff iculty of f inding a common ground that Auchan 
ultimately abandoned the project? Two other reasons seem just as important. 
First, the campaign lost its “internal ally” within the company, namely a man-
ager (and a member of the f irm’s board) who had once served in a socialist 
cabinet and who was sympathetic to the campaign’s cause. When he left the 
company, the collaboration lost its advocate. Second, an alternative response 
had been elaborated by the interest group FCD (which regrouped the main 
French retailers, including Auchan and Carrefour). They built up a common 
program of social auditing, called Initiative Clause Sociale (ICS). Auchan 
ended up relying on the ICS and so collaboration with the campaign was no 
longer necessary and even incompatible with this joint response by retailers.
The move by the FCD and the creation of a monitoring initiative meant 
that there was now a new player in the game, one that federated many of 
the campaign’s most important corporate targets. What drove the f irms to 
cooperate? In the past, the business association had dealt with a number of 
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“collective action problems” the retailers had faced, such as quality control. 
There was thus precedent for the FCD playing such a role, especially in 
the context of movement pressure (Bartley, 2007). But one would need to 
conduct more research to gain insight into the decision-making process 
that lead the FCD to take the lead in this interaction with the campaign, 
and to see the role of corporate players in this process.
At first, the ICS could be seen as a technical solution to the problem raised 
by the campaign. Retailers came up with a joint way to monitor codes of 
conduct, using social audit f irms. The campaign coalition got mixed signals 
from this newly created player, and hoped with good reason that it might get 
to participate in its work. The campaign was invited to presentations and 
other meetings with the ICS. In other words, intercorporate collaboration 
did not rule out collaboration with the campaign. This only came about 
in further interaction, as the ICS became a counterstrategy to exclude the 
campaign. Launching, in 2001, the f irst ranking of retailers giving them 
grades according to their “ethical performance,” the campaign wanted to 
increase ethical competition between the retailers. The goal of the rankings 
was to push f irms with poor grades to do better in the future to catch up 
with their competitors. But the intercorporate collaboration undermined 
this tactic. The ICS turned out to be an astute strategic response because it 
avoided competition among firms on this issue. With all retailers joining the 
same program and having the same social standards, none of them stood 
out by positioning themselves as particularly “ethical.” In other words, the 
joint response made it very diff icult for the campaign to use the strategy 
of dividing the opponents into good and bad pupils.
The campaign sanctioned the lack of progress (that is, the fact that none 
of the f irms was willing to agree to independent control) by degrading com-
panies with every new edition of the yearly rankings. The f irms perceived 
this as a provocation and refused to cooperate with the campaign, eventu-
ally refusing to answer their questions regarding their business practices. 
Turning to the media arena, the ICS held a press conference on the same 
day the rankings were released. It published an open letter defending its 
approach and accusing the campaign of turning the “noble” issue of ethics 
into a matter of competition between retailers. They also attacked the 
campaign’s legitimacy and competence in this matter. The counterstrategy 
of the f irms thus ceased to be limited to the technical realm of the issue 
and became one of publicly f ighting back against the campaign’s actions in 
the arena of mass media. Overall, the dynamic observed resembles one of 
early (albeit modest) gains that subsequently get lost as targets join forces 
and organize their response (Jasper and Poulsen, 1993).
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Consumers and Markets
The strong reaction by the French retailers was thus provoked by the rat-
ings, which allowed potential consumers to distinguish between more 
or less ethical f irms. This tactic was introduced into the campaign at the 
beginning of the year 2000, after three consecutive petitions. The petitions 
had singled out specif ic targets, but they were framed as a general claim; 
they did not imply that the targeted f irms were behaving particularly badly, 
nor did they explicitly differentiate between f irms. The f irms interpreted 
the rankings as more threatening than the petitions. Rankings are a market 
tactic, based on the model of product evaluations by consumer organiza-
tions. They give consumers the tools to make informed purchasing choices 
– in other words, to boycott or buycott f irms (Micheletti, 2003). Although 
the French campaign gave bad grades to all evaluated companies, there 
were still distinctions, and letters by consumers written to the campaign 
makers suggest that they were interpreted that way (Barraud de Lagerie, 
2010).
The mobilization of consumers and the creation of tools like rankings 
that make it possible to incorporate political dimensions into consumption 
decisions is a specific tactical action repertoire movement players can use in 
market arenas (Balsiger, 2010; Dubuisson-Quellier, 2013). But while rankings 
can threaten f irms, on the flip side they also potentially reward those f irms 
that do better than their competitors. In France, retailers refused to play 
this game; by cooperating with each other, they managed to avoid making 
ethics an aspect of producer differentiation. This worked because all the 
important corporate campaign targets were collaborating, thanks to the 
prominent role of the business association.
A look across the border shows what can happen if this is not the case. 
There was also a branch of the Clean Clothes Campaign in Switzerland, 
raising the same claims and using similar tactics. But instead of cooperat-
ing with each other and shielding themselves against forms of “ethical” 
competition, some of the targeted clothing retailers in Switzerland actually 
started developing specif ic offers for “ethical” consumers. Doing so, they, 
too, only partly responded to the campaign’s claims. They sidestepped 
them by producing clothing lines that were particularly ethical, while few 
changes were made on the commodity chain of all the other products. This 
led to the development of a niche market for ethical clothes. Other move-
ment players – NGOs not part of the campaign – played an important role 
in this development, as they collaborated with f irms to develop socially and 
ecologically responsible commodity chains for fair trade and organic cotton.
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The Swiss example highlights market-based responses by corporations 
and shows how targets can use competing movement strategies to their 
benefit. There is a potential conflict between forms of collaboration between 
movement players and f irms, such as organic and fair trade labels, and the 
Clean Clothes Campaign’s goals: for firms, the development of niche markets 
for ethical goods is a strategy to avoid demands for more encompassing 
change. The development of a fair trade label for cotton, in which many 
Swiss development aid NGOs were involved, led to a sharp conflict with the 
campaign. This label threatened the campaign, but the campaign could not 
prevent its development. Firms could use such labels to sidestep campaign 
demands, thus playing different movement actors against each other.
The rise of this niche market is a byproduct of the campaign, which pushed 
companies to show they care about production conditions and raised aware-
ness among consumers about this issue. It is further favored by the activities 
of competing social movement players and even state players that contributed 
financial support. The rise of a new niche market can be seen as the develop-
ment of a new arena as a consequence of movement action. Firms create this 
new arena together with collaborating NGOs. The creation of the new arena 
changes the context for the original movement player, the Clean Clothes 
Campaign. It now has to deal with a novel context, characterized by the 
existence of a niche market for ethical clothes supported by competing NGOs.
In this modified context, the Swiss campaign’s strategy reveals a recur-
rent strategic dilemma between promoting the development of alternative 
markets and f ighting for more encompassing change on the mainstream 
market. In its rankings, “good practices” by brands and labels were put 
forward and recommended to consumers. One volunteer group associated 
with the campaign created an “ethical shopping map” to offer guidance to 
ethical consumers. But the campaign makers then refused to continue on 
this consumerist track and decided to refocus on denunciation campaigns. 
The concern that campaign makers had – and this was already a big issue 
during the first such consumer campaigns by the same organization in the 
1970s – was that promoting alternative markets may create the impression that 
no more mobilization is necessary, and may thus have a demobilizing effect.
Movement Players: Building up Influence Chains to Attack 
Corporations
How do social movements target market actors and use market arenas as a 
site for protest? The case of the anti-sweatshop movement gives important 
132 PhIlIP BAlsIger 
insights into this question. The campaign in France targeted f irms directly 
and attempted to build up pressure to make them yield to its demands. 
It did so by building up influence chains (Zietsma and Winn, 2008) that 
allowed it to create leverage over retailers. These companies in turn should 
take responsibility for the working conditions at their supplier factories. 
In a way, retailers were thus only intermediary targets; the campaign used 
their power in the supply chain to improve working conditions at factories in 
developing countries that do not directly sell to consumers and are therefore 
diff icult to target.
Within the market arena, the campaigns used two interlinked influ-
ence chains. First, it was based on raising the awareness of consumers and 
mobilizing them. The creation and articulation of a consumer demand for 
more ethical clothes should bring f irms to respond. Second, the campaigns 
attempted to damage the reputations of f irms by publicly questioning and 
denouncing their practices. The threat to corporate reputations should 
provoke change. These strategies thus belong to what King and Pierce (2010), 
in analyzing the “contentiousness of markets,” classif ied as contentious 
actions taking place in the market place. The privileged arena is the market 
arena itself, where consumer power and public shaming threaten prof it 
and reputation.
Threats to reputation worked particularly well in the case of the well-
known big retailers, as is shown by their strong reaction to the social 
record evaluations published by the campaign. This market consists of a 
limited number of players with high public brand recognition. The rank-
ings for the f irst time directly named and shamed companies for their 
specif ic malpractices. The campaign hoped to pit the retailers against each 
other, driving them into an “ethical competition” and splitting what might 
otherwise be a united opponent. Such a consumerist strategy (building on 
the model of product quality tests by consumer associations) attempts to 
take advantage of both f irms’ tendencies to differentiation and imitation 
in markets. Differentiation should lead some of them (especially small 
“challenger” f irms [Schurman, 2004]) to adopt better practices to appear as 
a leader in this regard and gain competitive advantages; through imitation, 
other f irms should come to adapt to this benchmark, which is put forward 
as an example to be followed by movement players (see also Raeburn, 
2004).
While these inf luence chains take place in the market arena where 
f irms compete, the campaign also tried to build influence chains within 
companies. Here, corporations appear as arenas composed of different 
players pursuing sometimes distinct goals. On the one hand, consumer 
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power itself can be seen as taking place within companies, especially when 
changing consumer preferences incite f irms to adapt their offer. On the 
other hand, the presence of unions also offered the campaign a chance to 
bring up its demands from within companies. However, this was done in a 
very limited way. Within the CFDT, the cause was especially promoted by 
the textile industry branch, but French textile producers were not targeted 
by the campaign. Retailer employees, in turn, were much less unionized. 
In one specif ic case (a public shaming action directed against Carrefour 
with regard to a dramatic accident at a Bangladeshi factory), unionized 
workers who were supposed to promote the campaign were uncomfortable 
and rejected the focalization of the public campaign on their company, 
criticizing the campaign’s attempt “to make Carrefour the scapegoat of all 
retailers.”3
Influence chains were also built when the campaign succeeded in finding 
internal allies. Movements may f ind sympathizers within companies who 
can be of great help in advancing movement goals (Dobbin, this volume; 
Raeburn, 2004) or weaken advocates of opposing ideas (Weber et al., 2009). 
In the case of Auchan, the campaign had found an important internal 
advocate of its goals who pushed for a greater commitment to social respon-
sibility of the company, and his departure cut this internal influence chain. 
Similarly, the development of corporate social responsibility departments 
may lead to the recruitment of personnel sympathetic to movement goals, 
although such departments are often used to conceive of alternative strate-
gies bypassing movement demands.
Finally, the campaign took advantage of the connectedness of market 
arenas to other arenas and players. It began actively targeting local legisla-
tors to push for the adoption of ethical public procurement policies. In this 
way, legislative change could be used to put pressure on clothing f irms and 
ultimately to improve working conditions in factories of the developing 
world. This strategy proved effective, but it reached different f irms than the 
ones targeted by the other petitions and rankings of the campaign. Markets 
are structured into various niches subarenas; while one such niche could 
be reached via targeting local governments in their role as consumers, the 
broad retail market remained unaffected by this strategy, and the campaign 
had to continue targeting it through means of consumer and reputation 
pressure.
Table 1 shows the different strategies used by the campaign to target 
corporate players, distinguishing between the arenas where actions take 
place.
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corporation Allies within companies
– consumers
– unions
– sympathizers in management
local politics local legislators to adopt ethical procurement resolutions
Corporate Players: Confronting and Sidestepping
The analysis furthermore points to the wide range of responses one f inds 
among corporations targeted by movement players. Within corporations, 
the anti-sweatshop campaign as well as other initiatives around the promo-
tion of corporate social responsibility often led to the establishment of 
new departments to specif ically deal with these questions, i.e., devising 
strategies to respond to civil society demands. Thus, because such issues 
were relatively new in the European context, new players were created 
within f irms or existing players were given new tasks.
As far as the reactions to campaign claims go, we can distinguish between 
actions of sidestepping, confrontation, compliance and ignorance (see Ta-
ble 2). Ignorance means nonreaction, while compliance is its opposite: fully 
yielding to movement demands. Sidestepping is in-between: companies 
take up some of the demands, but usually leaving out the most binding 
(and costly) aspects. Confrontation, f inally, has drawn the least attention 
so far. It means that companies attack movement players. It may be done 
by corporate players who have taken actions of sidestepping previously, or 
players who had so far chosen to ignore demands. It involves “hostile” ac-
tions where corporate players directly f ight back against movement players 
by delegitimizing their claims and frames. When choosing confrontation, 
corporate players act similarly as countermovements opposing each other 
(Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996; Bob, 2012).
Table 2 Corporate strategies when facing movement demands
Ignorance Compliance Sidestepping Confrontation
nonreaction Fully yielding to 
demands
taking up aspects of demands 
without fully complying
Fighting back
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Ignorance was the targeted f irms’ f irst response. Indeed, for many of them 
the hope to sit out protest and let the wave of agitation and media attention 
pass was a successful strategy. Because movement players gradually focused 
on those f irms that had given in to some aspects and could then be held 
accountable to these resolutions, those f irms that did not react at all fell 
out of the spotlight and did not face any more public pressure.
Compliance designates firms completely yielding to movement demands. 
While some companies in other countries did decide to fully cooperate, in 
France we only f ind the f irst steps to such compliance in the response of 
Auchan. Quickly, Auchan’s collaboration with the campaign coalition was 
supplanted by a form of sidestepping which ultimately led to confrontation. 
With the help of their business association, the targeted retailers built up a 
new player, the Initiative Clause Sociale. The ICS was f irst conceived of as a 
technical solution to the issues brought up by the campaign. Because it did 
not agree to associate the campaign coalition with its monitoring scheme, 
it sidestepped campaign demands, taking up some demands (adopting 
and monitoring codes of conduct) without fully complying (independent 
monitoring involving NGOs and unions). The ICS soon became a powerful 
player to f ight back against movement attacks and eventually to openly 
confront the coalition. In particular, the ICS counterframed the issue by 
publishing statements that attempted to delegitimize the coalition and its 
tactics, and defending the approach pursued by the ICS. The campaign’s 
goal to split the companies and lead them on a track of “ethical competition” 
thus failed; the strategy had the opposite effect – it brought companies to 
cooperate and to oppose the campaign jointly.
Firms used other strategies of sidestepping, too. In particular, they tried 
to cherry-pick more moderate social movement players for collaboration 
to sidestep demands. This is what Carrefour and Auchan were doing when 
they collaborated with human rights NGOs. Doing so, they broadened their 
own coalition by associating movement players. This strategy of “splitting 
the opponent” parallels attempts by movement players to bring some f irms 
to cooperate, thus dividing corporations into good and bad, cooperative 
and confrontational. Finally, a different form of sidestepping occurs when 
f irms create new market arenas by developing niche products that take 
up movement demands without fully embracing movement goals. This is 
what happened in Switzerland. The creation of this niche market benefited 
from the presence of competing social movement players whose tactical 
approach was not to denounce companies, but to collaborate with them by 
creating ethical labels (Balsiger, 2012). Corporations could collaborate with 
them and thus gain greater legitimacy in selling ethical clothes. As in the 
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cherry-picking collaborations above, sidestepping thus took the form of 
playing off different movement organizations against each other.
Making Use of the Players and Arenas Perspective
The players and arenas perspective highlights the strategic interactions be-
tween movement players and their targets. Through the empirical analysis 
of the anti-sweatshop movement in France, I show the heuristic use of this 
perspective for social movement analysis. In particular, it allows focusing 
much more on the exchange of moves and countermoves between different 
players involved and puts much more emphasis on the strategies used by 
targets – in this case, corporations – to counter movement demands and 
shape the further unfolding of the interaction.
Some processes identif ied in the case study point at general dynamics 
at work in movement-corporate interactions on markets. First, the analysis 
shows the importance of distinct market arenas that can be reached through 
different influence chains. The movement coalition in France focused on 
public campaigns targeting clothing brands and general retailers. But it also 
conducted a campaign targeting local legislators to change the purchase 
behavior of public agencies. Although pursuing the same ultimate goal, 
these two strategies reached different market arenas. The latter brought the 
issue of codes of conducts to the agenda of medium-sized f irms specialized 
in the production of professional clothes, a market that could not be targeted 
through public campaigning. The public campaigns, on the other hand, 
proved useful to put pressure on f irms catering to individual consumers 
and caring about their reputation.
Second, the cases thus suggest that the study of social movement ac-
tivities facing corporate players should not be reduced merely to classic 
forms of protest such as those that are collected in protest event analysis; 
indeed, such forms – for example, demonstrations – may not be the most 
effective nor the most often used in this particular context. Paying at-
tention to strategic interactions in different arenas thus points at the 
variety of protest repertoires across arenas or in different institutional 
environments (Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008). Public campaigns and in 
particular consumerist tactics such as boycotts, buycotts, brand evaluations 
or the creation of labels, seem to be particularly eff icient forms of protest 
in market arenas. In consumer markets, they allow for the construction of 
leverage vis-à-vis f irms, both in a negative and in a positive way through 
potential consumer rewards. When looking at the articulation of these 
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tactics within a given player or the social movement arena, one f inds a 
specif ic dilemma for mobilizations in this tension between the promotion 
of alternative markets (be it indirectly through evaluations and other tools 
for political consumerists, or directly through the creation of labels) and 
protesting against existing market practices.
The players and arenas perspective furthermore proves useful to study the 
variety of corporate reactions to movement claims. The cooperation of French 
retailers and their attempts at counterframing and attacking the campaign-
ers demonstrates how corporations f ight back. Through their cooperation 
the companies succeeded in countering the movement player’s attempt to pit 
them against each other; at the same time, they built up a common strategy 
that partly takes up movement demands and is designed to counter efforts 
to damage their reputation. The Swiss example shows what happens when 
f irms choose differentiation by launching different ethical labels. This is 
a form of sidestepping whereby a new arena of ethical fashion as a niche 
market is created. It points to a recurring logic of the interaction between 
movements and corporations. What a movement player denounces – for 
example, animal rights in poultry factories, environmental pollution in the 
production and transport of food, genetically modified seeds, sweatshops, 
or the facility to watch porn on smartphones – can be taken up by existing 
or emerging entrepreneurs and turned into its opposite, thus developing an 
alternative product – animal welfare chicken, organic food, ethical fashion, 
or phones blocking X-rated content (Shamir and Ben-Porat, 2007). Often 
this process is described as the capacity of capitalism to feed itself from its 
critiques, which is true, but tends to underplay the fact that many movement 
players themselves actively promote the development of such markets and 
become crucial players in it – as entrepreneurs, makers of labels, and so on.4
Features of the market structure – the existence of a powerful business asso-
ciation in one case and the existence of two dominant and a number of smaller 
players in the other – as well as a diverging assessment of potential profits 
when adopting more ethical practices, may explain the different reactions 
observed in the two countries. In this respect, more future research should be 
done on the possible development of interaction routines between firms and 
movement players. More and more firms – especially big and transnational 
companies – now have whole departments that deal with politics, social 
responsibility, or risk management. An entire professional f ield has emerged 
around these issues. Through this, f irms develop an expertise in dealing with 
corporate campaigns; they try to monitor movement players and are better 
equipped to react to campaigns. Investigating how this development affects 
interactions between movement and firms should be a research priority.
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Notes
1. Tennis aficionados will enjoy recalling the legendary underhand serve by 
Michael Chang when playing Ivan Lendl in the 1989 Roland Garros fourth-
round match, or his approaching the T-line while waiting for Lendl to serve. 
Destabilizing his opponent with these surprise moves, he wore out his op-
ponent and eventually won.
2. One also needs to emphasize the role played by a “broker” NGO that 
specialized in accompanying small firms when trying to implement 
sustainability criteria on their commodity chain; this NGO, in addition, 
was importantly financed by a business association, La Maison du Textile, 
representing French clothing producers.
3. Quoted from the newsletter of the union’s section at Carrefour: L’Hyper 
204/205 (May 27, 2005), http://cfdt.carrefour.free.fr/carrefour/hypers/
Hyper%20204.pdf.
4. It is possible that a similar functioning can be observed in the interaction of 
movements with the state regarding the development of new policy fields. 
Here, too, movements provoke the making of new specialized policy areas 
where they come to play roles that go beyond contention. A well-studied 
example would be the case of AIDS policy.
References
Aspers, Patrick. 2010. Orderly Fashion: A Sociology of Markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
Armstrong, Elizabeth A., and Mary Bernstein. 2008. “Culture, Power, and Institutions: A Multi-
Institutional Politics Approach to Social Movements.” Sociological Theory 26: 74-99
Balsiger, Philip. 2010. “Making Political Consumers: The Tactical Action Repertoire of a Campaign 
for Clean Clothes.” Social Movement Studies 9: 311-329.
—. 2012. “Competing Tactics: How the Interplay of Tactical Approaches Shapes Movement Out-
comes on the Market for Ethical Fashion.” MPIfG Discussion Paper 12/9. Cologne, Germany: 
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
Barraud de Lagerie, Pauline. 2010. Les Patrons de la Vertu. Entrepreneurs de Morale et Instruments 
de Mesure dans la Construction de la Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises. PhD dissertation. 
CSO, Science Po, Paris.
Bartley, Tim. 2007. “Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational 
Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions.” American Journal of Sociology 
113: 297-351.
Beckert, Jens. 2009. “The Social Order of Markets.” Theory and Society 38: 245-269.
—. 2010. “Institutional Isomorphism Revisited: Convergence and Divergence in Institutional 
Change.” Sociological Theory 28: 150-166.
Bob, Clifford. 2012. The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Briscoe, Forest, and Sean Safford. 2008. “The Nixon-in-China Effect: Activism, Imitation, and the 
Institutionalization of Contentious Practices.” Administrative Science Quarterly 53: 460-491.
corPorAtIons As PlAyers And ArenAs 139
Campbell, John L. 2005. “Where Do We Stand? Common Mechanisms in Organizations and Social 
Movements Research.” In Gerald F. Davis, Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott, and Mayer N. 
Zald, eds., Social Movements and Organization Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Chamberlin, Edward Hastings. 1933. The Theory of Monopolistic Competition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Davis, Gerald F. 2005. “Firms and Environments.” In Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg, eds., 
The Handbook of Economic Sociology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Diani, Mario. 2011. “Attributes, Relations, or Both? Exploring the Relational Side of Collective 
Action.” International Conference on Social Science Methodology: A Special Reference to Social 
Movements. CNAS-Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu.
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1983. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomor-
phism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American Sociological Review 
48: 147-160.
Dubuisson-Quellier, Sophie. 2013. Ethical Consumption. Winnipeg, Canada: Fernwood.
Evans, Rhonda, and Tamara Kay. 2008. “How Environmentalists ‘Greened’ Trade Policy: Strategic 
Action and the Architecture of Field Overlap.” American Sociological Review 73: 970-991.
Featherstone, Liza, and United Students against Sweatshops. 2002. Students against Sweatshops. 
London: Verso.
Fillieule, Olivier. 2006. “Requiem pour un Concept. Vie et Mort de la Notion de ‘Structure des 
Opportunités Politiques.’” In Gilles Dorronsorom, ed., La Turquie Conteste. Paris: Presses 
du CNRS.
Fligstein, Neil. 2001. The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-first-Century 
Capitalist Societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
— and Doug McAdam. 2012. A Theory of Fields. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goodwin, Jeff, and James M. Jasper, eds. 2004. Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, 
and Emotion. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlef ield.
— and James M. Jasper, eds. 2012. Contention in Context: Political Opportunities and the Emergence 
of Protest. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Jasper, James M. 2012. “Introduction: From Political Opportunity Structures to Strategic Interac-
tion.” In Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, eds., Contention in Context: Political Opportunities 
and the Emergence of Protest. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
— and Jane Poulsen. 1993. “Fighting Back: Vulnerabilities, Blunders, and Countermobilization 
by the Targets in Three Animal Rights Campaigns.” Sociological Forum 8: 639-657.
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
King, Brayden G., and Nicholas A. Pearce. 2010. “The Contentiousness of Markets: Politics, Social 
Movements, and Institutional Change in Markets.” Annual Review of Sociology 36: 249-267.
Koopmans, Ruud. 2004. “Protest in Time and Space.” In David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and 
Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Luders, Joseph. 2006. “The Economics of Movement Success: Business Responses to Civil Rights 
Mobilization.” American Journal of Sociology 111: 963-998.
McAdam, Doug. 1982. Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
— and W. Richard Scott. 2005. “Organizations and Movements.” In Gerald F. Davis, Doug 
McAdam, W. Richard Scott, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Social Movements and Organization 
Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
140 PhIlIP BAlsIger 
Merk, J. 2007. “The Private Regulation of Labour Standards: The Case of the Apparel and Footwear 
Industries.” In Jean-Christophe Graz and Andreas Nölke, eds., Transnational Private Govern-
ance and Its Limits. London: Routledge.
Meyer, David S., and Suzanne Staggenborg. 1996. “Movements, Countermovements, and the 
Structure of Political Opportunity.” American Journal of Sociology 101: 1628-1660.
Micheletti, Michele. 2003. Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective 
Action. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Raeburn, Nicole C. 2004 . Changing Corporate America from Inside Out: Lesbian and Gay Work-
place Rights. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Schurman, Rachel. 2004. “Fighting ‘Frankenfoods’: Industrial Opportunity Structures and the 
Eff icacy of the Anti-Biotech Movement in Western Europe.” Social Problems 51: 243-268.
Schneiberg, Marc, and Michael Lounsbury. 2008. “Social Movements and Institutional Analysis.” 
In Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Roy Suddaby, and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, eds., 
The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
Shamir, Omri, and Ben-Porat, Guy. 2007. “Boycotting for Sabbath: Religious Consumerism as a 
Political Strategy.” Contemporary Politics 13: 75-92.
Soule, Sarah A. 2009. Contention and Corporate Social Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
—. 2012. “Social Movements and Markets, Industries, and Firms.” Organization Studies 33: 
1715-1733.
Tarrow, Sidney. 1989. Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Taylor, Verta, and Mayer N. Zald. 2010. “Conclusion: The Shape of Collective Action in the US 
Health Sector.” In Jane C. Banaszak-Holl, Sandra R. Levitsky, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Social 
Movements and the Transformation of American Health Care. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Van Dyke, Nella, Sarah A. Soule, and Verta Taylor. 2004. “The Targets of Social Movements: 
Beyond a Focus on the State.” Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change 25: 27-51.
Walker, Edward. 2012. “Social Movements, Organizations, and Fields: A Decade of Theoretical 
Integration.” Contemporary Sociology 41: 576-587.
Weber, Klaus, Hayagreeva Rao, and L. G. Thomas. 2009. “From Streets to Suites: How the Anti-
Biotech Movement Affected German Pharmaceutical Firms.” American Sociological Review 
74: 106-127.
White, Harrison C. 1981. “Where Do Markets Come From?” American Journal of Sociology 87: 
517-547.
Zald, Mayer N., Calvin Morrill, and Hayagreeva Rao. 2005. “The Impact of Social Movements 
on Organizations.” In Gerald F. Davis, Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott, and Mayer N. Zald, 
eds., Social Movements and Organization Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zietsma, Charlene, and Monika I. Winn. 2008. “Building Chains and Directing Flows: Strategies 
and Tactics of Mutual Influence in Stakeholder Conflicts.” Business & Society 47: 68-101.
6 Professions, Social Movements, and 
the Sovereign Corporation1
Frank Dobbin and Jiwook Jung
It is well known that social movements have become professionalized in 
recent decades. They have CEOs and CFOs, MBAs and CPAs. But it is not 
so well known that some professions have become social movements. We 
argue that the professions play two underrecognized roles as social move-
ment actors in the market arena. First, professions have taken over from 
mature social movements, creating permanent beachheads within the 
f irm for activism. To illustrate we discuss the role of the personnel profes-
sion in promoting the civil rights and women’s rights agendas, even after 
the civil rights and women’s movements had largely faded (Mansbridge, 
1986; McAdam, 1988). Personnel experts devised early equal opportunity 
measures and soon appointed in-house equal opportunity experts who 
fought for new rounds of diversity initiatives, and fought to extend protec-
tions to new groups, including Hispanics, older workers, and the disabled 
(Skrentny, 2002). Other social movements have similarly been picked up 
by professionals within organizations. From the 1930s, labor leaders and 
labor relations managers institutionalized the labor movement and its 
corporate opposition. From the 1960s, women’s advocates within state and 
federal governments have promoted the feminist agenda (Harrison, 1988; 
Vogel, 1993). From the 1970s, environmental engineers carried the green 
movement forward within the f irm.
Second, professions have substituted for social movements, mobilizing 
to change corporate behavior from without. We illustrate with the example 
of institutional investors, who became vocal advocates for a “shareholder 
value” movement comprising virtually no actual shareholders. The “share-
holder value movement” was in fact a movement led by professional fund 
managers who claimed to be carrying the flag for their clients – investors. 
They promoted a range of corporate reforms that fundamentally altered the 
ways of leading f irms. As we argue below, the reforms they promoted did 
more to advance their own interests, as fund managers, than the interests of 
their clients – investors in their funds. In this case, professionals from out-
side of the f irm used social movement tactics to change corporate behavior. 
They did this in their roles as professionals. Other exogenous professional 
groups have played similar roles, notably international labor standards and 
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environmental professionals, who created third-party private regulatory 
agencies to vet the practices of f irms in a wide range of industries, from 
Vietnamese footwear and apparel to Brazilian forestry products (Bartley, 
2007).
We begin by arguing that the position of the corporation in society 
changed signif icantly as it grew to control the lion’s share of resources 
and to determine the life chances, social benefits, and employment rights 
of individuals. We then turn to the two case studies to explore how pro-
fessional groups behave as social movement activists. In each corporate 
decision-making arena – personnel and corporate governance/strategy – we 
f ind a wide range of players at work: professionals, executives who may 
be movement allies or opponents, academic experts who offer strategies 
and vocabularies, and federal regulators, to name a few. These players 
may also be arenas, for collectivities such as professional societies may be 
arenas composed of individual players advocating different positions in 
one moment, and players acting with a single voice in the next (Mische, 
2008). Thus the Society for Human Resources Management is an arena in 
which personnel professionals developed diversity programs to implement, 
and then it becomes a player promoting said programs. The Council of 
Institutional Investors (CII) is an arena for investment professionals to 
determine their preferences as to corporate governance and compensation 
practices, and then it becomes a player when it promotes certain practices.
Both of these movements had opponents. Personnel managers who 
championed equal opportunity faced opposition from some executives, 
and opposition from the White House during the Reagan era. Institutional 
investors promoting shareholder value faced vocal opposition from execu-
tives who were trained in one management system and were then asked 
to embrace another. Yet personnel managers and institutional investors 
largely won their battles, even if equal opportunity programs met with 
mixed success and shareholder value was unevenly implemented.
Social movement theorists have been particularly attentive to how 
structural openings create space for activism (Kitschelt, 1986; McAdam et 
al., 2001; Tilly and Tarrow, 2006). Political openings were key to the success 
of both of these movements. Equal opportunity laws created a “political 
opportunity structure” (Tilly and Tarrow, 2006) within the f irm, although 
it was not a foregone conclusion that a professional group would take over, 
or that the group would be personnel experts rather than, say, lawyers. 
Moreover, regulatory changes created opportunities for the realization of 
shareholder value reforms. Two key reforms, dediversif ication and industry 
concentration, were facilitated by weak enforcement of antitrust in the 
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1980s, and by the Supreme Court’s refusal to enforce anti-takeover laws 
(Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley, 1994). A third reform, executive perfor-
mance pay, depended on regulatory approval of stock option grants. But 
no one could have guessed that these regulatory changes would facilitate 
institutional investors’ promotion of the “shareholder value” movement. 
Professional activism drove the diversity management and shareholder 
value management revolutions.
We take up several themes that are woven through the volume. First 
is the identif ication of an important new player in the social movement 
arena generally, the professional group. Second is the identif ication of an 
important and understudied political arena, that of corporate policy. As 
the corporation plays a larger role in social outcomes, from gender equality 
to environmental protection, we can expect it to be the target of more 
activism. Third is the balance between different forms of strategizing in 
f irms. In the introduction to this volume James Jasper outlines three forms 
of strategy – persuasion, coercion, and payment – that a player may use to 
get her way (see also Jasper, 2006). In the case of the diversity management 
revolution, we argue that personnel professionals use a combination of 
persuasion and coercion, exaggerating the threat of regulatory intervention 
to convince executives to follow their advice. In the second case, we argue 
that some institutional investors used a modicum of coercion to promote 
shareholder value precepts, notably shareholder proposals to boards, but 
that the strongest pressure came from the implicit threat by institutional 
investors to sell their shares. It was not positive sanction, in the form of 
reward, but negative sanction, in the form of the threat of withdrawal of 
f inancial support, that won the day. Payment and persuasion reigned in 
the end, for the payment was for embracing a new management paradigm, 
and without the persuasive force of the paradigm, f irms would never have 
capitulated to the changes fund managers promoted.
Professions and the Sovereign Corporation
We argue that professions have taken on social movement activities in part 
because the corporation has become sovereign in its own realm. The cor-
poration is increasingly a giver of rights, creator of inequality, and steward 
of the environment. Professional groups have thus led social movements 
addressed to f irms, sometimes from the inside, sometimes from the outside, 
sometimes taking the banner from an external social movement, sometimes 
initiating the charge themselves.
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The classic literature on the professions focuses on how particular groups 
win public confidence and state credentials (Friedson, 1975; Sarfatti-Larsen, 
1977; Starr, 1982). Andrew Abbott’s systems perspective attended to how 
contending groups vie for authority in a given domain. In France of the 
ancien régime, the groups competing for work as healers included “phy-
sicians, surgeons, pharmacists, ‘empirics,’ operators, spagiristes, and … 
the various members of the clergy” (Abbott, 1988: 157). The state would 
eventually license some groups and prohibit others from claiming expertise.
Since the late 19th century the corporation has become increasingly 
important to professions as a source of power and authority. Jurisdictional 
disputes between professional groups now often play out before executives 
rather than public off icials. Professions win authority within the corporate 
world not through licensure per se, but by popularizing the management 
practices they favor. Management innovations, accounting principles, and 
best practices in medicine are vetted f irst by corporations, and only after 
the fact by state regulators, if the state gets into the fray at all. Institutional-
ists have thus examined how experts seek to establish authority within 
organizations (Dobbin and Sutton, 1998; Fligstein, 1990).
This has occurred in part because corporations have come between 
the individual and the sovereign state. Fifteen short decades ago, only a 
handful of Americans worked outside of farming, government, and the 
clergy, in f irms operating canals, banks, railroads, and textile mills. A 
hundred years later, nine-tenths of Americans worked in formal organiza-
tions. Books like The Organization Man (Whyte, 1956) and The Organization 
Society (Presthus, 1962) described this change as revolutionary. For Charles 
Perrow (1991: 727) the formal organization had “absorbed society.” In the 
process, the corporation became an increasingly important collective actor. 
Corporations employ more people, and do more of society’s work, than the 
government these days, and so it should come as no surprise that they are, 
more and more, targets of political activism.
Meanwhile the liberal professions that predated the modern corpora-
tion, and played a central role in the early industrial economy, have been 
subsumed by corporations in several ways (Dobbin et al., 2007; Greenwood 
et al., 2002; Suddaby et al., 2007). In some cases, groups of professionals 
formed corporations to pursue their professions jointly, in publicly owned 
accountancy, investment bank, and medical practices (Suddaby and Green-
wood, 2005). In other cases, members of the autonomous, liberal professions, 
including lawyers, doctors, and accountants, were hired as regular employ-
ees by f irms, to provide their services from the inside. In still other cases, 
new professional groups emerged solely to serve the corporation, such as 
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management and personnel professionals. These groups are often neglected 
by scholars of the professions, who define them as nonprofessionals because 
their authority is recognized by f irms rather than by the state.
Meanwhile, organizational scholars have begun to recognize that profes-
sions sometimes behave as social movements. This idea can be traced to 
Abbott’s (1988) description of nascent professional groups lobbying the state 
for licensure. The growing literature on social movements and organiza-
tions (Bartley, 2005; Strang and Jung, 2005) has demonstrated that within 
the f irm, managers and professionals often behave like social movement 
activists, developing lobbying strategies and political agendas through 
professional associations and networks and then advocating for change in 
the f irms they work for (Davis et al., 1994; Dobbin and Kelly, 2007; Edelman 
et al., 1999; Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). We build on this literature to 
consider the role of professionals in the arena of corporate decision-making.
The Personnel Profession Takes Over Civil Rights
The conventional wisdom about social movements, as operating independ-
ent of corporations and as addressing their claims to the nation-state, dates 
to before the rise of the modern corporation. The American model of the 
social movement as a force outside of the party system arose in the 19th 
century with the Second Great Awakening, and was institutionalized as 
part of the political process only with the temperance, suffrage, and labor 
movements. Before those movements, issue-oriented political activism 
outside of the party system was all but unknown (Clemens, 1997). The civil 
rights movement helped to reestablish the model of the issue-oriented 
social movement for a new round of movements in the 1960s and 1970s, 
including the anti-war, women’s rights, and environmental movements 
(Skrentny, 2002).
Apart from stimulating other conventional social movements, the civil 
rights movement spawned political action in a newly professionalized form. 
After Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, social movement groups 
such as the NAACP and the Urban League picketed employers who wouldn’t 
hire blacks, organized jobs banks, and f iled charges against companies 
that discriminated. Otherwise the movement turned to new tasks, and 
gradually petered out.
But a new movement emerged within the personnel profession to carry 
the civil rights project forward. Because we don’t have a language for de-
scribing a national network of professionals as a social movement, we have 
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neglected its emergence. Many personnel experts fought equal opportunity 
innovations, but by the late 1970s, every major f irm had equal opportunity 
experts on staff. Personnel was transformed from a bastion of white men 
with backgrounds in labor relations to a bastion of white women attracted 
by equal opportunity goals. By the end of the century, seven out of ten 
personnel experts were women. They were rarely the same people who 
marched for civil rights in Selma and Washington, but they continued the 
work of that social movement just the same.
Figure 1 traces the expansion, and increasing feminization, of the person-
nel profession. The changes were driven in large measure by new equal 
opportunity and aff irmative action regulations that spawned a series of 
personnel innovations from 1961, when John F. Kennedy issued Executive 
Order 10925 requiring federal contractors to practice “aff irmative action” 
in ending employment discrimination. While the number of managers 
in the United States roughly doubled between 1960 and 2000, personnel 
management grew tenfold.
Personnel experts brought their professional toolkit to the task of 
eliminating discrimination at work. They had long designed bureaucratic 
systems to manage federal regulations, beginning in the 1920s with wages 
and hours and labor relations regulations (Brandes, 1976; Brody, 1980). After 
the Wagner Act of 1935 empowered unions, they negotiated union contracts 


































note: data on personnel specialists and managers, excluding clerical workers, from us decennial 
census of Population and current Population survey of the Bureau of labor statistics. Annual 
data before 1968 are interpolated from the decennial census. http://factfinder.census.gov/ and 
http://www.census.gov/cps/, accessed november 1, 2006; Bureau of labor statistics 2006; us 
census Bureau 2006.
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alongside labor lawyers and went on to implement the grievance procedures, 
seniority systems, job classification schemes, and pension programs written 
into those contracts (Kochan et al., 1986; Selznick, 1969).
After passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, personnel experts promoted 
compliance practices they had developed in earlier years, building their 
profession strategically. The players-and-arenas approach emphasizes 
attention to the full roster of strategic players (Jasper 2006). In this case, 
personnel professionals have been neglected by others, who emphasize 
the courts, executives, the civil rights and women’s movements, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulators, Department 
of Labor overseers of federal contractors, and elected off icials (Blumrosen, 
1993; Chen, 2009; Graham, 1990; Harrison, 1988; Skrentny, 1996; Stryker, 
2000; Vogel, 1993).
We build on Jasper’s (2012) argument that there are three broad strategies 
players use to get their way: persuasion, coercion, and payment. In this case 
we identify a hybrid strategy, “persuasion of coercion.” Personnel experts 
persuaded executives that coercion was a real threat. They talked up the 
legal risk, exaggerating the coercive authority of the state and the risk of 
regulatory and judicial sanction. We suggest that government coercion is 
socially construed by professionals, who use public policy as a strategic 
resource for their own purposes. Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger (1992) 
study the personnel literature to f ind that experts significantly exaggerated 
legal risks to employers to win executive attention and resources. Because 
employers are not experts, “professionals have become social f ilters who 
determine how employers perceive legal threats, how they understand 
the law, and how they construct the compliance requirements” (Edelman, 
2002: 195). Personnel specialists claimed to be able to develop bureaucratic 
inoculations against future judicial and administrative rulings (Dobbin 
and Sutton, 1998).
This strategy worked, in that personnel won control over equal opportu-
nity compliance at a time when unionization was declining and thus their 
labor relations function was waning. They built new roles for personnel 
off icers within the f irm. In the 1960s, they wrote nondiscrimination poli-
cies based on union nondiscrimination rules, and set up recruitment and 
training programs for women and minorities. In the 1970s, they formalized 
hiring and promotion systems to eliminate managerial opportunities to 
exercise bias. In the Reagan years, when aff irmative action was on the 
ropes, they argued that the new hiring and promotion practices helped 
to rationalize “human resources management” and relabeled “equal op-
portunity” programs as “diversity management” programs. Then in the 
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1990s and 2000s, the increasingly feminized human resources profession 
focused on women’s issues, pushing for the expansion of work-life and 
anti-harassment programs.
Personnel’s equal rights advocacy, via “persuasion-of-coercion,” evolved 
through four distinct phases. In each of these phases, the personnel profes-
sion worked out strategies and practices to lobby executives in their profes-
sional meetings, and then took these strategies and practices back to their 
organizations and championed them. Each acted, at f irst, as the lone local 
representative of a wider social movement. In the f irst phase, personnel 
experts put their heads together and recommended special recruitment 
and training systems. In response to Kennedy’s 1961 order requiring federal 
contractors to take “aff irmative action” to equalize opportunity or risk 
losing federal contracts, personnel executives began to dismantle de jure 
discrimination. Experts at Lockheed’s Marietta, Georgia, aircraft factory 
were f irst to propose changes, soon after Lockheed won a billion-dollar air 
force contract. In short order a network of personnel experts in f irms with 
government contracts organized Plans for Progress as the private-sector 
arm of the President’s Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity 
(PCEEO), which was headed by Vice President Lyndon Johnson. That group 
soon had 300 members that pledged to strike rules that excluded blacks 
and Latinos, and later women, from jobs ranging from meat cutter to chief 
executive.
Federal contractors certainly felt the strong arm of coercion in the early 
1960s, for they were concerned about losing contracts. One might conclude 
that in this arena, personnel experts were merely carrying out the coercive 
requirements of federal agencies. But federal regulations did not specify 
corporate practices that had to be changed. And so the strategy of personnel 
experts was to use persuasion to convince executives to accept the programs 
they favored, and then to suggest to the courts that they should accept 
emerging industry norms, which they themselves had created.
Personnel experts built on traditional recruitment programs, which tar-
geted Harvard and Yale and the Big 10, with recruitment programs for blacks 
and women, targeting Howard and Spelman, Wellesley and Mount Holyoke. 
They recruited production workers not only in white high schools, but in 
inner-city high schools that had never before seen recruiters. They also built 
on conventional skill and management training programs, establishing 
programs designed for blacks and women. By creating new recruitment 
programs, personnel experts def ined discrimination as the categorical 
refusal to consider minorities and women for jobs. By creating new training 
programs, they def ined discrimination as the failure to provide women 
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and minorities with the skills they needed to succeed. Executives at federal 
contractor f irms often went along with these innovations out of fear of 
losing their contracts, although few actually lost them.
Opposition to these programs came from both sides. On the one hand, 
some executives thought new recruitment and training programs went too 
far and resisted them. An executive interviewed by the Bureau of National 
Affairs reported that he would not countenance active recruitment of 
blacks: “I have given instructions as of 1965 … that if any good Negro ap-
plicants appear and if we have any openings, hire them. We have had none 
during this period … [but] to go outside our area and recruit them would 
discriminate against local applicants” (Bureau of National Affairs, 1967: 3). 
On the other hand, civil rights activists argued that f irms were not keeping 
their nondiscrimination pledges. The NAACP and Urban League protested 
that employers who had pledged to open jobs to blacks in 1961 would not 
even let blacks in the door to apply, and picketed large employers in the 
South (New York Times, 1961: 31).
Federal agencies in charge of Civil Rights Act and aff irmative action 
enforcement looked to what Plans for Progress employers were using for 
guidance. The foot soldiers of the movement were to be found not on the 
streets of Selma, but in the personnel office at Lockheed’s Marietta, Georgia, 
plant. They weren’t always willing conscripts, but now the personnel profes-
sion had added a specialty, and the old hands would have to change their 
focus from guarding against unions to protecting equality of opportunity. 
The President’s Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity lobbied 
f irms to do more to promote equality of opportunity, but they left it to 
private-sector personnel experts to f igure out what to do (Graham, 1990).
In the second phase of the evolution of personnel strategy, experts 
considered changes in the law and collectively settled on the formalization 
of hiring and promotion as the second broad response. The stimulus was 
a three-pronged increase in federal oversight in the early 1970s. First, the 
Supreme Court extended the definition of discrimination in 1971, in Griggs 
v. Duke Power Company, striking down employment practices that appeared 
to be neutral but which had the effect of needlessly excluding blacks. 
Second, the Department of Labor expanded aff irmative action reporting 
and enforcement. Third, in 1972 Congress gave the EEOC power to bring 
lawsuits, and the number of suits skyrocketed from several hundred to 
over f ive thousand a year by the end of the decade (Burstein and Monahan, 
1986; Peterson, 1974; Skrentny, 1996: 127). With its new powers the EEOC 
negotiated $75 million in settlements in 1973 and 1974 with AT&T in the 
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f irst in a string of high-prof ile discrimination consent decrees (Shaeffer, 
1975: 5).
Personnel experts like Barbara Boyle, who designed IBM’s f irst equal 
opportunity program before opening a consultancy, now argued that the 
courts would question many common employment practices. The solution, 
they argued, was equal opportunity programs built on the foundation of 
classic personnel administration, beginning with formal hiring and promo-
tion practices to stop managers from discriminating (Dobbin et al., 1993). 
They recommended test validation procedures pioneered by industrial 
psychologists. They designed quasi-judicial grievance and disciplinary 
mechanisms, adapted from their union management toolkit, to intercept 
discrimination complaints before they reached the courts (Edelman, 1990; 
Sutton et al., 1994). In the process, Boyle and colleagues def ined formal, 
legalistic employment rules as the antidote to discrimination, equating 
fairness with the rule of law. They also built an equal opportunity arsenal 
that they, personnel experts, were uniquely qualif ied to deploy.
These professionals faced some social movement pushback, particularly 
from feminists who argued that this approach did little for women (Har-
rison, 1988; Vogel, 1993), and that personnel specialists and federal regulators 
alike were only concerned with race (Danovitch, 1990). Feminists in the 
government led this charge, not disenfranchised activists (Badran, 2009; 
Stetson and Mazur, 1995). But liberal judges generally supported the equal 
opportunity measures f irms embraced in the 1970s. They often asked why 
f irms charged with discrimination had not instituted the job descriptions, 
validated job tests, job posting systems, and salary classif ication systems 
that the personnel profession prescribed as anti-discrimination measures 
(Boyle, 1973: 92; New York Times, 1962).
In the third phase, personnel developed “diversity management” practices 
to take the place of equal opportunity practices. Ronald Reagan became the 
f irst high-profile opposing player in this arena when, in the 1980 election 
campaign, he called for eliminating bureaucratic red tape to unleash the 
potential of the economy. Once in off ice he made plans to dismantle the af-
f irmative action regime and diminish the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. Reagan’s predecessors had expanded equal opportunity and 
aff irmative action regulations, and his Republican predecessor, Richard 
Nixon, had done as much as any (Skrentny, 1996).
The success of the social movement that personnel experts organized 
within their f irms can be seen in executive attitudes. When Reagan chal-
lenged measures to integrate the workplace, corporate executives came to 
the defense of personnel (Fisher, 1994: 271). In 1979 the Wall Street Journal 
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reported a poll showing that two-thirds of top executives favored programs 
to promote women and minorities, and by 1985, a survey of Fortune 500 
executives found that 95 percent would continue to use numerical goals 
for the representation of women and minorities even if Washington backed 
away from aff irmative action regulations (Fisher, 1994: 270; Harvard Law 
Review, 1989: 661). A 1986 survey found that while enforcement had been cut, 
nine out of ten Fortune 500 companies planned no changes to aff irmative 
action programs and the tenth planned to expand programs (Bureau of Na-
tional Affairs, 1986: 90). Many executives came out in support of aff irmative 
action, in amicus briefs, telegrams to Reagan, and congressional testimony 
(Harvard Law Review, 1989: 662). In the end, Reagan’s own Republican 
cabinet off icials talked him out of eviscerating the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission and putting an end to affirmative action regulations 
for federal contractors. A key player in the equal opportunity debate, the 
administration, had become an arena for dissent and deliberation.
While Reagan did not eviscerate federal enforcement agencies, he did 
diminish their powers and send the clear message that equal opportunity 
was on the chopping block. Equal opportunity experts within f irms rede-
fined their activities under two different banners. They recast performance 
evaluations, skill training, and job-posting systems as part of an effort to 
rationalize the allocation of “human resources” (Dobbin and Sutton, 1998; 
Kelly and Dobbin, 1998). Those programs had been torn from the modern 
personnel administration manual of the 1950s, and rebranded as equal 
opportunity measures, and so now they came full circle. Social movement 
activists internal to the f irm were covering their tracks, claiming to be 
working for the bottom line.
The eff iciency argument worked for programs like job-posting systems 
that were nominally race- and gender-neutral. For other programs, consult-
ants such as R. Roosevelt Thomas dropped the language of legal compliance 
for a language of “diversity management,” which became the second banner 
(Bureau of National Affairs, 1995; Lynch, 1997). The personnel profession 
worked out a new rhetoric for their equal opportunity programs, arguing 
that the workforce would have growing numbers of women and minorities 
(Johnston and Packer, 1987). Diversity training, culture audits, and diversity 
performance evaluations would help the employees to work better together.
In the fourth phase, which overlapped with the third but came to 
dominate in the 1990s, personnel experts turned their attention to women’s 
issues; work-family programs and anti-harassment measures. The human 
resources profession had gradually become feminized between 1970 and 
1990, and leaders came to champion gender equality. In the 1970s, personnel 
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experts pushed f irms to install maternity leave programs to comply with 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, until the Supreme Court ruled in 1976 that 
the act did not require maternity leave. By that point, leading f irms had 
maternity leave programs on the books, which helped to quell corporate 
opposition to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. After that, person-
nel experts did not argue that other work-life programs were required by 
the Civil Rights Act, but they did argue that flexible working arrangements 
and child care supports could be part of a “good-faith effort” defense against 
claims of sex discrimination. Public off icials had created tax incentives and 
federal demonstration projects that supported on-site child care, dependent 
care expense accounts, f lextime, and part-time career options, and these 
helped personnel experts to build a case for work-family programs.
Women’s advocates in personnel did tie the issue of harassment at work 
to Title VII. After a struggle in the 1970s to win recognition of workplace 
sex harassment as employment discrimination, legal scholar Catharine 
McKinnon and her colleagues saw three federal court decisions in 1977 
defining workplace sex harassment as discrimination under Title VII. In 
1986 the Supreme Court upheld this view, and in 1991, Anita Hill’s charge that 
Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas had sexually harassed her at the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission focused national attention 
on the issue. The press coverage helped win congressional support for the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which gave women the same right to sue for punitive 
damages in discrimination suits that African-Americans had (Bequai, 1992).
Personnel experts proposed remedies from their professional kit bag: 
sexual harassment grievance procedures, modeled on union grievance 
procedures, and harassment sensitivity training, modeled on diversity 
training and ultimately on the management sensitivity training seminars 
of the late 1960s (Dobbin and Kelly, 2007). In time the Supreme Court would 
follow the lead of personnel experts. Absent any hard evidence that training 
or grievance procedures quell workplace sexual harassment (Bisom-Rapp, 
2001), in 1998 the Court found that these practices could inoculate employers 
against liability in certain harassment cases (Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
534 US 775 [1998]; Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 US 742 [1998]).
The personnel profession came to play a surprisingly central role in the 
civil rights arena, taking up the baton from movement activists after passage 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For a few years the NAACP still picketed the 
odd company that failed to comply with the law, but in short order, the 
movement had moved within the f irm. Personnel managers made changes 
to corporate personnel systems that no one could have anticipated in 1964, 
ostensibly in response to the law and changing judicial interpretation. 
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In 1964, civil rights leaders hoped that f irms would open jobs to blacks. 
By 1994, f irms had instituted culture audits and diversity training and 
discrimination grievance procedures, changes that civil rights advocates 
from 1964 could not have imagined.
Affirmative action and civil rights laws spawned a professional subgroup 
in personnel largely because the requirements of the laws were unclear, 
and thus personnel experts could claim the unique ability to divine what 
the courts would expect of employers. It was thus the law’s ambiguity 
that created a subspecialty within personnel management which, now 
institutionalized, continues to use social movement tactics to f ight for 
equal opportunity from within the f irm.
Institutional Investors as Movement Activists
If the case of personnel manager advocacy for equal opportunity demon-
strates how a social movement can be taken over by professionals within 
the f irm, the case of institutional investor advocacy for shareholder value 
demonstrates how a social movement, directed at the f irm, can be initiated 
by professionals outside of the f irm. Both cases illustrate how the f irm has 
become an object of social movement activity, conducted by professionals 
not in their spare time but in their work roles. Both cases show the dividing 
line between the professions and social movements to be changing.
The arena of corporate strategy and governance is populated by a set 
of players spanning the public and private sectors. Corporate executives, 
shareholders, and board members are all tied to the firm. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission regulates publicly held firms, as do industry specific 
regulators, such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the 
Federal Communications Commission, and domain-specific regulators, such 
as the Environmental Protection Agency and the EEOC. A number of market 
intermediaries play important roles, including institutional investors (mutual 
fund managers, investment banks, commercial banks, insurance companies, 
university endowments), securities analysts, hedge funds, and private equity 
firms (Dobbin and Zorn, 2005). Market intermediaries influence firms through 
“payment,” in Jasper’s (2012) language of strategizing, but they mostly use the 
threat of negative sanction, through shareholder proposals that challenge 
management decisions publicly and the threat to sell their shares, causing 
share price to decline and making it harder for f irms to raise capital.
When they began to promote new shareholder value practices, institu-
tional investors faced concerted resistance from executives who had built 
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their careers on the business model that the shareholder value paradigm 
attacked. Under that model, executives were paid salaries that were little 
affected by corporate performance. They released little information to 
investors beyond what was required by law. They dominated their own 
corporate boards to keep shareholders from challenging decisions, appoint-
ing their subordinates as members and chairing boards themselves. They 
operated internal capital markets, expanding through acquisition. They 
use diversif ication to hedge against the decline of a single industry. This 
system provided stable income and employment for corporate executives 
but, shareholder value advocates claimed, did not promote the interests of 
shareholders in maximizing f irm value. Executives built huge diversif ied 
empires with little concern for profitability or share price, focusing their 
efforts on expanding into new industries that would guarantee stability. 
Executives maximized f irm size to increase their salaries, and stability to 
maximize their longevity in off ice.
In the 1970s American industry was pummeled by rising oil prices, 
competition from Japanese automakers, and stagf lation. Investors and 
executives questioned whether there was something wrong with American 
management. Meanwhile institutional investors were winning growing 
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influence over f irms, as their control of shares skyrocketed through the 
democratization of shareholding, led by the rise of 401k plans and defined-
contribution pension plans, both of which funneled savings into the stock 
market.
The ageing of the baby boom generation, pension regulations that popu-
larized 401k plans, and the growth of private investment in mutual funds 
gave fund managers huge quantities of cash to invest, and unprecedented 
power over f irms (Swedberg, 2004). Peter Drucker’s Unseen Revolution: 
How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America (1976) and John Stephens’s 
The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (1979) anticipated the change. 
Figure 2 shows the growth in institutional investor holdings, between 1980 
and 2005, in a sample of 736 large US f irms, most of which at some point 
appeared on the Fortune 500 list. Institutions held about 30 percent of stock 
in the average company in 1980 and about 70 percent by 2005 (Dobbin and 
Jung, 2010).
Institutional investors began to coordinate their activities – something 
they had previously eschewed as industry competitors – to challenge 
corporate strategy. While investors had historically tended to avoid direct 
confrontation with management, some institutional investors, notably 
public pension funds such as CalPERS (the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System), began to talk of collective action. When disappointed 
by incumbent managers, investors had long taken the “Wall Street Walk,” 
quietly divesting. Selling shares, however, was not always a viable option 
for institutional investors. On the one hand, index funds designed to match 
the performance of the market had trouble doing so if they dumped the 
stock of a major f irm. On the other hand, the biggest funds held 5 percent or 
more of the stock of many companies, and news of a sell-off could depress 
share price before they could get out, leaving them with large paper losses. 
Fund managers instead sought to improve performance of f irms in their 
portfolios by taking collective action to improve management practices.
To advance their agenda of corporate governance and management 
reforms, activist fund managers utilized social-movement-like tactics. The 
f irst thing they did was to organize a collective, with public pension funds 
in the lead (Davis and Thompson, 1994). In 1985, Jesse Unruh, a trustee of 
the CalPERS board, gathered public and private pension fund managers 
to found the Council of Institutional Investors (CII). Corporate America 
recognized its potential power immediately. Members controlled $130 
billion in assets. One Wall Street executive was quoted as saying, “If the 
institutions start speaking with one voice, they could become a f inancial 
OPEC” (Jacoby, 2007: 244). CII endorsed a “Shareholder Bill of Rights” in 
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1986, which broadly def ined its governance-reform agenda, including 
independent oversight over management and greater shareholder input 
in key corporate decisions. A regulatory change helped the burgeoning 
activism by institutional investors. Previously, communications aimed 
at inf luencing the votes of more than ten other shareholders had to be 
examined and approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
in advance of a shareholder meeting. The SEC adopted new proxy rules in 
1992 allowing direct communication among shareholders, which facilitated 
collective action among fund managers.
Taking advantage of their newfound political as well as economic influ-
ence, the CII and leading public pension funds challenged management. 
For the purpose, they adopted both informal and formal measures. With 
the rising f inancial power of fund managers, f irms put in investor-relations 
off ices and chief f inancial off icers to manage corporate image (Zorn, 2004). 
Now they privately negotiated with companies to embrace the governance 
and strategic reforms advocated by shareholder value proponents (Carleton, 
Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998).
Where behind-the-scenes lobbying failed, the formal step of anti-
management shareholder proposals sometimes succeeded. While submit-
ting proposals for a vote at the company’s annual meeting was a measure 
available to virtually any shareholder, proposals were rare, and individuals 
who submitted them had been mocked as “corporate gadflies.” From the 
mid-1980s, groups of fund managers became more active. Between the mid-
1980s and the mid-1990s the number of shareholder resolutions supported by 
institutional investors tripled (Proff itt, 2001), and institution-led proposals 
now won more votes than individual-led proposals. While shareholder 
proposals were nonbinding, they put pressure on management to change. 
Institution-led proposals covered the range of shareholder value prescrip-
tions, from board independence to executive pay for performance.
Fund managers dubbed their activism the “shareholder value” move-
ment, but shareholders were rarely involved. They described a David 
versus Goliath struggle, pitting small-holding pensioners against the fat 
cats who ran America’s largest public companies for their own benefit. In 
fact, institutional investors advocated shareholder value principles that 
would support their own interest in short-term share price increases, but 
that might not serve shareholders so well. A cornerstone of the shareholder 
value paradigm, as institutional investors promoted it, was the stock option. 
Options tied executive compensation to annual increases in share price, 
aligning executive compensation with the compensation of institutional 
fund managers, who earned bonuses based on annual increases in the value 
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of stocks under management. Unlike actual shareholders, both groups 
benefitted from market volatility, for each drop in the market offered execu-
tives, and fund managers, the chance to reap the benefits of the market’s 
next rise through bonuses and option grants.
Part of the shareholder value ethos was to transform poorly managed 
companies to boost their share value. Next we discuss each of the reforms 
that shareholder value theorists advocated. We argue that fund managers 
succeeded in promoting the elements of the shareholder value playbook 
that they really wanted. The best evidence that the “shareholder value 
revolution” was promoted by a social movement made up of fund managers 
may be in the outcome of this revolution. Firms embraced the changes that 
fund managers wanted for their own benefit, but not those that would serve 
the long-term interests of shareholders, such as those that would dampen 
risk-taking and market volatility, which served fund managers who, again, 
reaped the rewards of every rise in the stock market but paid little of the 
price of market declines.
Shareholder value reformers promoted pay for performance and executive 
equity-holding by arguing that executives had become lazy and self-serving 
in part because their compensation was ill suited to the needs of share-
holders. But only performance pay was in the interest of fund managers, 
because performance pay encouraged short-term increases in share price 
at the cost of long-term stability, and fund managers’ annual bonuses were 
based on short-term share price increases. The movement pushed hard for 
performance pay, neglecting the prescription for long-term equity-holding 
to stabilize growth. Circa 1975, the best way for a CEO to get ahead was to 
“grow the company” through diversifying acquisitions. Most of the money 
CEOs made came in the form of salary, and the bigger their companies, 
the bigger their salaries. Reformers cited agency theory in economics to 
argue for performance pay. Michael Jensen, a f inance professor at the 
University of Rochester who would later move to Harvard Business School 
and become a principal of the Monitor Group consultancy, was coauthor 
of the seminal article (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Writing in Harvard 
Business Review, Jensen and Murphy (1990) argued forcefully that major 
f irms made the mistake of paying their executives like bureaucrats, tying 
compensation to showing up for the job rather than to performing. They 
called for boards of directors to require CEOs to be substantial shareholders 
and link compensation to performance through stock options and bonuses 
(Khurana, 2002: 191).
There were good reasons for executives to oppose both performance pay 
and equity-holding (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If performance pay was to 
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replace straight salary, executives might lose out in a downturn that was not 
of their own making. Moreover, portfolio theory suggested that no investor 
should have all of his eggs in one basket, and equity-holding schemes such 
as corporate long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) required executives to hold 
substantial equity in the f irm, preventing them from diversifying. Fund 
managers convinced firms to move to performance pay but did not convince 
them to increase executive equity-holding (Westphal and Zajac, 1994). 
Long-term executive equity holding did not serve fund managers’ personal 
interests, because their bonuses were tied to short-term increases in share 
value (Dobbin and Jung, 2010).
Shareholder value theorists also called for f irms to dediversify. But their 
heart was not in it, because dediversif ication incurred signif icant one-time 
costs of reorganization, which dampened profits in the immediate future. 
Fund managers were in it for the annual bonus, and thus while they talked 
about dediversification, CII and the movement generally did not hold execu-
tives’ feet to the f ire.
Focused f irms, shareholder value advocates reasoned, would be able to 
pursue business opportunities with more agility. C.K. Pralahad and Gary 
Hamel argued in the Harvard Business Review in 1990 that f irms should 
focus on industries their managers knew well. As Michael Useem (1996: 153) 
argues, “While diversif ication had been a hallmark of good management 
during the 1960s, shedding unrelated businesses had become the measure 
during the 1980s and 1990s.” Corporate executives resisted dediversif ication 
publicly, f ighting break-up takeovers through poison pills, golden para-
chutes, and state anti-takeover laws (Davis, 1991; Davis and Stout, 1992). In 
the end many conglomerates were broken up, but fund managers played 
little part in this (Dobbin and Jung, 2010). Instead, hostile takeover f irms 
raided large conglomerates and broke them up, and securities analysts 
neglected large rambling conglomerates because their prospects were 
diff icult to assess, leading executives to dediversify to get the attention of 
analysts markets (Zuckerman, 1999; 2000). After 1980, America’s corporate 
behemoths dediversif ied to ward off takeovers (Davis et al., 1994).
Shareholder value proponents advised, as well, that debt financing of 
acquisitions could prevent unwise takeovers. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
offered a prescription for preventing ill-advised acquisitions, building on 
ideas from f inancial economics (Miller and Modigliani, 1961; Modigliani 
and Miller, 1958). Agency costs stem from managers’ propensity to favor 
stability over profits, overreward themselves, and focus on the short term. 
One way to reduce agency costs is to use debt to f inance expansion. This 
moderates the principal-agent conflict by reducing equity financing, forcing 
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managers to recognize the cost of capital. Debt also leverages equity by 
multiplying returns, and frees up profits to be used for share buy-backs that 
increase stock price (Westphal and Zajac, 1998; Zajac and Westphal, 2004). 
Debt f inancing is thought to discipline executives prone to using cash for 
ill-advised acquisitions that would dilute future prof its. Fund managers 
disliked debt f inancing, however, because they were working for an annual 
bonus, and f irms used debt to invest in new technologies or industries that 
would not pay off for several years (Dobbin and Jung, 2010). The average 
company’s corporate debt rose some 50 percent between 1980 and 2000, 
but this was driven by the rise of hostile takeover attempts, which led 
takeover agents to buy companies with debt, and some targets to take on 
debt to make themselves less attractive to suitors (Davis et al., 1994; Dobbin 
and Jung, 2010).
Shareholder value theorists also talked up board independence, with 
the idea that autonomy would enable boards to monitor executives and 
replace poor performers. Research conf irms that inside directors from 
the management team are in no position to challenge executives; large 
boards rarely act decisively (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Carleton et al., 1998; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988); and CEO-chaired boards seldom question 
management decisions (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Certo et al., 2003). Moreover, 
inside directors favor poison pills and golden parachutes that protect execu-
tives against losses in takeovers, undermining the role of takeover threat 
in disciplining wayward executives (Jensen, 1984). Financial economists 
recommended outside directors, small and agile boards, and outside chair-
men (Fama, 1980).
Fund managers did not insist on board independence, and in fact, by 
the best measure of independence (separation of the CEO and chairman), 
the average Fortune 500 f irm saw backward movement (Dobbin and Jung, 
2010). Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) argue that fund managers did not press 
the point because many of them faced conflicts of interest. They invested 
in f irms and sold pension instruments to those same f irms. Ford or GM 
could easily enough favor a pension provider that did not seek to interfere 
with corporate governance. While f irms did decrease the size of boards 
on average, and did appoint more directors who were not managers of the 
f irm, they became more rather than less likely to give the CEO the title of 
chairman, and so boards did not become more independent (Dobbin and 
Jung, 2010; Khurana, 2007).
Finally, institutional investors championed financial transparency. 
Agency theorists advised f irms to open their books to analysts, provid-
ing both f inancial and strategic information that would allow analysts to 
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assess f irm prospects and encourage changes to improve performance. 
Management consultants suggested that new Chief Financial Officers could 
take charge of increasing transparency, by issuing regular reports, holding 
conference calls, and issuing earnings preannouncements (Dobbin and 
Zorn, 2005: 193; Zorn, 2004). Transparency might reduce analyst discord 
over earnings projections and increase the odds of meeting analyst profit 
projections, which had been published since the early 1970s (Fox, 1997). 
Executives at leading f irms reported signif icant pressure from investors 
and analysts to meet these estimates, and responded by providing more 
information to investors and analysts and by managing earnings to match 
forecasts (Useem and Gager, 1996: 625). Firms were slow to provide more 
accounting information than the law required, but they came around as 
transparency became the norm, and as they came to see that transparency 
could boost the value of executive stock options.
Corporate structure and strategy have changed dramatically due to the 
shareholder value movement, carried out by institutional investors who 
claimed to be representing their clients, investors. Firms embraced stock 
options but not executive equity, f inancial transparency but not board 
independence, and both debt f inancing and dediversif ication. And while 
they publicly championed all of these changes, the fund manager movement 
pushed hard only for the changes that served its members, fund managers 
themselves. Institutional investors only became a key player in this arena 
when they, collectively, came to dominate control of stock. They organized 
along the lines of a social movement through the Council of Institutional 
Investors, despite the fact that fund managers were in direct competition 
with one another for jobs, and for lucrative investments.
Conclusion
We have looked at the role of one seldom-studied political player, the 
professional group as a social movement activist directing its attention at 
the f irm. When they are professionals working for a f irm, as in the case of 
diversity experts, their strategies may be honed in professional associations 
and networks, where new management models and rhetorics are worked 
out. Their professional associations are at once players and arenas. They are 
arenas when members are working out strategies to pursue and programs 
to promote. They are players when the associations are the locus of actions 
designed to change firm behavior. Then their f irms become arenas, in which 
interactions between different groups of professionals and managers are 
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played out. For instance, in the case of sex and race harassment, managers 
were eager to see programs put into place. In-house counsel often advised 
that there were no dependable immunizations against harassment lawsuits 
and recommended waiting for the courts to act. Personnel professionals 
promoted training and grievance systems, and these spread far and wide 
before the courts made a def initive ruling. The courts judged that because 
these were widely popular, f irms without them must not be trying to 
eradicate harassment (Dobbin and Kelly, 2007). Firms had become arenas 
in which two professions-as-social-movements worked out their differences.
Professions have, in these two illustrations, come to play novel roles in 
social movements, both as protagonists within the f irm and as antago-
nists outside of the f irm. This has occurred in part because the f irm has 
increasingly become the object of social movement activity. On the one 
hand, it occurred as the f irm gained power and influence over citizens. 
The NAACP demonstrated outside of department stores that refused to 
hire African-Americans. Environmental activists challenge oil companies 
directly. The targets of social movement activity are increasingly corpora-
tions themselves. On the other hand, it occurred as the state’s role in society 
was circumscribed by neoliberal ideology and f iscal constraint, leading 
the state to cede certain responsibilities for environmental protection, 
labor standards, and social welfare to private corporations and nonprofit 
intermediaries.
Organizational scholars have documented how professional groups 
operate as social movements, bringing new norms of environmental protec-
tion, gender rights, and work-family rights to the corporation (Saguy, 2003; 
Dobbin et al., 1993). Thus personnel experts pushed for maternity rights for 
workers while the women’s movement was busy pushing for passage of the 
Equal Rights Amendment (Kelly and Dobbin, 1999). Personnel experts won 
the day, and the women’s movement’s advocacy of the ERA failed. As we 
have noted, social movements have entered the f irm in a number of other 
ways over the years. When the Wagner Act guaranteed workers the right to 
organize, the labor movement gained representatives inside of f irms, some 
working for unions and others for management. As public policy creates new 
rights for individuals and protections for the environment and community 
under pressure from traditional social movement activists, professionals 
take over the details of implementing these rights and protections and 
become advocates themselves within f irms.
The relationship between the professions and social movements would 
seem to be in flux today, and thus we have argued not only that professional 
groups can act as within-f irm social movements and as extra-f irm social 
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movements lobbying for corporate change, but also that the line between 
social movements and professions is sometimes blurred. We see a range of 
different patterns. Existing professionals can spearhead a new movement, 
as in the case of institutional investors and shareholder value. Professionals 
can recognize a movement as in their interest and align with it, as in the case 
of health-care professionals organizing along pro-choice lines and against 
anti-abortion activists. Professionals can take the lead in new movements 
that support their own identity politics, as when female human resources 
managers champion work-life programs. Or individuals may choose to 
join professions in order to promote their political interests, as in the case 
diversity managers or environmental engineers.
When market intermediaries such as institutional investors want to 
change the behavior of f irms, they now use social movement strategies to 
bring f irms around to their way of thinking. We expect market interme-
diaries (hedge fund managers, securities analysts, investment banks) to 
continue to promote new management paradigms from the outside with 
social movement language and tactics, acting on their own behalf and on 
the behalf of the investors they represent.
Some argue that with the rise of “state feminism,” or women’s move-
ments spearheaded by government off icials, we are seeing a decline in 
conventional social movements (Badran, 2009; Stetson and Mazur, 1995). 
Skrentny (2002) argues that the civil rights movement created a model 
for related movements, and that these can now proceed largely through 
the initiative of government actors, who mobilize for the elderly, the disa-
bled, or veterans with or without the involvement of members of these 
constituencies. It may be that professionals within the state, and within 
f irms, are coming to usurp the conventional role of social movements. 
Thus, for instance, the movement for work-life f lexibility has largely been 
led by government regulators and legislators, and personnel professionals 
within f irms. Rallies in Washington, DC, are rare in that domain, and yet 
f irms, and legislatures, are steadily increasing work-life programs, policies, 
and protections.
The conventions of the social movement are thus changing, as are the 
conventions of the profession. We are witnessing the evolution of the actors 
and roles that constitute the modern ontology. While social scientists typi-
cally presume that ontology to be stable, comprising individuals, occupa-
tions, political groups, social movements, corporations, and nation-states 
with distinct roles, we have documented how some of these groups and 
roles are morphing before our eyes. Social movements become more profes-
sionalized, as others have shown, but in addition, professional groups take 
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on the tactics and rhetoric of social movements, blurring the line between 
activism and professionalism.
Note
1. Thanks to Jan Willem Duyvendak and James Jasper for comments and sug-
gestions on an early draft.
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7 The Double Game of Unions and the 
Labor Movement
Ruth Milkman
After a long period of neglect, sociological interest in the labor movement 
has burgeoned in recent decades, despite the relentless decline of trade 
union density in nearly all the world’s nations. The ubiquitous growth of 
class inequalities since the 1970s and the accompanying expansion of what 
has come to be called “the precariat” (Standing, 2011), along with a wave 
of innovative organizing efforts and the emergence of progressive union 
leadership in many countries in the 1980s and 1990s, helped to stimulate 
this unexpected renewal of labor movement sociology. “Not since the 1930s, 
when the ‘labor problem’ was omnipresent, has unionism commanded as 
much attention by sociologists,” an essay in the 1992 Annual Review of Sociol-
ogy declared soon after this new literature began to develop (Kimeldorf 
and Stepan-Norris, 1992).
Indeed, by the early 21st century sociology had become the primary 
disciplinary home for scholarship on unions and the labor movement, es-
pecially in the United States. This occurred partly by default, as economists, 
who formerly had dominated the study of “industrial relations,” all but 
abandoned the subject as the subf ield of institutional economics faded 
away and as union density declined to what many economists viewed as 
trivial levels. Some heterodox political scientists are engaged in research 
on labor movements, as are a few geographers and anthropologists, but in 
all these f ields the number of labor scholars is modest relative to that in 
sociology. Labor historians continue to make signif icant contributions, but 
even their numbers have dwindled since the 1970s and 1980s, when f igures 
like E. P. Thompson and David Montgomery inspired a new generation to 
enter the f ield. In the 1980s, sociologists also engaged with the “new labor 
history” that this generation produced (for US examples, see Kimeldorf and 
Stepan-Norris, 1992); soon after, however, the focus of sociological research 
on labor shifted to contemporary studies of “organizing the unorganized” 
and union revitalization (Clawson and Clawson, 1999).
One inspiration for the revival of interest among sociologists was the rise 
of “social movement unionism” in the 1980s in several countries in the global 
South, in particular in Brazil, South Africa (Seidman, 1994) and South Korea 
(Koo, 2001). A decade later many commentators applied the same label to 
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the grassroots union organizing that unexpectedly emerged among recent 
immigrants and other low-wage workers in the United States. Despite the 
widespread use of the term “social movement unionism” in these varied 
settings, however, the 1990s scholarship on this phenomenon developed 
almost entirely independently of the vast and growing literature on social 
movements. Indeed, the late-20th-century sociological literature on the labor 
movement generally disregarded – and was disregarded by – what Jasper 
(2010) calls the “McTeam” group of social movement scholars who elaborated 
the “political process” paradigm that was hegemonic at the time. Some labor 
sociologists did situate their work explicitly in relation to earlier social 
movements literature, especially resource mobilization theory (see Conell 
and Voss, 1990; Ganz, 2000; Martin, 2008), and a few were overtly critical 
of the political process model (Lopez, 2004; 2008), but most simply ignored 
it. The lack of attention was mutual: the voluminous “McTeam” literature 
seldom mentions union organizing or workers’ movements, despite the 
capacious, open-ended conception of social movements embodied in the 
political process paradigm.
This disconnect did not always exist. As recently as the 1970s, trade un-
ions and labor movements were a central preoccupation among sociologists 
of social movements. Well-known examples from the canon include Charles 
Tilly’s detailed analysis of strikes in his From Mobilization to Revolution 
(1978), and Piven and Cloward’s analysis of the labor upsurge of the 1930s 
in their influential Poor People’s Movements (1977), among many others. 
Scholars like Michael Mann (1973), if less directly identif ied with the social 
movements subf ield, also made influential sociological contributions to 
theorizing about labor in this period. Others, notably Offe and Wiesenthal 
(1980), developed a probing sociological analysis of trade unions based on 
a critical revision of Olson’s Logic of Collective Action (1965).
Social movements theorists’ attention to labor seemed to evaporate in 
the 1980s. To some extent this ref lected the new attention during that 
decade to “new social movements” led by Alberto Melucci (1988) and Alain 
Touraine (1981). Their interventions generated a wave of new research on the 
environmentalist, feminist, and various other identity-based movements, 
which were far more vibrant than organized labor at the time. Even earlier, 
many sociologists had joined André Gorz (1982) in bidding “Farewell to the 
Working Class” as an agent of social change. By the early 1980s, unionism’s 
strength and influence already had declined greatly from its post–World 
War II peak in many countries, and what remained of organized labor often 
resembled an encrusted bureaucracy rather than an active “movement.” 
The collapse of communism across Eastern and Central Europe at the end 
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of the decade further reinforced the perception that trade unions, along 
with the class conflicts in which they had once played a leading role, were 
relics of a bygone era.
That soon changed in the United States, however, where the 1990s 
brought progressive new leadership to the AFL-CIO and a resurgence of 
union organizing activity – a key stimulus for the revived interest in the US 
labor movement among sociologists that began during that decade. But this 
new literature emerged entirely outside the social movement subfield, as 
political-process scholars did not respond to the changes in US unions and 
the nation’s wider labor movement, and paid little heed to the burgeoning 
of scholarship those developments inspired.
One reason for this neglect may be that, as Walder (2009) has recently ar-
gued, the scope of inquiry in the social movements literature had narrowed 
dramatically by this period, moving away from its original concern with the 
macro-sociological dynamics giving rise to movements and shaping their 
political orientation. In addition, as Jasper (2004) points out, the subfield’s 
attention shifted to the micro-foundations of collective action. Even as 
the social movements literature continued to proliferate in the 1980s and 
1990s, it tended to concentrate on a single, if ambitious, goal, “to explain the 
conditions under which a movement – of any type – can grow and succeed.”
Perhaps the tendency of the “McTeam” group to presume that all social 
movements are alike in their basic dynamics is one reason that labor move-
ments – which, as detailed below, are distinctive in many respects – so rarely 
appear in the political process literature; another may be that in recent 
years labor movement “growth and success” have been rare. And crucially, 
as Walder suggests, social movement scholars of this period exhibited a 
conspicuous “lack of curiosity about the social structural roots of protest” 
(Walder, 2009: 398, 407). As a result, the vast changes in the organization 
of work unleashed by the neoliberal turn of the 1970s, which later helped to 
transform many unions and labor movements, were not on the radar screen.
Several other features of the political process paradigm also deflected 
attention from labor. As its main proponents have themselves acknowledged 
(see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001: 42), it emphasized opportunities 
more than threats, yet in the late 1970s and 1980s labor movements faced a 
frontal assault from employers in many countries and their opportunities 
for expansion were few and far between. That the political process literature 
also focused “inordinately on the origins of contention rather than on its 
later phases,” as its proponents have acknowledged (McAdam, Tarrow, and 
Tilly, 2001: 42) also may have helped push labor movements to the periphery 
of the f ield. Even the burst of new union organizing in the United States 
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associated with John Sweeney’s election to the presidency of the AFL-CIO in 
1995 involved union “revitalization” rather than the emergence of anything 
resembling a new movement, as Voss and Sherman (2000) have shown.
Another “defect” that McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly identify in their self-
criticism of the political process paradigm, namely that “it works best 
when centered on individual social movements and less well for broader 
episodes of contention,” is also relevant here, since as Dan Clawson (2003) 
has emphasized, labor movements tend to grow not incrementally but 
through large bursts of activity like the one in the 1930s in the United 
States. Finally, the internal dynamics of labor movements bear little 
resemblance to the US civil rights movement that was the main exemplar 
for political process theory. Nor do trade unions have much in common 
with the “new social movements” – def ined precisely by their distinctive-
ness from the “old” social movements (unions and working-class political 
parties).
Perhaps the political process paradigm is a better f it for analysis of 
the community-based low-wage worker organizations known as “worker 
centers” that took shape in the United States (Fine, 2006) during the 1990s, 
although these resemble NGOs more than “movements” (see Milkman, 2010). 
Worker centers have also contributed to the rise of the US immigrant rights 
movement in recent years, a movement that, as I have argued elsewhere 
(Milkman, 2011), can be understood as a type of labor movement, and one 
that happens to share several features with the civil rights movement. 
Indeed, the best analyses of this movement do make use of the social 
movements literature (Bloemraad, Voss, and Lee, 2011). But this may be 
the exception that proves the rule; in general, concern with unions and 
labor movements is conspicuously absent from recent social movements 
literature.
Against this background, it is useful to explore the ways in which un-
ions and labor movements might be analyzed in terms of the “players and 
arenas” perspective that motivates this volume. Due to space constraints 
as well as the limits of my own expertise, I attempt this only for the US 
case, but it could also prove a fruitful approach for labor movements in 
other national contexts. Because of the way it privileges strategies and 
tactics, as well as individual and collective choices, and because it is so 
resolutely anti-determinist, the “players and arenas” framework seems 
especially well suited to the analysis of unions and labor movements. Indeed 
most sociological studies of recent labor struggles already include detailed 
attention to strategies and tactics (see Bronfenbrenner, 1997; Ganz, 2000; 
Lopez, 2004; among many others).
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Labor Is Not Just Another Player
Trade unions and labor movements are different from many of the other 
players considered in this volume. Unlike corporations, the media, or profes-
sionals, they regularly engage in protest activity themselves, either on their 
own or as part of larger coalitions. Indeed, the most common form of labor 
protest, the strike, typically involves not only a work stoppage intended 
to disrupt operations at the target employer(s) but also direct appeals 
to members of the larger community for support. In addition to strikes, 
unions and other worker organizations often launch consumer boycotts 
to protest employer abuses, again appealing to the wider community. In 
recent decades, as strikes have become increasingly ineffective (for reasons 
discussed below), US unions and other workers’ organizations have increas-
ingly turned to “corporate campaigns,” which pressure employers through 
appeals to third parties or by actions that threaten to tarnish the public 
image of the corporate target (Manheim, 2000).
A classic article by Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) remains among the most 
valuable analyses of the radically different structural positions of work-
ers and employers and their collective associations. As they point out, 
employers are the primary “organizers” of workers, in so far as they select 
individuals through the hiring process; unions are thus subordinated from 
the outset as secondary organizers (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980: 72). In addi-
tion, both because they are fewer in number and because their collective 
interests are narrower, employers are far less easily divided internally than 
are workers.
For the same reasons, whereas labor organizations must continually 
struggle to build and maintain solidarity and collective identity among 
their members, for employers building unity is a much simpler task. Of 
course, employers also have far greater resources at their disposal when 
they do engage in collective action than unions do (78). And because govern-
ments depend so directly on the capital accumulation process for their 
own survival, employers’ political power is far greater, and far more easily 
hidden from public view, than that of organized labor. Indeed, the relatively 
weak position of unions and other workers’ associations often forces them 
into the vulnerable position of making public “demands,” a position that 
corporations are never compelled to assume (85-87).
Offe and Wiesenthal’s critique of liberal political theory, emphasizing the 
asymmetry between unions’ and employer associations’ collective action 
repertoires, offers an important caveat that is vital for the “players and 
arenas” perspective as well. Players vary in the nature and extent of their 
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power and influence, and unions are at the weak end of the spectrum (even 
if they seem strong compared to other protest groups).
A related and equally crucial difference between unions and the other 
“players” analyzed in this volume, at least in the United States, is that organ-
ized labor’s legitimacy has long been contested. That is true to a degree of 
some of the other players analyzed in this volume – for example, the legal 
profession is famously held in low public regard, and in some sectors of 
the population, the same is true of corporations, especially the largest and 
most powerful ones. But the illegitimacy of labor organizations goes much 
deeper, rooted in the long tradition of anti-communism in the United States 
and the nation’s pervasive cultural discomfort with the language of class. 
Even in the 1940s and 1950s, when US labor unions were at the height of their 
power, they were often tagged as “unAmerican,” their systematic purge of 
communists in the postwar period notwithstanding.
In recent years, what limited legitimacy unions enjoyed in the past 
has been further eroded as external attacks on them have escalated. 
Those attacks rarely come from conventional “protesters”; instead they 
are orchestrated by employers and corporate-funded right-wing political 
organizations. In the 21st century, despite the precipitous decline in organ-
ized labor’s membership, power, and influence since the 1970s, unions are 
regularly pilloried as “Big Labor,” a pejorative term that encapsulates their 
illegitimate status in society.
Despite all this, and even in its weakened state, the US labor movement 
is in some respects a player within “the Establishment.” Unions still have 
substantial human and f inancial resources that enable them to influence 
politics and public policy. As is often pointed out, organized labor is the 
single largest organized entity that speaks for and works in the interests 
of nonelites in the United States. It does so in four distinct arenas, each of 
which is governed by highly institutionalized rules:
a) Collective bargaining. Labor unions see their primary role as represent-
ing workers in collective bargaining with employers, in order to improve 
compensation (both wages and benefits), working conditions, employment 
security, and so forth. Other types of (nonunion) workers’ associations, while 
rarely able to engage in formal collective bargaining, are also sometimes 
able to build up enough leverage to extract concessions from employers.
b) Organizing the unorganized. Unions, and in recent years other labor move-
ment organizations like worker centers, organize workers who do not yet 
have collective bargaining relationships with employers, with the goal 
of either establishing such relationships or f inding other means through 
which to obtain concessions from employers on behalf of workers.
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c) Electoral politics. Organized labor’s role in US electoral politics remains 
substantial and well-known. Unions and labor federations provide large 
campaign donations to Democratic candidates, and also fund and staff 
get-out-the-vote efforts on behalf of those candidates. They do so in 
hopes that those elected with their help will support labor’s policy and 
legislative agenda, although as many commentators (e.g., Davis 1980) 
have pointed out, those hopes are regularly disappointed. For example, 
labor’s efforts to win passage of labor law reform have failed consistently 
over the last half-century.
d) Legislative lobbying. The failure of labor law reform notwithstanding, the 
US labor movement is a signif icant player in the legislative arena, both at 
the national level and in states with high union density. In this capacity, 
organized labor represents not only the interests of union members but 
also those of the larger working population. Over the past eight decades 
labor has successfully lobbied for minimum wage and living wage laws, 
regulation of overtime and working hours, occupational health and 
safety regulations, unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation, 
pension insurance and family and medical leave legislation. In recent 
years labor has also lobbied for comprehensive immigration reform and 
opposed trade liberalization, although in these areas its efforts have 
been far less successful. Still, as Taylor Dark (2001) has argued, labor’s 
influence in the legislative arena remains far greater than its dwindling 
membership would lead one to expect.
In all four of these arenas, the US labor movement participates in what is 
colloquially known as the “outside” game of mobilizing protests as well 
as – indeed sometimes simultaneously – exerting its leverage “inside” the 
system. Again, this dual approach differentiates labor from other “players” 
considered in these pages.
Over time, the balance between these two sets of activities has shifted: 
In the 1935-1975 period, the inside game was predominant; since the 1970s, 
however, with the neoliberal turn and the relentless decline of union 
density and power that accompanied it, the balance has tipped more 
and more toward the “outside” game. Indeed, this is precisely what gave 
rise to the “social movement unionism” of the 1990s, which involved the 
proliferation of strategies and tactics that were rarely used in the 1935-1975 
period, although many of them were reminiscent of labor’s pre-New Deal 
repertoire (Milkman, 2006). Ironically, just as this shift was taking hold, 
social movements scholars abandoned the study of labor movements, as 
we have seen.
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The New Deal and the Inside Game, 1935-1975
The recent wave of “social movement unionism” echoes many features of 
the era of US labor history that is most often associated with social move-
ment activity among workers and their unions, namely the early 1930s. 
Although the scale of organizing in the 1990s was miniscule by that historic 
standard, on other dimensions the parallels between the two periods are 
striking. At the outset of the depression decade, as in the 1990s and 2000s, 
private-sector union density was in the single digits, amid extreme levels 
of income inequality. At the time few commentators thought that labor had 
any prospect of growth or revival. “I see no reason to believe that American 
trade unionism will so revolutionize itself within a short period of time as to 
become in the next decade a more potent social influence,” George Barnett 
(1933), then president of the American Economic Association, famously 
stated in a December 1932 address. “Trade unionism is likely to be a declin-
ing influence in determining conditions of labor.”
The massive labor organizing upsurge that emerged shortly after 
this grim prognostication had a broad social base and a transformative 
agenda and impact – a major social movement by any standard (like 
many other major movements, its emergence came as a rude surprise to 
social scientists). Millions of workers won new legal rights and economic 
benefits through unionization itself and from the New Deal policies that 
the resurgent labor movement helped to secure. Among the key outcomes 
was the “Great Compression” in income inequality (Goldin and Margo, 
1992), which benefitted not only union members but the entire working 
class. So did legislation like the 1935 Social Security Act and the 1938 Fair 
Labor Standards Act. Especially important for organized labor was the 1935 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which for the f irst time guaranteed 
the right to union representation and collective bargaining to most US 
private-sector workers (albeit with signif icant exclusions such as domestic 
and agricultural workers as well as public-sector workers).
Over the next decade, the labor struggles that helped generate all these 
changes would be successfully channeled into state-sponsored institutional 
arrangements that rapidly rendered US trade unions far less “movement”-
like. The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, along with the Cold 
War purges of communists and other radicals from union leadership 
positions, effectively preempted much potential worker militancy in the 
postwar era. This “postwar settlement” created a relatively stable system of 
industrial relations that would endure for the next three decades. During 
that period, the role of unions as “players” in the collective bargaining and 
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organizing arenas became highly routinized. The rules were defined by the 
NLRA (as amended by Taft-Hartley), a statute often referred to by labor and 
management alike in this period simply as “The Act,” precisely because it 
was so fundamental to their relationship. It formally regulated collective 
bargaining as well as the electoral process through which unions could 
recruit new members.
The law was peculiar by international standards in regard to its winner-
take-all system that granted exclusive representation for workers in a given 
“bargaining unit” to a single union. But much like its counterparts in other 
advanced capitalist countries, the basic purpose of the system was to create 
“labor peace” and an orderly process of dispute resolution. Under the act, 
this took the form of legally binding multiyear contracts specifying wages, 
hours, working conditions, and fringe benef its, along with job security 
provisions, seniority systems and a variety of “work rules.” In contrast, 
the organization of the labor process, product choice and design, as well 
as marketing, were cordoned off as “managerial prerogatives” that were 
not mandatory subjects for collective bargaining. Contracts nearly always 
included elaborate grievance procedures as well; under some conditions 
labor-management conflicts could also be adjudicated by government 
agents, or as a last resort, the courts.
Inside this arena, which directly governed about a third of the private-
sector workforce at the peak of union density in the mid-1950s, and persists 
in some sectors to the present day, the key players on the labor side were 
elected and appointed union off icials, as well as rank-and-f ile workers, 
who typically had their own informal leaders (many of whom eventually 
became union off icials). Those union players interacted frequently with 
management representatives (ranging from foremen and supervisors to top 
executives), and with the government functionaries who administered “the 
Act.” Other players included private arbitrators and attorneys.
Labor was not a monolith: national and local union off icials often had 
different agendas, and rank-and-file leaders and workers were not always in 
accord with the union “bureaucrats” who served as their off icial representa-
tives. As well, workers were divided by race, ethnicity and gender, which 
sometimes created internal conflicts within unions. Thus unions had the 
continual challenge of unifying and creating a collective identity among 
their own members (see Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980), along with developing 
strategies and tactics vis-à-vis employers.
On the whole, the NLRA system functioned effectively in this period. 
Building on the foundation laid by the highly regulated political economy 
of the World War II years, a tripartite system in which unions were key 
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players (Lichtenstein, 1987), the postwar settlement not only stabilized 
labor-management relations, much to the benefit of employers, but also 
“delivered the goods” for unionized workers in the form of improved wages 
and benefits (especially health insurance and pensions); seniority systems to 
ensure equity in the distribution of layoffs, job assignments, shift schedules, 
overtime, and the like; it established avenues to pursue grievances against 
management; and perhaps most important, job security. Parallel systems 
of labor regulation directly modeled on the NLRA were later established 
in the public sector in many US states, and in California’s vast agricultural 
industry as well.
The NLRA and the various laws modeled after it also def ined the rules 
under which unions could organize new workers (the second “arena” listed 
above), through government-supervised “representation elections” in which 
workers voted for or against a particular union (or in some cases, in which 
they voted to choose among two or more unions competing to serve as 
their exclusive collective bargaining agent, or for the “no union” option). If a 
union won an election, it then entered into negotiations with the employer 
that typically led to a multiyear contract regulating the labor-management 
relationship in a given workplace or company. A standard feature of these 
agreements was a “no-strike” pledge, ensuring that for the duration of the 
contract work stoppages would not occur (although unoff icial “wildcat 
strikes” could and did break out without union authorization). As the con-
tract expiration date approached, negotiations for a new agreement would 
begin, and once that date arrived authorized strikes could be launched.
Many commentators (most recently Burns [2011]) have argued that 
the power to withdraw their labor – the strike – is the most important 
resource available to workers to advance their collective interests vis-à-vis 
employers, both in already-organized workplaces and in those where new 
organizing is underway. Indeed, it was mainly in strike settings – either 
end-of-contract strikes or those seeking initial union recognition – that 
the act’s effectiveness in stabilizing and regulating labor-management rela-
tions sometimes faltered. In an effort to address this problem, Taft-Hartley 
gave the government added legal means to intervene in strikes, mandating 
“cooling off” periods and binding arbitration under some circumstances.
Thus from the end of World War II through the 1970s, organized labor 
in the sector covered by the NLRA only appeared as a recognizable social 
movement, actively protesting against the status quo, when strikes broke 
out, often spilling over the boundaries of “normal” labor-management rela-
tions into the public arena. In these situations unions typically appealed 
for community support, both indirectly by seeking to advance their case 
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through the mass media, and directly by reaching out to the public through 
pickets and printed flyers. The struggles of workers in the 1960s and 1970s 
who were not covered by the NLRA, such as farmworkers and public-sector 
workers, more often took the form of social movements – indeed in the 
latter case, there was a direct intersection with the civil rights movement, 
since African-Americans were so often employed in the public sector. Over 
time these led to NLRA-like regulation of labor-management relations in 
those sectors as well.
In addition, as a key partner in the Democratic coalition that emerged in 
the New Deal era and then governed for much of this period, labor mastered 
the “inside game” in electoral politics and legislative lobbying in this period 
as well (Dark, 2001). It offered f inancial support to candidates, launched 
massive get-out-the-vote efforts, and developed a strong presence among 
lobbyists in Congress and key state legislatures, which helped secure legisla-
tion benefitting the nation’s workers.
Offe and Wiesenthal’s analysis (1980) appeared just as this era, when a 
critical mass of employers (however reluctantly) endorsed the principle of 
collective bargaining, was coming to an unceremonious end. Their account 
was based on the presumption that, in their words, “Unions have been 
accepted, in all advanced capitalist states, as an indispensable element 
of interest representation and of order and predictability, in the absence 
of which labor conflict and the disruption of social peace would be much 
harder to control” (99). That is an apt characterization of the 1945-1975 
period even in the United States, as commentators like C. Wright Mills also 
recognized at the outset of the postwar settlement (Mills, 1948). However, 
starting in the late 1970s, that system came under sustained attack from 
employers, and before long it ceased to function effectively.
Neoliberalism and the Outside Game, 1975-Present
The managerial reaction against unions, which began gathering force in the 
1970s, was part of the larger neoliberal turn: deregulation and deunioniza-
tion went hand in hand. Although the conventional wisdom often attributes 
union decline to global economic competition and new technologies, their 
impact was concentrated in the manufacturing sector, where outsourcing 
and massive deindustrialization further strengthened management’s ability 
to rein in once-powerful unions. But in sectors like construction, where 
jobs cannot be outsourced and international competition is negligible, a 
systematic managerial assault on union power also led to dramatic declines 
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in density (Linder, 2000). And although they were never as highly unionized 
as manufacturing and construction, density also fell sharply in industries 
like hospitality and retail, neither of which can be outsourced. Indeed, 
private-sector unionism fell in almost every industry and sector from the 
1980s onward.
In earlier decades, forward-looking employers had erected a parallel 
“human resource management” (HRM) model as an alternative to the 
traditional NLRA-based system of labor relations that took root in the New 
Deal era. As Sanford Jacoby (1998) has documented, this approach was 
motivated from the outset by employers’ desire to avoid unionism. Over 
time, the HRM model became hegemonic, embedded in business school 
curricula and widely celebrated in accounts of managerial “best practices.” 
The unionized sector was simultaneously condemned as cumbersome, 
ineff icient, and overly “adversarial” (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 1986).
By the early 1980s, nonunion HRM-based employers who, despite their 
best efforts, did face unionization efforts among their employees, could 
turn to the burgeoning “union avoidance” industry for expert assistance 
in combating the scourge (Logan, 2006). Virtually any company willing 
to pay the steep consulting fees of the new “union busters” and willing 
to adopt the prescribed battery of anti-union strategies and tactics they 
promoted had an excellent prospect of “preventing” unions from gaining 
a foothold. Many of the strategies and tactics in this new playbook were 
perfectly legal, thanks to a series of previous anti-union court decisions, but 
others were blatantly illegal (if highly effective) tactics, like f iring union 
activists. Such f irings occurred in 34 percent of a representative sample 
of 1,004 union organizing campaigns conducted between 1999 and 2003 
(Bronfenbrenner, 2009). Between 1950 and 1990 the number of workers f ired 
during organizing campaigns grew nine-fold (Meyerson, 2012: 24), making 
a mockery of the NLRA representation election system. Even when unions 
somehow did win representation elections despite all these tactics, many 
employers dragged their feet in the follow-up negotiations, engaging in 
“surface bargaining” so that f irst contracts were delayed or in many cases 
proved impossible to secure.
The ongoing process of “creative destruction” in market economies that 
guarantees the continual appearance of new f irms and the disappearance 
of old ones, combined with the growing influence of the HRM model and 
the rise of the union-avoidance industry, contributed to the sharp decline 
in private-sector union density that took off in the 1970s. By the 1980s, apart 
from the public sector, unionism was largely confined to “legacy” companies 
that were organized decades ago.
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But in this period, employers within such former bastions of unionism 
mounted a different kind of assault on union power. With the advice of the 
union-avoidance industry and partly inspired by the dramatic air control-
lers’ strike of 1981, they learned how to transform strikes, once the most 
effective tactic in organized labor’s arsenal, into vehicles for undermining 
unions. Now employers learned to deliberately provoke strikes by demand-
ing massive “givebacks” when their union contract expired. (If their unions 
failed to take the bait and declare a strike, lockouts often followed.) Taking 
advantage of the legal option under the NRLA of hiring “permanent replace-
ments” for strikers, employers then moved to either eliminate unionism 
entirely or to bludgeon unions into accepting dramatic concessions in order 
to maintain a foothold. Recent examples of such employer-initiated work 
stoppages include the southern California supermarket workers’ strike in 
2003-2004, which involved some 70,000 workers (LeDuff and Greenhouse, 
2004), and the multiyear Detroit News strike (Rhomberg, 2012). Since 1980, 
strike rates have plummeted in the United States, and the few strikes that 
do occur tend to be defensive struggles of this sort (US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2011; Burns, 2011).
In short, the rules def ining labor relations under the NLRA, although 
nominally still in force, have been captured by the union-avoidance indus-
try and by the employers who rely on it. As a result many unions today have 
abandoned the NLRA framework entirely in favor of a broad array of “new” 
organizing strategies, some of which are not really new but recapitulate 
the pre-New Deal labor movement repertoire. Most of these new strategies 
involve the “outside game” of mobilizing rank-and-f ile workers and their 
supporters in the wider community into various types of public protest. The 
inside game has not been abandoned entirely – for example, many unions 
appeal to elected off icials and other elites (such as clergy) for support as 
they seek leverage against targeted employers, as a supplement to grassroots 
mobilization and protest. But the balance has decisively tipped toward the 
outside game in recent years.
Another characteristic of the neoliberal era that has contributed to 
organized labor’s woes is the proliferation in advanced capitalist countries 
of precarious workers, including temporary and contract workers, interns, 
as well as a variety of nominally self-employed workers like day laborers, 
domestic workers, taxi and truck drivers and street vendors. Another grow-
ing group in the US case is comprised of “independent contractors,” many 
of whom are legally misclassif ied as such. For all these workers, NLRA-type 
unionization is either impractical or legally prohibited, further undermin-
ing what remains of the New Deal system. The term “excluded workers,” 
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often used in the US context to denote precarious workers, ref lects the 
continuing legacy of the NLRA, in that such workers are explicitly excluded 
from coverage under the act (as well as the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
Social Security Act).
For a variety of reasons, then, although in principle the bedrock labor 
laws passed in the 1930s remain in force today, in practice they have become 
increasingly ineffective. Traditional unions, many of whose leaders came into 
power under and became acculturated to the old New Deal order, were slow 
to adapt to this radically changed situation. A widespread siege mentality 
in union circles (understandable in that they are indeed under attack) has 
added to the diff iculty many union leaders face in responding to the new 
challenges. Nor did it help matters that many of these leaders were approach-
ing retirement age and thus had limited personal motivation to shift course.
Nevertheless, starting in the 1990s some unions did begin to experiment 
with different strategies and tactics, and to recruit a new generation of lead-
ers, many with experience in other social movements (Voss and Sherman, 
2000). This gave rise to the “social movement unionism” of the period and, 
equally important, to a new internal emphasis on leadership development. 
At the same time, impatient with the traditional unions and skeptical of 
their ability to adequately represent excluded workers as well as low-wage, 
undocumented immigrants in NLRA-covered jobs, other labor activists 
began to develop new community-based organizational forms in the 1990s.
Most important among these are the “worker centers,” now number-
ing in the hundreds, which have a much broader repertoire of advocacy 
and organizing than traditional unions (Fine, 2006). Targeting the most 
precarious, casualized occupations in which traditional forms of unionism 
are diff icult to establish, such as day labor or domestic work, along with 
low-wage industries that unions have largely abandoned, like restaurants 
and garment-making, as well as nominally self-employed workers like taxi 
drivers and street vendors, these fledgling organizations have attained a high 
profile in recent years and have greatly increased public awareness of the 
plight of low-wage workers. Recently some worker centers have attempted 
formal unionization efforts, recognizing the need for long-term, f inancially 
sustainable forms of organization; at the same time traditional unions have 
begun to experiment with the strategic and tactical repertoire of the worker 
centers, in a process of mimetic isomorphism (see Milkman, 2010).
Thus the players on the labor side have proliferated in the past two 
decades, and have broadened their tactical and strategic repertoires. This 
had generated an assortment of highly creative campaigns, many of which 
have succeeded despite the formidable forces arrayed against them. To date, 
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however, virtually none of them have been brought to scale, and desperation 
is the order of the day inside labor’s ranks, especially in collective bargaining 
and organizing (Meyerson, 2012).
Organized labor retains signif icant leverage in the legislative and politi-
cal arenas, however. Until very recently, the level of union density among 
public-sector workers like teachers, protective service workers, hospital 
workers, home care and child care workers has remained intact, even as 
private-sector union density has fallen into the single digits. Indeed the gap 
between private- and public-sector density has never been wider.
But in 2011, a long-brewing assault against public-sector unions burst 
into view, most dramatically in the state of Wisconsin, where Republican 
governor Scott Walker signed a bill virtually eliminating most public-sector 
collective bargaining rights in the state. Ironically, half a century earlier, 
in 1959, Wisconsin had been the very f irst state to legislate collective 
bargaining rights for public-sector workers. The rollback of that law by a 
Republican-dominated government, organized by the right-wing American 
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), sparked a new outbreak of social 
movement unionism, as Wisconsin workers took to the streets to defend 
their unions, among other things occupying the statehouse for weeks (Buhle 
and Buhle, 2011). Their spirited efforts, however, followed by an unsuccessful 
drive to recall Walker from off ice, failed to restore the earlier law, and 
public-sector union membership in the state has fallen dramatically.
Similar attacks on public-sector workers in other states, also emanating 
from ALEC, are proliferating. Although in late 2011, Ohio voters reversed a law 
similar to the one that is now in effect in Wisconsin through a referendum, the 
one remaining bastion of unionization in the United States – and the last pillar 
supporting what remains of the “inside game” – is now coming under the same 
kind of systematic attack that began in the private sector in the late 1970s.
The US labor movement in the early 21st century increasingly resembles 
its counterpart during the pre-NLRA period, when workers lacked any 
formal right to collective representation and when the judicial system 
as well as the police and military were regularly mobilized on behalf of 
employers faced with labor disputes. The iron f ist is less often deployed 
against labor today than in the past, replaced by the velvet glove in the shape 
of the “union-avoidance industry” – although that would likely change 
rapidly were a major labor union upsurge to develop. In the meantime, 
unions and other worker organizations increasingly have no alternative 
but to play the outside game, as their insider status is steadily evaporating. 
The renewed grassroots organizing and protest this has already begun to 
unleash deserves careful attention from social movement scholars.
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Conclusion
Unions and the labor movement are different from the other players 
considered in this volume, in that they are simultaneously part of the 
“establishment” and active agents of social protest. From the New Deal era 
onward, the US labor movement in particular has played both an “inside” 
game – using its leverage with elected off icials and other elites and within 
the collective bargaining process to secure advances for workers – and an 
“outside” game – mobilizing workers and their allies in public protests and 
deploying tactics that disrupt normal routines. As organized labor’s power 
and legitimacy have declined in recent decades, however, the balance has 
shifted decisively toward the outside game. Thus 21st-century labor unions 
have increasingly turned to the strategic repertoire of their pre-New Deal 
counterparts, and nonunion forms of labor organization have proliferated, 
as they did a century ago. As a result, the distinctiveness of labor as a player 
relative to other protest groups is more muted than in the past, even as 
labor’s status and capacity as an institutional player has become increas-
ingly tenuous. These shifts both help to explain the recent resurgence of 
sociological interest in labor movements and point to the relevance of the 
players and arenas perspective that is the framework of this volume.
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Part 3
Experts, intellectuals, and media

8 Giving Voice
The Ambivalent Roles of Specif ic Intellectuals in Immigrant 
and LGBT Movements
Walter Nicholls and Justus Uitermark
Intellectuals are central players in all social movement and movement 
organizations, broadly conceived as people specialized in discourse pro-
duction as a result of their education and experience. They often take up 
leading roles within organizations, setting up decision-making procedures, 
negotiating with authorities, writing legal proposals, and communicat-
ing with the media. The fact that intellectuals are better than others in 
producing (legitimate, convincing, enticing, coherent) discourses creates 
certain dilemmas. On the one hand, it is good for the movement as a whole if 
intellectuals use their wit and knowledge to the fullest, effectively appealing 
to the public and pushing forward the movement’s ideas. On the other hand, 
such wielding of power may marginalize others within movements. They 
may simply not be represented and there may even be cases where the 
discourses espoused by intellectuals delegitimize and marginalize weaker 
groups within the movement. Intellectuals who represent the movement 
thus contribute to the movement’s strength but may – wittingly or unwit-
tingly – repress images and ideas not f itting their representations. The risk 
that marginalization by intellectuals happens is probably higher when 
the people they represent have scarce cultural and symbolic resources 
(as in the case of movements for undocumented immigrants) than when 
they have substantial resources (as in the case for movements for LGBT 
people). Still, the power to represent the movement and what it stands for 
is an issue to some degree in all movements. In short, intellectuals can be a 
force for the movement but may also exercise power over others within the 
movement. The resulting Power of Representation dilemma – intellectuals 
have superior skills of representation but if they use them for the movement, 
they marginalize others within the movement – has been a topic of heated 
debate within many movements. Prominent movement intellectuals have 
suggested different ways of resolving the dilemma both in theory and in 
practice.
This chapter provides an overview of how some activist intellectuals in 
the past have addressed and sought to resolve the Power of Representation 
dilemma. It then zooms in on one particular way of resolving the dilemma 
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advocated by Michel Foucault. By introducing the concept of “specif ic intel-
lectual,” Foucault outlined a role for intellectuals that would allow them 
to supersede the Power of Representation dilemma. Specif ic intellectuals 
could and would use their concrete expertise in different arenas (plan-
ning, law, psychiatry, etc.) to assist marginalized groups rather than lead 
or represent them. They would lend their technical expertise to struggles, 
“speaking with” the people in those struggles rather than “speaking for” 
them (Foucault, 1984; Artières, 2002; Kurzman and Owens, 2002). In this 
way, he argued that this new kind of intellectual (or what other scholars have 
called the “new class” [see King and Szeléyni, 2004; Eyal and Buchholz, 2010]) 
would play a different role than the “traditional intellectuals” like Émile 
Zola, Jean Paul Sartre, and others: rather than claim superior knowledge 
of the truth, specif ic intellectuals would use their intellectual resources 
to facilitate marginalized peoples to represent their own interests and 
meanings in the public sphere.
The remainder of the chapter empirically examines the roles of specif ic 
intellectuals in two prominent social movements seeking equal rights for 
marginalized and stigmatized people: the immigrant and LGBT rights 
movements in the United States. These movements seek the extension of 
basic rights within a liberal citizenship regime. The common conditions of 
exclusion (legal-juridical) and hostility facing immigrants and LGBT people 
present activists of these different movements with common constraints, 
goals, and internal dynamics. These movements are players within political 
arenas where they position themselves in relation to other players, including 
opponents and bystanders. Movements are internally also arenas, with 
different factions and persons struggling to def ine what the movement is 
about and how it should be achieved. The Power of Representation dilemma 
arises because choosing strategies in political arenas will have repercus-
sions for the internal functioning of movements; it is a form of the Janus 
dilemma (Jasper, 2006).
The “arenas” facing the “players” present them with “rules” that help set 
the stakes of political action, inform strategic possibilities, and distribute 
value to the specif ic kinds of resources (capital) that “players” bring to the 
game (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Fligstein and McAdam, 2012; Jasper, 
this volume). We understand that intellectuals can constitute their own 
arenas, with their own distinctive rules of the game (Jasper, this volume). 
However, for the purposes of this chapter, we focus on them as players 
with certain resources that enable them to play a specif ic and important 
role within social movements. By focusing on these two social movements 
– both struggling against stigmatization discursively but having very dif-
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ferent resources to do so – we can deepen our analyses of the factors that 
precipitate intellectual involvement and better assess persistent dilemmas 
within them. The chapter shows that specif ic intellectuals took up key 
positions within the largest organizations within these movements, and in 
both cases produced discourses that resonated strongly with the general 
public. However, their strategy also marginalized certain voices, which 
sparked conflicts over the nature of rights being demanded and the ways 
in which subject populations were represented.
Specific Intellectuals as Players in Social Movements
Intellectuals have long been key players in social movements (see Gramsci, 
1971; Mann, 1993) and their roles have been debated by scholars and activists 
alike (Kurzman and Owens, 2002; King and Szeléyni, 2004; Eyal and Buch-
holz, 2010). This section traces the efforts of theorists involved in past social 
movements (from Lenin to Foucault) to def ine the roles of intellectuals, 
the dilemmas arising from these roles, and different ways for resolving 
these dilemmas. Early Marxists argued that it was the task of intellectuals 
to reveal the deeper meaning of particular struggles to the marginalized 
working classes engaged in these struggles (King and Szeléyni, 2004). While 
many of these Marxists employed the concepts of “false consciousness” and 
“ideology” to analyze problems with working-class thought, Lenin employed 
the concept of “trade union consciousness” to diagnose the problem (Mayer, 
1994: 673). He argued that the squalid living conditions of the working 
class tempted most workers in the struggle to forego the distant goal of 
class emancipation for the immediate goal of winning “bread and butter” 
concessions from employers. The intellectual possessed the knowledge and 
cognitive resources to see beyond day-to-day struggles and to fashion strate-
gies and visions that would enable the working class to achieve far-reaching 
goals. Intellectuals played a strategic role in social movements because they 
served as the true consciousness of the working class. Without intellectuals, 
the working class would be tempted into one short-term concession after 
another, trapping itself in the cul-de-sac of reformism.
Many of his contemporaries agreed with Lenin’s diagnosis of the 
problem (trade union consciousness), but some believed that his solution 
introduced an important dilemma: the Power of Representation dilemma. 
Top-down intellectual leadership would bolster the revolutionary resolve 
of working-class social movements but this created a new oligarchy and 
blocked workers from speaking for themselves. Lenin and his allies accepted 
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this as a necessary trade-off that would be resolved after the emancipation 
of the working class. However, democratic socialists like Leon Trotsky and 
Rosa Luxemburg argued that the intellectual leadership needed to design 
institutional mechanisms (workers’ councils, soviets, etc.) that could diffuse 
intellectual resources and skills to workers and help raise their conscious-
ness. By diffusing intellectual resources downward in this way, workers 
could see the true meaning of class struggle and assume leadership of 
the movement, avoiding the Power of Representation dilemma (Trotsky, 
1970). Most Marxists involved in these debates agreed that the resources of 
intellectuals (theoretical knowledge and discursive skills) were essential for 
keeping working-class social movements on their historical mission and sav-
ing them from reformism. The disagreement stemmed over whether workers 
could acquire the intellectual capacities needed to think, speak, and lead 
themselves. Lenin was skeptical, while democratic socialists believed that 
the dilemma could be resolved by diffusing theoretical knowledge to the 
working classes through consciousness-raising activities.
Antonio Gramsci (1971) addressed the Power of Representation dilemma 
in a new way by seeking to dissolve the very distinction between intel-
lectuals and workers. He questioned the assumption that intellectuals 
possessed a monopoly on legitimate knowledge and argued that “all men are 
intellectuals but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals” 
(Gramsci, 1971: 121). He argued that the values, norms, and ethics of the 
dominant class were reproduced in the everyday lives of people through 
institutions like the church, schools, associations, trade unions, and the 
family. Through the diffusion of ideas across different sites in civil society, 
the dominant ideas of the bourgeoisie became the common sense of the 
people. This common sense denied workers the vocabulary and concepts 
needed to make its implicit knowledge of wrongs and injustices explicit. 
In this context, “organic intellectuals” (part-time theorists and organizers, 
teachers, religious leaders, etc.) aligned with the working class played a 
fundamental role by introducing discourses and ideas that challenged the 
“common sense” and provided the working class with frames needed to 
articulate what the class implicitly knew but did not know how to say. The 
organic intellectual was therefore to function as the “tongue” of the working 
class rather than its conscience. Because of the proximity (knowledge, 
social, geographic) of the organic intellectual to real working communi-
ties, they would not “speak for” the people but would “speak with” them, 
resolving the Power of Representation dilemma.
The 1960s and 1970s marked a widespread embrace of Gramsci’s 
bottom-up intellectualism. Paulo Freire (1971) developed a “pedagogy of 
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the oppressed” that largely drew on Gramsci’s work (O’Cadiz et al., 1998). 
His theories were influential in Latin American social movements and 
counterbalanced the Leninism of traditional communist parties and of 
the Cuban Revolution. Freire’s theories and methods would diffuse to the 
United States through the concept of “popular education” in the 1980s and 
1990s as Central American immigrants became active members in labor 
and immigrant rights movements (Milkman, 2006).
In France, Michel Foucault and his colleagues extended Gramsci’s ideas 
of the organic intellectual by introducing the concept of the “specif ic intel-
lectual.” It must be noted that his formulations coincided with similar 
efforts by other sociologists during this time to broaden the concept of 
the intellectual beyond that of the traditional intellectual (Eyal and Buch-
holz, 2010). Foucault highlighted the growing importance of a new kind of 
intellectual in the post-1968 mobilizations. The expansion of the postwar 
welfare state increased the need for teachers, psychiatrists, planners, and 
so on. This expansion channeled intellectuals to work in a wide variety of 
institutional sites where power was deployed to discipline and control dif-
ferent population groups (such as hospitals, housing, schools, prisons, and 
factories). These changes reflected an important departure from traditional 
intellectual work. Their work in concrete institutional sites blurred the 
distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge. It also moved 
intellectual work away from the search for a single transcendent truth 
to the application of useful and practical knowledge in a wide variety of 
institutional settings. Structural changes therefore precipitated a dramatic 
change in intellectual work and the use of knowledge, moving from the 
search for universal truth to gaining concrete understandings of governing 
practices and applications in plural, concrete, and specif ic institutional 
settings. Moreover, specif ic intellectuals became frontline executors of 
state power but this raised ambivalences with regards to the populations 
they were supposed to govern. As they worked in institutional sites, the 
interests of some specific intellectuals coincided with the patients, students, 
migrants, residents, and prisoners they were supposed to govern. Intel-
lectuals in other words found themselves drawn into criticisms of specif ic 
modalities of power alongside actually repressed people.
According to Foucault, these changes in intellectual work (from theoreti-
cal to practical knowledge; from the search for truth to engaging in governing 
practices; from thinking in the “ivory towers” to concrete and face-to-face 
engagements with repressed people) changed intellectuals’ role in social 
movements. Specif ic intellectuals were less likely to focus on giving voice to 
the voiceless or reveal the truthfulness of particular struggles. Instead, they 
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played a more supportive role in these struggles, deploying their technical 
knowledge of institutions (prisons, hospitals, schools, immigration law, 
etc.) to support the multiple forms of resistance. Foucault thus resolved the 
Power of Representation dilemma by inverting the role of intellectuals and 
the groups they represent. While Marxists had claimed that intellectuals 
possessed supreme knowledge of the (class) struggle, Foucault argued the 
opposite, that workers and other oppressed groups best knew what their 
struggles were about. The role of the intellectual, too, is inverted as specif ic 
intellectuals take on the role previously assigned to workers – they put their 
labor at the service of struggles envisioned by others.
Foucault’s analysis of these changes is reflected in the way he assessed 
his own activism in support of prisoners. In 1971, he helped organize an 
anti-prison organization called the Prison Information Group (GIP),1 which 
laid out its new position:
The GIP does not propose to speak in the name of the prisoners in various 
prisons: it proposes, on the contrary, to provide them with the possibility 
of speaking for themselves and telling what goes on in prisons. The GIP 
does not have reformist goals; we do not dream of some ideal prison: we 
hope that prisoners may be able to say what it is that is intolerable for 
them in the system of penal repression. (Eribon, 1991: 228)
The prisoners know the wrongs being done to them. They do not need 
intellectuals to reveal the “hidden” powers of penal repression or the deeper 
meanings of their political action. What they lack are the technical skills 
and information needed to express these problems to the public. They need 
the practical knowledge of specif ic intellectuals to express themselves in 
the public sphere. This latter point is reiterated in a discussion between 
Foucault and a striking worker, when he tells the worker,
We are in agreement that workers have no need of intellectuals to know 
what it is they do. They know this perfectly well themselves. His [the 
intellectual’s] role consequently is not to form the workers’ consciousness, 
since that already exists, but to allow this consciousness, this worker’s 
knowledge, to enter the information system and be circulated. (Foucault, 
in Eribon, 1991: 253, emphasis in the original)
Intellectuals’ technical and practical knowledge permits the experiences 
of marginalized groups to get into the “information system.” Intellectuals 
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are thus key players enabling marginalized groups to voice grievances 
within political arenas.
Foucault’s intervention was not simply a normative prescription (what in-
tellectuals should do). It stemmed from an analysis of the dramatic changes 
of intellectual work in the postwar period and reflects contemporary ef-
forts to theorize this “new class” in the postwar context (Gouldner, 1982; 
Kurzman and Owens, 2002; King and Szeléyni, 2004). We can summarize 
his argument in the following way: First, power in the postwar context 
was diffused through a wide variety of relatively autonomous institutions 
(psychiatry, medicine, penal institutions, schools, housing, immigration) 
and these institutions created demand for professionals with intellectual 
skills. Second, as more intellectuals were channeled into disciplinary insti-
tutions, the line between theoretical and practical knowledge was blurred. 
Most intellectuals were no longer searching for universal truths by acquiring 
substantive/theoretical knowledge but instead focused on the technicalities 
of governing target populations in diverse institutional spaces. These intel-
lectual workers interacted with targeted populations and many developed 
strong motives to ally themselves with the struggles of prisoners, patients, 
residents, and students. Third, because mobilizations and campaigns were 
carried out in a diverse range of very specif ic institutional domains, they 
tended to be partial and nonuniversal. Overlaps were possible (universities 
were envisioned as a connecting point for assembling diverse struggles) but 
such overlaps were not enough to create a single, “historical” social move-
ment. This marked the age of partial resistances to localized power rather 
than large social movements for achieving singular truths and historical 
change. Lastly, these structural changes brought new intellectuals into 
proximity (in knowledge, social relations, and physical relations) with 
marginalized groups. As a consequence, intellectuals were less inclined 
to “speak for” marginalized groups and would “speak with” them. Thus, 
the core Power of Representation dilemma associated with intellectuals 
(“speaking for” or “speaking with”) was supposed to be dissolved as intel-
lectuals mobilized their technical and practical knowledge – rather than 
pointing the way, they would help others to get to where they wanted to go.
Specif ic intellectuals have indeed assumed a great presence in differ-
ent social movements. Scientists and experts in European environmental 
movements legitimated the idea that uncontrolled industrialization posed 
a threat to the planet (Hajer, 2005). When struggles emerged in the 1970s 
to deinstitutionalize psychiatric care, trained welfare and medical profes-
sionals assumed central roles (Duyvendak, 2011). Trained professionals 
(such as lawyers, nonprofit professionals, or communication experts) have 
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assumed important roles in the immigrant rights movements in Europe and 
the United States (Siméant, 1997; Voss and Bloemraad, 2011; Nicholls, 2013a; 
Nicholls, 2013b). Urban planners trained in the most prestigious universities 
of the United States have dedicated themselves to a range of urban mobiliza-
tions to expand the “right to the city” (Soja, 2010). Social movements that 
have undergone professionalization assign specif ic intellectuals prominent 
and strategic roles to play.
The following sections assess the actual role of specif ic intellectuals in 
two social movements of highly stigmatized groups seeking recognition 
for rights in hostile environments. We f ind that the rising importance of 
specific intellectuals has not resolved the Power of Representation dilemma 
as Foucault predicted. Instead, the increased professionalization of social 
movements and the increased importance of mass media both make spe-
cif ic intellectuals more powerful players within social movements and 
exacerbate the Power of Representation dilemma.
Marginalized Groups as Threats: Denying the Rights of Others
Marginalized groups have historically been denied recognition to equal 
rights because they are represented as a threat or polluter to the established 
political community (Elias, 1994; Isin, 2000; Benhabib, 2004; Alexander, 
2006). “Others” are said to lack necessary values that would make them fully 
productive citizens: they don’t have the mental capacities to participate in 
democratic deliberations or the civility needed to fulfill core citizenship du-
ties (Rancière, 1993; Raissiguier, 2010). For example, workers in 19th-century 
France were denied political rights because they were said to lack the mental 
and moral capacities to engage in a public debate over the “general interest” 
(Rancière, 1989, 1993). Marginalized groups may also possess beliefs, values, 
needs, manners, and languages that pollute or contaminate the community 
of citizens (Isin, 2000; Alexander, 2006). The lack of necessary attributes 
and the possession of polluting conduct/cultures make these marginalized 
groups into fundamental threats to the established political community. 
If established members want to preserve their community, it is argued 
that they have no choice but to deny marginalized others recognition as 
human beings deserving full rights. In Hannah Arendt’s terms, their other-
ness makes them ineligible for the “right to have rights” in the established 
political community (Arendt, 1973; Benhabib, 2004). While some individuals 
may consider these inequalities in how basic rights are distributed to be 
a “moral shock,” most people assume that inequalities are a normal and 
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banal part of the order of things and that the denial of rights to the other 
is a necessary part of life (Arendt, 1994).
Since the 1980s and 1990s, immigrants and rights activists have faced an 
extremely hostile discursive and political context in the US (Nevins, 2002; 
De Genova, 2005; Menjivar, 2006; Chavez, 2008; Massey and Pren, 2012). 
Anti-immigrant forces produce compelling messages for why federal and 
state governments should strip immigrants of many basic rights (social, po-
litical, and civil) and forcefully remove them from the country. They stress 
that immigrants present a core threat to national stability, economically 
and culturally. They (immigrants) make Americans foreigners in their own 
lands, competing for jobs, and cheating the welfare state. Following from 
this, anti-immigrant forces argue that even though some immigrants may 
have sympathetic stories, it would be impossible to allow them access to 
basic rights because this would open the “floodgates” for more immigrants. 
These arguments were articulated by professional anti-immigration as-
sociations (Federation for American Immigration Reform, Americans for 
Immigration Control, Numbers USA, among others) and taken up prominent 
state and national politicians (Diamond, 1996; Money, 1999). Moreover, a 
new generation of public intellectuals articulated a coherent discourse 
that painted immigrants, and particularly Latino immigrants, as a cultural 
threat (rather than just economic) to the national community (Chavez, 
2008). Framed in this way, it became “common sense” that immigration was 
a serious if not existential problem that required some kind of action from 
local, state, and national government off icials. This resulted in a series of 
government measures to criminalize unauthorized migration and suspend 
the rights of immigrants in the country (Nevins, 2002; Massey and Pren, 
2012), including the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act (IIRIRA) and Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PROWARA), both signed into law in 1996 by President 
Bill Clinton.
The 1980s and 1990s presented the LGBT community with a similarly 
hostile environment. First, the prominence of the Christian right within the 
mainstream Republican Party contributed to mainstreaming culturally con-
servative discourses. The discourse on “family values” saw the decline of the 
heterosexual and patriarchal family contributed to deviance, breakdown, 
and decline. The LGBT population was seen as a threat because it embraced 
moralities, practices, and categories that departed from established norms. 
It needed to be kept apart from the “normal” populations, criminalized 
through the continued enforcement of anti-sodomy laws, and denied some 
basic rights. Second, the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s compounded the stigma 
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associated with the LGBT population. The disease’s strong association with 
gay men reinforced general perceptions that this population was a polluting 
element. Christian conservatives in organizations like Moral Majority and 
the Family Research Institute used AIDS to reinforce stigmas, asserting 
that the disease was brought upon gay men as punishment for their wicked 
ways. By the 1990s, conservative forces had gained enough political and 
ideological influence that they were able to push through the passage of 
the highly restrictive Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996.
Undocumented immigrants and LGBT people were both represented 
as a powerful threat to the country. The threatening character of these 
populations provided justif ication to enact laws (both signed by President 
Bill Clinton in the same fateful year) that suspended access to basic rights.
The Stakes: Gaining Recognition of the Right to Have Rights
When basic rights are denied to marginalized people, activists must craft 
counter representations that demonstrate that these people indeed have 
the “right to have rights” in the country (Arendt, 1973; Benhabib, 2004). 
Only when activists craft such representations can “banalities of injustice” 
(Arendt, 1994) (such as borders, closets, raids, and segregated spaces) be 
considered “wrong” by larger portions of the population and recognized as 
a violation of fundamental principles of equality. For those groups that bear 
the greatest stigmas and face the greatest hostility, the options for creating 
effective representations tended to be limited. An effective representation 
consists of demonstrating that they are not irreducibly different and do 
not bear polluting attributes that threaten the established community. 
They must show that they share established values and cultures and stand 
to make contributions to the community. Representations of conformity 
cleanse the marginalized group of stigmas that made them polluters and 
threats. By emphasizing their intelligence, love of family, love of country, 
creativity, and civic engagement, they demonstrate that they are not threats 
but instead reinvigorate the moral, political, and economic life of the coun-
try (Honig, 2006). Demonstrating identif ication with established values 
helps to transform this “impossible” other (Raissiguier, 2010) into a group 
that may indeed deserve recognition of equal rights. Facing the positive 
representations of a marginalized group, other players within political 
arenas have greater diff iculty justifying restrictive policies on moral and 
ethical grounds. Effective stories, arguments, messages, and performances 
do not guarantee the extension of full rights, but make such an extension a 
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legitimate issue for public debate. The centrality of mass media in structur-
ing the “public sphere” has only served to enhance the importance of craft-
ing effective representations as a preliminary step in gaining recognition 
as rights-bearing human beings (Gamson, 1995; Koopmans, 2004).
The modern immigrant rights movement dates to the 1980s (Coutin, 
1998; 2003). While this movement faced increasing hostility through the 
1990s, the situation worsened signif icantly in the 2000s with the War on 
Terror (De Genova, 2007; Coleman, 2007; Massey and Pren, 2012). Within 
this context, immigrant rights activists pushed for several measures to 
legalize the status of undocumented migrants. Two of the most prominent 
measures were the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (2006, 2007) 
and the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. 
The latter measure aimed to provide a pathway to legalization for college 
students, youths involved in community service activities, and military 
service members. Advocates of the DREAM Act have sought to increase 
public support for the measure by representing undocumented youths 
and their cause in a favorable light. In particular, the immigrant rights 
movement has sought to destigmatize undocumented youths by stressing 
their conformity with national values (Nicholls, 2013a). The youths were 
also portrayed as the “best and the brightest,” rebutting the stereotype 
of immigrant youth as deviant and delinquent. Rights associations also 
sought to absolve youths from the stigma of illegality by stressing that their 
status was “no fault of their own.” These youths could not be held legally 
accountable for breaking the law because they did not choose to cross the 
border. The argument stressed that this group of immigrants possessed 
the right set of cultural and moral attributes that made them deserving of 
rights within the existing order of things.
The LGBT movement has a longer history than the contemporary im-
migrant rights movement and has experimented with various strategic lines 
(Armstrong, 2002). Whereas one faction embraces a strategy that stresses 
the common values of homosexual and heterosexual populations, another 
faction argues that society needs to accept different forms of partnerships 
that depart from heterosexual norms. While both representational strate-
gies became prominent in the early 1970s, growing hostility in the 1980s 
and 1990s favored a strategy that stressed identif ication and assimilation 
over disidentif ication and difference. In the late 1990s the f ight against 
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) placed marriage rights on the move-
ment’s political agenda. Gaining recognition of this basic right depended 
on representations of same-sex couples as people sharing the same values, 
aspirations, and family structures as “normal” heterosexual couples:
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Marriage provides families stability and security.
One thing that both sides of the marriage issue can agree upon is that 
marriage strengthens families. … [LGBT] people deserve equal access 
to the American dream. Gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people 
grow up dreaming of falling in love, getting married and growing old 
together. Just as much as the next person, same-sex couples should be 
able to fulf ill that dream. We know from anecdotal evidence that after 
same-sex couples have a commitment ceremony, their friends and family 
treat them differently – as a married couple. Shouldn’t they, too, have 
the legal security that goes along with that? (Human Rights Campaign, 
in Davidson, 2006: 46)
A powerful discourse emerged that stresses the universal virtues of the 
“traditional” family. By denying lesbian and gay couples the right to marry, 
the state is denying them a fundamental right. In this instance, identif ica-
tion with established values has become a way to assert that a fundamental 
wrong has been committed against this population.
During the 1990s, both undocumented immigrants and LGBT people 
were embedded in political arenas that framed them as potent threats to the 
national community. Within such a context, the f ight for rights depended 
f irst on their need to demonstrate that they were indeed rights-deserving 
human beings. In both cases, similar strategic lines were pursued: they 
asserted their “right to have rights” by stressing their sameness with the 
established population and, following from that, asserted that continued 
denial of inalienable rights from these clearly deserving human beings was 
unjust and morally wrong. Producing and expressing effective discourses in 
the arena of public opinion was a necessary part of the struggle to achieve 
recognition as rights-deserving human beings.
The Role of Specific Intellectuals
To craft resonant representations for stigmatized groups requires particu-
larly high concentrations of cultural and symbolic capital that intellectuals 
possess (Bourdieu, 1994; Wacquant, 2005). Activists must have an intimate 
knowledge of the political culture of the established community and under-
stand how to pitch messages that resonate with the public at intellectual, 
moral, and emotional levels. They must also possess enough symbolic 
capital to ensure that the arguments, messages, and stories they articulate 
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are considered legitimate by the national public. Lastly, they must possess 
connections with media gatekeepers who can assist in transmitting their 
frames, messages, and talking points to the public (Koopmans, 2004). These 
forms of capital however are not equally distributed across a social move-
ment. University-trained professionals embedded in social movements have 
greater access and control over these forms of cultural and symbolic capital. 
By contrast, less educated activists and newcomers to social movements 
are less prepared to craft and disseminate compelling representations of 
themselves or their rights claims, requiring them to depend on well-trained 
professionals to represent them in the public sphere. These specif ic intel-
lectuals therefore become key players as representational brokers mediating 
relations between marginalized groups and the outside world.
Professionals in local and national immigrant rights associations have 
played instrumental roles since the 1980s (Coutin, 2003; Varsanyi, 2008). In 
the mid-2000s, prominent immigrant and human rights associations formed 
coalitions to support the DREAM Act. The rights associations took a leading 
role in crafting a discourse that represented undocumented youths in a way 
that would gain broad public support for their cause. The more the campaign 
sought to convince people in conservative areas of the country, the greater 
the need to produce a clear, simple, and sympathetic representation of 
these youths and their cause. Highly professionalized specif ic intellectuals 
took leading roles in devising messaging campaigns, working with media, 
and ensuring messaging coherency across the national social movement 
network. Legal and communication experts within these organizations 
crafted representations and played brokering roles within this campaign. 
The undocumented youths making up the rank and f ile of the movement 
played a marginal role in crafting representations of themselves and their 
cause, at least until 2010 when an internal struggle erupted over these power 
imbalances in the movement issues (more on this in the next section).
Similarly, the hostile conditions of the 1980s and 1990s encouraged one 
of the leading LGBT organizations in the United States, the Human Rights 
Campaign (HRC), to pursue a strategy that stressed identif ication with 
the values and moralities of the established community. While the HRC 
competed with other organizations within the LGBT movement, it eclipsed 
these organizations in the late 1990s and 2000s. Its national membership 
is estimated at 600,000, its 2010 income was $37.92 million (up from $21 
million in 2001), and it has local steering committees in 21 states. Like the 
immigrant rights organizations discussed above, the organization’s leading 
staff members are university-trained legal and communication profession-
als, with advanced expertise in messaging, marketing, public relations, 
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and political lobbying. Communication experts assumed responsibility for 
producing representations of the LGBT community and arguments for equal 
rights. Once these arguments are produced, they also diffuse them through 
different media channels (online and offline), across regional networks, into 
the political arena, and into national and state-level courthouses across the 
country. These communication experts assume a strategic role in creating 
a discursive space through which both activists and different publics think 
about and frame the issue at hand. They provide thousands of activists and 
sympathizers with a discursive template to think and speak about why the 
denial of basic rights to this group is wrong and why changes are needed.
Thus, specific intellectuals have played vital roles in producing discourses 
that represent these marginalized groups and their claims for equal rights. 
They became “brokers” because they created representations that connected 
groups discursively and emotionally to publics that had cast them to the 
margins. However, contrary to Foucault’s expectations, the specif ic forms 
of knowledge possessed by these intellectuals placed them in a leading 
role in crafting and disseminating representations of marginalized groups. 
By assuming a central role in demonstrating how the status quo is wrong 
and expressing the case of these groups in the public sphere, the specif ic 
intellectuals in these cases became both the “voice” and “conscience” of 
these groups.
We turn now to two variants of the Power of Representation dilemma. 
Each is associated with distinct cleavages in these kinds of social move-
ments.
Cleavages between the Leadership and the Rank and File
The greater control that specif ic intellectuals have over cultural and 
symbolic capital introduces representational hierarchies whereby they 
assume a leading role in crafting and disseminating messages to the broader 
public. Assuming this role raises the risk of specif ic intellectuals “speaking 
for” marginalized groups. While most movements are internally stratif ied 
in this way, the gap between the intellectual leadership and the rank and 
f ile depends on the cultural and social composition of the movement. The 
tendency for a large representational gap increases when a social move-
ment is made up of large numbers of people with low levels of cultural and 
symbolic capital (e.g., immigrant movements). In these instances, there is 
less likelihood that the specif ic intellectuals will be drawn directly from 
the rank and f ile and a greater likelihood that they will be drawn from 
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the professionalized organizations (i.e., human rights groups, nonprof it 
organizations, etc.) that support these struggles. This contributes to the 
likelihood that the leadership will “speak for” marginalized groups rather 
than “with” them, planting the seeds of conflict between the leadership 
and rank and f ile of the movement.
Conflicts erupted in 2010 between youths and the intellectual leader-
ship of the immigrant rights movement over the strategic direction of the 
movement, reflecting deeper cleavages over who should represent who in 
the immigrant rights movement. Many of the undocumented youths were 
frustrated that their calls for a change in strategy were not taken seriously 
by the leadership of the movement. These sentiments were expressed in an 
op-ed article in Dissent (Perez et al., 2010). The piece, written by some of the 
more prominent dissident youths, questioned the legitimacy of the tradi-
tional leadership to represent undocumented immigrants like themselves. 
They argued that the leaders did not share their social background and 
residency status and because of this, they did not face the same pressures 
as undocumented youths. They also argued that while the professionalized 
leadership gained increased funding, political prestige, and media exposure, 
these gains were not distributed to undocumented activists who took most 
of the risks. “Because if we accept and embrace the current undocumented 
student movement, it means the social justice elite loses its power – its 
power to influence politicians, media and the public debate. The power 
is taken back by its rightful holders” (Perez et al., 2010). These critiques 
ultimately culminated in efforts of the undocumented youths to reject 
the leadership of the movement, with many shifting their support to more 
“organic” immigrant leaders around the country.
Movements with more mixed levels of cultural and symbolic capital have 
more muted hierarchies, with intellectuals more likely drawn from the rank 
and f ile. Their common positioning with the rank and f ile allows them 
to “speak with” the movement rather than for it. For example, the mixed 
social, cultural, and activist background of LGBT activists increased the 
likelihood that the leading intellectual forces of the movement would also 
be drawn from the gay and lesbian community itself. There was no need to 
go “outside” the group to f ind people with the resources needed to pursue 
core intellectual functions. Nevertheless, the middle- and upper-middle-
class backgrounds of leading intellectual voices (now and historically) has 
resulted in representations of the LGBT cause with a very distinctive class 
background (Valocchi, 1999; Armstrong, 2002). The dominance of middle-
class framings provides greater opportunities for activists with middle-class 
dispositions to assume leadership roles. These internal class divides have 
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spurred complaints by working-class activists of cultural marginalization, 
fewer opportunities for upward political mobility, and less influence. They 
feel that the leadership is “speaking for” them rather than “with” them. Thus, 
the LGBT movement has been able to recruit intellectuals from its own 
ranks, allowing it to temper a central dilemma of intellectual involvement 
in social movements. Nevertheless, class-based selection mechanisms result 
in the prominence of an intellectual leadership from middle- and upper-
middle-class backgrounds, resulting in representations and representatives 
that stress middle-class values and silencing those from working-class 
backgrounds.
In sum, specif ic intellectuals assume a leading representational role 
within the social movements of marginalized groups because their access 
to scarce resources enables them to craft effective representations. Their 
possession of these scarce and necessary resources makes them into power-
ful players within movements, introducing divides between them and rank 
and f ile activists. Although the Power of Representation dilemma cannot 
be fully resolved, the tendency of intellectuals to “speak for” marginalized 
groups does seem to vary according to movements’ social and cultural 
makeup: divides are more likely in movements predominantly composed 
of resource-poor groups.
Cleavages between “Deserving” and “Undeserving” Groups
Gaining rights for a marginalized group depends on crafting representations 
that stress conformity and identif ication with the values of the established 
group. Specif ic intellectuals working for the largest organizations in the 
LGBT and immigrant rights movements have worked hard to cleanse the 
movements they represent from stigmas by emphasizing the qualities that 
make these groups normal, law-abiding, and productive citizens. While 
this representational strategy opens the door for some, it also differentiates 
“good” and “deserving” subjects from those who fail to conform to estab-
lished values, norms, and moralities. Those who fail to f it the discursive 
boxes of the “good” and “deserving” subject often f ind themselves pushed 
further to the legal and symbolic margins. Strategies by intellectuals to 
improve the position of the movement within political arenas therefore 
have trade-offs for groups unable or unwilling to meet mainstream norms 
of respectability.
Within the undocumented youth mobilization, leading advocates have 
become fully aware of this dilemma. On the one hand, they recognize 
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that representations of the “good immigrant” sharpen differences between 
this group and other immigrants who may not assimilate so easily with 
established norms. If “good” immigrants deserve legal rights because they 
are the “best and brightest” and are not at fault for their legal status, those 
who are not particularly the “best,” “brightest,” or “innocent” f ind it diff icult 
to justify their own rights claims. Some within the general immigrant 
rights movement criticize the messaging strategy of the youth campaign 
and the leadership responsible for creating it. On the other hand, while 
undocumented youths and their advocates fully recognize problems associ-
ated with these representations, they also recognize that they have been 
effective in gaining support from conservative publics and politicians. They 
believe that their ability to become a leading force in the general immigrant 
rights movements has been a function of this particular messaging strategy 
and that changing it dramatically would weaken their political support. 
Thus the dilemma: that the more they push this representation the more 
they alienate other immigrant groups making up the broader social move-
ment but the less they push this representation the less likely it is to gain 
the support of hostile publics and wavering politicians.
Similar debates developed within the LGBT movement with the in-
creasing centrality of the marriage campaign in the 1990s and 2000s. The 
conservative turn in the 1980s and 1990s favored representational strategies 
stressing identif ication, assimilation, and marriage. This shift aggravated 
tensions with factions that had rejected heterosexual assimilation and 
embraced difference. As one observer noted, “Since 1993, marriage has 
come to dominate the political imagination of the national gay movement 
in the United States. To read the pages of The Advocate or Out is to receive 
the impression that gay people hardly care about anything else. … I have 
no doubt that a large constituency has formed around this belief. But the 
commitment is not universal, to put it mildly” (Warner, 1999: 120, emphasis 
added). The prominence of Queer theory provided specif ic intellectuals 
working in dissident groups a powerful discursive repertoire to deepen their 
critiques of the assimilation line. Josephson summarizes these criticisms 
in the following way:
For some queer critics of the same-sex marriage quest, the current hetero-
centric vision of marriage inappropriately associates the public granting 
of a privacy privilege with adult citizenship for those professing lifelong, 
monogamous sexual relationships. Their objection is not so much to the 
fact that same-sex couples wish to have such relationships recognized, 
but rather to privileging this form of sexual relationship above all others. 
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If married couples – opposite or same-sex – are provided greater social, 
economic, and political privileges than nonmarried individuals, the 
result will be secondary exclusions and reinforcement of an undesir-
able link between a particular form of intimate association and adult 
citizenship. (2005: 271)2
The central criticism was that in focusing on gay marriage, LGBT rights 
advocates were inadvertently privileging (morally and legally) one way of 
living (marriage) and downgrading multiple others who did not agree with a 
“heterocentric” vision of life. Marriage advocates have come to recognize the 
merits of the critique, but they also recognize that the marriage campaign 
(and its associated representational strategy) has provided the LGBT com-
munity an important vehicle to achieve basic rights in the country. This 
exposes a critical dilemma within the movement (again, a dilemma shared 
with undocumented immigrants): representational strategies that stress 
identif ication with the norms of the established group work to extend 
basic rights to marginalized groups but the strategy produces new divides 
because it privileges certain norms and groups within the broader marginal-
ized population over others. Those failing to abide by established norms 
and expectations are excluded; deprived of privileges and rights accorded 
to those who can more easily adopt to the moral and cultural attributes of 
the “good” and “deserving” lesbian or gay person.
Conclusion
All contemporary movements consist in part of intellectuals, i.e., people 
with comparatively strong skills of representation. These skills are an im-
portant resource of movements but they also raise an important dilemma: 
if intellectuals use their skills for the movement, they marginalize others 
within the movement who lack such skills. Different movement intellectuals 
have sought to resolve this Power of Representation dilemma in different 
ways. While Marxists debated how exactly intellectuals should use their 
privileged position to guide the masses, more recent theorizing has main-
tained that intellectuals can and should speak with movements rather than 
for them. This idea is most clearly stated by Michel Foucault, who argued 
that specif ic intellectuals would and should use their skills not to guide or 
represent marginalized groups but amplify their voices.
We examined how specif ic intellectuals actually operate in two move-
ments in the US: the immigrant rights movement and LGBT movement. 
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While recognizing important differences between the immigrant rights 
and LGBT movements, our analysis shows that the largest organizations 
within them have as a central objective to convince the general public 
that their constituents merit recognition as equals. Before actual laws 
are enacted to extend basic rights to excluded others, these groups must 
f irst gain recognition of these people as rights-deserving human beings. 
They must be deemed to have the “right to have rights” within the existing 
citizenship regime before legal-juridical rights are granted to them (Arendt, 
1973). The imperative of gaining recognition from a hostile public raises 
the importance of representations (i.e., discourse, symbols, performances, 
diffusion) in the campaigns for marginalized groups. In these contexts, 
an important function assumed by the specif ic intellectuals is to craft 
such representations and articulate them in public. They produce new 
languages and feelings that connect the worlds of outsiders to the worlds of 
the established group, working to reveal the humanity (and therefore their 
inalienable rights) of the “other” through the careful construction of argu-
ments, talking points, storylines, public performances, etc. In performing 
these functions, the specif ic intellectuals become representational brokers 
between the previously disconnected worlds of marginalized groups and 
established populations.
Although there are important differences between the LGBT and the 
immigrant rights movement, we also f ind similar dilemmas. Tensions 
continue to arise over elites “speaking for” marginalized groups. We also 
f ind that the representations produced by leading intellectuals contribute 
to differentiating “good” and “deserving” groups from less deserving others, 
introducing a powerful and important cleavage within both movements. In 
both cases intellectuals and activists may temporarily patch up cleavages 
and f issures but the dilemmas cannot be fully overcome. In both cases we 
studied here, the largest movement organizations aimed for legal reform 
and strategically decided to selectively portray the groups they represent as 
sharing established values and moral norms. Representations of conformity 
cleansed the marginalized groups of stigmas that made them polluters 
and threats but at the same time alienated more radical and marginalized 
groups. These dilemmas are by no means accidental. They result from the 
efforts of specif ic intellectuals to employ their resources and respond most 
effectively to the “rules of the game” of their political arenas.
The promotion of the intellectual as a mere channel for already existing 
voices and the rejection of the intellectual as leader of interpretation and 
representation amounts to what Bourdieu called a “strategy of conde-
scension” – “the refusal to wield domination can be part of a strategy of 
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condescension or a way of taking violence to a higher degree of denegation 
and dissimulation, a means of reinforcing the effect of misrecognition and 
thereby of symbolic violence” (Bourdieu, in Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 
145). By claiming to merely assist marginalized groups or amplify their 
voices, specif ic intellectuals simultaneously hide and exercise their power 
to shape and steer mobilizations. Contrary to what the idea of the specif ic 
intellectual assumes, intellectual action cannot merely assist groups but 
necessarily selects some rather than other voices and helps to construct 
identities, groups and claims. For intellectuals operating within movements 
it is essential to recognize this in order to assess their own role and respon-
sibility as central players within movements. For sociologists studying 
movements it is essential to recognize that the resources of representation 
within movements are unequally distributed. The unequal distribution of 
these powerful resources results in many different conflicts that fragment 
social movement and shape their internal relational dynamics.
Notes
1. Group d’Information sur le Prison.
2. Baird and Rosenbaum expressed early on the criticism in the following way, 
“Traditional marriage is integral to the corrupt authoritarian structures of 
society; it is a suspect institution embodying within itself the patriarchy. … 
[T]he most important issue for gay and lesbian couples is whether or not 
they should ‘sell out’ to the enemy – the patriarchal culture – that seeks to 
oppress and eliminate them” (Baird and Rosenbaum, 1997: 11).
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9 Playing with Fire
Flame-Retardant Activists and Policy Arenas
Alissa Cordner, Phil Brown, and Margaret Mulcahy
“The lack of an entirely clean toxicological prof ile for BFRs [brominated f lame 
retardants] … raises a fundamental public health policy question: whether we 
should act on the evidence of increasing body burdens given uncertainty about 
the magnitude of the health hazard.”
– David Littell, Deputy Commissioner of the Maine Department of 
 Environmental Protection
Emerging environmental health concerns are often marked by disagree-
ment over the scientif ic basis for establishing the causal impact of toxic 
substances on human health. In these controversies, anti-toxics activists, 
scientists, government regulators, and industry representatives interact in 
a variety of scientif ic and regulatory arenas and universally call on science 
to justify their positions. The ubiquity of science in regulatory and legisla-
tive arenas by players with and without scientif ic credentials challenges 
dominant notions that science must be objective and certain in order to 
be valuable and actionable. By claiming that uncertain science can still be 
used to influence policy, environmental activists and other proregulation 
players seek to further their policy agendas, and simultaneously push the 
bounds of what counts as legitimate science.
This chapter describes a case study that highlights alignments between 
activism and science that frequently occur in regulatory arenas and which 
allow multiple actors to draw on similar frames and strategies to advance 
their causes. We focus on state-level regulation of f lame retardants (FRs), 
chemicals that are used to slow or prevent f ire but that may be linked to 
health and environmental hazards. These chemicals are an ideal case study 
because they have been subject to both regulation and voluntary market 
action; have attracted the attention of a wide variety of players; and are 
widely studied and thus the subject of sometimes contradictory scientif ic 
research. We integrate multiple bodies of theory to reconcile a focus on 
players as they act, react, and interact across scientif ic, regulatory, and 
advocacy arenas, with the recognition that constraints can be imposed by 
other players as well as by structural inequalities or the rules of arenas. We 
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also highlight the commonalities and differences in players’ agendas and 
messages by analyzing over a hundred in-depth qualitative interviews and 
formal testimony submitted in response to a state-level FR ban. Addition-
ally, we apply the dominant epidemiological paradigm framework, from 
medical sociology and environmental sociology, to a nondisease (though 
still health-related) setting. This framework aligns with recent theoretical 
advances in the study of health social movements in two important ways: 
by describing a case study of a social movement with various institutional, 
state, and nonstate targets, and by offering a new conception of how social 
movements operate within a multi-institutional setting (Armstrong and 
Bernstein, 2008; Banaszak-Holl, Levitsky, and Zald, 2010).
The Politics of Science
Our analysis takes seriously both the actions and goals of the players 
engaged in the environmental health controversy around FRs, and the 
arenas in which they interact. Players are individuals and organizations 
who actively work to advance state-based regulation and affect corporate 
practices related to FR chemicals. FR players interact in multiple arenas, 
such as state legislatures and organized public protest. The large and diverse 
arena of anti-toxics activism shares some overlapping political and organi-
zational territory with the large and diverse arena of biomonitoring research 
(measuring the presence and concentrations of chemicals in tissues).
Players play on uneven turf, since not all players have equal access to all 
arenas or equal ability to influence arenas’ structures or participants. An 
environmental activist described these inequalities: at a legislative hearing, 
the chemical industry will “have ten people in the room and we’ll have two. 
They’re up there lobbying every day and we can’t be. So there’s an issue of 
just resources, and being able to basically pick your battles. … We can’t be 
everywhere all the time.” The FR story tells us that it is important to be at-
tentive to these social and political structures. As another activist explained, 
“it’s a David and Goliath [story]. Many of us are volunteers, or running on a 
shoestring. We aren’t even certain about our funding sources and what the 
future holds. … [A]ll those advantages that come with more resources, which 
equals more power.” Building on this understanding of players and arenas, 
we integrate theories from the sociology of science and medical sociology 
with an empirical focus on social movements and regulatory action.
Scientif ic authority and knowledge is increasingly valued and required 
in nonscientif ic f ields, such as regulation and civil society, through a pro-
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cess of scientization. Questions in regulatory, legal, and social movement 
spheres are increasingly asked and answered in scientific or technical terms 
(Frickel, 2004; Kinchy, 2010; Michaels and Monforton, 2005; Morello-Frosch 
et al., 2009). Scientization privileges an ideal of objective and value-natural 
science that cannot be met. By placing science on a pedestal, scientization 
gives way to scientism – the belief that science provides all needed answers. 
This has parallels with technocratic approaches to international develop-
ment, in which technological f ixes are applied – often with disappointing 
results – to problems that are social or political at their root (Ferguson, 
1990). The ubiquity of formal and informal risk assessments across multiple 
nonscientif ic spheres is a symptom of this scientization; that is, debates 
focus on the veracity of risk assessments, not whether they are asking the 
right questions, relying on the correct assumptions, or including all neces-
sary points of view. An overreliance on scientism and dominant frames 
implies that activists must wait for action or resolution, sometimes as long 
as 27 years in the case of the EPA’s dioxin assessment (Cone, 2012).
This discourse of scientism combines with discourses of neoliberalism to 
limit both state regulatory capacity (to topics for which scientif ic certainty 
seems to be available) and public participation (by restricting participation 
to expert voices) (Kinchy, 2010; Kinchy, Kleinman, and Autry, 2008; Moore 
et al., 2010). Additionally, some social movements have responded to neo-
liberalism and scientization by challenging dominant social structures and 
systems, developing consumer-based campaigns, improving their scientif ic 
expertise, and conducting their own research projects, as with advocacy 
biomonitoring (Frickel, 2004; Morello-Frosch et al., 2009; Polanyi, 2000; 
Szasz, 2007).
The dominant epidemiological paradigm (DEP) is the codif ication of 
science, government, and private-sector beliefs about disease and its causa-
tion (Brown et al., 2001; Brown, Morello-Frosch and Zavestoski, 2012). It 
includes established institutions entrusted with the diagnosis, treatment, 
and care of disease sufferers, as well as journals, media, universities, medi-
cal philanthropies, and government off icials. By showing the connections 
between institutions, practices, and knowledge about disease, the DEP 
explains how prevailing scientif ic authority and knowledge makes sense 
of environmental factors and a general understanding of the scientif ic 
framing of environmental health hazards and disease causation. While 
prior use of the DEP has been to explain diseases or syndromes (such as Gulf 
War Illness), here we extend the DEP to analyze the assessment of health 
hazards of chemicals and other contaminants hazards such as the use of 
FRs, acknowledging the ways in which it provides various players a common 
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language to both express and contest ideas in public arenas. In doing so, 
we explore the ways in which scientif ic authority and expert knowledge 
is increasingly influential in nonscientif ic arenas through scientization.
Perhaps because of its pervasive nature and application in nontraditional 
areas, some are questioning the role of science by situating it in the social 
world. The political sociology of science focuses on the role of power and 
inequality in science and knowledge production, and thus provides a lens for 
studying the interactions among players in contested arenas. In particular, 
the new political sociology of science assumes that science is inherently 
political, and explores the networks, institutions, and power structures that 
are both visible and hidden in contemporary scientif ic practices and or-
ganizations (Frickel and Moore, 2006). Scholars in this tradition build on 
Actor Network Theory’s sensitivity to scientif ic practices and connections 
between actors (Latour, 1987, 2005), without treating structures and macro-
forces as exogenous or f ixed. This perspective is useful for studying players 
and arenas because it recognizes the value and necessity of expert scientif ic 
knowledge in many circumstances and the fact that scientif ic authority 
is influential in a variety of nonscientif ic f ields (Bourdieu, 2004; Polanyi, 
2000). Thus the new political sociology of science takes science down from 
its pedestal by interrogating knowledge generation as heavily influenced 
by social, cultural, economic, political, and institutional forces.
The Case of Flame-Retardant Chemicals
FR chemicals are widely used as additives to consumer and household prod-
ucts, including mattresses, electronics, car and airplane interiors, insulating 
foams, and carpeting, to slow combustion. The widespread use of chemical 
FRs since the 1970s has coincided with state and national policies, educational 
campaigns, and behavioral changes (like decreased smoking rates) that have 
decreased f ire mortality, injuries, and incidence in the United States from 
approximately 12,000 in 1970 to 3,500 in 2007 (Birnbaum and Staskal, 2004; 
Blum, 2007; US Fire Administration, 2009). Most research, activism, and 
regulations on FR chemicals have focused on certain formulations that have 
been found to be persistent (they persist in the environment without quickly 
breaking down), bioaccumulative (they accumulate in body tissues and thus 
concentrations increase up the food chain), and toxic (they can cause harm 
to body tissues). In particular, two general groups of FR chemicals have 
received the most attention: polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs) and 
Tris formulations (multiple chlorinated and brominated versions).
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FR chemicals are ubiquitous and rapidly accumulate in the environment, 
wildlife, and in people, who are exposed through household dust, physical 
contact, ingestion, smoke, and contaminated air (Betts, 2004; Betts, 2009; 
Hites, 2004). Brominated FRs can disrupt the endocrine system, interfering 
with hormones and potentially harming reproduction and development 
(Rudel and Perovich, 2009). In animal studies, PBDEs have been shown to 
be neurological and reproductive toxins and potentially carcinogenic (Betts, 
2008; Birnbaum and Staskal, 2004). Recent epidemiological studies have 
connected PBDE exposure to developmental and reproductive effects in 
people (Harley et al., 2010; Herbstman et al., 2010; Main et al., 2007; Meeker 
and Stapleton, 2010; c.f. Harley et al., 2011). Several FRs have been regulated 
in the US. In the 1970s, polybrominated biphenyls were accidentally mixed 
with animal feed and contaminated millions of people in Michigan, and 
were subsequently removed from production (Egginton, 2009). Also in the 
late 1970s, tris (2,3-dibromopropyl) phosphate, a mutagenic chemical used 
in children’s pajamas, was investigated by the Consumer Products Safety 
Commission and removed from use in children’s clothing (Blum and Ames, 
1977; Consumer Products Safety Commission, 1977).
PBDE FRs have received much regulatory attention in the US, and state-
level bans on certain PBDEs have provided a focus for activist attention, 
pressuring the supply chain to shift away from some or all brominated 
FRs and motivating FR manufacturers to phase out chemicals. Starting in 
2003, 11 states passed bans on several PBDEs and they were subsequently 
regulated by the EPA. The subsequent phase-out of a third widely used 
PBDE was followed by further EPA restrictions in 2012 (US EPA, 2012). Other 
states have recently taken action to restrict several types of tris chemicals 
(N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 37-0701 – 37-0709 and 71-3703). Despite these 
restrictions, FRs remain a profitable and growing international industry 
(Fink et al., 2008; Voith, 2010).
Arenas and Players Is State Bans
Our case study involves multiple arenas and players operating within the 
larger environmental health social movement. Following Verta Taylor 
and Mayer Zald, we understand social movements as “networks and or-
ganizations in a variety of institutional settings where groups contend over 
ideas, practices, identities, and resources” (2010, 304). In this case study, we 
examine the legislation enacting a partial ban on PBDE FRs in Maine in 
2004 within the context of state-level anti-toxic regulation, under the larger 
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umbrella of national environmental health controversies. This chapter is 
part of a larger project on the social implications of FR chemicals (Brown 
and Cordner, 2011). We draw on in-depth interviews with approximately 
110 respondents, including scientists, state and federal regulators and leg-
islators, industry representatives, f ire safety experts, and activists from 
environmental and health social movement organizations (SMOs) (for 
specif ic details on methodology, see Brown and Cordner, 2011). Although 
we classify individuals according to professional categories, we recognize 
that these categories are fluid and not clear-cut: for example, some activists 
have PhDs in scientif ic f ields.
Starting in 2003, state legislatures in California, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and 
Washington State restricted the production, use, sale, and/or distribution 
of two formulations of PBDEs: pentaBDE and octaBDE. Similar bills failed 
in Alaska, Montana, Vermont, and, notably, Connecticut, home of one of the 
world’s three major brominated FR companies. Several states also restricted 
the use of decaBDE in certain product uses (for example, mattresses) or 
following the identif ication of a safer alternative.
Activist arenas regarding state-level chemical regulation are home to 
many types of players (Figure 1): national coordinating environmental 
organizations (e.g., Safer Chemicals Healthy Families); state-based anti-
toxics organizations (e.g., Clean New York); national organizations that 
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supported state-based efforts (e.g., NCEL); local aff iliates of national 
organizations that endorsed state campaigns (e.g., Planned Parenthood of 
Alaska); local, state, and/or national f iref ighting organizations; mothers 
groups and breastfeeding advocates (e.g., the Maine State Breastfeeding 
Coalition); and organizations with off ices at the state and federal level 
(e.g., US PIRG and state-based PIRGs). Activists were also keenly aware of 
opposed players such as industry-funded advocacy and research organiza-
tions (e.g., Citizens for Fire Safety); and FR users, including the product and 
component manufacturers and retail operations that make up the supply 
chain. All of these activist actors use scientif ic evidence about the dangers 
of chemical exposure to argue for stricter regulation. They argue that their 
campaigns are scientif ically grounded, demand participation in decision-
making processes, and even carry out their own scientif ic research. This 
is similar to other environmental social movements; anti-GMO activists in 
Mexico used three scientif ic tactics: “(1) using scientif ic information as a 
resource; (2) participating in scientif ic research; and (3) reframing policy 
problems as broadly social, rather than as solely scientif ic or technical” 
(Kinchy, 2010). State and federal regulatory and legislative contests provided 
a central arena attracting the involvement of these players. State campaigns 
coordinated with and learned from each other, showing how players interact 
within regulatory and activist arenas. Someone who had been involved 
in the Maine legislation described their collaboration with Washington 
State: “We also worked closely with Washington State, who were doing the 
PBDE action plan which had quite a bit of alternatives information, so were 
sharing information.” Additionally, there are multiple state and nonstate 
regulatory arenas that matter: different federal agencies, such as the EPA 
and the CPSC; state agencies, including California’s Bureau of Home Fur-
nishings and Thermal Insulation; and nongovernmental standards-setting 
organizations, such as the National Fire Protection Association. Arenas can 
also exist within government off ices; NGOs, scientists, f ire experts, the FR 
industry, and chemical users participate in the alternatives assessments 
of chemicals of concern through the EPA’s Design for the Environment 
program (Lavoie et al., 2010).
Events in arenas leave behind memories and symbols that continue to 
influence activity in the future. For example, the use of a type of tris f lame 
retardant in children’s pajamas continues to affect contemporary under-
standings of FR regulation and activism, so much so that even well-informed 
individuals simply use the word “tris,” even though there are multiple types 
of tris FRs. Activists and scientists alike mention this incident as part of 
the background to their work. One scientist said that when he gives public 
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talks about FRs, “someone always asks me, well is that the stuff that was 
used in kids’ pajamas 30 years ago?”
Environmental Health Activism and Science
Activism against FR chemicals is located within a larger environmental 
health movement, which grew up alongside of the environmental justice 
movement to which it is connected. The broad FR arena overlapped sub-
stantially with other arenas of anti-toxics organizing, especially the larger 
campaign for reform of the US EPA’s Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). 
Indeed, most activists explicitly described their FR campaign as being part 
of a larger strategy for TSCA reform. One activist commented that FRs aren’t 
the only chemicals of concern from scientif ic or populist perspectives, 
“but they are representative: their routine release into the environment, 
routine exposure, environmental and human exposure. All of that becomes 
representative of the broken federal chemical safety system.” Others called 
FRs “a poster child” for TSCA reform.
Approximately 84,000 chemicals are currently registered with the US 
EPA’s Toxic Substances Control Act Inventory (US EPA, 2010). For most 
there is little information on the potential health and environmental dan-
gers of exposures (Judson et al., 2008), especially the long-term, multiple 
exposures that characterize daily life. Beyond the toxic disasters associated 
with chemical explosions or historical contamination sites (Zavestoski, 
2009; Brown and Mikkelsen, 1990), research is also accumulating about 
the potential dangers from long-term, low-level exposure to the toxic and 
hormone-disrupting chemicals that are ubiquitously used in household 
products. In response, NGOs have developed campaigns and national coali-
tions around toxics regulation (Belliveau, 2011; Lubitow, 2011).
Along with the growth in activist attention to toxics, research methods 
have advanced dramatically. Scientists can measure chemicals in the hu-
man body at parts per trillion. The Tox21 program, an interagency research 
collaboration, is conducting high throughput screening of thousands of 
chemicals through hundreds of bioassays (Kavlock et al., 2009). For these 
advances in exposure and toxicological screening, scientists’ ability to 
conduct research has outpaced their ability to interpret the results for 
human health outcomes. Technological risk has outpaced technological 
benefit (Beck, 1992) and our ability to accurately interpret risk. In short, en-
vironmental health hazards in modern society are ubiquitous but uncertain. 
According to one environmental health advocate, we are in the middle of an 
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“uncontrolled chemistry experiment,” with potential but highly uncertain 
long-term reproductive, neurological and other toxic health problems for 
everyone, especially future generations.
Rhetoric, Research, and Regulation
Science is the central rhetoric in all arenas related to environmental regula-
tion. Regulators, industry representatives, and activists alike frame their 
positions as being based on the best available science. Activists follow the 
latest scientific developments, share abstracts of recent publications through 
Internet listservs, and invite scientists to speak on conference calls and at 
activist meetings. Some activists also carry out their own science: numerous 
environmental organizations, often through projects developed through 
national coalitions, have conducted research commonly known as advocacy 
biomonitoring, in which participants are recruited based on their willingness 
and ability to publicly speak out about their body burden and their interpreta-
tion about the potential origins of their personal exposure results (Morello-
Frosch et al., 2009). In 2007, for instance, environmental advocates in Maine 
conducted a biomonitoring project of 13 individuals with a compelling public 
story, and tested for a number of FRs, partially to support proposed legislation 
to phase out the use of PBDEs (Alliance for a Clean and Healthy Maine, 2007).
Scientists often tread a f ine line between pure science and policy applica-
tions. As we explore the actions of those involved in FR science and policy, 
we f ind that roles are sometimes fluid and manifold. For instance, current 
NIEHS director Linda Birnbaum plays multiple roles in diverse arenas 
in the FR issue: she is a researcher investigating the chemicals, directs 
an NIH institute that grants funds for research and oversees publication 
of the leading journal Environmental Health Perspectives, and acts as a 
public f igure who speaks openly about the need to study FR hazards. Her 
research trajectory and interests may influence the research orientation of 
the NIEHS; the articles published in Environmental Health Perspectives may 
increase awareness about particular toxics issues both among scientif ic 
communities, who can pursue similar research, and among lay people, 
who might petition legislatures and government agencies for regulations 
based on scientif ic f indings. This shows how players in one scientif ic arena 
– government research – can influence players in other scientif ic arenas as 
well as activist and regulatory arenas.
Individuals interested in inf luencing the use of FRs simultaneously 
function within and across many arenas, and their activity in one arena 
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inf luences activity in another. We interviewed one activist in a state-
based anti-toxics organization who participates in multiple national 
activist networks: she is on the Steering Committee for an EPA Design for 
the Environment Partnership to assess alternatives to a current-use FR; 
coordinates a state-level partnership of labor activists, teachers, lawyers, 
nurses, environmental justice leaders, and consumer advocates; testif ies 
at committee hearings at the statehouse; is on the board of a governmental 
FR panel; helped to organize advocacy biomonitoring projects; and attends 
scientif ic conferences. As with Birnbaum, this activist’s work in one arena 
may bleed into others: she may learn of new efforts to use alternatives 
through her role in federal arenas and may share this information with 
members of her state partnership to encourage them to pursue similar 
measures. Additionally, she may be able to share exciting, local initiatives 
in national arenas such as conferences and panels.
Science in State Regulation
In 2004, Maine became the second state to pass a partial ban on PBDE 
FRs: LD1790, titled “An Act to Reduce Contamination of Breast Milk and 
the Environment from Release of Brominated Chemicals in Consumer 
Products.” Testimony concerning this bill provides a window into the types 
of claims used by actors on both sides, specif ically claims about whether 
the science on PBDEs and other brominated FRs was strong enough to 
justify regulation.
On February 17, 2004, the Natural Resources Committee of the Maine 
House of Representatives heard testimony from environmental activists, 
learning disabilities activists, medical professionals, former f iref ighters, 
the bromine FR industry, plastics manufacturers, and trade associations. 
Originally introduced as a sweeping set of regulations of many FRs, it was 
scaled back during several committee meetings to a ban on pentaBDE and 
octaBDE, and provided for possible future restriction of decaBDE following 
a series of research reports by the Maine Department of Environmental 
Quality and the identif ication of safer, functional alternatives. The bill 
was enacted by the state legislature and signed by Governor Baldacci on 
April 14, 2004.
The nearly 300 pages of testimony and supporting documents in the com-
mittee f iles contain a wealth of information about the players involved in 
this dispute and the multiple arenas in which they worked, including claims 
by all sides that the science supported their position (State of Maine, 2004). 
PlAyIng wIth FIre 221
Analysis of the testimony from this hearing reveals that science provided 
the primary argument for many people’s position on the legislation, whether 
in support or in opposition. Scientific authority was highly valued: attendees 
with advanced degrees mentioned these in their testimony, or wrote “PhD” 
after their name on the sign-in sheet; submitted testimony often included a 
list of references; and people cited researchers in academia and at NIEHS by 
name. In addition to the written testimony of all attendees, the committee 
files contain several research publications, the 37-page curriculum vitae of a 
leading FR researcher, a “fact sheet” and bibliography on PBDEs prepared by 
a local environmental health nonprofit, and a detailed PowerPoint presenta-
tion made by an industry advocacy group.
Those opposing and supporting the legislation used remarkably similar 
scientif ic language to justify their claims. The director of science and policy 
of the Environmental Health Strategy Center, a Maine-based nonprof it, 
testif ied, “The growing body of scientif ic literature makes an increasingly 
clear case for phasing out brominated f lame retardants.” On the other 
side, Susan Landry of Albemarle Corporation, a leading brominated FR 
manufacturers, said, “The numerous scientif ic studies do not support the 
ban of all f lame retardants” and Raymond Dawson of the Bromine Science 
and Environmental Forum, an industry advocacy organization, said that a 
ban on all BFRs “is not based on science.”
The two sides emphasized different consequences of the use of bromi-
nated FRs. Those in support of the legislation included medical profession-
als and representatives of several learning or developmental disabilities 
organizations, and they highlighted the potential human health hazards 
of exposure to these chemicals. Arthur Lerman, a state representative and 
the executive director of a nonprofit working with disabled children, cited 
six scientif ic articles and four news stories to support his statement that 
“[s]cientif ic research to date suggests that brominated f lame retardants 
could be yet another contributor to abnormal brain development in chil-
dren.” In contrast, those opposing the regulation emphasized the chemicals’ 
contribution to f ire safety. John Moritz of a plastics company, wrote in his 
testimony, “There have been scientif ic studies to demonstrate that the use 
of brominated flame-retardant chemicals in TV and computer components 
dramatically reduce the spread of f ire in these products.”
Scientif ic uncertainty around this type of environmental health contro-
versy thus acts as a mechanism for players to advocate their point of view 
while employing a dominant and respected language of science. Those 
opposing the legislation argued that the absence of data should prevent 
the legislation. Fern Abrams, representing a trade association for the 
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electrical interconnect industry, wrote that “there is no data indicating 
that the halogen FRs presently used in printed circuit boards present any 
signif icant environmental or health hazard.” This echoes testimony by 
Sandra Kennedy, of the Retail Industry Leaders Association, that “there is 
no data indicating that these FRs present any signif icant environmental or 
health hazard.” In contrast, several attendees argued that uncertainty about 
the potential risks of brominated FRs should not preclude legislative action. 
Saskia Janes of the Maine Public Health Association stated, “We don’t know 
what chemicals are found in our bodies and homes, nor do we have any 
idea whether or not these chemicals are safe.” David Little, deputy commis-
sioner of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection, commented 
“though the bio-accumulative tendencies of BFRs are clear, the actual health 
hazard posed by exposure to these chemicals is less clear due to a lack of 
definitive and nonconflicting toxicological studies of BFRs in humans.” His 
testimony contained a reference list of 20 scientif ic research papers. Finally, 
Joel Tickner and Ken Geiser of the Lowell Center for Sustainable Production 
testif ied in favor of the component of the legislation aimed at assessing safer 
alternatives: “Policies to promote adoption of safer substitutes to problem 
substances provides a cost-effective means to protect health and stimulate 
innovation in the face of uncertain, but potentially high risks.”
The Dominant Epidemiological Paradigm
The dominant epidemiological paradigm (DEP) is the codif ication of sci-
ence, government, and private-sector beliefs about disease and its causation, 
which we extend here to include the analysis of health risks of contaminants. 
The DEP is well suited to a model based on players and arenas, since it focuses 
on a multiplicity of actors who work in multiple locations. Analyses of envi-
ronmental health contestations usually rely on a smaller number of players, 
typically scientists, environmental activists, government, and business. The 
DEP includes a rich set of actors, some of whom may not even recognize their 
role in a particular contestation, such as journal editors triaging articles or 
mentors who discourage graduate students from exploring potentially risky 
areas of research. The complex dynamics of the FR case study demonstrate 
the importance of scholarly attention to both the actions of the players 
and how players’ decisions can be constrained by the arenas in which they 
operate, as illustrated above with the cases of Birnbaum and the activist.
It is precisely these kinds of realizations that make the DEP useful 
for following the actors and understanding their motivations. We view 
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the DEP as a model that helps us understand the complexity of disease 
discovery and dictates or at least influences a variety of processes that 
play out on the ground. Actors participate in the DEP process at different 
locations, as they take action in one or more of the relevant arenas. For 
example, a toxicologist looking at chemical action on DNA and epigenetic 
biomarkers, an epidemiologist looking at thyroid dysfunction, an environ-
mental health activist engaging in legislative campaigning, and a regulator 
crafting regulations all believe that work in their specif ic arena will lead 
to better understanding of disease and its causation and prevention. By 
participating in these DEP-relevant areas, they are promoting certain 
forms of knowledge and beliefs over, or at the expense of, others. These 
players all depend on the knowledge and beliefs created and promulgated 
by those who came before them and on the multiple roles they may be 
playing simultaneously.
Unlikely players are also relevant in the FR controversy, including f ire-
f ighters, burn victims, and furniture manufacturers. Arenas, too, are more 
varied. In addition to the activist arenas described above, state, federal, 
and international regulatory bodies are important at the state, federal, and 
international levels. As examples, California’s Bureau of Home Furnishings 
and Thermal Insulation created de facto national requirements through 
a furniture flammability standard, Technical Bulletin 117; the Consumer 
Products Safety Commission is responsible for developing f lammability 
standards for certain products; and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission provided an important arena where a world-wide collaborative 
of players successfully halted a strict new flammability standard (Kirshner 
and Blum, 2009). Specif ic industries, such as furniture and electronics, act 
as both players and arenas; the furniture industry can act as an arena in 
which players, including other industries, regulators, and scientists compete 
to influence purchasing and product-use decision-making, but can also act 
as a player when designated trade associations release position papers or 
send representatives to testify at important hearings. Indeed, the alliance of 
players involved in seeking regulation, bans, and phase-outs has succeeded 
in entering a surprisingly large number of arenas. In these different arenas, 
FR advocates face different sets of players and must act quite differently. 
Our notion of “f ield analysis” (Brown et al., 2010) complements the DEP 
approach, providing both current groupings of actors and their prior influ-
ences. Whereas the DEP comprises the totality of inputs necessary to change 
a particular causal connection for an environmental health concern, the 
f ield analysis highlights the main players currently working on that in 
concerted fashion.
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Conclusion
Through this case study, we have demonstrated the complex and overlap-
ping arenas surrounding anti-toxics regulation, and the various roles that 
players take on in these arenas. In doing so, we have sought to provide 
a more nuanced understanding of how players operate in response to 
relevant scientif ic and regulatory constraints, notably the mandatory role 
of scientif ic evidence and scientif ic uncertainty in science policy, and how 
health and science are understood and constructed within the dominant 
epidemiological paradigm.
Multiple players grounded their FR policy positions on scientif ic evi-
dence. However, science and policy are both arenas where power matters 
greatly. For example, activists point out that the different funding levels 
of environmental nonprofits and international chemical companies mean 
that they end up with unequal access to decision-makers, unequal amounts 
of time to devote to each relevant regulatory or legislative activity, and 
different abilities to create and publicize their own research even though 
they are operating in the same paradigms and employing the same language 
as their opponents. In addition to scientific authority, individuals also called 
on multiple types of authority to fortify their argument.
We have seen stark differences in how different actors interpret the 
common language of science, particularly when uncertainty is involved. 
The scientists who interact frequently with activists working on FRs and 
other toxics issues are influenced by their understanding of whether and 
how scientists have a stake in policy-making when their research is policy-
relevant. We argue that some activists and scientists are trying to reclaim 
scientif ic uncertainty as something that can still be scientif ic and useful for 
policy-making. Specif ically, those in support of FR regulation use scientif ic 
uncertainty to encourage legislators to err on the side of caution and put the 
burden of proof on the chemical industry. Conversely, industry representa-
tives attempt to use uncertainty to support the continued use of products.
To overcome the uncertainty in FR health effects, advocates often high-
light uncertainty as stemming from the lack of adequate research, rather 
than as an inevitable characteristic of any body of research. They seek a 
precautionary, preventive approach, especially in light of similarities to 
known hazardous compounds. Producers of FRs, as well as some product 
manufacturers and retailers that use them in secondary production, high-
light uncertainty as an end result, calling for extensive additional research 
before action and, in many cases, supporting a conclusion of overall safety. 
Some of the secondary producers are caught between chemical manufactur-
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ers’ claims that uncertainty means safety, and public and advocate claims 
that uncertainty means potential danger, perhaps leading to boycotts 
or lost market share. Regulators and legislators must mitigate between 
the opposing sides, while meeting often conflicting goals of f ire safety, 
economic growth, and public health. If scientists can reclaim uncertainty 
from its negative connotations, they can expand the arena of scientif ic 
authority. But more importantly, this involves embracing uncertainty as 
a fundamental element of science, rather than a temporary condition of 
science. This could bring them closer to advocates, who have legitimate 
fears, and to regulators, who are thwarted in their capacity to regulate. 
This in turn could lead to an expanded role for precautionary public health 
concerns in environmental regulation.
The dominant epidemiological paradigm was conceptualized in relation 
to controversies over disease causation, but it proves useful to understand 
this contestation over the health effects of FRs because of its identif ication 
of a broad range of involved actors and a multitude of institutional targets. 
In this way, our research aligns with the “multi-institutional politics” focus 
in recent work on health social movements (Armstrong and Bernstein, 
2008; Banaszak-Holl, Levitsky, and Zald, 2010). This body of work recognizes 
that health social movements no longer target their activism exclusively 
(or, sometimes, even primarily) toward state targets, but instead work for 
change in a broad institutional “f ield of contention” (Taylor and Zald, 2010: 
307). Scientif ic discourses, we have shown, are a source of authority that 
can bridge across multiple institutional levels, often but by no means always 
directed at state decision-makers. Looking at the activism around FRs as a 
multi-institutional arena of contestation allows us to identify unexpected 
alliances, discuss the multiple levels at which players become involved in 
policy claims, and analyze the strategic role of science in pursuing those 
policy claims.
In our work we have emphasized contestations over environmental 
health issues, extending our prior focus on embodied experience of diseases 
to the present focus on hazards of FRs (Brown et al., 2004). We note similar 
approaches in David Hess’s technology-oriented social movements and Scott 
Frickel and Neil Gross’s science and intellectual movements (Hess, 2005; 
Frickel and Gross, 2005). We believe that our framing of scientif ic and advo-
cacy work on FRs raises several questions for social-movement scholarship 
beyond health and science realms. For one, we learn that key players, like 
the advocates we described, are not monolithic in their beliefs and actions. 
Rather, they have conflicting roles in their own professions or grouping. 
They also move between arenas, which force them to act differently in 
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diverse settings. Any set of players will face both internal pressures (from 
their f ield) and external pressures (from larger social structures). They will 
vacillate between a pure professional practice and an applied, sometimes 
value-laden one. We can better understand these players through their 
reflexive interaction with others, including those who challenge them.
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10 Put Me in, Coach? Referee? Owner? 
Security?
Why the News Media Rarely Cover Movements as Political 
Players1
Edwin Amenta, Neal Caren, and Amber Celina Tierney
Social movements desire coverage in the news media mainly as a means to 
other ends (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993). The news media can amplify the 
messages of movements to train the attention of the mass public on their 
causes (Ferree et al., 2002) and organizations (Vliegenthart, Oegema, and 
Klandermans, 2005). News coverage also catches the eye of political officials 
who are often the targets of the action (Lipsky, 1968). The news media may 
also lend these organizations and leaders legitimacy (Koopmans, 2004) 
and broadcast their grievances, preferred ways of conceptualizing an issue, 
and what to do about it (Gamson, 2004; Ryan, 1991; Ferree et al., 2002). Thus 
movements seek news media coverage and often devote much time and 
energy to trying to secure it (Gitlin, 1980; Gamson, 2004; Ryan, Anastario, 
and Jeffreys, 2005; Sobieraj, 2011).
Key scholarship sees the news media as a “master forum” in public dis-
course and as an “arena” in which various “players” seek to make gains in 
public debates and discursive contests (Ferree et al., 2002). Yet the player and 
arena metaphors are only partially helpful in describing the interactions 
between the main news media and movement participants, and better 
describe interactions between the news media and institutional politi-
cal actors. The news media are themselves players in news coverage, but 
they see and comport themselves more as impartial referees, moderating 
debates. But more important for movements is the news media’s role as 
gatekeepers to coverage. The news media mainly confine movements to the 
sidelines, as they are typically barred from participating in these discursive 
contests. With respect to movements, the news media acts more like team 
owners or stadium security. The discursive interactions and contests of 
movements often pit them against police and other guardians of order. On 
the rarer occasions movements do get covered in political contexts, they 
do not choose who is speaking or playing for them and do not call their 
own plays, unlike institutional political actors, who usually do. Also, the 
contests involving movement actors are usually not refereed fairly, unlike 
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those between representatives of the two major political parties. If seeking 
news coverage is a game, movements are playing a vastly different one from 
political institutional actors who appear routinely and often at their own 
discretion. All that said, movements do sometimes gain coverage and get 
points across in it, and their efforts are well worth studying.
We mainly address the most professional and nonpartisan news media 
with a national focus and use US examples to demonstrate our points. At the 
center of the news media are the main national newspapers, such as, in the 
United States, the New York Times and Washington Post, the wire services, 
including the Associated Press, United Press International, and the US 
branches of Reuters and the Agence France-Presse, national newsmagazines 
such as Time and Newsweek, and the network television news programs of 
NBC, CBS, and ABC (Sigal, 1973; Gans, 1979). The professionalization of the 
news media was largely a 20th-century phenomenon, peaking in the last third 
of that century in the United States (Schudson, 2002). Although we focus on 
the United States, our claims are meant to apply broadly to professional news 
organizations in capitalist democracies with widespread freedom of the press.
These national news media have undergone great changes and are not the 
only media of interest to movements. Over the last two decades, the United 
States has seen the rise of outright partisan news television organizations, 
notably cable’s Fox News, and 24-hour news cable channels, such as CNN, 
as well as the ubiquity of the Internet and other new electronic means of 
communication. Websites like Politico compete with national newspapers in 
political newsgathering. The drop in ad revenue for the print news media has 
killed off many newspapers and reduced the “news hole” of those remain-
ing, while altering their delivery of news, such as the web transformations 
of Newsweek and U.S. News & World Report. Moreover, partisan political 
weeklies, such as the Nation or the National Review, often provide move-
ments coverage (Rohlinger, Kail, Taylor, and Conn, 2012). Furthermore, the 
Internet has provided new ways for movement actors to communicate with 
potential supporters (Earl and Kimport, 2011). Finally, movements also seek 
favorable treatment in television programs, f ilms, and books.
All that said, the national newspapers are still the central institutions of 
newsgathering. The folding of newspapers heightens the importance of the 
remaining ones, as newsgathering has become more centralized; in many 
ways, to the extent that the newspapers constitute an arena, it is a more 
restrictive one. Newspapers such as the New York Times still set the agenda 
for other news outlets, and their articles are amplif ied further by the many 
aggregating websites. Newspapers’ professionalized form of organization, 
operating procedures, and staff ing remain largely unchanged.
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In this chapter we make some of these points through a review of 
the academic literature on the news media and their approach to social 
movements and other political actors and the discussion of some recent 
research. In the review we address the use of the player and arena model 
and indicate its advantages and disadvantages in describing the interactions 
between the news media and social movements. From there, we turn to 
a review of the literature on the operating procedures and institutions 
of the news media, and its approach to political news. We contrast the 
way institutional political off icials are treated with the way movements 
are treated by the news media. We follow the review with a discussion of 
research addressing the rare conditions under which social movements 
and their actions do get covered, and the rarer conditions under which the 
coverage aids them in discursive debates. Here we review some f indings 
and present some research from the Political Organizations in the News 
(PONs) project (Amenta and Caren, 2012), which addresses the national 
newspaper coverage of national US social movement organizations (SMOs). 
It shows that some SMOs have been covered frequently and that under 
certain conditions SMOs can advance their interpretations of events and 
their demands for action in newspaper articles.
Movement, Media Students Use Players, Arenas
Gamson and other scholars have often applied the terminology of players 
and arenas to the interactions between major news media organizations 
and movements (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993; Gamson, 2004; for a more 
general discussion, see Jasper, 2006). Notably, Ferree et al. (2002) posit a 
series of public discourse forums, which constitute the public sphere, with 
the mass news media at its center. In their heuristic model, the news media 
constitute both the master forum and a major site of political contestation. 
They divide the news media into an “arena,” a “gallery,” and a “backstage.” 
Backstage is where potential “players” prepare themselves for these contests 
(see also Cook, 1998). Those with extensive organizations and resources, 
collective players or actors, can prepare extensively for these contests. 
The arena is where discursive contests take place. Everyone important 
politically is in the gallery. Ferree et al. (2002) employ these terms in ways 
that seem equally applicable to athletic contests and staged performances, 
involving either players or actors (see also Oliver and Myers, 1999), as is 
typical with scholarship relying on Goffman’s framing imagery. However, 
when we refer to “actors” below, we are using the term not as a metaphor 
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for someone playing a role or following a script in a play, but instead as a 
concept, as in Weber’s “social action” – for someone engaging in a purposive 
line of activity.
From the player and arena point of view, social movements might be seen 
as coequal players, competing in the news arena with various institutional 
political actors, hoping to win discursive battles. But following Gamson and 
Wolfsfeld (1993), Ferree et al. (2002) also indicate that not all players in the 
news media are alike. Journalists are more equal than others, as they are, 
at once, players and gatekeepers, purveyors of meaning and controllers 
of access to the forum. Ferree et al. (2002) also indicate that “arena” is a 
misleading metaphor if it is understood to mean an even playing f ield. They 
argue that the contours may take different forms for different players and 
can indeed change during the course of any discursive conflict. Following 
them, we discuss some of the complications that ensue by using these terms 
to describe the journalists and the news media in their relation to discursive 
struggles among political actors, including social movement ones.
Journalists are in some ways akin to players in coverage, as they advance 
interpretations of issues that shape and influence discursive struggles. 
However, they typically do not view or represent themselves as players in 
politics (Cook, 1998). Instead, they view their interpretations as objective 
and represent themselves as referees, giving a fair hearing or equal time 
to the most relevant, influential, or legitimate players. Indeed, journalists’ 
code of conduct holds that they should almost never preempt the news or 
be at the center of the story, and so they try to avoid being called players in 
coverage by news media watchdogs by using as neutral terms as possible. 
This includes employing anodyne and specif ic terms like “anti-abortion” to 
refer to a movement that calls itself “pro-life” and “abortion rights” to refer to 
a movement that calls itself “pro-choice.” Editors also play a role by debating 
whether to replace contested terms, such as “partial-birth abortions” or 
“illegal immigrants,” with less provocative language. Reporters are less 
disingenuous than Supreme Court nominees who claim that they will be 
neutral umpires despite documented biases and patterned slants in their 
decision-making. Reporters are more like boxing referees who cannot help 
throwing a few punches, but then forget having done so.
Journalists’ strategizing mainly has to do with gaining access to sources 
and information, outdoing their counterparts in other news organizations 
for scoops, and displacing their coworkers from page one. In this way, they 
are mainly playing in a different arena than those with political goals. 
Because journalists see their writing as disinterested, they do not strategize 
about it in the same way as those seeking coverage for political purposes. 
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Indeed, in the most professionalized newspapers there is a metaphorical 
wall between the editorial page and the news. The executive editor of the 
New York Times claims to learn about the paper’s editorials at the same 
time as the reader. Similarly, there is a separation between the business 
and content ends of newspapers.
More important, journalists act more like gatekeepers and debate mod-
erators with respect to political contenders in discursive struggles. Journal-
ists decide whether public actors or political contenders get to participate 
in public debates and, once that is decided, which players are going to be 
taken most seriously and receive the most playing time. That is, they decide 
whose voices will be heard most prominently, whose understandings of an 
issue are to be presented, and which issues will be deemed as representing 
the main lines of conflict. In short, what the journalists do is more akin to 
the activities of owners, management, promoters, and stadium security, as 
well as referees, in sporting contests. But the news media employ these roles 
selectively, treating institutional political actors more like star players and 
movements more like wannabe players or, sometimes, trespassers.
The term “player” is a helpful shorthand in referring to political insti-
tutional actors in discursive contests in political news coverage. The news 
media will usually allow them into the debate or arena, allow them to 
engage the political issues they choose, allow them to speak for themselves, 
and treat them relatively equally and fairly. This is most certainly true for 
officials in high offices representing opposing parties in a two-party system. 
The views of top institutional off icials are solicited, and they can often 
generate coverage simply through news releases and press conferences. 
Indeed, they resemble the types of superstar or “franchise” players that 
make far more money than their general manager and coach and are guar-
anteed playing time. These top off icials usually face decorous institutional 
rebuttal by opposition political leaders in what is a fairly evenly refereed 
discursive contest. Here the news media serve as referee and there is not 
much gatekeeping.
However, the news media mainly act as team owners and stadium 
security with regard to movement actors, making them mainly wannabe 
players – like nonprospects soldiering away in the low minors or develop-
ment leagues. The news media’s security function is selectively applied to 
movement speakers, who are usually prevented from entering discursive 
contests. Worse, movement actors are often treated less like players than like 
spectators illegally trespassing on the f ield of play. When movement actors 
are allowed to enter the discursive contests of the news media, they often 
f ind themselves not in the political contest they were hoping for, against 
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political institutional actors, but instead facing police or less legitimate 
political actors. It is a far different game than the one top institutional 
political off icials play, and one without much discursive payout.
In addition, when movements are allowed to engage in a political debate 
with the institutional political players, movement leaders often do not 
choose who represents them in the debate, and the news media referees the 
discursive contest differently. Journalists select the movement participants 
and do so frequently as foils for elected off icials, in the way that a boxing 
promoter of a promising f ighter will select for him unskilled but eager op-
ponents (tomato cans) to enhance his record, or baseball organizations will 
develop prospective players signed with expensive bonuses by populating 
the low minor leagues with former collegiate players with almost no chance 
to advance to the major leagues (scrubs). Sometimes movement participants 
are chosen on the basis of how authentic or novel they seem to reporters 
rather than how central they are to a movement. When movement actors 
are juxtaposed to institutional political actors in a news article, moreover, 
the news media do not referee this contest in the evenhanded way they 
would when two institutional actors are involved. It is no surprise that 
movements infrequently appear in news coverage, relative to institutional 
political off icials, and are infrequently presented substantively.
The term “arena” is also only partially useful in depicting the interactions 
among journalists, institutional political actors, and movements. First, the 
arena metaphor is a stretch when applied to discussions in newspapers 
because only rarely do these actors physically enter any arena, in the way 
that they might walk into legislative chambers, courtrooms, or the White 
House. The only ones that truly enter are the journalists, who, as noted, do 
not act mainly as players in the discursive contests that are their articles and 
do not see themselves as players when they are acting that way. The journal-
ists f ind source material either in the output of government bureaucracies, 
on the spot, or over the telephone. From there, they conduct the discursive 
game within their off ices or at least on their own electronic devices, in the 
articles they construct. The arena is constructed by the way the news media 
are organized to gather and report news and its standards and operating 
procedures employed in deciding what is news. The process of gaining the 
ear of journalists takes place not only on an uneven playing f ield, but the 
f ield plays differently for different actors doing more or less the same thing.
Movements are covered too infrequently to be players in the news 
media in the way that institutional political actors frequently are. So in 
order to make sense of the news coverage of movements, we start with 
news organizations and journalists, whose form of organization and rules 
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are central in determining when and how movements are covered. We 
discuss the differences between how news organizations and journalists 
treat institutional political and movement actors, by focusing on the social 
organization of the news (Schudson, 2002).
New Rules Lift Some, Demote Others
The divergences in the coverage of social movements and institutional 
political actors are rooted in professional news organizations’ form of 
organization, practices, and thinking (Sigal, 1973; Tuchman, 1980; Gans, 
1979; Gamson, 1988; Ryan, 1991; Smith et al., 2001; Oliver and Maney, 2000; 
Schudson, 2002; Sobieraj, 2011). A key source of news is politics, and the news 
media’s central mission is in covering it according to a relentless calendar 
of institutional political events (Sigal, 1973; Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1980). The 
news media treat key institutional political actors as newsworthy by default 
and they are covered, typically substantively by politics beat reporters 
on the national desk – which signals that their activities are of national 
importance. By contrast, the news media marginalize movements in politi-
cal coverage, viewing them mostly as wannabe players who lack legitimacy 
and political influence, and are unworthy of substantive coverage. Instead, 
movement activities, notably protest, achieve newsworthiness chiefly by 
way of their potential threat to public order, often leading journalists to 
cover their activities as something akin to crime by way of the metropolitan 
desk. This approach relegates movement activities to local importance only 
and typically focuses on the logistics of interactions between protesters 
and noninstitutional political players, often police. This coverage does not 
help movements in their bids for political influence and can make them 
seem dangerous or bizarre.
At the center of the mission and business model of the news media is 
to publish what it deems to be news. Professional news organizations are 
money-making operations, but enforce a strict separation between the 
newsroom and the editorial page, and between the newsroom and the 
advertising that supports the business (Sigal, 1973; McQuail, 1992; Kahn and 
Kenney, 2002). This reinforces their claim to their paying audience that they 
are providing high quality, fresh, and objective daily news, and advertising 
revenue is based on subscriptions, viewers, or “clicks,” for their web pages. 
Professionalized newsrooms are organized in specif ic ways based on their 
understanding of newsworthiness, with journalists assigned to cover people 
and issues expected to be recurrently newsworthy in the context of separate 
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orienting “news desks,” with subject, issue, or territorial concentrations 
known as “beats.” News organizations are staffed with journalists trained in 
the practices and ethics of reporting and editing, and who employ standard 
operating procedures regarding what constitutes news and which events 
deserve coverage (Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1980; Soloski, 1989).
Professionalized journalists play by their own rules, with their peers and 
standards as their main reference groups. Professional journalists see news 
as being based on qualities including timeliness, the impact of events, the 
prominence of the people involved in them, the proximity to readers, with 
local news angles considered important in national stories (e.g., Mencher, 
2008). News also comprises events that are unusual in some ways, or highly 
conflictual. Reporters and editors focus on events with currency, which 
means many people taking a sudden interest in a situation. These qualities 
are open to interpretation, but most claims by reporters to editors regarding 
the value of a story, and claims by editors to other editors regarding the 
placement and length of the story, will refer to these guidelines. There is 
substantial subjective agreement among news professionals on individual 
cases of what constitutes news and the relative salience of different news 
items, and these standards are reinforced daily on newspapers when news 
desk editors meet with managing editors to decide what will go on the front 
page (Sigal, 1973; Clayman and Reisner, 1998).
Journalistic rules privilege political actors. Politics is a staple of news 
coverage and typically receives the highest prof ile in coverage, and ac-
cordingly newsrooms are organized around it (Sigal, 1973; Fishman, 1980; 
Tuchman, 1980; Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993; Bennett, 2007). Routine po-
litical newsgathering on the “national” news desk revolves mainly around 
institutionalized political activity and off icial state actors. News “beats” are 
organized such that most coverage of politics is initiated by those elected 
to the highest off ices, those seeking their positions, and those appointed to 
positions of administrative authority. Political decisions have high impact 
and involve prominent people to whom reporters have great access, as 
compared to, say, business leaders. Some issues receive recurrent attention: 
new laws being proposed, debated, enacted, or rejected; cases before and 
decisions being made by courts; candidates being nominated and elected 
to key off ices. These lawmaking and electoral activities typically run on 
standard schedules that guide and constrain news organizations. Often 
political stories involve conflict and disputes, such as those between the 
major political parties in a two-party system like the US, the president 
and Congress, factions of parties in Congress, and factions on the Supreme 
Court. These stories are expected to include the views of the main opposing 
Put me In, coAch? reFeree? owner? securIt y? 237
sides, somewhat evenly balanced, as reporters seek to provide “fair” coverage 
(Hallin, 1984), and so journalists see themselves as moderating or refereeing 
debates among these crucial political players.
Journalists are mainly competing with one another in this coverage, to 
find and publish this information. They are playing by self-determined rules 
and largely against one another. No beat journalist wants to be “scooped” or 
“beaten” on a story by local or national competitors covering the same of-
f icial or institution. Similarly, reporters compete with one another on their 
own newspapers to write stories their desk and managing editor will see 
worthy of page one. This competitive spirit meshes with the organizations’ 
desire to cultivate a reputation for vigorous and diligent reporting, as well as 
their organizations’ mission to sell more newspapers or web subscriptions 
by providing the freshest and highest quality news.
Similarly, simply by following their own rules, journalist often marginal-
ize movement actors. Like politics, crime and scandal are also central to 
news coverage, given their timeliness, impact on people, and the fact that 
they sometimes involve important people (Hetherington, 1985; Schudson, 
2002; Harcup and O’Neal, 2010). Although institutional political officials and 
movement people are both subject to reporting about scandal, movement 
activities are more likely to be covered in that context and far more likely to 
be featured in crime-related reporting (Gitlin, 1980; Oliver and Maney, 2000; 
Bennett, 2007; Sobieraj, 2011). Protest has been largely routinized over the 
last several decades, but still often strays into vandalism, traff ic disruption, 
countermovement disputes, or various conflicts and confrontations with 
police. Protests that involve these sorts of threats to public order will typi-
cally be covered as crime. These articles provide extensive information about 
the particulars of the events, focusing on specif ic threats to public order 
posed by protest or f irst-amendment issues surrounding the right to protest, 
and tend to avoid discussion of the substantive issues of protest (Kaniss, 1997; 
Iyengar, 1991; Bennett, 2007; Sobieraj, 2011). Assignments for these articles 
are typically made by the metropolitan news desk to reporters covering spot 
news, with the news seen to be of local interest and brief duration.
News Media Are Refs, Pols Are Players
Political news coverage centers on the activities of institutional political 
off icials (Gans, 1979; Fishman, 1980; Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). These 
off icials exercise great political influence and, unlike movement actors, 
often do not need coverage to achieve political goals. Having been elected 
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or appointed by elected off icials, they exercise legitimate authority over the 
polity and control the levers of political power. They can decide whether 
to engage in an overseas war or a war on poverty, whether environmental 
laws will be enforced, and whether discriminatory or health-care laws are 
deemed constitutional. Given their potential inf luence and agreement 
regarding the news value of inf luence, the news media take them seri-
ously and are indeed highly constrained to cover them (Gans, 1979). Much 
information is handed to the news media as a result of press conferences and 
released reports, with the expectation that it will be covered (Sigal, 1973). 
Political off icials emit a regular stream of scheduled events and activities, 
and there is often daily news to be reported about the president, Congress, 
administrators, and the courts. For similar reasons, there is extensive news 
coverage of the election bids of these off icials, those who seek to displace 
them, and on the selection of key administrators and justices.
The elected and appointed off icials typically want to reveal information 
about their plans only in the manner and time of their choosing, and are 
often successful in doing so (Sigal, 1973; Cook, 1998). They know that they 
are going to be covered – it is only a matter of when, how favorably, and 
whether the coverage will provoke support or opposition to their plans. 
If they are unsure about the potential political support behind a line of 
action, they may “leak” information to see how it plays among other political 
actors, through a “trial balloon.” If they suspect that opposition is going to 
build against plans to which they are f irmly committed, they may try to 
effect them without prior journalistic scrutiny. These off icials also want to 
thwart or minimize the publication of news accounts revealing question-
able, improper, or illegal activities. Such coverage saps their political power 
and hinders their chances to realize their plans. If political off icials do not 
like how they are being covered, they may lobby or bully the press, in part 
by reducing access. A president with considerable public support has the 
greatest leverage and can work the press quite effectively, as after 9/11 when 
the George W. Bush administration was able to transmit misinformation 
about supposed weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in the run-up to its 
2003 invasion.
However, over time journalists have acted in a more entrepreneurial way, 
“initiating” an increasing stream of political coverage (Schudson, 2002), 
in their competition with one another to uphold their missions to inform 
the public and the citizenry, to spark debate about political issues, and 
promote democratic processes. This places them in a kind of detective 
game with political off icials, seeking information about any secrets or 
important unrevealed processes in existing policies and their plans for 
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the future. Journalists also seek to ferret out improprieties or corruption. 
A news series with such revelations, with perhaps the Washington Post ’s 
Watergate coverage by Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein 40 years ago being 
a pinnacle, will enhance the organization’s reputation for investigative 
journalism, elevating it above its competition and placing it in contention 
for Pulitzer Prizes and other prestigious awards.
News Media Are Owners and Security; Movements Are Hopefuls
The leaders of and participants in SMOs and protest actions seek to gain 
mainstream mass news media coverage for many reasons (Gamson and 
Wolfsfeld, 1993), most of all to aid their organizations and social change 
missions. There is no better way to reach large numbers of people, gain 
support and legitimacy for the organization, and inf luence elite actors 
than through the news media (Gamson, 2004). They want their own view 
of issues to be aired in the media, and favorably so, both to change public 
perceptions and gain political support. That the professional news media 
aspire to fairness and objectivity also affords their attention greater cred-
ibility among third parties than that of partisan news outlets. A movement 
includes a variety of organizations, leaders, and participants, often at odds 
in how they define their causes, grievances, and prescriptions, and news 
coverage will provide advantages in these internecine conflicts (Gamson, 
1988; Berry, 1999; Vliegenthart et al., 2005).
Although the news coverage of movements and SMOs is a potential 
cultural consequence of them (Earl, 2004; Amenta et al., 2009; see also 
Schudson, 2002), as we have seen this coverage is external to movements and 
not under their direct control. In this way, movements’ newspaper coverage 
is unlike mobilizing constituents, creating collective identities, increasing 
individual and organizational capacities, altering the career trajectories of 
participants, or publishing their own newsletters and websites, and more 
closely resembles movements’ potential political consequences (Amenta 
et al., 2010). For political decisions the most proximate actors are political 
executives, legislators, administrators, and judges; for newspaper coverage 
key decisions about who, what, and how to cover are made by journalists. 
Given their lack of control, movements face a dilemma in seeking news 
media coverage. Like powerful allies, the news media can amplify mes-
sages, but will often distort them (Jasper, 2006: 129). Despite distortions and 
the opportunity costs of seeking media attention, most movement actors 
actively seek media coverage (Sobieraj, 2011).
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But the news media are set up in such a way that it mainly keeps move-
ments out of the news. The news media treat political off icials like estab-
lished players and serve them as referee. The news media treat movements 
as hopeful or wannabe players, in the way that team owners or stadium 
security would. The relationship between movements and the media has 
been described as “asymmetric” (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993), but a better 
term might be “supplicant.” Movements need the news media far more 
than the news media need them. The latter f ind movements only rarely 
newsworthy, and cover them more rarely still in ways that will aid their 
myriad goals. Although movements sometimes have the support of many 
people willing to commit much time and energy to disinterested causes, 
movements only rarely matter in politics and usually lack legitimacy in 
political action. Movements that rely on symbolic protest underscore their 
great distance from political influence.
The news value of protest, often involving large numbers of people and 
expressing not only worthiness (Tilly, 1999), but also righteous indignation 
over grievances, is sometimes determined by size (McCarthy et al., 1996) 
or novelty (Sobieraj, 2011). But with their negligible influence, legitimacy 
deficits, and nonroutine schedules, movements are subject to far different 
rules of media engagement than institutional political leaders. Rarely is 
it any journalist’s beat to acquire information that movements may have 
and rarely do news organizations compete over it. Movement leaders and 
participants are often willing to spill all their hopes, dreams, and talking 
points at a moment’s notice, submitting to what they perceive as the rules 
of news-making (Gitlin, 1980), but usually the news media are not interested 
and may be repelled by the efforts (Sobieraj, 2011).
Of far greater interest to the news media is when violence attends 
movement actions. Because protest often involves many people in public 
places, it is often treated by the news media as a potential threat to public 
order (McCarthy et al., 1996; Bennett, 2007). When violence or vandalism 
or countermovement skirmishes are part of protest, the news media will 
cover it not as political action, but as a crime story, and will often dispatch 
metropolitan beat or general assignment reporters to the task. The crime 
article is unlikely to treat seriously protesters’ grievances, critiques of 
existing understandings, and potential solutions, and so when protests are 
covered their purposes are frequently ignored (McCarthy et al., 1996; Smith 
et al., 2001; Earl et al., 2004). Sobieraj (2011) f inds that in protests surrounding 
party nominating conventions and presidential candidate debates only 2 
of the 45 organizations that sought coverage were treated in a meaningful 
way. The rest were treated as potential criminals or amusing sideshows.
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The rules surrounding newsworthiness are similar for institutional 
political actors and movements in one way – both can make news through 
scandal. SMOs often survive on funding from everyday people and have 
public-interested missions, and so any revelations involving the overpay-
ment of leaders, the mismanagement of resources, or the outright theft of 
funds will provide compelling news. Organizations running afoul of these 
lofty standards have ranged from the Townsend Plan to the Teamsters, 
from Operation PUSH to the United Way, and for some SMOs in some years, 
scandal or investigation constitutes the majority of their coverage. Needless 
to say, such coverage is unlikely to advance the goals of an SMO and its 
allies (Amenta et al., 2012a).
When Media Grant Movements Play
Although movement actors receive little news coverage, which is frequently 
insubstantial in nature, movements can sometimes convince the stadium 
security to allow them entrance and let them play. More rarely movements 
can gain a kind of standing with the press (Ferree et al., 2002). In these 
instances movements are treated as regular news sources with some 
political legitimacy, more like the off icial political players, though usually 
for a specif ic issue over a shorter period of time, the way minor league 
baseball players are sometimes called up to the big team when rosters 
expand in September and are often used to pinch run or in relief to face one 
batter. Even when movement actors manage to gain this sort of standing, 
only sometimes do they gain the sort of coverage that portrays them in a 
relatively favorable light or transmits their grievances, understandings, and 
demands. Such coverage matters so much to movement actors that it is well 
worth examining the conditions under which it occurs.
Protest does of course get covered. Research shows that newspapers tend 
to report on collective action that is large, violent, geographically proximate 
to the newspaper, or draws the participation of larger organizations (Mc-
Carthy et al., 1996; Oliver and Maney, 2000; Myers and Caniglia, 2004; Earl 
et al., 2004; Strawn, 2008). But the news media only rarely provide protest 
coverage that transmits the protesters’ grievances and demands, as it would 
for institutional political actors. Protests surrounding the G-20 meetings in 
Pittsburgh in September 2009 received extensive coverage and sometimes 
favorably so, but not on substantive issues, only on f irst-amendment ques-
tions surrounding the right to protest (Kutz-Flamenbaum, Staggenborg, 
and Duncan, 2012).
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Fortunately for movement actors, they can be covered in many ways 
other than protest, as two major databases on protest and SMOs show. The 
Political Organizations in the News (PONs) project found that approxi-
mately 1250 national SMOs appeared in more than 350,000 articles in the 
New York Times in the 20th century (Amenta et al., 2012b), as compared to 
the 21,000 articles on protest events in the Dynamics of Collective Action 
data set (McAdam et al., 2009) from 1960 through 1995. If one compares 
the articles on nonlabor SMOs for this shorter time period with articles on 
collective action not including lawsuits, there were still about six times as 
many articles on national SMOs as on protest-related action: about 100,000 
articles on SMOs versus about 17,000 articles on protest events, many of 
which were locally focused.
However, some movement industries are much better covered than oth-
ers. It was rare for a movement to be covered more than once a day in a given 
year in the New York Times (Amenta et al., 2009). Only the labor movement, 
for most of the century, the veterans movement, around World War II, the 
African-American civil rights movement, of the 1950s and 1960s, and the 
end-of-the-century environmental movement received this kind of standing 
in the newspaper of record over several years. These movements combined 
three things: a large number of organizations, a disruptive capacity, and 
enforced national policies aiding the movement’s constituency. For the 
labor movement, its coverage in the 1930s and 1940s correlated closely with 
strike activity and afterward with unionization, suggesting that movements 
may gain coverage early on through disruption, organize to increase their 
social and media presence, and gain further attention and support through 
helpful policy changes.
For any given movement industry, however, the PONs project f inds 
that newspaper coverage is typically concentrated in a few organizations. 
Despite some cases in which the movement industry had more than a 
hundred SMOs, the top f ive SMOs in coverage received more than half of 
the coverage in 31 of 34 movement industries (Amenta, Caren, Elliott, and 
Tierney, 2013). Overall, these elite SMOs averaged 82 percent of the total 
coverage. This proportion was highest in the early part of the century when 
the bench of SMOs was not as deep as it is now. Despite massive shifts 
in the volume of coverage since 1940, the proportion of coverage going 
to the top SMOs has been relatively constant. For some movements, one 
SMO completely dominates the coverage, as the case of the National Rifle 
Association for gun-owners rights and the American Civil Liberties Union 
for civil liberties. In contrast, the coverage of the environmental move-
ment is not greatly dominated by its most prominent SMOs, currently the 
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Sierra Club and the National Resources Defense Council, with only slightly 
more than half of its coverage captured by the top f ive. In short, national 
newspaper attention tends to work to the advantage of a movement’s most 
prominent SMOs, suggesting that even among SMOs gatekeeping to the 
arena is selective.
What accounts for the newspaper coverage of SMOs within a movement? 
The literature has answered mainly by identifying characteristics of SMOs 
that aid them in dealing with the new media or make them particularly 
newsworthy. These studies typically address SMOs in a given movement 
at a given point in time (Andrews and Caren, 2010; Corbett, 1998) or focus 
on one or a few SMOs over time (Barakso and Schaffner, 2006; Rohlinger, 
2006). Among the key SMO characteristics found to influence coverage 
include the resources, bureaucratization (Corbett, 1998), and media staff 
(Rohlinger, 2006). However, having media capacities certainly did not 
ensure coverage among the organizations studied by Sobieraj (2011). 
Combining data on local environmental organizations and their news 
coverage in North Carolina newspapers, Andrews and Caren (2010) found 
that organizations that looked and behaved like interest groups or service 
organizations, with a large membership and professional staff and employ-
ing routine advocacy tactics, were more likely to be covered than those that 
acted like radical protest organizations. Examining political contexts of 
coverage, Rohlinger et al. (2012) f ind that routine political events, including 
elections, legislative debates, and court decisions, boost mainstream media 
attention for SMOs.
The next steps involve examining the interaction between the news 
media, political and social contexts, and SMO characteristics to explain 
their coverage. In a study of the newspaper coverage of LGBT SMOs, El-
liott, Amenta, and Caren (2012) f ind that policy changes interacted with 
the policy emphases of highly resourced SMOs to heighten their media 
prof iles. Larger LGBT SMOs focused on anti-discrimination were advan-
taged over those focusing on hate crimes or military matters, because 
of the considerable policy action on the f irst issue. By contrast, SMOs 
with protest orientations drew extensive national newspaper attention 
during crises. The results support “political reform” arguments that posit 
a positive influence of policy gains on social movements and their news-
paper coverage (Amenta et al., 2012), but also suggest how the process 
works. As social movement industries gain policies that support their 
constituents the specif ic SMOs that advocate the policy and SMO policy 
advocates with wide policy foci gain in media attention and in influence 
within the movement as a whole (Vliegenthart et al., 2005). Although the 
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f indings support the idea that resources matter for SMOs in influencing 
outcomes, they also place resources in context. In addition, movements that 
ultimately make political gains typically receive news attention through 
protest in their early years and only later gain attention by way of more 
established organizations and policy debates, a pattern also found with 
the labor movement (Amenta et al., 2009). However, no research has yet 
determined or pinpointed the influence of early news coverage on political 
gains for movements.
But when are they treated by journalists as serious political players? 
When do movement actors stick with the big club as regular political 
players? Or under which conditions do movements and SMOs gain 
broadly favorable or high quality coverage? These questions are important 
because favorable coverage may lead to gains in political inf luence or 
greater support for an SMO in competition with others, and can be an 
end in itself for SMOs f ighting stigma in the treatment of the groups 
they represent.
There are many ways to interpret “favorable” and “high quality,” most 
of which are diff icult to measure. Coverage may be more subtly “slanted” 
for or against movement actors (Rohlinger, 2007; Smith et al., 2001) or may 
sometimes provide a nonindividualistic or “thematic” discussion of issues 
(Iyengar, 1991). As for more easily researched issues, at a low end of better-
quality coverage, movement people may gain a kind of local standing in 
a given article by being quoted or paraphrased in it (Ferree et al., 2002; 
Gamson, 2004), providing them with voice and signaling their legitimacy 
as representing a particular group on an issue. Frequently SMO spokes-
persons are quoted in ways that do not transmit substantive messages, 
however, such as when commenting on wayward protesters, organizational 
f inances, or other matters tangential to their cause (Sobieraj, 2010). Better 
coverage reports the movement’s preferred way to understand or frame 
an issue and its diagnoses of problems and solutions (Snow and Benford, 
1988; Ferree et al., 2002). It is better still if movement points are supported 
with testimony from elected politicians or scientif ic experts (Koopmans, 
2004). It is especially important to transmit a “demand,” also known as a 
“claim” (Tilly, 1999) or “prescription” (Snow and Benford, 1988), as demands 
are central to contests over meaning (Koopmans, 2004; Lipsky, 1968) and 
convey the movement’s understanding of a policy issue (Ferree et al., 2002; 
Rohlinger, 2007).
Some research suggests that demands appear in articles partly to 
the extent that movement players act assertively in the areas typically 
dominated by institutional political actors. “Assertive” actions engage the 
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political process in ways that threaten the prerogatives of institutional 
political actors and include electioneering, contentious conventions that 
competed with gatherings of the major parties, legislative action, such 
as placing bills before Congress, and movement-led initiatives and refer-
endums, and have been found to be politically inf luential (see Amenta, 
2006). Assertive action differs from other institutional actions like lob-
bying, petitioning, or information distribution by attempting to override 
or overrun institutional political actors rather than working with them. 
The news media are highly interested in legislation, elections, and court 
actions, which draw the attention of reporters on politics beats. To be 
treated like institutional political players movements have to act like 
them.
Amenta, Gardner, Tierney, Yerena, and Elliott (2012) examine front-page 
articles across f ive national newspapers mentioning the Townsend Plan 
and f ind that a “movement-initiated” article – one whose news peg is move-
ment activity of some sort – involving “assertive” actions reliably included 
demands. Articles involving assertive action that appeared when an old-age 
bill was before Congress also included demands in them. Disruptive ac-
tion worked the opposite way; not being about disruption was a necessary 
condition for an article to contain a demand.
These results f it with previous and new research. Oliver and Maney 
(2000) found that protest about legislation was more likely to be covered 
in Madison, Wisconsin, newspapers. Rohlinger (2007) found that anti-
abortion SMOs challenging abortion laws through institutional venues 
were included in coverage more often than others. Sobieraj’s (2011: 100-101) 
research on protest surrounding political party conventions f inds that 
Veterans Opposing War, one of two organizations receiving extensive 
coverage that was substantive, engaged in assertive actions including a 
convention for members and targeted protests to influence the war posi-
tions of Democrats. Their approach contrasted with the media-centered 
events of the vast bulk of the organizations. Boykoff and Laschever (2011) 
f ind that the Tea Party “rose meteorically” in media attention when it was 
actively campaigning, protesting, and pressuring elected off icials during 
the primaries and general election of 2010 (see also Skocpol and Williamson, 
2011). Kutz-Flamenbaum et al. (2012) found that activist groups protesting 
the 2009 G-20 summit in Pittsburgh were able to gain temporary standing 
in local newspapers by holding meetings open to the press to compete with 
the gathering of the G-20 summit leaders. These results concur with the 
generally insubstantial coverage received by protest elsewhere (Smith et 
al., 2001; Earl et al., 2004).
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Movement actors may gain temporary regular player status by being 
assigned a political news beat or being treated as representing a group 
in a policy debate (see Amenta et al., 2013). The New York Times assigned 
Washington-based political reporters to the labor movement from the 
1930s until the end of the 20th century. In other instances, prominent SMOs 
were incorporated in standard political beats, such as the old-age SMOs to 
budgetary and health politics, the ACLU to the courts beat, top SMOs from 
the environmental movement to an environmental beat, and AIDS SMOs 
to the health beat. The Tea Party received beat coverage from the Times in 
2011 and 2012. The Townsend Plan and AARP have been treated as players 
in the debates over Social Security.
However, simply having been assigned a beat or being covered in the 
context of a beat does not ensure substantive coverage. The Times assigned 
a Jewish affairs reporter, accounting for the Jewish civil rights movement 
gaining far more coverage in the Times than in the Washington Post (Amenta 
et al., 2009), but mainly dealing with local issues. Times beat reporters 
were also assigned to the civil rights movement in the 1960s, but by way 
of a regional, Southern news beat, one that also comprised the KKK and 
other movement opponents, and often reported logistically on movement 
activity. Some high-profile movements, such as the student and black power 
movements of the late 1960s, received beat treatment, but were not often 
covered substantively, and were often assigned to local, courts, and police 
reporters. The recent Occupy movement is another case in point. As these 
examples suggest, it is worth determining the conditions under which 
specif ic SMOs receive extensive coverage and under which such sustained 
coverage is substantive.
Conclusion
The terms “player” and “arena” are valuable heuristic tools for analyzing 
the news coverage of movements and other political actors, but the term 
“player” best suits major political actors in their interactions with the news 
media. The mission of the news media, their standard forms of organiza-
tion, and their reporting rules ensure that these institutional actors will be 
covered and their disagreements and points of view faithfully transmitted. 
Although the news media are purveyors of meaning and often provide 
interpretations of political issues and controversies, they tend not to see 
themselves as players and instead see themselves as referees or umpires 
in a match between legitimate players. Because the news media are not 
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organized around covering social movements and are trained not to see 
them as newsworthy, movement actors are more like wannabe players in the 
supplicant role. Journalists act more like owners or hired security as far as 
SMOs and protesters are concerned. They tend to keep movements out of the 
news, and when movements are allowed in the paper or on television they 
gain mainly episodic coverage, often on logistics, and f ind themselves in 
debates not with political opponents, but with police and others concerned 
with public safety.
Social movements want news media coverage for many reasons, but 
it is diff icult to achieve and more diff icult still to achieve in ways that 
are valuable to movements. Movements cannot greatly control what is 
transmitted by the professional news media. News rules mainly deter-
mine when and how movements and other political actors are covered. 
The news media are organized around providing daily information about 
elected and other major political f igures and are highly constrained by the 
routine activity of these off icials. By contrast, the application of the rules 
of newsworthiness ensure that movements will be covered irregularly and 
usually outside political news. When movement actors clear their higher 
bars of newsworthiness, they usually cannot address the political issues 
they seek to influence. Only rarely do they f ind themselves in the sort of 
substantive discursive debates that institutional political off icials f ind 
themselves in daily.
Yet coverage is precious to movements, and it is well worth studying when 
and why movements are sometimes able to enter the discursive game and 
when and why they sometimes score some points. There is considerable 
research now on the conditions under which protest will be covered, why 
some movements are covered more than others, why some SMOs within 
movements are covered more than others, and why movement coverage 
gets across points that it seeks to transmit. When movements act like or 
seek to wrest away the prerogatives of elected political off icials they tend 
to be treated more like them in news coverage. But they may have to go 
through some protest to get there.
Note
1. Acknowledgement: This chapter was supported in part by National Science 
Foundation Grants SES-0752571 and SES-1023863. We thank James M. Jasper 
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11 When and Why Religious Groups 
Become Political Players
The Pro-Life Movement in Nicaragua1
Silke Heumann and Jan Willem Duyvendak
In this chapter we ask when and why religious groups become political play-
ers, by analyzing the involvement of Catholic and Evangelical churches in 
the Nicaraguan “pro-life” movement. The movement emerged as a collective 
player after the 1990 elections that marked the end of the Sandinista regime 
and the transition to neoliberal democracy under the 14-party opposition 
coalition UNO (Unión Nacional Opositora). Its mobilizing capacity grew 
dramatically over time, especially in opposition to therapeutic abortion: 
while the f irst anti-abortion rally in 1994 drew around 5,000 people (Envío 
Team, 1994), in 2000 rallies drew 15,000 (La Prensa, 2000), and by 2006 
200,000 people (Kampwirth, 2008: 129). The emergence and growth of the 
pro-life movement represented a major challenge to the quest for greater 
recognition of gender equality, sexual rights and reproductive rights in 
Nicaragua and culminated in a total abortion ban in 2006 – even when 
the life of the pregnant woman is at stake (Heumann, 2010; Reuterswärd 
et al., 2011; Kampwirth, 2006; Kampwirth, 2008). Much of this success is 
attributed to the political power and mobilizing capacity of the churches 
(Kane, 2008).
It may seem almost self-evident to see churches as political allies or 
even the driving force of the pro-life movement. However, as we demon-
strate in this chapter, there is nothing natural about churches becoming 
an ally or active participant in this or any political movement. In the 
case of Nicaragua, we show how Evangelical churches were initially 
at odds with the Catholic Church and eschewed all political activism 
as outside their spiritual mandate. It was only after pro-life activists 
strategically targeted the church with their recruitment efforts that 
Evangelical churches decided to engage with the Catholic Church and 
with pro-life politics, transforming the pro-life movement’s inf luence 
in state politics. Also the Catholic Church, while having a longer history 
of political involvement, experienced dramatic changes and internal 
conf licts around what the “nature” and the extent of its political role 
should be, with “pro-life” and “pro-family” politics crystalizing as a salient 
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issue only in the 1990s, partly as a result of a conservative backlash within 
the church.
Rather than starting with pregiven players, we show how political ac-
tors and arenas became constituted and transformed over time through 
constantly changing interactions: religious people – and this is true for 
both Evangelicals and Roman Catholics in Nicaragua – had to be actively 
recruited to the pro-life movement. They are not “naturally” or automati-
cally mobilizable. In this case, the relationship between Evangelicals and 
Roman Catholics evolved over time from stiff competition to brothers-in-
arms in the pro-life movement, a development that has to be understood 
as the outcome of complex interactions between different players, notably 
pro-life activists, clergy, church members, politicians, public functionar-
ies, and last but not least activists from the women’s movement. These 
interactions don’t take place in a vacuum, but in particular contexts that 
change over time. Therefore, while we do not suggest a path-dependency 
argument, we see these interactions as being partly shaped by the history 
of these relationships: both in terms of how this history is subjectively 
perceived and (re)constructed on an individual and collective level and 
in terms of how it has def ined the positions of these different players in 
relation to each other.
This chapter explores the interactions and strategies that made the 
emergence and growth of a collective player such as the pro-life move-
ment possible from a historical perspective, while connecting them 
to the (changing) political contexts, constructions of meanings, and 
emotional responses that played a role in this process. Rather than tak-
ing for granted a connection between social conservatism and religion, 
and therefore the churches and the pro-life movement, we will look at 
churches as arenas of struggle to understand when and how certain 
churches became platforms of pro-life activism. We conclude that when 
scholars of social movements make movement strategies the object of 
analysis, it not only helps us understand a movement’s interactions with 
its opponents, but also how alliances and coalitions are formed, and how 
those alliances and coalitions not only depend on, but also transform, 
the respective arenas.
Our analysis draws predominantly on 25 semi-structured and in-depth 
interviews conducted with Catholic and Evangelical social conservative 
advocates and activists in Nicaragua between 2004 and 2007, as well as 
newspaper clips, magazine articles, church pronouncements and institu-
tional documents of the 1980s and 1990s (see Heumann, 2010).
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Relationship between Churches, Politics and Social Conservatism
Even though religious organizations came to play an important role in the 
pro-life movement, in this study we question the idea that there is a “natural 
connection” between them. Wood’s analysis of the political role of religious 
institutions in the US is one of the studies that have shown that religious 
institutions do not have an “inherent” political nature but that their role 
depends on their relationship with other players, as well as on their internal 
struggles and politics (1999: 307-332). Christian Smith (1996) analyzes the 
strategic advantages that churches enjoy as social movement actors. He 
distinguishes between issues of motivation and identity, resources, social 
and geographical positioning, and privileged legitimacy. However, while 
these “assets” for activism are indeed important, especially to understand 
why religious organizations may be interesting for social movements, in 
themselves they are not suff icient to explain when and why religious actors 
become involved in political struggles and in which ways.
Katzenstein’s (1995) study on feminist activism of nuns and laywomen 
within the Catholic Church in the US also challenges a monolithic view 
of the Catholic Church as inherently conservative and in line with the 
positions of the Vatican. To understand the role of churches in the pro-life 
movement we have to look at struggles in various arenas and at subjective 
and emotional processes that led to the transformation of church members 
and clergy into pro-life activists.
The “causal” relationship between religiosity and social conservatism 
is also challenged in the f indings of a study by Ziad Munson (2008) of the 
pro-life movement in the US: rather than seeing faith as the driving fac-
tor for social-conservative worldviews, he shows how people, once they 
are recruited for the pro-life movement, come to reinterpret their faith 
in terms of pro-life values. In our study this is most evident in the case of 
Evangelicals: for them the salience of the abortion issue was clearly a result 
of the recruitment efforts of Catholics, not a preexisting concern.
In a broader sense, this perspective challenges the idea that stable and 
preexisting belief systems in the churches determine church involvement in 
social movements. Morris (2000), for instance, argues that the US civil rights 
movement owed its success and mobilizing power to the African-American 
churches and that it was more than a “structural entity”; it contained the 
“cultural framework through which the movement would be framed” (Mor-
ris, 2000: 448). He argues that the “freedom and justice frame” emerged 
out of the church’s “transcendental belief system,” a process Morris calls 
“frame lifting.” In this article, we question this idea of a preexisting frame 
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in the churches that is lifted into the pro-life movement. We will show how 
pro-life activists target the churches strategically with recruitment efforts 
and seek to appropriate religious spaces as mobilizing structures for the 
movement. In doing so, they appeal to existing frames in these churches, 
but at the same time they provide these churches a language to politically 
think about abortion.
The Catholic Church and Politics
The Catholic Church has been the predominant church in the Pacif ic re-
gion of Nicaragua since the Spanish colonization, deeply influencing both 
popular culture and politics. Even though at the turn of the 20th century 
Nicaragua was off icially declared secular, until the 1960s the power of the 
Catholic Church remained largely unchallenged (Gooren, 2003). In the latter 
part of the 20th century two developments would change that: the growth of 
Evangelical churches (addressed in more detail in the subsequent section), 
and the emergence of liberation theology, which challenged the church 
hierarchy from “within.”
During the f irst half of the 20th century the off icial Catholic Church 
openly supported the military dictatorships in Latin America, but the 
renewing force of the Second Vatican Council in 1962 changed the role that 
the Catholic Church played in the region. It gave way to the emergence of 
a liberation theology, which offered a reinterpretation of Christian dogma 
and declared its identif ication with the poor and the excluded (Stein in 
Walker, 1997: 235-247). The Christian base communities that were organized 
among the population as well as some members of the church hierarchy 
started to oppose the totalitarian regimes, and to struggle against poverty, 
social exclusion, and human rights violations, and in this way found a com-
mon cause with Marxist-inspired revolutionary movements in the region. 
The Vatican soon opposed this development. Liberation theology and the 
involvement of the clerics and devotees in liberation movements produced 
a signif icant split in the Catholic Church across Latin America, between 
those who followed the precepts of the Vatican and those who refused to.
The blend of Marxist-inspired liberation and Christian faith character-
ized the Sandinista movement, which in 1979 led a revolution that ended 
four decades of military dictatorship, the Somoza dynasty (Randall, 1994: 
ix-xiii, 1-27; Walker, 1997: 1-17). The Catholic hierarchy in Nicaragua had sup-
ported the Somoza dynasty for over thirty years. Cardinal Miguel Obando y 
Bravo, appointed Archbishop of Managua in 1970, was the f irst to criticize 
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Somoza and throughout the 1970s denounced the human rights abuses of 
the Somoza dictatorship. Gill (1998) argues that interreligious competition 
played an important role here. In those countries where the Catholic Church 
faced the most competition from other churches, the episcopies started to 
oppose the military dictatorships during the 1960s and 1970s and sought to 
expand their social basis among the poor (Gill, 1998: 112), Nicaragua being 
a case in point.
Although critical of the Somoza dictatorship, Cardinal Obando was 
deeply conservative concerning the organization and mission of the church, 
and he feared the domination of Marxist and “atheist” ideas in the new 
Sandinista government, as well as the loss of control over his own constitu-
ency. Church conservatives could, however, hardly argue that the clergy 
was not represented in the Sandinista state, as the Sandinistas placed an 
unprecedented number of priests in important government positions. But 
these priests were thought to show more loyalty to the Sandinistas than to 
their own authorities, and conservatives feared the division of the church 
(Envío Team, 1981).
By 1980, the relationship between the leadership of the Roman Catho-
lic Church and the Sandinista regime had deteriorated. A deep conflict 
developed between Nicaraguan bishops – supported by the Vatican – and 
the Sandinista state as well as between the church hierarchy and its own 
base communities that were supportive of and actively involved in the 
revolutionary process (Kirk, 1992). The conflict led to the excommunication 
of priests who had accepted high positions in the Sandinista state, and the 
persecution of right-wing clerics accused of counterrevolutionary activities 
by the government. This included the expulsion of foreign-born priests and 
bishops from the country, and the censorship of church pronouncements 
and the media in general. One of the most dramatic expressions of this 
conflict occurred during the 1983 papal visit to the country in which Pope 
John Paul II’s speech was drowned out by the crowd, because he refused 
to express any word of sympathy for those Nicaraguans who had died as 
a result of the aggressions of counterrevolutionary warfare (Envío Team, 
1983). In general the church-state conflict was most intense in the f irst 
half of the 1980s. In the second half of the decade the f irst attempts at 
demobilization and negotiation between Sandinistas and anti-Sandinistas 
started. In 1987, Obando was appointed to the Central American Peace 
Commission as a sign of and attempt at reconciliation. His role in the peace 
process earned him renewed legitimacy among the population (Kirk, 1992).
After the 1990 elections, under the Chamorro government in which 
Catholic charismatics were given key positions, many privileges of the 
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Catholic Church were reinstituted. The Catholic Church was exempted 
from taxes (in contrast to Protestant churches), and also received public 
funds. The Cathedral of Managua was, for example, a “gift” of the Chamorro 
government to the Catholic Church. Chamorro also donated real estate 
to construct the Nicaraguan Catholic University (UNICA) that opened its 
doors in 1993 under the lifelong direction of Cardinal Obando (Loáisiga 
Mayorga, 2005).
The Catholic Church is still today the institution with the most legitimacy 
and credibility among the population (Zovatto, 2002). Political leaders rec-
ognize the importance of having public support for the church, something 
that representatives of the Catholic Church actively cultivate to ensure 
that their interests are represented in national policy. Since the defeat 
of the Sandinistas, the Catholic Church hierarchy has therefore regained 
signif icant influence in public policy. The change in government-church 
relations between the revolutionary period and the 1990s, and the recogni-
tion that the approval of the church was crucial for any political project, 
were well illustrated during the pope’s visit to the country in 1996. On this 
visit, the Sandinista leadership off icially apologized to him for the 1983 
incident, which he deeply resented. The pope’s visit right before the elections 
and his indirect “warnings” against a possible restoring of the Sandinista 
regime are said to have contributed to the electoral success of the right-wing 
liberal party under Arnoldo Alemán in 1996.
In addition to its increasing political power, by the early 1990s the Catho-
lic Church hierarchy – through exerting pressure on and employing the 
excommunication and relocation of priests – had also managed to regain 
power over its constituency, and to neutralize the Catholic Christian base 
communities that had emerged in the context of liberation theology during 
the 1970s. The base communities still exist, but have lost most of their 
former political and social signif icance (Aragón, 2009). In other words, the 
internal struggles between different factions that at some point produced 
visible divisions in the church have over time led to the hegemony of the 
more conservative sectors. This allows the church to appear in public as a 
more unified player but internal diversity, differences, and conflicts persist.
Evangelical Churches and Politics
Protestantism in Nicaragua, although present since the early 20th century, 
did not grow signif icantly until the late 1960s. In the 1980s and 1990s 
Protestant churches experienced an unprecedented growth to almost 20 
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percent of the population. Catholic aff iliation in these 20 years decreased 
from 90 percent to 75 percent (Gooren, 2003). By 2002 there were more 
than 130 different Protestant denominations in Nicaragua with over 5,000 
congregations (González, 1998; Zub, 2002).
Protestantism in Nicaragua is highly diverse, with considerable differ-
ences between but sometimes also within congregations. While in this 
chapter we look at both Catholic and Evangelical churches, Evangelical 
churches behave more like social movements because of their more autono-
mous forms of organization. The same denomination may have different 
characteristics in different locations or socio-political contexts. Protestants 
in Nicaragua tend to be indiscriminately called “evangélicos” and are often 
associated with emotional services that include singing, clapping, and 
trances (Gooren, 2003).
On the Nicaraguan Pacif ic coast, the Evangelical Pentecostal denomi-
nation Assemblies of God became the biggest denomination. They have 
undergone a similar process from historical rejection of politics and social 
involvement, to an increasing incursion into politics since 1990: while in 
1986 the Assemblies of God expelled a well-known Sandinista pastor, Miguel 
Angel Casco, for being involved in politics, by the late 1990s several pastors 
and representatives were not only publicly involved in pro-life activism but 
also participated in politics in the strict sense, by working in the Ministry 
of the Family.
The Baptist Convention represented a signif icant sector of Nicaraguan 
Protestantism, especially because of the political role they played during 
the 1980s (González, 1998; Instituto Nicaragüense de Evangelismo a Fondo, 
1998). Baptists in Nicaragua are typically middle class and more highly 
educated than other Protestants. They have been highly visible since the 
beginning of the 20th century because of their social engagement, including 
the founding of schools, a hospital, and social organizations. During the 
1980s the Baptist Convention predominantly supported the Sandinistas. 
In the 1990s, however, the Baptists became more conservative (Zub, 2002).
The relationship between Evangelical churches and the Sandinistas 
was complex and also depended on the political orientation of specif ic 
denominations. On the one hand, the Sandinistas viewed Evangelical 
growth with suspicion and were alarmed by what they considered to be 
“the invasion of the sects.” Because Pentecostal churches and in particular 
the Assemblies of God were linked in the US to the political and religious 
right, the Sandinistas suspected Nicaraguan Evangelicals of engaging in 
counterrevolutionary activities. On the other hand, the Sandinistas also 
sought the support of Evangelicals, especially given their conflict with the 
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Catholic Church hierarchy, and they maintained good relations with the 
more left-wing Protestant churches, particularly the Baptist Convention 
and also some of the Pentecostal churches (Stoll, 1990).
With the restoration of the Catholic Church’s power after regime tran-
sition, Evangelicals found themselves ever more marginalized from the 
state. The restoration of Catholic privileges triggered outrage and protest 
among Evangelical communities. In light of their growth and political 
marginalization, Evangelicals from both the left and the right engaged in 
repeated efforts to enter the political arena in the early 1990s by founding 
different political parties. Initially, these met with little success, and only 
one party managed to establish itself: the right-wing Camino Cristiano 
Nicaragüense (Nicaraguan Christian Path, or CCN) in 1996 (Rodriguez 
Arce, 1998; Zub, 2002: 64).
Emergence of the Pro-Life Movement in the 1990s
The pro-life movement can be seen as a network of players including 
individual activists, civil society organizations, religious and political 
institutions and spaces involved in advocacy or activism to reinforce 
conservative worldviews, laws, and policies around gender, sexuality, and 
abortion. The main issue that mobilized the pro-life movement was its 
opposition to abortion, but the movement has also opposed homosexuality 
and young people’s access to sex education and contraceptives. The f irst 
pro-life organization – ANPROVIDA – emerged in Nicaragua in the early 
1990s and is a local branch of Human Life International (HLI). HLI, based 
in the US, claims to be the biggest pro-life organization in the world with 
over 80 organizations worldwide. It def ines itself as a Catholic apostolate – 
meaning that it is of Catholic faith and has the aim of “spreading the word,” 
but is led by lay Catholics and is not a structural part of the Catholic Church. 
Toward the mid-1990s, in reaction to a vibrant international and national 
women’s movement around gender-based violence and reproductive health 
and rights, other pro-life organizations emerged, such as ANIMU and Sí a 
la Vida. Rafael Cabrera, the founder of ANPROVIDA, also held a number of 
important positions, such as head of the Nicaraguan Medical Association, 
dean of the Faculty of Medicine of the American University, and head of 
the Pastorate for Life of the Catholic Church.
In consequence, all those organizations appeared in the public debate as 
pro-life players. In the f irst half of the 1990s, Elida de Solórzano, the founder 
of the women’s pro-life organization ANIMU (Nicaraguan Women’s Associa-
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tion) was also working in the Ministry of Education (together with another 
pro-life activist, Minister of Education Humberto Belli), and from 1998 
onwards in the Ministry of the Family – together with Minister of the Family 
Max Padilla, who was recruited to the pro-life movement once he became 
a minister. In close cooperation, they transformed parts of the state into 
platforms of pro-life activism. While the UNO government under Violeta 
Chamorro was supportive of conservative values and of the Catholic Church, 
it was under the government of neopopulist Arnoldo Alemán (1997-2002), 
leader of the right-wing liberal party, that the pro-life movement thrived 
under full governmental support. In the late 1990s, Evangelical leaders 
from the Assemblies of God – the biggest Evangelical denomination in the 
country, who were also coordinating an umbrella organization of Evangeli-
cal churches – were recruited by Catholic pro-life leaders and subsequently 
drew other Evangelical churches into the struggle. Together they formed 
the Nicaraguan Pro-Life Committee, an important factor for the success of 
the pro-life movement. We now analyze the different trajectories through 
which Catholics and Evangelicals were drawn into the pro-life movement 
and effectively became constituted as players.
Catholics: The (Trans)formation of Grievances
The precursors and “moral entrepreneurs” of today’s pro-life movement 
were a handful of activists who became sensitized to pro-life ideals in the 
late 1970s. They were lay Catholics mobilized in response to international 
population policies that promoted massive birth control in developing 
countries, and as a result of their participation in conservative parts of the 
Catholic Church, particularly the Catholic Family Movements that have 
proliferated throughout the world since the late 1960s. One of them, and 
also one of the most visible faces of today’s pro-life movement, is Rafael 
Cabrera, a gynecologist who in 1990 founded ANPROVIDA, the f irst pro-life 
organization in Nicaragua.
Catholic social conservatives rejected the Sandinista regime for different 
yet overlapping reasons. Many disagreed with their political and economic 
model, associating Sandinismo with communism, totalitarianism, and 
atheism. There was a consensus among respondents that the Sandinistas 
had a negative impact on the family, especially because their ideologies had 
divided Nicaraguan families along partisan lines, and forced relatives into 
exile and combat. Nevertheless, the conflict over the family was not (yet) 
perceived as more pressing than other issues, such as the general political 
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situation in the country or the challenge to church authority and power 
posed from inside and outside its walls. Of course the conflict with the 
Sandinistas could itself have been framed in terms of gender, sexuality, and 
the family during the 1980s – and in part it was. But this did not become 
dominant until the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Catholic social conservatives experienced the regime transition in 1990 – 
after the Sandinistas lost the general election – as a moment of joy and also 
an opportunity to undo the “damage” caused by the Sandinista regime to 
the Nicaraguan family: “The year 1990 as a year of transition, reconciliation, 
of national salvation. The aim was to reconstruct the families” (personal 
interview [PI], 2005: 15). Conservative Catholics used the state as a strategic 
player, as a platform of activism, especially through the Ministries of Health 
and Education. They received key positions in government and the Ministry 
of Education especially became a bastion of pro-life politics.
While many social conservatives perceived the new situation as ad-
vantageous to their cause, they also felt threatened. The f lourishing of 
the women’s movement in Nicaragua in the early 1990s, especially in the 
context of two international conferences that put issues of women’s rights, 
sexuality, and reproductive health at the center of the political debate: the 
International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994 
and the International Women’s Conference in Beijing in 1995. Each had a 
significant impact on debates and government policies concerning women’s 
sexual and reproductive health and rights in Nicaragua (Heumann, 2010; 
Kampwirth, 2006). These developments, referred to with a range of terms, 
such as “gender ideology,” “feminism,” “ideologies of women’s liberation,” and 
“homosexualism” (sic), were held responsible for the perceived destruction 
of the “family” and “family values”:
There is the liberation, the ideologies of women’s liberation. … [T]hey are 
so radical that the man is the enemy of the woman, so a family with a man 
and a woman is not desirable anymore, but two women or two men, of one 
and the same sex. All these influences provoke family disintegration. The 
ideological influence of what is called modernism in quotation marks. 
It can’t be something modern, modern should be what constructs, not 
what destroys. And this destroys the family, definitely a homosexual man 
can’t even procreate but has to adopt. So this is not natural anymore. 
(PI, 2005: 5)
The UN conferences inspired the f irst public mobilizations of the “pro-life” 
movement.
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Catholic social conservatives experienced the different governments that 
ruled throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s as favorable to their goals 
and ideals. This was especially the case with Arnoldo Alemán, a right-wing 
populist who governed Nicaragua from 1997-2002 and actively supported 
the pro-life movement. He introduced the “Day of the Unborn Child” as an 
off icial national celebration and personally headed pro-life mobilizations. 
Alemán also reduced the role of the Women’s Institute and instead founded 
the Ministry of the Family, which subsequently became another bastion for 
pro-life activism, once Minister of the Family Max Padilla was recruited by 
the pro-life movement. The combination of triggering threats and sustained 
political support throughout the 1990s spurred the power and growth of 
the pro-life movement.
The leaders of the movement expanded their networks throughout the 
state, civil society, and religious organizations. Pro-life activists not only 
had important connections with the churches and key positions in the 
government, but also kept direct channels of communication and lobbying 
in all state institutions that could be relevant to their goals, via personal 
contacts with government off icials.
Evangelicals: Similar Grievances, Different Trajectories
Compared to conservative Catholics, conservative Evangelicals had similar 
readings of the Sandinista period, perceiving them as totalitarian, oppres-
sive, and intolerant toward their religious faith and practice:
Being a church, the problem with Sandinismo lay in the fact that … they 
wanted the church to be an instrument to incline people to the revolution. 
How many times did I have to tell them: “Remember that the church is not 
a political party, it’s not to politicize people. It’s a free, voluntary issue. In 
church, we have all the political parties; we enter the temple as church 
members.” … It goes without saying that they didn’t accept that and this 
is why they always had us in the category of counterrevolutionaries, CIA 
agents. (PI, 2005: 34)
The Sandinistas recognized Evangelicals as an important political force and 
tried to gain their support, and they interpreted their refusal as hostility. 
Interviewees described how repressive actions against them ultimately 
undermined support for the revolution:
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They committed various abuses. In the Assemblies of God they killed 
a pastor of ours, and they killed several deacons of ours. They closed 
temples of ours on the Atlantic coast, in Ciudad Sandino [and] they 
destroyed a hall that served us as temple in Villa Libertad. They wounded 
the pastor and some members by stoning. We had diff iculties. But as an 
honest and objective observer not everything in the revolution was bad, 
but these aspects, yes. One of the most diff icult aspects – and I think 
this was the reason why we Nicaraguans decided to put an end to the 
revolution – was that communism and Sandinismo as expressions of 
international communism, are a persecuting system, there is persecu-
tion, in the neighborhood, in the city, in the country, they intercept your 
telephone. It’s a disaster. (PI, 2005: 34)
But some Evangelicals, as members of the poorer sectors of society, ap-
preciated a number of the Sandinistas’ social policies and redistributive 
measures, particularly those that gave them access to (higher) education 
and better living conditions:
In that period abortions could be easily obtained. There was no promo-
tion of values as such. Of waiting, of abstinence, of faithfulness. They 
promoted other values, such as solidarity, sacrif ice, these were also 
important values. But the off icial policy was very distant from God. (PI, 
2005: 24)
Despite their resentments of the Sandinista regime and despite the San-
dinistas’ attempts to draw them into the political conflict, conservative 
Evangelicals tried to stay out of politics. There is no evidence that they were 
actively engaged in “pro-life” activism during the 1980s.
Conservative Evangelicals welcomed the end of Sandinista rule as eagerly 
as the Catholics. It meant the end of the war and military service as well as 
of the harassments they experienced under the Sandinista regime.
However, regime transition did not have the same effect for them as for 
the Catholics. On the contrary, the new government, in which prominent 
Catholics had key positions, regranted a number of privileges to the Catholic 
Church, and Evangelicals had less access to the state than before 1990. The 
Sandinistas had at least shown interest in their political support. Zub (2008) 
notes that after 1990 Evangelicals had no formal channels of communication 
with the state.
The incursion of Evangelicals into politics has to be seen in light of their 
growing constituency, their disappointment with existing politics (domi-
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nated by Catholics), their quest for a government that would represent them, 
and also the hope and belief that Evangelical politicians would not be cor-
rupt (Zub, 1992; Zub, 2002; PI, 2005: 33; PI, 2005: 34). The foray of Evangelicals 
into the political arena entailed a major change of their theological practice 
and was an important prerequisite for their later involvement in pro-life 
politics. Despite similar readings and grievances, Evangelicals only became 
involved in pro-life politics in the late 1990s, and they only did so in response 
to recruitment efforts by (Catholic) leaders of the pro-life movement.
Different positionings vis-à-vis the state, but also different characteristics 
of the churches, their politics, and their constituencies, explain the different 
paths Catholics and Evangelicals took toward social conservative activism. 
Evangelical involvement in the (Catholic) pro-life movement is remarkable 
for several reasons: they had to go through deep internal changes in order 
to become political actors in the f irst place and they had to overcome a 
relationship with Catholics that historically had been one of competition 
and conflict.
The Catholic Church and Pro-Life Activism
The off icial position of the Vatican toward birth control and abortion is well 
known. It is often wrongly assumed that this position has been uncontested 
and unchanged throughout history. Whereas abortion historically had been 
condemned as concealment of sexual sin, the hegemony of the “right to life” 
argument is a relatively recent development of the last 50 years (Catholics 
for a Free Choice, 1996). It was precisely the conservative movement that 
emerged in response to the Second Vatican Council that led to what is 
believed to be the most radical statement of opposition to birth control of 
the Catholic Church. Humane Vitae, an encyclical issued by Pope Paul VI, 
stated that “each and every marriage act must remain open to the transmis-
sion of life” (Shallat, 1994: 150).
In Nicaragua, the Catholic hierarchy as personif ied in Archbishop and 
Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo, advocated for social conservatism during 
the 1980s. But at the beginning of the decade, he had been more concerned 
with the general political situation and the position of the church. A pas-
toral letter from 1984 expressed concern about the “materialist and atheist 
education that is mining the children’s and youngsters’ consciences” and 
the fact that part of the clergy were supporting these “materialist forces.” 
It also expressed concern about the censorship of the media (Conferencia 
Episcopal de Nicaragua, 1984). Only in the second half of the 1980s did 
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“the family” increasingly become the focus of concern. In a pastoral letter 
from 1986, worries about concrete issues regarding marriage, divorce, and 
abortion come to the fore (Conferencia Episcopal de Nicaragua, 1986). But 
the predominant concern of the church hierarchy remained the loss of 
control over its own constituency and its loss of power with the state.
During the 1990s, the Vatican made sexual politics one of its main targets 
of struggle. John Paul II reaff irmed the “pro-life” statement of his predeces-
sor in Veritatis Splendour (Ioannes Paulus PPII, 1993) and more explicitly in 
Evangelium Vitae (Ioannes Paulus PPII, 1995). It is no coincidence that these 
two encyclicals were published on the eve of the Population Conference in 
Cairo and the International Women’s Conference in Beijing, respectively. 
Through its controversial status as “non-member state permanent observer” 
of the UN, the Catholic Church hierarchy lobbied actively against birth 
control and abortion (Kissling, 1999).
We should not equate this hierarchy with the church as a whole. To 
appreciate the role Catholic networks play in the development of social 
conservative activism, it is important to distinguish between platforms for 
activism and advocacy (players) and arenas where discussion and dissent are 
taking place among various players. The universities are emblematic of this 
difference. Nicaragua has three Catholic universities: the Central American 
University (UCA), the Catholic University (UNICA), and Ave María College. 
UCA is a Jesuit university founded in 1961, and historically known to support 
liberation theology and the political left. It has an “Interdisciplinary Gender 
Studies Program,” and has offered room for discussion forums on sexual and 
reproductive rights organized by leaders of the women’s movement. UNICA, 
by contrast, was founded in 1992 by Cardinal Obando. It has received f i-
nancial support from both the Chamorro and the Alemán administrations. 
Between 1997 and 2001 Alemán assigned one-third of the whole state budget 
for university scholarships to Obando’s UNICA (Loáisiga Mayorga, 2005). 
Ave Maria College (today Ave Maria University) was founded in 1999 as the 
satellite campus of a US private university founded by Thomas Monaghan, 
an American entrepreneur who founded Domino’s Pizza. It was headed until 
2007 by Humberto Belli, a prominent Nicaraguan Catholic pro-life activist, 
member of the Catholic institution Opus Dei, with links to the US political 
and religious right since the 1970s, who also became Minister of Education 
in 1990 (Envío Team, 1990; Gonzalez Ruiz, 2005). The two conservative 
Catholic universities thus only emerged in the 1990s.
Some of the pastoral councils of the Catholic Church were also mentioned 
as important players promoting pro-life ideals. The Pastoral for Family, 
Life and Infancy, for instance, was led for several years by Rafael Cabrera 
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and also works closely together with the Catholic Family Movements and 
pro-life civil organizations.
The Catholic Lay Movements of Evangelization like Cursillos and En-
cuentros Conjugales were identified by informants as important spaces that 
triggered experiences of religious conversion and commitment to pro-life 
and pro-family ideals. These movements are organized around weekend 
retreats of self-reflection and community-building that worked as powerful 
tools of personal transformation.
It is important to see these organizations as dynamic, their political roles 
and positions continuously changing, and in that sense, at some moments 
in time more as an arena with conflicting voices than as united players. The 
role of Cursillos in particular has changed considerably. From its conserva-
tive origins in Spain under Franco, Cursillos de Cristiandad became very 
popular and important in liberation theology in Central America in the 
1970s (PI, 2005: 36) Many left-wing Catholic leaders who joined the revolu-
tion, such as Fernando Cardenal, were f irst recruited through Cursillos 
de Cristiandad. During the backlash in the 1980s, huge internal tensions 
arose, eventually leading to Cursillos being taken over by the conservative 
Catholic hierarchy (PI, 2005: 38).
The Catholic Family Movements, by contrast, are less susceptible to 
these changes because they have as their primary goal the promotion of 
Catholic (sexual) morality. Other parts of the Catholic Church are known 
for their conservatism and their commitment to socially conservative 
(sexual) politics and operate in a less public way, such as Opus Dei, the 
Neo-catechumenal Way, the Charismatic Movement City of God, and the 
Full Gospel Businessmen Fellowship. These four groups were established in 
Nicaragua in the 1990s. Catholic organizations have proliferated since then 
with the support of the government, the Vatican, and other international 
actors involved in pro-life activism.
Neither the off icial position of the church nor its political role is mono-
lithic or static, and therefore the church is not a natural or pregiven pro-life 
player, but an institution that has become constituted as an important player 
in and through national and international politics, in various arenas. Once 
appropriated as platforms for pro-life activism, religious networks help 
promote social conservatism. Messages, activism, and initiatives of social 
conservatives can take a variety of forms, including the religious service 
itself, Bible study groups, religious retreats for young people (retiros juveniles) 
or for married couples (encuentros matrimoniales, encuentros conjugales), 
talks in neighborhood centers, schools, and universities, as well as more 
direct forms of political action, such as petitions and public demonstrations.
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Evangelical Churches and Pro-Life Activism
Conservative Evangelicals in the 1990s were mostly organized either through 
the Consejo Nacional de Pastores Evangelicos de Nicaragua (CNPEN) or the 
Nicaraguan Evangelical Alliance (Alianza Evangélica Nicaragüense, or 
AENIC), an interdenominational organization founded in 1990 (and a legal 
entity since 1996) that openly rejects “anthropocentric” worldviews (Alianza 
Evangélica Nicaragüense, 1996). AENIC also became an important pro-life 
actor at the end of the 1990s.
The leaders of AENIC were also leaders of the Evangelical denomination 
Assemblies of God. These Evangelical leaders were originally approached 
by the then-Minister of the Family, a Catholic pro-life activist. In one of 
the follow-up meetings to the international conferences, he had been ap-
proached by the vice president for public policy of Focus on the Family, who 
urged him to seek an alliance with Evangelicals (PI, 2005: 12).
AENIC claims to encompass 70 percent of the Evangelical churches in 
the country (PI, 2005: 34), although members of more left-wing Protestant 
churches (GD, 2007) question this claim. It is even unclear to what extent 
these leaders are acting in the name of the constituencies of their own 
denominations. The study by Gonzalez (1998) revealed not only the eco-
nomic marginality of Pentecostal church constituencies, but also their lack 
of familiarity with mainstream politics. Most of those surveyed couldn’t 
name more than one or two leading parties in the country and did not 
know their full names. More than 40 percent of Evangelicals didn’t know 
the leaders of their own denominations. Nevertheless, Evangelical church 
leaders have been able to mobilize considerable parts of their constituencies 
for the pro-life cause. Evangelical, and in particular Pentecostal, churches, 
are present across Nicaragua, literally in every neighborhood, and have very 
strong and dense networks. Members typically spend much more time at 
church or being involved in church activities than Catholics. On average the 
services last for two hours, compared to the Sunday masses of the Catholic 
Church, which are often only 45 minutes long. These institutions appear to 
exert more social control than Catholic churches, in that they are constantly 
active in the neighborhoods: going from door to door to gain adherents, but 
also organizing members to help each other out in all kinds of practical 
matters, such as borrowing construction materials for a house, helping in 
its construction, and aiding members to f ind employment.
In 1999, the strategic alliance between Catholic and Evangelical social 
conservatives gave way to the creation of an overarching coalition that 
claimed to represent the pro-life movement in Nicaragua: the Nicaraguan 
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Pro-Life Committee (PI, 2005: 17). Members of the committee claimed to be 
integrated and supported by a large number of organizations that signed on 
to its public pronouncements. A closer look at their constituency, however, 
reveals a small number of persons who appear and act as representatives 
of different institutions, ranging from medical associations to civil society 
organizations and religious spaces. The pro-life movement depends upon 
a rather small number of militants committed to the cause, in need of reli-
gious networks in order to expand their mobilizing capacity. This however 
is a choice riddled with strategic dilemmas.
The Extension Dilemma: Between Strategic Secularism and the 
Centrality of the Churches
While churches offer important platforms for the pro-life struggle, leaders 
from civil organizations like ANPROVIDA, as well as Evangelical leaders, 
complained that they often had to lobby within their churches in order to 
get their support. This is not to say that the churches don’t support their 
goals or don’t share their ideals, but they did not necessarily consider the 
pro-life struggle a priority. Particularly in the Catholic Church, a highly 
politicized player, informants found it was not always convenient to raise 
“pro-life” concerns (PI, 2005: 10; PI, 2005: 11).
In general, pro-life activists from civil society organizations consider 
their association with the Catholic Church a double-edged sword. On the 
one hand it is important and fruitful, because in the activists’ view the 
secular pro-life discourse and the religious discourse complement each 
other. They also consider the church indispensable in organizing public 
mobilizations, as they are aware that they don’t have the capacity or the 
social base to mobilize the masses. On the other hand, the inextricable link 
between the church and the movement was viewed as potentially harmful 
because it was seen as making them more vulnerable to the critique of 
violating the secular character of the state. Some felt it also weakened their 
arguments by making them appear “less scientif ic”:
Because the message of ANPROVIDA – based on legal, scientif ic, or social 
arguments – was weakened when it linked us to the Catholic Church. 
Because what we had said … about the scientif ic and medical arguments 
was ignored. … And I think that this is a strategy of the pro-abortion 
groups, to focus on that [our link with the church] in order to weaken 
our arguments. (PI, 2005: 10)
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In the interviews, some pro-life leaders from civil organizations also tried to 
emphasize the scientific and legal arguments and downplay the significance 
of religion. The latter nevertheless becomes evident when looking at their 
life histories. Pro-life activists view their relationship with the church with 
ambivalence, considering that without the churches a pro-life movement 
would hardly exist: “Personally I think that we shouldn’t have appeared 
together or very connected with each other, and that we had to focus on 
these topics and [appear together] only in necessary moments, where it was 
of necessity to appear all united, because of course there were [moments] 
where we had to appear together” (PI, 2005: 10).
Ultimately, civil society organizations that engage in socially conserva-
tive politics, like ANPROVIDA and ANIMU, consist of only a handful of 
members, who are very committed and keep the movement going. Still, they 
are not able to mobilize a significant number of people without the churches:
We don’t have the resources or a way to mobilize. This is to say, here we 
have to resort to the Christian churches. We are the ones who are in 
the initial position to contradict or to tell whoever, but to mobilize you 
require a big organization, and we don’t have the money to do that or the 
possibility that people will believe us. (PI, 2005: 12)
Despite the hesitation to resort to church support, an invitation by a church 
authority to join a protest or sign a petition is undeniably compelling. This 
extends to Evangelical churches as well:
Our church has something that is the unity initiated by the pastor. He 
invites us to be part of transcendental issues in the country where we 
can’t remain quiet, and he urges us to exercise that when these meetings 
or kinds of demonstrations take place, in defense of our rights as a church 
and as Christians. This motivates me to be part of something that is 
promoted in the church as unity. (PI, 2005: 23)
Political inf luence thus includes lobbying in the National Assembly or 
with important public functionaries through petitions, “consciousness 
raising” activities, public demonstrations and influencing public opinion, 
and, according to respondents from different sides, direct pressure from 
the Catholic Church hierarchy.
The pro-life movement consists of a core of militant activists who use 
a diversity of arenas to promote their ideas. However, these activists are 
relatively limited in number and don’t have any significant mobilizing capac-
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ity. Hence, the Catholic and Evangelical churches play a crucial role in the 
pro-life movement: they offer a platform for the daily “consciousness raising” 
activities, for the establishment of transnational projects and networks, and 
most importantly, they offer the grounds for a common identity based on a 
shared interpretation of Christianity and the Bible. In this way they constitute 
a powerful basis for collective mobilization: people are mobilized through 
church networks, the authority of church leaders, and religious discourse. Pro-
life leaders make use of both national and transnational networks. Despite 
the claims of Nicaraguan pro-life leaders that they speak the native, authentic 
voice and are guardians and representatives of traditional Nicaraguan values, 
we f ind that local organizations have structural and personal links with 
transnational conservative networks that play an important role in the de-
velopment of the social-conservative movement in Nicaragua through direct 
recruitment, f inancial support, advocacy messaging, and strategic advice.
While religious groups have boosted the pro-life movement’s capac-
ity to influence the state, their mobilizing capacity, and their discursive 
resonance, pro-life activists experience trade-offs between “secularism” 
and “religiosity” as political strategies. In the current context, in which 
secular and religious worldviews are increasingly presented as opposite and 
incommensurable, and in which religiosity is presented as irreconcilable 
with the public sphere and the very idea of “modern democracy,” political 
activists come increasingly under pressure to make a clear “choice” of one 
or the other. In such a situation, the religious extension of the movement 
may prove increasingly restrictive.
Conclusion
What can we learn from the strategic interactions between churches (both 
the Roman Catholic and the Evangelical), the pro-life movement, and state 
actors? We can draw three main conclusions regarding the strategic interac-
tions that turn religious groups into political players:
– Political mobilization of religious individuals and groups is sometimes 
more driven by interreligious competition than by a specif ic common 
religious cause (e.g., pro-life): the incursion of conservative Evangelicals 
into the political arena was mostly caused by interreligious competition. 
Once they became a political force that could not be ignored, Evangelicals 
were recruited by Catholic pro-life leaders to join the pro-life coalition. 
While they share similar frames of understanding about the Family and 
Christian Morality (with capital letters), the decision to become active 
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reflects their general quest to gain political influence and participation. 
This reveals the strategic aspect of the interaction: Evangelicals who 
had tried without success to f ight against the privileges and power of 
the Catholic Church concluded that they could gain by collaborating 
with it. In turn, Catholics were forced to acknowledge Evangelicals as 
a growing political force and potential competitor. As pro-life activists, 
they considered collaboration advantageous when they could channel 
their political action toward goals that would favor both their interests. 
Therefore, rather than presenting a puzzling development (Kane 2008), 
the historically antagonistic relationship between Evangelicals and 
Catholics in part explains their subsequent coalition.
– The transformation of churches into platforms of political mobilization 
demands a lot of bottom-up efforts and top-down support. There is an 
important and complex relationship between religious networks and 
the pro-life movement. Most activists have important personal roots 
in religious communities. In the case of the Catholics, they typically 
have a history of involvement in the Catholic Family Movements. In 
Nicaragua the churches became important organizational structures 
for recruitment and are crucial for collective mobilization, but their 
participation is a product of active and strategic recruitment by pro-life 
activists.
– The support of the churches and their constituency will be welcomed by 
pro-life organizations but the “visibility” of their religiousness in public 
manifestations will depend on the legitimacy of religious arguments in the 
political arena (sometimes and by some primarily understood as a secular 
arena). As the Nicaraguan case has shown, dependence upon the churches 
is also seen as an Achilles’ heel for some social-conservative leaders, who 
feel increasing pressure to craft a “scientif ic” and secular image in order 
to reach a public that values a secular state, ruled by law and informed by 
science. In addition, when churches become political players, they are also 
subjected to competing political goals and, as pro-life activists complain, 
the support for pro-life politics by church leaders sometimes depends on 
how strategic it is for churches in a particular political context.
In this chapter, we have dealt with the question of how churches become 
part of social movements. Assets of churches as outlined by Smith (1996), 
which give them strategic advantages as social movement players, can 
contribute to explaining why it may be strategic for some players to recruit 
church members and appropriate religious organizations as mobilizing 
structures. But it does not explain how and why church leaders or church 
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members decide to become involved in social movement activism. To do so, 
it is necessary to empirically analyze strategic interactions between religious 
actors and other players (state actors, social movement actors, protestors), 
and to scrutinize the precise meanings that get attached to “religion” in 
those specif ic struggles. Other players may prefer “strategic secularism” to 
alliances with religious actors, just like religious players may prefer not to 
become part of movements that are partly secular, let alone being “absorbed” 
into a secular state. We therefore conclude that churches’ preexisting belief 
systems do not determine their involvement in social movements, but the 
strategic interaction among themselves, with third parties and the state. 
Churches don’t automatically provide the “cultural framework through 
which the movement would be framed,” as Morris (2000: 448) has argued for 
the civil rights movement. We didn’t f ind a clearly circumscribed or uniform 
pro-life frame in the churches that was subsequently lifted into the pro-life 
movement. On the contrary, we saw that the churches are internally diverse 
and changing over time, and are better understood as arenas of struggle 
between different and often competing forces. Pro-life activists targeted 
the churches strategically with recruitment efforts in order to appropri-
ate religious spaces as mobilizing structures for the movement – thereby 
transforming them into platforms of pro-life activism.
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12 What the Tea Party and Occupy Wall 
Street Illuminate about Bystander 
Publics as Proto-Players
Hahrie Han and Dara Z. Strolovitch
Successful movements build like snowballs rolling down a hill. They start 
small, with a core group of participants, but get larger as they roll, gaining 
momentum and size as they progress. To generate this momentum, move-
ment leaders and participants must appeal to constituencies that might 
not seem interested or to have a stake in their issues and goals. They must 
also mobilize the opinions of many actors who will never join their actions, 
but whose consciousness about the issues may be raised, who may contact 
elected officials about them, or who may adopt a position on an issue related 
to the movement’s goals that determines their voting behavior (Lee, 2002). 
These external constituencies are examples of “bystander publics” – indi-
viduals and groups to whom movements may try to appeal, but who have yet 
to engage with a movement. Some bystander publics never engage with the 
movements that court them, while others eventually become participants. 
Some bystander publics may someday become supporters of a movement, 
while others come to oppose it and its goals.
Although bystander publics stand outside the movement, they are critical 
players because they exist in dynamic dialogue with the movement. But 
scholars have given scant attention to the relationship between move-
ments and bystander publics. In their study of social movement audiences, 
Kathleen Blee and Amy McDowell (2012) argue that the ways in which 
movements construct, give meaning to, and interpret bystander publics 
affect the strategies and goals they choose. Viewed this way, these play-
ers, real or imagined, affect the strategic alternatives movements see, the 
strategic considerations they take into account, and, ultimately, the choices 
they make. That is, movements imagine, interpret, and give meaning to the 
bystander publics, strategically making choices about whom to engage, 
whom to ignore, and even whom to antagonize. Charles Tilly (1977) famously 
analogized movements to street performers rehearsing routinized scripts. 
The performance analogy is apt, because it captures the way movements 
perform with audiences in mind: as Blee and McDowell (2012) argue, those 
audiences become players in the performance itself.
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The term “bystander” might seem to connote a passive observer or a mere 
consumer of movement politics. “Bystander publics,” however, possess as 
much agency as any of the other strategic players. Rather than standing 
passively on the sidelines, many members of “bystander publics” are actively 
engaged in processes and institutions that build their democratic capacities 
and shape the choices they will make about if and how to engage with 
the movement. As individuals assemble, interact, and work together as 
friends, neighbors, cocongregants, students, parents, and coworkers, they 
deliberate over political and nonpolitical issues. By building relationships 
and developing civic skills, they develop democratic resources, cultures, and 
strategies that plant seeds that, under some conditions, social movements 
may later harvest (McAdam, 1988; Morris, 1984; Putnam, 2000; Skocpol, 
2003; Han, 2009).
In this light, many members of bystander publics are more than mere 
consumers of social movements. Instead, in building these democratic 
capacities, developing traditions of action (and inaction), creating networks, 
and learning and crafting democratic strategies, bystander publics develop 
identities, resources, and capacities that influence the way movements 
choose to interact with them. As such, bystander publics are not simply 
objects of social movements’ influence and suasion. Instead, as John Mc-
Carthy and Mayer Zald (1977) have argued, they can be important resources 
for movements.1 While McCarthy and Zald focus on the resources that 
elites can bring to movements, we examine resources from members of 
the mass public. In addition, we argue that bystander publics bring much 
more than just resources – they also have distinct traditions, strategies, and 
capacities that can shape whether and how movements engage them, as well 
as whether and how a bystander public responds to movement overtures.
At their cores, social movements attempt to harness and build power, 
typically among “outsider” groups that “lack the resources, the contacts, or 
the experience to use other political strategies” (Ginsberg et al., 2009: 256) 
or that do not have access “to conventional means of expressing their views” 
(Barbour and Wright, 2009: 607). To do so, movements try to draw attention 
to political causes by leveraging the power that they do have – power that 
lies with aggrieved constituencies who are or can be motivated to change 
their circumstances. From the perspective of the movement, then, many 
members of “bystander publics” are potential sources of power through 
the resources to which they have access, the strategies through which they 
develop and deploy those resources, or the traditions that shape those 
strategies. This power can take multiple forms, including material resources 
(such as money), technical knowledge (such as facility with online social 
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media), symbolic support (such as supportive public opinion), affective 
bonds (such as shared consciousness), or even oppositional targets (such 
as having clear opponents can help movements build supporters) (see, for 
example, Snow and Soule, 2010; Snow et al., 2007).
Because bystander publics are agentic players, their engagement with a 
movement can have feedback effects that shape and change the movement 
itself. Although movement activists typically want to expand their scope 
to include as many players and publics as possible, they must also remain 
mindful about the possible trade-offs of engaging a bystander public and 
mobilizing it into the movement. Depending on the possibilities that each 
public might offer, movements can make different decisions about which 
among the range of possible bystander publics to engage, which ones to 
ignore, and which ones to oppose, as well as about how to engage with 
or oppose them. Because movements cannot predict or control the way 
bystander publics will respond to their overtures, these choices entail what 
Jasper (2006) calls “engagement dilemmas.” So while bystander publics 
may bring much needed resources, incorporating them into a movement 
can alter or transform the identity of the movement itself by changing or 
watering down messages (Strolovitch, 2007), presenting a movement with 
what Jasper calls an “extension dilemma” (Jasper, 2006: 26-27).
In other words, movement participants face what Jasper calls the 
“Bystander dilemma” in which they must decide whether to encourage 
bystanders to get involved in light of the risks that new players might change 
the nature of the movement itself (Jasper, 2006: 123). Reaching out, Jasper 
argues, can bring more diversity but less unity, more power but less focus, 
and breadth at the expense of depth (Jasper, 2006: 127-128). Each of these 
strategic choices about whom to engage are implicitly choices the movement 
makes about its character, agenda, and actions. So while bystander publics 
are, by def inition, not participants in a particular movement, they can 
nonetheless be central to def ining the values the movement will embody 
and the goals that they will pursue.
To explore these relationships between bystander publics and move-
ment values and goals, we examine the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street, 
focusing on each movement’s relationship to what scholars have come to 
call “intersectionally marginalized populations” – that is, disadvantaged 
subgroups of broader marginalized groups. In particular, we examine each 
movement’s choice of targets and the ways in which each one characterizes 
economic problems and their victims.
We begin by def ining “bystander publics” and discussing their rela-
tionships to other social movement players. We then move on to a brief 
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discussion about intersectional marginalization and its implications for 
understanding social movements in general and the Tea Party and Occupy 
Wall Street in particular. After laying the groundwork for our examination, 
we explore the similarities and differences in the ways each movement has 
framed the political implications of economic problems and in the ways 
each one attempts (or does not attempt) to engage potential participants and 
sympathizers. For example, we examine the ways in which each movement 
drew on existing networks and organized groups to build its movement, 
using this as a lens through which to understand how movements make 
choices about which possible bystander publics to engage, which ones to 
ignore, and which ones to cast as their opponents, as well as how these deci-
sions both reflect and serve to construct each one. We argue that although 
both movements were stimulated by a sense of economic disaffection, 
the ways in which they came to represent very divergent analyses of and 
responses to the economic problems of the f irst decade of the 21st century 
help us to understand the role of “bystander publics” in social movements.
Bystander Publics: An Overview
We conceptualize “bystander publics” as “proto-players” who may, but who 
have yet to, engage with a social movement. Many movement participants 
– including networks of supporters, artists and intellectuals, religious 
organizations, and many other movement “players” – were, at some point, 
members of a bystander public. Once they begin to engage with a movement 
(as either supporters or opponents, or even in choosing to ignore the move-
ment), their status changes, and they are no longer bystanders. “Bystander 
public” is consequently an umbrella term that encompasses a wide range 
of different publics, none of which is a monolithic entity.
Indeed, there is great heterogeneity among the range of possible bystander 
publics as well as among the individuals who comprise any particular one, 
both in their potential interest in the movement and in the potential power 
they have to mobilize in support or opposition to the movement. For exam-
ple, though he does not use the term “bystander publics,” Taeku Lee (2002) 
foregrounds the role of groups we can conceptualize as bystander publics 
in his analysis of sympathetic Northern whites, unsympathetic Northern 
whites, Southern whites, Northern blacks, unmobilized Southern blacks, 
and others among the range of possible audiences targeted by civil rights 
movement activists. African-Americans around the country had a direct 
interest in the civil rights movement, as did the Southern whites who were 
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being challenged. Northern whites, on the other hand, were more removed 
but represented a potentially powerful source of public opinion. All of these 
groups were, at some point, what we call bystander publics, even though 
they had a range of kinds of relationships to and interest in the movement. 
Some of them observed the civil rights movement without engaging with it 
or even forming an opinion about it, while others may not even have been 
aware that the movement existed. What unites them in this category is that 
they are outside the movement, but could be drawn into it.
While members of bystander publics may not have decided whether 
or how to engage with a movement, many of them are actively engaged 
in civic and democratic processes that shape the way they relate to the 
movement. As members of and participants in religious institutions, 
schools, voluntary associations, and the like, individuals assemble with 
other people in myriad ways as neighbors, friends, partners, colleagues, 
families, and so on. Each of these relationships is a possible avenue for the 
development of the democratic capacities, orientations, and culture that 
shape the choices individuals make about how to engage with movements. 
In his 19th-century classic Democracy in America, for example, Alexis de 
Tocqueville (2001) noted the ubiquity of “associations” in the United States, 
arguing that nowhere had they been more “successfully used or applied to 
a greater multitude of objects” (95). Democracy works as well as it does in 
the United States, Tocqueville argued, because through these associations, 
Americans become familiar and comfortable with democratic practices and 
norms (2001). Even if the associations they join do not address the issues 
that concern the particular social movement in question, people develop 
democratic capacities through their participation.
For this reason, democratic theorists have argued that the process of 
being in a public can be transformational (Barber, 2003; Pateman, 1970). 
Borrowing from performance studies to understand the way in which 
the choices performers make are shaped by characteristics, actions, and 
interpretations of the audiences, Blee and McDowell (2012) call these by-
stander publics “audiences.” In interaction with each other, performers and 
audiences (or movements and bystander publics) are distinct players that 
shape one another. This is particularly true of members of marginalized and 
disenfranchised groups. Before the Nineteenth Amendment enfranchised 
women, for example, they “came together in organizations devoted to good 
works: caring for the sick, teaching the young, housing orphans, and the 
like. Later on, their organizational purposes grew to encompass agitation 
on behalf of social causes … and self-improvement through intellectual 
and literary pursuits” allowing women – particularly educated, white, 
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and middle-class women – to develop skills and “exercise public influence 
otherwise denied them” (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba, 2001: 73-74; see also 
Lerner, 1979; Baker, 1984; Giddings, 1984; Cott, 1987; Kunzel, 1991).
As bystander publics engage in these democratic processes, they are often 
unorganized. In this sense, bystander publics resemble “issue publics,” or 
loose groupings of people who share a common, but often latent, interest in a 
particular issue (Converse, 1964; Hutchings, 2003; Krosnick, 1990). Members 
of these publics might be relatively quiescent or very action-oriented; they 
may be budding allies or potential opponents. The public could be large or 
small, with a well-developed civic infrastructure or only loose ties between 
people. People may not identify as members of an issue public, and they may 
not be aware of the issue or active around it until it presents a threat to their 
interests. Issue publics (and similar bystander publics) may thus be primar-
ily imagined players. Movements and other strategic players may imagine 
that a reservoir of latent interest in (or opposition to) their issues exists, 
but be unsure about how large, developed, or organized that public is. They 
may imagine that a bystander public is ready to act, but be unsure of what 
the triggers to action are. With respect to issue publics, scholars theorize 
that the issue public rises up like a “sleeping giant” when its interests are 
threatened, thus clarifying its interests in the process (Hutchings, 2003). 
Until that threat exists, however, issue publics are extremely heterogeneous, 
largely imagined publics. Despite being unorganized, a bystander public is 
poised to rise up in response to threat precisely because it has engaged in 
the Tocquevillian processes described above that help it develop a sense of 
culture that shapes the strategic choices it makes.
Bystander publics and movements each have their own interests that 
they seek to enact in the relationship they form with each other. Uncovering 
these interests is often a relational exercise itself. In choosing whether and 
how to engage with a bystander public, organizers must f irst get to know 
them through a process of relationship-building. Because the bystander 
public is largely imagined until it becomes an organized player, movements 
rely on individualized processes of relationship-building to get to know and 
define these publics. As an organizer enters a community and begins to 
reach out to bystander publics, the beliefs, preferences, strategic interests, 
and resources they have to offer may not yet be clear. In his description of 
the Industrial Areas Foundation, for example, Mark Warren (2001) describes 
the patient relational work in which organizers engage as they get to know 
a community and map its publics before they attempt to organize it on a 
particular issue. Much of this interpersonal work is done with bystander 
publics, or groups and individuals who have yet to engage with the move-
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ment. The relationship-building process is an exploratory phase, but can 
also shape the interactions that emerge. Many elements of their social 
context affect the way in which bystanders process information about the 
social and political world, whether they interpret information and form 
narratives that lead to civic and political action, and the kinds of civic 
skills they develop (see, for example, Zuckerman, 2005). People participate 
in politics for myriad reasons, among these motivations are often social 
ones (Han, 2009; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Green and Gerber, 2004). 
The social context within which movements develop relationships with 
bystander publics can influence the choices members of each group make.
Even when they are not actively engaged in action together, then, by-
stander publics and social movements do not stand in isolation relative to 
one another. Instead, movement organizers engage in ongoing attempts 
to assess the micro- and macro-level dynamics within relevant publics. 
That is, they engage in the kinds of one-on-one relationship-building with 
individual members of a community that Warren (2001) describes, as well 
as in macro-level imagining and strategizing about ways to reach out to new 
constituencies and mobilize bystander publics. Lee, for example, describes 
how civil rights movement organizers built coalitions across large organiza-
tions that helped them mobilize progressive white liberals to their side 
(2002). Blee and McDowell (2012) show how the shifting interpretations 
social movement groups ascribed to their audience shaped the kind of 
strategic actions they wanted to take. At the same time as movement leaders 
assess the resources and power of a bystander public, individual members 
of those publics are engaged in social processes that lay the foundations for 
the democratic deliberation, skill-building, and action that puts them into 
direct relationship with a movement. These relationship-building processes 
help transform bystander publics from imagined players into potentially 
strategic players. If there is a “there there” in the bystander public, it may 
emerge as a strategic player relative to the movement, with each group 
assessing and anticipating the role of the other in fulf illing its strategic 
interests.
This dynamic relationship is thus critical to the development of a move-
ment’s identity and strategic agenda. Important questions remain, however, 
about the ways in which movements view, reach out to, and engage with 
bystander publics. How is public opinion mobilized by protestors and their 
opponents? What do bystander publics do before they are mobilized as 
players? How do movements strategize about the bystander publics and 
anticipate their reactions? Bystander publics f igure as symbolic (imagined) 
players even before they become engaged as actual players. Are they seen 
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accurately, or are they distorted in systematic ways? Although the bystander 
public is not a player per se, it is a player imagined and referenced by other 
players. How do such strategic interactions unfold? How do movements 
make choices about reaching out to bystander publics? What kind of 
mobilizing and rhetorical strategies are most likely to be effective? Under 
what conditions are these publics transformed into active participants? 
Although a complete answer to these many questions about the dynamic 
relationship between bystander publics and social movements is beyond 
the scope of this chapter, we can gain traction on some important aspects 
of them by examining the case of the Tea Party movement and Occupy Wall 
Street in the United States.
Bystander Publics, Economic Movements, and Intersectionality
The early development of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street demonstrates 
how decisions about how to engage with particular bystander publics reflect 
but also shape the values that movements come to embody. In particular, we 
examine the way the movements chose their targets and the ways in which 
they characterized the victims of economic injustice, focusing particularly 
on each one’s conceptualization and treatment of intersectional popula-
tions. These cases illustrate some of the ways in which movements make 
choices about which possible bystander publics they would engage, which 
ones they would ignore, and which ones they would cast as their opponents, 
and how these decisions both reflect and serve to construct each movement. 
Although both movements were stimulated by economic discontent, their 
relationships with bystander publics help us to understand how and why 
each one came to represent such divergent analyses of and responses to the 
economic problems of the f irst decade of the 21st century.
Intersectionality in the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street
“Intersectionally marginalized” is a term used to describe multiply mar-
ginalized groups, whose disadvantage is constituted by more than one 
form of inequality (Crenshaw, 1989). Low-income women, for example, 
experience disadvantages based on both their sex and their economic 
status. Theories of intersectionality were developed initially by feminists 
of color who were frustrated with a feminist movement that privileged and 
essentialized the experiences and positions of white women, representing 
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these as being those of “all women,” and also with a civil rights movement 
that similarly privileged and essentialized the experiences and positions 
of black men. While intersectionality has a long lineage, the term itself was 
coined and developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw, a legal scholar and critical 
race feminist theorist. As many readers know, theories of intersectionality 
contend that groups can be marginalized along many axes within what 
Patricia Hill Collins has called the “matrix of domination” (Collins, 1990; for 
other foundational articulations, see, inter alia, Crenshaw, 1989; Combahee 
River Collective, 1981; Hull, Scott, and Smith, 1982; Mohanty, 1988). From an 
intersectional perspective, these multiple forms of marginalization – in-
cluding race, gender, class, sexuality, age, and disability – do not function as 
“separate, f ixed, and parallel tracks, but are rather dynamic, simultaneous, 
and mutually constitutive” (Strolovitch, 2007: 24).
More generally, intersectional theories reject the notion that one particu-
lar form of domination or social relation – be it race, class, patriarchy, or 
heteronormativity – is the primary source of oppression. While they recog-
nize that important inequalities persist among racial, gender, or economic 
groups, intersectional approaches highlight overlapping and intersecting 
inequalities within marginal groups. These many forms of oppression and 
disadvantage are not static or rankable, and they do not operate along 
single axes in simple or additive ways. Instead of functioning as separate, 
f ixed, and parallel tracks, they are at once dynamic and structural, and 
they create cumulative inequalities that def ine, shape, and reinforce one 
another in ways that constitute the relative positions and opportunities of 
differently situated members of marginalized groups. The effects of these 
multiple forms of discrimination are compounded, exponential, and unique 
products that are different from and far greater than the sum of their parts, 
creating unique dimensions of disempowerment for differently situated 
subgroups. Most central for analytic purposes is that because they are 
mutually constituted, specif ic forms of disadvantage and privilege cannot 
be understood, much less addressed, in isolation.
At the heart of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street movements are con-
cerns about economic conditions – and hence intersectionally marginalized 
populations – in the United States. Economic issues in the US are ideologi-
cally fraught, however, and economic inequalities intersect and overlap with 
other axes of inequality, including racial and gender marginalization, both 
in their constitution and manifestation as well as in people’s ideas about 
their origins, effects, and solutions. As a consequence, many of the issues 
taken up by these two movements have particular effects on members of 
intersectionally marginalized groups.
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The Tea Party began after an on-air tirade by CNBC commentator 
Rick Santelli, who blamed “irresponsible” homeowners for the mortgage 
foreclosure crisis. While the situation was not labeled or treated as a crisis 
until it began to affect moderate-income whites, it has disproportionately 
affected low-income people of color. Occupy Wall Street also developed 
out of economic concerns, but one that harnessed the growing feelings of 
powerlessness felt by many in the face of rising economic disparities and the 
increasing institutional power of Wall Street and the wealthiest 1 percent 
of the population. Although Occupy claims to stand for the “99 percent” of 
Americans who are left out of what they characterize as a power grab on 
the part of elites, the most affected populations are often intersectionally 
marginalized ones.
This shared focus on economic conditions initially led many scholars and 
journalists to note the similarities between the two movements. Although 
we do not want to overstate the extent of their similarity, the two move-
ments share what seem at f irst glance to be striking parallels. “Occupy 
Wall Street movement intrigues, confounds the Tea Party,” declared one 
headline in the October 18, 2011, issue of the Christian Science Monitor. 
The article continued by noting that “[s]ome commentators are drawing 
parallels between the two populist uprisings – opposition to government 
bailouts of corporations is one prominent example – and some have even 
suggested a big-tent merger that could yield policy to alleviate the economic 
dissatisfaction, political powerlessness, and middle-class angst that drives 
both movements” (Johnson, 2011). The article quoted Rory McVeigh, director 
of the Center for the Study of Social Movements at the University of Notre 
Dame, who said, “We’ve … got a conservative populist movement and a 
progressive populist movement happening at the same time. … There’s a 
sense on both sides that it’s us against that unnamed force out there running 
the world.” The two movements arose at similar times and in response to 
similar phenomena. Both claimed to be “big tents” that focus on economic 
issues rather than on so-called social issues. Both claimed to be populist 
movements and to speak for broad swaths of nonelite publics.
Despite these similarities, the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street have 
diverged in the ways they characterize and react to intersectional popula-
tions, revealing vast differences in what each one stands for. As grassroots 
movements, both have resisted the attempt to label them or specify precisely 
what their goals and claims are.2 Nonetheless, certain positions are clear. 
While the Tea Party blamed marginalized groups such as mortgage default-
ers and their government enablers, Occupy Wall Street reached out to these 
groups as the victims, rather than causes, of economic problems. While 
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both movements address issues related to inequality, the Tea Party might 
be seen as attempting to mobilize bystander publics of resentful members 
of dominant groups while the bystander publics for Occupy Wall Street 
are marginalized groups and intersectionally marginalized subgroups of 
these broader populations. A key axis of difference between the move-
ments is apparent in the way each one identif ies and defines the “unnamed 
force” that is “running the world,” and, consequently, who it identif ies as its 
antagonists and its potential adherents. As most readers know, where the 
Tea Party espouses diagnoses and solutions that are typically conservative, 
Occupy Wall Street’s positions are typically left-progressive. While the 
Tea Party focuses its anger on government, Occupy directs its energies 
to opposing the power of Wall Street and large f inancial institutions. In 
addition, while Occupy Wall Street wants to try to overthrow existing power 
structures, the Tea Party attempts to mobilize constituencies who want to 
maintain the status quo. So while leaders and participants in each move-
ment may have felt “economically disaffected,” the institutions they blame 
for this disaffection are different. Examining how each one conceives of 
and treats intersectional populations thus provides insight into the values 
that underlie the identity and claims of each movement. To understand 
how these choices emerged, we next examine the way the relationship 
between each movement and its bystander publics shaped the choices each 
one made on this front.
Bystander Publics, the Tea Party, and Occupy Wall Street
The Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street serve as excellent cases through 
which to examine bystander publics, revealing as they do the strategic 
choices and dilemmas movements confront about mobilizing possible 
participants to join their cause. Both movements originated with viral 
outcries against powerful political and economic institutions that sparked 
rapid reactions among a previously unorganized public. The Tea Party owes 
its name to Rick Santelli, a former futures trader and the vice president of 
Drexel Burnham Lambert, a major Wall Street banking f irm. In February 
2009, Santelli delivered a rant on CNBC against the Obama administration’s 
planned assistance to foreclosed homeowners and what he characterized 
as the irresponsibility of those homeowners. Although his overt goal was 
simply to voice his anger and discontent, as he was speaking, he urged “all 
you capitalists” to join him in a Chicago Tea Party on Lake Michigan to 
dump derivative securities into the water. This call elicited cheers from 
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the traders around him on the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
The video spread virally through YouTube, and within hours someone had 
created a website, “Off icialChicagoTeaParty.com.”
Similarly, Occupy Wall Street began with a clarion call to protest. In 2011, 
the radical bi-monthly magazine Adbusters sent an email to its supporters 
calling for a protest against Wall Street. Adbusters was run by 69-year-old 
Kalle Lasn, a refugee from Estonia who had spent his early years in German 
refugee camps fleeing the Russian Army during World War II, and Micah 
White, the 29-year-old son of a white mother and an African-American 
father who says, “I don’t really f it in with either group” (Schwartz, 2011). Lasn 
and White ran Adbusters together in Canada, creating a magazine known 
for its vivid imagery. Characteristically, in their call to arms, they used a 
powerful image of a ballerina poised on Wall Street’s “Charging Bull” statue, 
with pictures of protestors in the background f ighting through clouds 
of tear gas. Unlike other attempts to foment protest that the magazine 
had tried to provoke, this email spread quickly, prompting White to say, 
“Normal campaigns are lots of drudgery and not much payoff, like rolling 
a snowball up a hill. This was the reverse” (Schwartz, 2011). Only 15 minutes 
after Adbusters sent the email, 26-year-old Justine Tunney read it. It took 
her only one day to register the name OccupyWallSt.org, which eventually 
became the movement’s online hub.
As Santelli and Adbusters went viral, they faced the challenge of harness-
ing the energy created by the overwhelming response to their rhetoric and 
organizing it into an actual protest that could have an impact on politics and 
public policy. Each budding movement imagined a larger group of unorgan-
ized bystanders who shared their outrage about economic issues but had 
not yet joined the movement. Building the movement involved a series of 
strategic choices about how to partner with organized bystander publics 
to develop the resources they needed, while still growing the support they 
were building among this unorganized but imagined group of bystanders. 
To do so, each movement built on an existing infrastructure of networks 
and groups that predated their call to action.
By many accounts, neither Santelli nor Adbusters had anticipated how 
powerfully their message would resonate with discontented bystanders 
around the country. Two weeks after Santelli delivered his rant in Chi-
cago, dozens of Tea Party protests had risen up around the country. These 
protests drew both organized and unorganized bystanders. Many were 
disaffected individuals who had heard about the protests through online 
and traditional media – bystander publics who became activated once 
they heard a resonant call to action. Other publics were more organized, 
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drawing on existing social networks and structures. Keli Carender, for 
example, was a blogger in Seattle who had called for a “Porkulus” protest 
against government waste a week before Santelli’s rant. Her f irst protest, 
which occurred three days before Santelli went viral, did not draw enough 
people to f inish all the pork that had been donated by conservative writer 
Michelle Malkin. In the end, Carender took the leftover pork to a homeless 
shelter (Zernike, 2010).
Although turnout for the Porkulus protest was small, Carender began 
to build a relationship with bystander publics that allowed her to better 
understand her audience, draw resources from them, and take advantage of 
the energy that emerged once Santelli’s rant went viral. She capitalized on 
the energy sparked by Santelli to remobilize the relationships she had built 
with conservative groups and media. These groups helped her publicize 
and organize for another protest a week later – which doubled in size. Six 
weeks later, she hosted another protest that drew 1,200 people. Within a 
year, she was being flown to Washington by Freedom Works to be more 
formally trained in organizing and activism. Founded in 1984, Freedom 
Works became a national hub for Tea Party activity once local groups began 
to sprout around the country, using its existing infrastructure to provide 
support to the entire grassroots movement.
Adbusters also benefited from the infrastructure of preexisting social 
networks and groups that helped turn its email message into a movement, 
albeit very different ones than those that the Tea Party had been able to 
access and exploit. Adbusters was also not the f irst to call for an occupation 
of Wall Street. On June 14, 2011, a group called Operation Empire State 
Rebellion had called for an occupation of Zuccotti Park, but only four 
people showed up (Bennett, 2011). The Adbusters call to arms was different, 
however, because it spread quickly through the social networks of people 
on its email list. After Tunney created the website OccupyWallSt.org, for 
instance, she began operating it with a team of people who were, like her, 
mostly transgender anarchists. They did not come together spontaneously, 
but instead had been part of a preexisting social network.
Similarly, as White witnessed the viral spread of the email, he began 
to seek partnerships with other publics who could help him bridge his 
relationship with his audience. He reached out to other organizations like 
New Yorkers Against Budget Cuts (NYABC), a group of student and labor 
activists who could help organize an actual protest among bystander publics 
to which they were connected. This group had come to fame months before 
when they erected “Bloombergville,” a tent city around City Hall to protest 
New York City’s mayor, Michael Bloomberg. NYABC had been planning a 
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protest on Wall Street on August 2, a month before Adbusters’s proposed 
protest. The group agreed to devote some time at the protest to planning 
for Occupy Wall Street, but this decision caused some conflict. At the rally 
on August 2, students and labor activists supporting NYABC tried to run a 
traditional rally with speakers, alienating the anarchists who came wanting 
a “leaderless” form of assembly. After some shouting, a group of anarchists 
broke off, starting their own meeting and establishing the norm that Occupy 
would be run through leaderless general assemblies (Bennett, 2011). The 
two groups were not, in other words, necessarily natural allies, but White 
needed the help of NYABC to organize Adbusters’s protest.
Both the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street characterize themselves as 
“leaderless” movements, but the foregoing account of their origins makes 
clear that each one relied on the access of key individuals to organizations 
and networks with preexisting infrastructures – to, in other words, by-
stander publics – to help the movement spread. The structure and makeup 
of these organizations and networks – in other words, their relationship 
to the bystander publics – inf luenced the way the movement began to 
def ine itself. The bystander publics thus became players. When Santelli’s 
rant went viral, for instance, FreedomWorks seized on it, creating a website 
called “I’m with Rick” the next day. Initially a bystander public, but already 
a political group, FreedomWorks wanted to create a closer partnership 
with the movement. FreedomWorks was a long-standing conservative 
organization led by former House Majority Leader Dick Armey that had 
been f ighting losing battles for a less activist government. The organiza-
tion lacked a viable grassroots infrastructure, but its early support of the 
Tea Parties endeared it to the movement. As the movement continued 
to build momentum, the partnership between the insurgent Tea Parties 
and FreedomWorks became a marriage of convenience: FreedomWorks 
provided the “unstructured activists” with “political know-how” while the 
Tea Partiers provided FreedomWorks with “street cred” and valuable “free 
labor in battleground districts” (Bennett, 2011).
Occupy Wall Street similarly drew on the support of progressive institu-
tions and organizations. For example, although it began with a loose collec-
tion of anarchist organizations, beginning with White’s initial partnership 
with NYABC, it quickly developed partnerships with unions and other labor 
organizations. One of New York’s largest municipal employees unions threw 
its support behind Occupy Wall Street, helping to ensure large turnouts for 
its protests (Ungerleider, 2011). “Big labor” initially sat back, maintaining a 
position as a watchful bystander. By October, however, the labor bystander 
public had become an engaged part of the movement, as major unions and 
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union organizations like the AFL-CIO, SEIU, and the Teamsters endorsed 
Occupy, offering boots on the ground, organizing experience and sup-
port, and a wealth of other resources (Kroll, 2011). Occupy maintained its 
commitment to “horizontal” organization and anarchist practices in its 
decision-making, but it was undeniably drawing on the support of organized 
groups on the left. The involvement of these and other groups illustrates 
what Jasper characterizes as the “powerful allies dilemma” in which the 
resources and support of more powerful groups and individuals helps 
broaden and publicize the movement but can also water down its goals 
and curtail its radicalism (Jasper, 2006: 129). While powerful allies can be 
important, then, they are more likely to change the movement or use it for 
their purposes than they are to be changed by it.
Discussion
It was far from inevitable that either Santelli’s tirade or Adbusters’s email 
would spark a movement. People like Keli Carender and Operation Empire 
State Rebellion had tried to foment similar protests but had failed to mobi-
lize bystander publics, or imagine their audience as a player, as effectively as 
Santelli and Adbusters. Once they began to mobilize opinion through their 
viral battle cries, the early organizers of what would eventually become the 
Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street partnered strategically with groups that 
could provide valuable organizing resources and infrastructure to turn an 
ideological cry into a movement. In the early days, then, they were mobiliz-
ing the opinion of bystander publics through their ideological stances, but 
also the resources of other publics through their strategic partnerships. 
With each choice about with whom they would partner, each movement 
was also making choices about the values it would embody. By partnering 
with labor, for instance, Occupy Wall Street made common cause with one 
of the most longstanding advocates of economic justice and workers’ rights. 
The Tea Party, in contrast, partnered with groups like FreedomWorks, which 
explicitly turned a blind eye to questions of socio-political injustice, focus-
ing solely on the effort to remove government intervention in the economy, 
regardless of the impact it had on marginalized groups. The implications 
of these choices become clearer in an examination of how each movement 
characterized and interacted with intersectional populations.
Given the early partnerships that each movement built with these other 
actors, their divergent reactions to and relationships with marginalized 
groups and intersectionally marginalized groups in particular are not 
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surprising. Indeed, in spite of what might have seemed at f irst to be a similar 
sense of grassroots economic disaffection at the root of each movement, 
the radically divergent ways in which each one has characterized economic 
inequality is not surprising given the partnerships they were creating with 
bystander publics. Moreover, and most relevant to thinking about bystander 
publics, both the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street attempted to appeal 
to broad publics by seeming to try to focus on “economic issues.” However, 
in trying to cast a wide net so that they might mobilize a wide array of 
marginalized groups that comprised these bystander publics, each quickly 
faced challenges: Occupy Wall Street was accused of being insuff iciently 
attentive to racialized poverty, as well as to issues of empire, gender, sexual-
ity. For its part, although the Tea Party had claimed to want to avoid “social” 
issues, the positions of many movement participants on issues such as 
immigration, welfare, same-sex marriage, and reproductive rights were 
diff icult to contain and quickly began to define its relationship with several 
bystander publics by groups such as undocumented immigrants, feminists, 
people who defaulted on their mortgages, and recipients of public assistance 
as antagonists, thereby narrowing the range of possible sympathizers.
Conclusion
What do the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street teach us about bystander 
publics? In their inception, movements seize on networks and organizing 
attempts that have already been made – this was true with storied social 
movements like Rosa Parks and the Montgomery Bus Boycott (Branch, 
1989), and was true of both the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street. Both 
movements grew out of a viral reaction spread quickly through online 
networks. The organizations and individuals that sparked this reaction 
could not have anticipated how it would spread, but once it began to spread, 
a range of organizations and groups (bystander publics) sought to seize on 
the momentum. As these publics tried to negotiate new relationships with 
the movement, movement organizers had to make fast choices about which 
partnerships to create and which ones to reject. Often, they made these 
choices strategically, thinking about the resources each public could bring 
to the movement. Indirectly, these choices also affected the movement’s 
identity. How the movement spreads in the bystander publics thus begins 
to shape the values the movement comes to embody, and the strategic 
choices it makes about who is “in” and who is “out.” Both movements began 
by drawing on long-standing economic and socio-political discontent 
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among the middle-class, but spread among radically different networks. 
The indigenous groups, organizations, and social institutions that organize 
people’s social worlds shaped the biases of each network and, eventually, 
the way each movement addressed questions of economic injustice.
These cases thus provide important insights into our understanding of 
bystander publics. First, they make clear that these publics are not passive 
consumers of the movement. Instead, they are actively engaged in demo-
cratic processes that help them develop resources that movements may later 
seek out. Second, the choices that movements make about partnering with 
or rejecting certain bystander publics affects the identities these move-
ments develop. With respect to the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street, we 
saw this in the divergent reactions they had to intersectional populations. 
While Occupy Wall Street conceptualized these marginalized groups as 
victims, the Tea Party sought blame. Had each movement developed differ-
ent relationships with bystander publics, or had the publics had different 
resources to offer, the choices they made may have been quite different.
Notes
1. Note that in The Art of Moral Protest, James Jasper asserts that the term 
“resources” should be restricted to money and the things it can buy, and not 
include people and the things they do. 
2. As such, broad debate exists about exactly what the demands of each move-
ment are (Parker and Baretto, 2013; Skocpol and Williamson, 2012). 
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 Conclusion
Patterned Fluidity: An Interactionist Perspective as a Tool 
for Exploring Contentious Politics
Jan Willem Duyvendak and Olivier Fillieule
In this book, a strategic interaction perspective (SIP) has been applied by 
authors coming from various disciplinary backgrounds and theoretical 
traditions. In a way, by participating in this book, the authors are making a 
statement: we all agree that an approach focusing on the strategic interaction 
among players in arenas has much to offer the study of protest, particularly 
compared to the previously – and overly – dominant contentious politics 
model. Other attempts have been made recently in the same direction, 
mainly in critically referring to the theory of f ields elaborated by Pierre 
Bourdieu (Mathieu, 2012; Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). While we largely 
share their ambition, we are convinced that an interactionist approach is bet-
ter equipped to deal with the challenges raised here than the concept of f ield 
is. In this conclusion, we will defend this innovative approach, outlining the 
strong advantages of the notions of the “social world” and “arena” (as opposed 
to the concept of f ield) and the virtue of what we will call a “dispositionalist 
interactionism” in order to make sense of micro-mobilization processes 
and agency in interactions (as opposed to structuralist and rational choice 
theories). Thus, we honor James Jasper’s pioneering work, while at the same 
time engaging in discussions with him and other authors of this volume 
regarding various aspects that deserve further elaboration.
Jasper has developed a broad strategic interaction perspective, dealing 
with various players and arenas – and not merely players involved in protest. 
In particular, he developed this perspective in Getting Your Way: Strategic 
Dilemmas in the Real World (2006). In this conclusion, we will defend this 
innovative approach as indeed a major step forward in our understanding 
of both more and less ritualized forms of interaction, notably protest. We 
would claim, however, that even though the SIP can be applied to various 
forms of interaction, it contributes especially to our understanding of the 
least institutionalized, the least routinized forms of interactions, such as 
those between movements and their targets. Both players and arenas are 
very fluid in the context of protest and change, and it is precisely this fluidity 
which is a central tenet of the SIP. It should come as no surprise that it was 
as a scholar of protest that Jasper developed this dynamic perspective.
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At the same time, we will argue that there is a risk of overestimating the 
fluidity of players, even in the case of protestors, and that we should look 
for patterns in the fluidity. Players are not formed overnight, nor do they 
totally change in the interaction itself. Although we agree with Jasper that 
players constantly reinvent themselves, we should still pay attention to 
where they come from and how that informs the strategic choices they make 
in the hic et nunc. Socialization, norms, rules and cultural notions predating 
interactions do count, even for protestors who might feel cognitively and 
emotionally “liberated.”
The Best of SIP
Let us start with what we consider the main contributions of the strategic 
interaction approach. In the first place, as this volume shows, the SIP centers 
our attention on the various players that protesters must contend with. 
These are more or less institutionalized players, more or less supportive 
of their causes, or more or less coercive. This opening up of the possible 
worlds of interaction stands in sharp contrast to much recent research on 
protest that has become very “movement centric.” In that sense we agree 
with McAdam and Boudet (2012): “The f ield of social movement studies 
has expanded dramatically through the past three decades. But as it has 
done so, its focus has become increasingly narrow and ‘movement centric.’” 
By this they mean: “The f ield’s preoccupation with movement groups and 
general neglect of other actors who also shape the broader ‘episodes of 
contention’ in which movements are typically embedded” (McAdam and 
Boudet, 2012: 2). This book – dealing with so many players (and subplayers) 
and arenas – can be read as an answer to their criticism that movement 
scholars have increasingly neglected the broader constellation of political 
and economic (f)actors:
In focusing primarily on movements, the emerging community of move-
ment scholars began unwittingly to push to the margins the very actors 
– economic elites, state off icials and political parties – that had been 
central to much of the pioneering work that shaped the f ield in the f irst 
place. Gradually, Ptolemy replaced Copernicus as the guiding spirit of the 
emerging f ield. Instead of situating movements in a fuller constellation 
of political and economic forces and actors, movements and movement 
groups increasingly came to be the central animating focus of the f ield. 
(McAdam and Boudet, 2012: 22)
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Paying attention to the broader context – as authors do in this book – doesn’t 
mean, however, that one must prioritize macro-factors over meso- and 
micro-, or political and economic aspects over cultural and emotional ones. 
On the contrary, instead of a move back to Marxist, structuralist times 
favoring macro-factors, the SIP proposes to make, what we would call, a 
lateral move. In the words of Jasper: “The main constraints on what protes-
tors can accomplish are not determined directly by economic and political 
structures so much as they are imposed by other players with different 
goals and interests” (Jasper, this volume). This book’s lateral move implies 
that a SIP is about various players in the same social space; it is through 
and in strategic interaction with others in specif ic arenas that differences 
in economic resources, persuasion and positions become apparent. It is 
in the “horizontal” strategic interaction itself, and not in political forces 
from “above” or, for that matter, economic forces from “below,” that these 
economic, political, and cultural differences materialize, that they are 
experienced.
The parts of the book dealing with market arenas and experts and with 
intellectuals and media clearly demonstrate the broad perspective that 
a SIP encourages. However, the f irst section on “supporters,” including 
Chapter 1 on factions, and Chapter 2 on fractions, should not be misread 
as exclusively dealing with movement-internal affairs. Both convincingly 
show the impact of the “outside,” indeed, they fundamentally question 
the very distinction between movement inside and outside, and posit the 
irreducible heterogeneity of players within movements.
Second, but related to the previous point, the SIP is not a deductive, 
“distanced” way of analyzing protest; it helps us to empirically understand 
the dynamics and outcomes. This stands in sharp contrast to approaches 
dominant in the US for decades, such as the “early” “political opportunity 
structure” approach, that relied (too) heavily on structural models. Move-
ments were portrayed as facing contexts with structural characteristics, but 
rarely as autonomous players actively pursuing their goals. Recent proposi-
tions attacking this problem converge on more strategic and interactionist 
models. For instance, this is the case in France where the study of social 
movements, strongly influenced by Bourdieu’s critical sociology, has long 
paid particular attention to interaction dynamics within different f ields 
(Fillieule, 1997; Agrikoliansky, Fillieule, and Mayer, 2005; Sommier, Fillieule, 
and Agrikoliansky, 2008; Péchu, 2006; Mathieu, 2012). Strategic and f ield 
approaches have also developed in the American literature, particularly, 
but not exclusively, due to James Jasper’s repeated calls for a perspective 
oriented toward the analysis of strategic interactions between players across 
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different arenas (Jasper, 2004; 2006), as well as Fligstein and McAdam’s 
(2012) conceptualization of strategic action f ields, which directly relies 
on Bourdieu’s concept of f ields as spaces of struggle opposing incumbent 
actors and their challengers.
In the introduction to this book, Jasper argues for a “doing justice to real-
ity” approach. He stresses that the analytical use of “capacities” or “strategic 
means” is “more concrete” than Bourdieu’s forms of capital, and far more 
inductive than very abstract analyses in terms of “power.” Yet a SIP has a 
better understanding of not only the means of protest; the same is true – 
according to Jasper – for the goals: “Strategic theories have the advantage 
of encouraging (or forcing) the researcher to acknowledge a range of goals 
through empirical investigation rather than deductive theory”. Moreover, 
he states that “we need to do this kind of work if we wish to acknowledge 
the lived experience of human beings”. Even though this may sound quite 
ambitious to some, we agree with Jasper that a lot of the theorizing, and 
particularly the “modeling” in recent sociology has taken us far (too far) 
from those actual experiences (Bertossi and Duyvendak, 2012; Bertossi, 
Duyvendak, and Schain, 2012).
Structuralism was not only highly problematic because of its deduc-
tive way of analyzing protest behavior, but also because it needed stable, 
“superimposed” categories (and it never showed much interest in whether 
people “experienced” those categories, whether these made any “sense” to 
them). Thus, the f irst task for a SIP is to destabilize all a priori categories, to 
de-essentialize any particular characteristics of players and arenas, and to 
show that movements are indeed “on the move,” diff icult to grasp. Another 
way of saying this is that structuralist analyses have been particularly prob-
lematic for (the research on) social movements, since the latter are the least 
structural, the least routinized, the most challenging of everything fixed and 
stable. In situations of cognitive liberation (McAdam, 1999), “everything solid 
melts into air”; the impossible is perceived as possible because people have a 
new look at reality and a new “feeling” about what is possible. Old categories 
blur and therefore social movement scholars will always emphasize that 
the quintessence of protest behavior is the embattledness of the possible.
In that sense it comes as no surprise that Jasper in his introduction 
underlines the importance of agency and choice – the fact that protestors 
think they have options:
A great deal of sociology has been devoted to showing why people have 
fewer choices than they think. Social facts, structures, networks, institu-
tional norms or logics all emphasize constraints. Various kinds of habits 
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and routines are introduced to explain the stability of interactions, most 
recently in the guise of the habitus, an internalized set of dispositions 
for reacting in predictable ways even while improvising slightly within 
the set.
As a matter of fact, any scholar familiar with social movement research 
knows that the existing literature overwhelmingly relies on three different 
tools, all – at f irst sight – marginalizing the role of agency: structural condi-
tions (political opportunity structures, the density of horizontal networks 
and links to the elite, suddenly imposed grievances, etc.), cultural idioms 
(cultural frames, Weltanschauung , traditions, etc.) and mobilization 
structures (leadership, material and organizational resources). As Rod 
Aya argues ironically, in this tripartite configuration, structures, culture 
and the availability of resources dictate the course of events; conversely, 
these events can also provoke changes in existing structures, cultures 
and resources. And yet, in this framework, “structure (with an assist from 
culture) constrains agency to make the events – by violence; and the events 
constrain agency to change the structure – again by violence. Agency is the 
Third Man between structure and event who does the killing and coerc-
ing. He makes the action happen” (Aya, 2001: 144). As a result, even in the 
most structuralist models, individuals are at one point or another called 
upon to explain “the transition from word to deed,” thus surreptitiously 
introducing a rational choice approach without admitting it. It is thus not 
surprising that, under such conditions, the existing literature ceaselessly 
swings between rather unconvincing binary oppositions: the spontaneity of 
the masses and emotional contagion, versus the calculated and manipula-
tive actions of group leaders; and the reliance on established forms and 
cognitive shortcuts during routine situations and the prevalence of tactical 
choices and innovation – usually attributed only to leaders – in situations 
of structural uncertainty (Bennani-Chraïbi and Fillieule, 2012).
We desperately need a more balanced perspective on the role of agency. 
We are therefore sympathetic to Jasper’s call for renewed attention to the 
importance of choice (read: agency), although he may run the risk of over-
estimating what people in most situations experience as changeable since 
strategic interactions are always “situated,” that is, historically established: 
the social norms involved therein are and have been the object of gradual, 
multiple, and simultaneous developments. The fact that interactions have 
been changing over time doesn’t mean that the interaction pattern can 
easily be transformed at any point in the future. Jasper is certainly right that 
too many sociologists have been looking at rather stable series of interac-
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tions – but that is not a reason to misrecognize the stability of many forms 
of interactions.
When and why people experience choice and have the option to dra-
matically change the interaction or, vice versa, when and why people do 
not experience these options, makes a huge difference. We should not too 
hastily generalize from the experiences of players in protest interaction – 
who might think about themselves as having multiple options and, hence, 
agency – to all forms of strategic interaction. We think that it is empiri-
cally useful to distinguish between various types of strategic interactions: 
between players who are part of the routinized organization of the social 
world and players involved in mobilization, when enormous shifts may 
occur: in meanings, in feelings and, consequently, in strategic interaction. 
This book clearly deals with the latter group of players and interactions.
In what follows, we start by critically discussing the notion of a f ield 
of contention (Bourdieu, 1984), which is gaining importance in social 
movements literature, before contrasting it with the concepts of the 
social world and arena (Strauss, 1978; Strauss, 1982; Strauss, 1984; Becker, 
1982). In this discussion, we stress that the fluidity of protest interactions 
makes the concept of arena more apt than the concept of f ield. In the 
second part, we look for patterns in fluidity, going beyond SIP’s fascination 
with the hic et nunc, the synchronic. We argue that one should take into 
account actors’ socialization and dispositions, as well as their cultural 
and historical dimensions, when exploring the micro-foundations of 
interactions.
The Misleading Metaphor of Fields of Contention
Social movements have a historically specif ic origin that parallels the 
development of modernity itself, starting at the end of the 18th century 
(Gusf ield, 1978). The rise of state-building, capitalism, urbanization, and 
communications provided the impetus for the development of the division 
of labor, f irst labeled by Durkheim in 1893 as “social differentiation.” By this 
term, we mean a historic process that affects society and which suggests a 
greater complexity of social relationships. This evolution results from the 
repeated creation of previously nonexistent specialized structures. Many 
theories attempt to account for this structuring of the social world in more 
or less independent spaces. Depending on the scholar, there is talk of fields 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), organizational fields (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983), sectors (Scott and Meyer, 1983), games (Scharpf, 1997), networks (Powell 
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et al., 2005), or, in the case of the government, policy domains (Laumann and 
Knoke, 1987) and polity systems/subsystems (Sabatier, 2007), and markets 
in the economic realm (Fligstein, 1991; 2001). Social movement scholars 
have also tried to conceive of movements as specif ic social orders, starting 
with the seminal work of McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1977) who coined the 
concepts of social movement organizations (SMOs) and social movement 
industries (SMIs) or the closely related concept of multi-organizational fields 
(Curtis and Zurcher, 1973), referring to all organizations (including both 
opponents and supporters) with which a protest movement interacts. More 
recently, scholars have started to recognize that organizations are not the 
only mobilizing structures in social movements and that social movements 
do not have members but participants (e.g., Oliver, 1989; Diani, 1992). Among 
others, the concepts of submerged networks (Melucci, 1989), ideologically 
structured action (Zald, 2000), social movement networks (Diani and Bison, 
2004) and social movement communities (Buechler, 1990; Taylor and Whittier, 
1992; Lichterman, 1995) have helped to conceptualize the diffuse nature of 
protest activities and their moving structures.
Yet, paraphrasing Jasper, all those definitions treat protest groups and 
other players asymmetrically, reducing the latter to the “environment” of 
the former, “a structural trick that reduces the agency of all players except 
protestors. … All players confront dilemmas, make choices, react to others 
and so on. We can only understand contention when we pay equal attention 
to all of them” (2004: 5; see also Walker, Martin, and McCarthy, 2008.) In 
recent years, the influence of Bourdieu’s theory of structuration on social 
movement scholars has brought to the forefront the powerful concept of 
f ield to describe the complex web of relationships and interactions among 
contentious movements. To our knowledge, Crossley (2003) was one of the 
f irst to use the notion of “f ields of contention,” followed by Fligstein and 
McAdam (2012) who speak of “strategic action f ields,” not to mention the 
numerous French scholars whose intellectual training drives them naturally 
to refer to Bourdieu’s concepts, which they adopt (on “activist f ields,” see 
Péchu, 2006) or adapt to the empirical reality they are studying (on “spaces 
of contention,” see Mathieu, 2012).
Our interactionist perspective justif ies speaking about “social worlds” 
and “arenas” as well as our choice of not using the Bourdieusian term “field,” 
when we try to make sense of social movement emergence and activities. 
Let us explain. Much of Bourdieu’s work is devoted to the exploration of 
these social worlds endowed with specif ic explicit and implicit operating 
principles, but this is especially true of two of his works, The State Nobility 
(1996a) and The Rules of Art (1996b). A f ield is defined as a social subworld, a 
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sphere of social life which, over time, has become increasingly autonomous 
and distinct from other f ields, with its own specif ic social relations, issues 
and resources. We are not all driven by the same motivations or seek the 
same rewards in the religious f ield, the f ield of sports, and the political 
f ield.
As a result, two crucial elements appear in this theory, that of the 
boundaries of the f ield, and that of the relations that each f ield has with 
its environment. According to Bourdieu, the members of the f ield are 
constantly working to exclude those lacking the capital specif ic to the 
f ield. A major methodological consequence is that it is not up to sociologists 
to determine the boundaries of a f ield. Instead, their task is to study the 
battles of different agents to def ine the border, to try to invade the f ield, or 
to maintain their position in the f ield. This means that the f ields are not 
totally set in stone but are instead subject to the influence of other f ields 
while they, in turn, may influence other f ields. Therefore, the f ields are not 
absolutely but, more or less, autonomous. In other words, they are more or 
less endowed with their own law, which is still disputed within each f ield 
and which may be subject to external influence, as when the constraints 
of profitability in the economic f ield have an impact on artistic creation. 
This focus on variations in autonomy draws our attention to the fact that 
there is a history in each f ield leading to progressive autonomization, the 
f ield then acquiring its own rules of the game, from a specif ic ideology, and 
institutions responsible for playing the role of gatekeeper. It is in The Rules 
of Art that Bourdieu offered his best empirical demonstration of the validity 
of the concept of f ield, by studying the autonomization of the artistic f ield 
in the 19th century, when artists managed to make a living from their art 
and to liberate themselves from patrons, at the same time that the ideology 
of “art for art’s sake” emerged.
The concept of the f ield is the most powerful concept we have today to 
examine the historical process of structuring our societies. Nonetheless, 
all the varieties of relations do not fall within f ields, and their forms of 
structuration and modes of functioning fail to fully account for protest 
activities in particular and their interactions with other social actors.
First, the real world cannot be wholly confined to the f ields. This does 
not exhaust the totality of differentiation phenomena. In fact, f ield theory 
is solely interested in relations between dominant forces and in describing 
the specialized worlds from which many are excluded. “The legitimism of 
f ield theory, which can be observed in the diminution of interest accorded 
to actors the more removed they are from the major agents in the f ield, is 
also not without problems in the study of all the dominated actors in the 
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f ield and of all the marginal forms of experience, weakly institutionalized” 
(Lahire, 2013: 164). This critique is particularly appropriate for social move-
ments, which only rarely mobilize the most legitimate social groups with the 
most resources. An analysis in terms of f ields would lead to an examination 
deliberately focused solely on the leaders and activists, ignoring the rank 
and f ile. Now, the force of any mobilization is also based on the power of 
numbers (DeNardo, 1985), the strength of those “external to the f ields.” 
The notion of strategic action f ields developed by Fligstein and McAdam 
is vulnerable to this critique as well, since they believe that, in using the 
metaphor of the Russian dolls, they have a universal concept applying to 
all social relations (including the relationship between two individuals). 
Now, as Lahire quite rightly observes: “In seeing ‘f ields’ everywhere, … 
we no longer see anything at all and the concept is no longer interesting” 
(Lahire, 2006: 44).
Secondly, the rules of f ield structuration do not take account of the func-
tioning of social movements. If we postulate that any genuinely constituted 
f ield is the culmination of a progressive process leading to the acquisition 
of its own specif ic ideology, principles of hierarchization and structuration, 
and institutions empowered to pronounce and guarantee verdicts on the 
internal struggles for hierarchization and trace the boundaries of the f ield 
in excluding laymen, we can conclude that the world of social movements 
does not constitute a f ield. The sphere of social movement players does not 
seem suff iciently institutionalized, structured, and unif ied to correspond 
to Bourdieu’s def inition (Mathieu, 2012). Here, three elements must be 
explained.
Not all individuals who devote themselves to protest activities are 
professional activists. Thus, it would be very reductionist to claim that 
the positions and practices of participants in protest activities could be 
explained by their position in the f ield. As Lemieux correctly observes: 
“The investment in the game, however wholeheartedly, cannot be ab-
solutely continuous, other social games having inevitably to be played 
as well, if only those organized around bios and oikos (the management 
of the domestic space, sexuality, health, family relations, the raising of 
children …)” (2011: 89; for a similar critique from a feminist standpoint, 
see McCall, 1992). The interactionist sociology of activism, in focusing 
on all spheres of individual life (family, professional, and so on) has 
demonstrated that life outside the f ield (prior to activism, as well as in 
other parallel activities) is important in understanding “activist careers” 
(Fillieule, 2001; 2010).
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In addition, the notion of the f ield suggests f ixed boundaries demarcat-
ing a f inite list of competitors. Now, the particularity of protest struggles 
is that the spatial limits are both shifting over time and specif ic to the 
causes concerned. Thus, the anti-AIDS movement saw its borders rede-
f ined when the state established public policies to combat the epidemic 
(Epstein, 1998; Voegtli and Fillieule, 2012), and it does not involve the same 
actors as, for example, the battle against drinking and driving (Gusf ield, 
1981). Finally, the particularity of protest battles is not to be part of the 
domains controlled by gatekeepers tasked with ensuring that borders 
are respected. The special nature of political mobilization concerns the 
ad hoc bringing together and opposition of diverse groupings, whatever 
their legal status (associations, NGOs, loose networks, unions, parties and 
even specif ic sectors of the state). Moreover, one of the central issues of 
any protest struggle is to obtain from state authorities the recognition 
of their legitimate right to act (Mathieu, 2012). The notion of strategic 
action f ields developed by Fligstein and McAdam suffers from the same 
f law of assuming a priori boundaries based on established formal rules, 
when they make the existence of “formal governance units that are 
charged with overseeing compliance with f ield rules and, in general, 
facilitating the overall smooth functioning of the system” (2012: 14) a 
def ining criterion.
Third, as Fligstein and McAdam (2012) do rightly stress, relations between 
social movements cannot be grasped only as relations of domination and 
competition, as is assumed in f ield theory. These relations may also reflect 
various forms of cooperation, indeed games of competitors-partners when 
the activities of opponents seem to constitute a vital driving force in the 
maintenance of mobilization and structures connected to the struggle. 
Overall, and to conclude with f ield theory (and its various proposed re-
formulations), it seems to us that it may accurately describe certain very 
hierarchical social subspheres, generally those where some players exercise 
power over some sector of the social realm. Yet, for all the reasons we have 
just presented, protest activities themselves are not part of a given and 
specif ic f ield. Contention is not limited to a circumscribed and relatively 
stable sphere of activity, more or less autonomous from other f ields.1 By 
nature, contentious activities develop at the margins or at the intersec-
tions of multiple f ields, depending on the issues at stake, as well as on the 
individual or complex players they mobilize or target. This is why we prefer 
to draw upon the notion of the arena to designate the space delineated by 
anti-establishment mobilization, a space by def inition specif ic to each 
cause and potentially shifting over time.
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The Social World and the Arena Perspective in the Interactionist 
Tradition
The perspective developed in this book suggests turning to another concep-
tion of the structuration of society, expressed in terms of “social worlds” and 
“arenas.” The interactionist tradition in its symbolist version (H. Blumer, G. 
H. Mead, and A. Strauss), as well as its rhetorical and dramaturgical version 
(E. Goffman and J. Gusfield), has a dual advantage. First, it draws particular 
attention to the link between individual, meso-, and macro-social levels, as 
well as to strategic interactions, from a dynamic and processual perspective, 
which rejects all structuralism (Blumer, 1969: 50).
Interaction defines the social world deliberately vaguely, as a network of 
actors cooperating to accomplish specific activities. It is up to the sociologist 
to identify who is acting with whom, to produce what, with what degree of 
regularity and based on which conventions. Approached in this way, the 
activities of cooperation and competition may be distributed along an axis, 
from the most routine, formally organized, and strictly repeated activi-
ties, to the most unstable, rapidly changing ones. One consequence of this 
theoretical approach is to deny the operational value of descriptions which 
establish strict boundaries and watertight classif ications. Any individual 
or complex player may at any moment be or get involved in a given world 
or subworld.
Therefore, the notion of a world has the advantage of being more inclusive 
than that of a f ield in not limiting the boundaries only to dominant actors. 
All those (individuals and organizations) are part of a given world who have 
a stake in the accomplishment of a task.
Our task becomes tracking groups of individuals who cooperate to 
produce things which belong to this world, at least in their eyes. A world is 
not strictly speaking a structure or an organization, but rather a network of 
individuals who cooperate so as to allow a given product to exist. Nonethe-
less, people caught in the same world may have divergent interests and, 
while the concepts of coordination and cooperation are central, they fall 
along a continuum, from entirely conflictual relationships to those of pure 
coordination.
The notion of a “world” is associated with that of an “arena.” In its drama-
turgical and rhetorical version, the term “public arenas” appeared f irst in 
Gusfield’s Symbolic Crusade (1963) to designate the space of status struggles 
over the issues of the temperance movement, and then in The Culture of 
Public Problems (1981), where Gusf ield studied the f ield of controversies 
around the public problem of drunk driving. For his part, Strauss used the 
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term “arenas” in Psychiatric Ideologies and Institutions (Strauss et al., 1964), 
to designate the idea of a “‘negotiated order,’ which emerges, takes shape 
and stabilizes within interactions, both within and between organizations” 
(Cefaï, 2007: 104). Strauss (1978: 124) explained the meaning:
Within each social world, various issues are debated, negociated, fought 
out, forced and manipulated by representatives of implicated subworlds. 
Arenas involve political activity but not necessarily legislative bodies 
and courts of law. Issues are also fought out within subworlds by their 
members. Representatives of other subworlds (same and other worlds) 
may also enter into the fray. Some of these social world issues may make 
front page news, but others are known only to members or to other 
interested parties. Social world media are full of such partially invisible 
arenas. Wherever there is intersecting of worlds and subworlds, we can 
expect arenas to form along with their associated political processes.
On this basis, we define an arena as a space both concrete (that is, from a 
dramaturgical perspective, the place and time of the staging of interactions, 
for example, the street or a courtroom) and symbolic (that is from a rhetori-
cal perspective, the site of the polemics or the controversy, of testimony, 
expertise, and deliberation) which brings together all the players, individual 
or complex, participating in the emergence, def inition and resolution of 
a problem. The arenas do not exist at the time the problem appears. It is 
the emergence of a problem that generates its contours as a function of 
individuals and groups which intervene in the situation, and mobilize a 
specif ic part of the social world or f ield,2 either openly or discreetly.3 This 
has numerous consequences.
First, a theoretical and disciplinary consequence is that the sociology of 
social movements and the sociology of public problems are closely related, 
as Blumer (1969) emphasized when he observed that social problems are the 
products of collective action. This echoes the calls from some scholars, on 
one side, in the f ield of social problems, such as Spector and Kitsuse (1973; 
1977) and, on the other side, from those involved in social movement studies 
(Benford and Hunt, 1992; Neveu, 1999; and Cefaï and Trom, 2001), since the 
two areas share “an interest in the ‘rhetoric of collective action’” def ined 
as “the demands of members of public institutions, advocacy groups and 
social movement organisations” (Hunt, 1992, in Cefaï, 2007: 599).
The concept of problematization constitutes in some ways the point of 
connection between these two sociological traditions. This concept refers to 
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all social activity with the objective of entailing the emergence of a problem 
and rendering it a potential subject of public policy. Foucault def ines it as
all the discursive or non-discursive practices that bring something into 
the game of true and false and constitute it as an object for thought 
(whether this be in the form of moral reflection, scientif ic analysis, or 
political analysis). … Problematization does not mean representation of 
a pre-existing object, nor creation through discourse of an object which 
does not exist. (Foucault, 1994: 670)
Therefore, the success of mobilization around a problem results from the 
capacity of certain players to enlist other players, to have them in some 
way enter the game and, thus, to create a coalition which necessarily keeps 
the problem on the “agenda” of institutions and organizations which can 
provide a response, whether this be from a particular sector of the state, 
private operators acting in the market, or institutions such as churches. 
Other players oppose these groups for various reasons, and try hard to 
prevent this being placed on the agenda since they fear that it will lead to an 
action contrary to their interests, one which might be benefiting from the 
complicity of institutional agents and political managers reluctant to deal 
with a “hot” question that would disturb their routines and could ultimately 
lead to the challenging of positions they occupy in their respective f ields 
or worlds.
In fact, the latter observation is crucial. The arenas at the heart of which 
activities of problematization develop can very well transform themselves 
over time into social subworlds, indeed even into new f ields. There are 
very many examples of these trajectories of arenas ending with the peren-
nial establishment of specialized subspheres, for example, in the sector of 
poverty management and solidarity where the churches lost their monopoly 
to various forms of public management during the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Another example would be feminist movements, some fractions of which 
(“femocrats”) became institutionalized, leading to the creation of specif ic 
subfields of public action in favor of women’s rights, contributing, in turn, 
to a modif ication of the sphere of feminist struggles. In this book, particu-
larly Chapters 5 and 6, dealing with corporations, provide examples of this 
tendency of institutionalization of interactions, transforming arenas into 
more established f ields.
Yet, above all, the concept of arena has a major methodological conse-
quence which brings us back to the heart of the SIP developed by Jasper. 
The identif ication of an arena as a site of interaction around a problem 
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can not be decided a priori and must be based on the concrete observation 
of interactions among a multiplicity of actors in a process. This requires 
starting with players and their strategies. It is only subsequently that the 
observation of their interaction can feed the knowledge of a level of social 
reality which is not that of the situation or of the interaction but that, more 
macro-sociologically, of the social world. It is to this question of the con-
nection of different levels of social reality, at the basis of the link between 
structure and agency, that we devote the following section.
Hodiecentrism?
A strategic approach runs the risk of exclusively focusing on the interaction 
itself: a kind of “hodiecentrism,” a fascination with the hic et nunc, the 
synchronic, whereas we think that a strategic perspective should take the 
historical dimension, the diachronic, into account as well. Players are more 
than “constituted” in a series of interactions – they have some stability; 
they embody a certain continuity. Hence, even though history indeed 
acquires meaning in the present, experiences and convictions predating the 
interaction play an important role when we want to understand interaction 
dynamics.
By emphasizing the “biographical” part of players, Jasper seems to agree 
that these diachronic aspects should be carefully taken into account: “One 
can only understand these decisions if we come to grips with the biography 
and psychology of that single person; such factors must f ind a place in 
social-science models” (1997: ch. 9). However, in her chapter, Polletta, in 
particular, seems to worry that in a SIP this “meaningful” past is not suf-
f iciently taken into account:
It is not only that individuals’ and groups’ goals are often multiple and 
sometimes unacknowledged. It is also that the choices that are on the 
table in a dispute are viewed through the lens of preexisting frameworks 
of meaning. An option comes to be viewed as the “black” choice or the 
“strategic” option, not because of any logical connection to what is black 
or what is instrumental, but rather because of structures of symbolic 
associations that predate this particular battle.
Polletta seems especially worried that a strategic approach becomes too 
voluntaristic (our term) when it would suggest that in every interaction 
everything is open and possible – as if players are not burdened by all forms 
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of “cultural constraints” (Polletta’s term): “Their ideas about what counts as 
strategic are shaped by cultural associations that they sometimes challenge 
but more often do not.”
We agree with her on this latter point but we would also stress the fact 
that an interactionist perspective is not necessarily anti-diachronic, blind 
to the “forces of the past,” whether acting at the level of individuals, through 
their system of disposition or their habitus, or at the level of the memory 
of past battles and accepted forms of political conflict. We shall briefly 
explain these two elements.
An interactionist perspective is compatible with a f irmly dispositional-
ist approach which endeavors to study observable practices in situ (and 
therefore players’ calculations) not only in the light of the contexts of action 
(the structure of observed interaction) but also in the light of the history 
of individuals, that is, to their socialization and their system of disposi-
tion. Consequently, the interactions observed always trigger incorporated 
dispositions, even if they also generate new dispositions. In other words, 
the players, individually or collectively, prepare to act on the basis of their 
understanding of the objects populating their world. Yet interpretations of 
their meaning are mediated by their system of dispositions, which orients 
their behavior and their decisions. This does not prevent interaction from 
also being the place and time of a formative process whereby individuals 
modify their lines of action, in light of the actions of others. From this 
perspective, players’ moves and countermoves are “neither the pure and 
simple replica of what has been internalized, nor the sudden and mysterious 
eruption, ex nihilo, of innovation” (Dobry 1986: 260).
Such a conception, which Lahire coins a “dispositionalist and contextual-
ist sociology,” keeps us at an equal distance from both certain ethnographic 
studies satisf ied with describing a situation or an action that is occurring, 
and from the authors of rational choice theory. The former tradition is 
particularly strong among French pragmatists who defend purely contex-
tualist conceptions of action (Boltanski, 1990; Cefaï, 2007; Dodier, 1993). For 
example, Boltanski is solely interested in “constraints related to the arrange-
ment of the situation in which people are placed” (Boltanski, 1990: 69). The 
skills attributed to the actors are assumed to be universally mastered by 
the individuals concerned and therefore Boltanski does not study them, 
which also means that he presupposes that mental dispositions as well as 
dispositions to act are transferable or transposable from one domain of 
social activity to another.
Rational choice scholars are certainly right that individual actions are 
the combined result of rational choice (which, nevertheless does not explain 
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what motivates such choices) and the hope of success (which does not presup-
pose the “reasonable” nature of said choices) but they are misleading when 
attempting to reconstruct how actors make calculations in situ. As Kurzman 
writes (2004), rational choice theory is primarily interested in predicting 
action, based on the identification of preexisting preferences. As a result, “we 
do not see players making decisions” (Jasper, 2004: 4; see also Jasper, 2006: 
ch. 3). In addition, the anthropological foundations of rational choice theory 
often circumscribe it within the confines of cognitivism, even when attempts 
are made to “contextualize” the explanatory models. We are, therefore, still 
very far from obtaining an adequate account of actors’ socio-cultural roots, 
whether concerning the nature and strength of preexisting ties, opportunities 
and obligations that the latter engender, or their spatial grounding in cost/
benefit matrices (Gould, 1995). Finally, many historians have demonstrated 
how the momentum of protest activities also signif icantly contributes to 
redefining social ties and forms of interpersonal attachment, thus rendering 
futile the attempt to reconstruct cost/benefit structures by means of static, 
one-dimensional models. (Redy, 1977; Bouton, 1993: ch. 5)
Patterns in Protest Players and Arenas
Dispositionalist interactionism suggests that the truth of the social world is 
not entirely confined to the order of the interaction. Here, the early studies 
by Goffman, Face Work (1955) and Behavior in Public Places (1963), prove ex-
tremely insightful in showing that interactions are framed like a ceremony. 
They follow the rules of intervention stemming from the law (Gusf ield, 
1981: ch. 2), from learned mechanisms defining conduct and organization 
(Wright, 1978; on crowds and riots, see McPhail, 1991; on demonstrations, 
see Fillieule and Tartakowsky, 2013), and from more implicit constraints, 
notably with respect to decorum and civility (on the public perception of 
protest, see Turner, 1969). From a Durkheimian perspective, we believe that 
strategic interactions are deployed in an “already existing” world and that
the individuals with whom I’m dealing are not inventing the world of the 
chess game each time they sit down to play; neither are they inventing 
the f inancial market when they buy stock, nor the pedestrian traff ic 
system when they move on the street. Whatever the singularities of their 
motivations and their interpretations, they must, in order to participate, 
f it into a standard format of activity and reasoning which makes them 
act as they act. (Goffman, 1981: 307)
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Beyond the more or less universally accepted and imposed rules of interven-
tion in a given society (reflecting laws and mores), each f ield, each social 
world and subworld is characterized by its own rules, which Becker, in Art 
Worlds, calls “conventions.” This concept designates the fact that
people who cooperate to produce a work of art usually do not decide 
things afresh. Instead, they rely on earlier agreements now become 
customary, agreements that have become part of the conventional way 
of doing things in that art. … Conventions thus make possible the easy and 
eff icient coordination of activity among artists and support personnel. 
… Though standardized, conventions are seldom rigid and unchanging. 
They do not specify an inviolate set of rules everyone must refer to in 
settling questions of what to do. Even where the directions seem quite 
specif ic, they leave much unsettled which gets resolved by reference to 
customary modes of interpretation on the one hand and by negotiation 
on the other. (Becker, 1974: 771)
As a logical consequence of the structured character of society, f ields, and 
social worlds, the modalities by which arenas are constituted and function 
also correspond to conventions, explicit or implicit, rhetorical (in the notion 
of frame) and dramaturgical (in notion of tactical repertoires), even though 
in the case of arenas these modalities will be less stable and more fluid than 
in the case of f ields and social worlds.
Action can only be grasped in concrete circumstances of a copresence, in 
fully considering the requirements stemming from mutual involvement in 
a social relation and the inherent uncertainty in the sequential unfolding 
of exchanges. Nonetheless, these circumstances – which Goffman terms 
situations – are preordained: while the course the action will take cannot 
be predicted, it always falls within a particular context which one can 
characterize as a collection of conventions, that is, signif icant elements 
of orientation which impose a certain regime of obligations on those who 
participate. The conventions which constrain the functioning of an arena 
are characterized by four traits.
First, an arena’s conventions stem from the conventions in the f ields or 
subworlds, at the margins or intersection of which the arena emerges and 
develops. If they do not entirely overlap, they are partially linked to them.
Second, an arena’s conventions stem from the conventions internalized 
by individual or collective players who are involved in a specif ic arena, 
depending on their own history, memories and culture. Therefore, if they 
do not entirely overlap, they are partially linked to them.
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Third, these conventions are not equivalent to the arithmetical sum of 
conventions characterizing the f ields, worlds, and players involved. The 
very morphology of an arena (i.e., the form at its core made by the networks 
of alliance and conflict) and its dynamic (the entrance or departure of 
players, as well as the shifting of borders in the social space) determine 
a configuration that is always specif ic to relationships between players, 
so that the conventions are both a restrictive framework for action and a 
strategic issue in the struggle for actors. They promote the conventions to 
which they are most attached or which serve them best against those put 
forward by their adversaries, or even by their allies.
Fourth, and as a consequence, the conventions structuring an arena are 
inevitably idiosyncratic and patterned. From this perspective, studying a 
protest arena requires that we attempt to disentangle references to settled 
and mutually recognized conventions from those linked to innovation and 
invention (Mariot, 2011; Fillieule and Tartakowsky, 2013).
From what we have discussed, we must draw one central conclusion. 
Beyond the irreducible heterogeneity and diversity of protest arenas, some 
common patterns could be detected, as the work of Jasper and others show 
so well. One of the most interesting aspects of Jasper’s work is how he ef-
fectively “dismantles” any f ixed or central idea about players and arenas on 
the one hand, and yet he searches for recurring patterns and typical forms 
of strategic interaction involving certain players in specif ic arenas on the 
other hand. To quote his introduction once more: “Only in the strategic 
back-and-forth of engagement can we ever achieve a fully dynamic picture 
of politics, in the plans, initiatives, reactions, countermeasures, mobiliza-
tions, rhetorical efforts, arena switches, and other moves that players make.” 
The fully dynamic picture doesn’t imply, however, that we can’t distinguish 
among types of arenas (with their specif ic conventions) and among play-
ers, with particular resources, experiences, ambitions, etc. In other words, 
Jasper proposes to go beyond the totally idiosyncratic. He doesn’t want 
to claim any universal rules governing these interactions, but he makes 
the point that we can develop “catalogs” of interactions that “typically” 
happen between specif ic “types” of players and/or within certain arenas. 
“Although the strategic complexity of politics and protest is enormous, in 
this book we hope to make a beginning through a careful examination of 
players and arenas, accompanied by theorizing on the strategic interactions 
among them.” Organized around different types of players and arenas, 
the book tries to empirically grasp the types of strategic interactions that 
can be considered “characteristic.” In many cases, these patterns could be 
summarized as strategic dilemmas, typical of certain players in specif ic 
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arenas. As Polletta puts it in her contribution: “To gain analytic purchase 
on strategic choice in the swirl of multiple players, audiences, and arenas, 
complex goals, and ambivalent emotions, Jasper (2004) introduces the 
concept of strategic dilemmas, a concept that is developed in this volume.”
Our ambition here is not to summarize all these “typical” strategic 
interaction patterns and dilemmas so characteristic of a player and/or 
an arena, but we hope that anyone who has read this book agrees that 
this is indeed a very fruitful way to move forward. In every chapter, these 
“typical” aspects came to the fore, showing the enormous diversity of types 
of interactions protestors have to deal with, depending on the other players, 
and the arenas they are in. Although we have not yet been able to offer 
a catalog of typical strategic interactions, based on various arenas and 
players, we are getting close(r) to it, since every chapter is able to refer to 
typical forms of interaction, “bound” to the rules of that arena and the type 
of players involved.
This more systematic understanding of strategic interaction runs the 
risk of resulting in a rather “structuralist” approach, in which interaction 
is predictable, expected to follow a certain pattern. In his introduction, 
Jasper seems to be aware of this risk when he criticizes such a structuralist 
approach of Kriesi et al. (1995), who claim that – in the case they discuss 
– “social democrats usually do this and that.” “Overt facilitation of action 
campaigns of new social movements by a Social Democratic government 
is unlikely, because of the risk that such campaigns might get out of hand.” 
Jasper doesn’t agree that this risk is “objectively given,” and sees it rather 
as something that government decision-makers might have to think about 
case by case, might disagree about, and might try to manage in creative 
ways.
Beneath such visions, it seems as though costs, benefits, and risks are 
already given rather than emerging and shifting constantly during 
engagements, due to all the players’ actions. In contrast, an interactive 
approach would see various players adapting to each other, anticipating 
moves, and trying actively to block opponents. Both sides are constantly 
moving targets.
We partly agree with this criticism, but wonder if our def initions of arenas 
and of conventions do not offer a middle way between the type of claims 
made by Kriesi and his collaborators, and the typical forms of strategic 
interaction – summarized in “catalogs” – proposed by Jasper himself.
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In other words, in our view, the book’s case studies in fact show the 
“typical” forms of strategic interaction between protestors and other players 
in specif ic arenas in their situated and dispositionalist forms. Moreover, as 
Jasper himself writes in the introduction:
Each of the following chapters combines illustrative materials from case 
studies with theoretical formulations and hypotheses. More theoretical 
generalizations are possible for those players that have already been 
well studied, such as the media. … In other cases, authors stick closer to 
their case materials to tease out observations about interactions. In all 
cases, our aim is to advance explanations of how protest unfolds through 
complex interactions with other players.
As the various chapters show, “theoretical generalizations” mean generaliza-
tion in line with the case study, based on more (of the same) cases. In the 
end, a SIP is an inductive, robustly empirical approach that only allows for 
generalizations – theorizing – as long as the concrete case studies permit, 
given the dynamic, complex, and situated character of strategic interaction.
Notes
1. For that reason, while we largely share Mathieu’s (2012) critique of the 
notion of a field of contention, we think his concept of a “space of social 
movements” is wrong in considering that social movements constitute a 
specific universe, clearly distinct from other social fields. (Please also see 
Ancelovici 2009 for the same observation.)
2. Our conception of arenas is, therefore, very different from that used, for 
example, by Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) for whom there exist in the social 
world, in a permanent and structured manner, different public arenas, such 
as, for example, the media arena, the political arena, the legal arena, and, 
one might add, following Neveu, the “arena of social movements,” defined 
as “an organized system of institutions, processes and actors that has the 
property of functioning as a space of appeal, in both the sense of a demand 
for a response to a problem and that of legal recourse” (Neveu, 2000: 17, 
emphasis added).
3. This point is crucial and explains why we speak of an “arena,” following 
Strauss and not a “public arena,” as does Gusfield. To avoid the lack of 
realism of the contentious politics approach which limits the definition of 
social movements to open and public actions, we defend a more inclusive 
definition which falls on a continuum of public and open actions, lobbying 
and pressure and hidden actions (Fillieule, 2009).
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